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ABSTRACT
The thesis attempts to set sources broadly representative of the 
range of British attitudes to Germany and the Germans - fran 
Spender, Lew, Maxse and Dillon, to Bowse, Namier, Vansittart, 
Gollancz and Barraclough in a framework informed by 
multidisciplinary theory. There are five main themes: the
classification of attitudes; the analysis of content; the 
identification of a relatively constant British self-image; the 
potential for attitudinal dilemmas and cognitive dissonance 
inherent in that self-image; national character as a concept 
and as a descriptor. Although dealt with in this order the 
themes interrelate. For example, the . first phase of content 
analysis [chapters 4 to 8], where the emphasis is on the way in 
which sources differ, anticipates the discussion in chapter 10 
of the differences in their approaches to the modal distribution 
of cultural and individual characteristics in Germany; the 
classificatory model proposed as an alternative to the 
Idealist-Realist dichotomy in chapter 2 [and ’tested' in a brief 
case study in chapter 3] is consistent with the definition of 
the self-image and facilitates discussion on cognitive 
dissonance.
It is proposed that a classificatory system based on an
(vii)
Idealist-Realist dichotomy with respective pro and anti-German 
sub-sets does not adequately highlight the nuances and 
ambiguities which often informed group or individual attitudes 
toward Germany. It is argued that such a system cannot readily 
deal with the views of realists who were ideologically neutral 
[i.e. not ideologically anti-German] in their definition of 
Germany as the enemy, of idealists who were ideologically 
opposed to Germany, or of others who were equivocal. An 
alternative model is offered in the form of partially congruent 
parallel continuums of competition and cooperation, travelling 
in opposite directions in relation to respective minimum and 
maximum positions.
In chapters 4 to 8 the content analysis of sources focuses on 
their different perceptions of Germany and the Germans: whether 
they made distinctions between Germans s- and what form such 
distinctions took - or regarded them as 'all of a kind.' It is 
argued that underlying expressed attitudes to Germany and the 
Germans from the British side was a notion of self, 
incorporating two main components: a pragmatic component
defining Britain as a material competitor in a competitive 
world, and an ideological component defining a package of traits 
and values associated with the cultural condition 'being 
British.' The ideological component of the self-image was 
commonly validated and served as an assessment instrument for 
making judgements on Germans. It is argued that the
(viii)
intellectual and psychological need to maintain a consistent 
relationship between expressed attitudes and declared values, 
particularly when the values were central to the self-image, led 
to the use of dissonance reducing mechanisms.
The ways in which one national culture may reasonably be said to 
differ from another, and the methodological requirements for 
tenable cross-cultural analysis, are explored through critical 
consideration of the concept 'national character.' A theoretical 
framework is devised for the critical analysis of the views 
presented by the sources on the national character of the 
Germans. This framework relates their perception of modal 
structure [unimodal, bimodal, multimodal] to their level of 
commitment - positive or negative - to propositions on cultural 
homogeneity, differential sharing, the causal autonomy of 
situational factors, the significance of international cultural 
influences, the innate nature of characteristics, and concern 
for methodological rigour. An image of the configurations and 
features in the German cultural profile is formulated. 
Recognition of the partial and provisional nature of this 
image, and discussion of what it omits and lacks in terms of 
texture, is used to demonstrate the deficiencies of the 
Schwarzweissmalerei approach to Germany and the Germans.
PART 1 
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 1 
ORIGINS AND PURPOSES
[13
The form and content of this thesis have their origins in the 
convergence, over a period of 20 years, of a number of personal 
interests and professional imperatives. First degree studies 
at the University of Glasgow stimulated a long-standing interest 
in German history, language and literature, and in 
multidisciplinary approaches - theoretical and conceptual - to 
an understanding of the past. Those interests were reinforced 
by reflection on the various images of Germany and the Germans 
to be found in the work of British historians and other writers, 
particularly since some of the images appeared to have achieved 
a longevity which was resistant to changing circumstances. The 
variety and ubiquity of British images of Germany led in turn to 
curiosity about the British self-image that might underlie them 
and to an attempt to identify that self-image, initially through 
analysis of feature films. ^  Professionally, involvement in 
curriculum development called for response to particular 
problems. The design, implementation and evaluation of teaching 
materials intended to develop or advance the critical thinking 
capacities of lew achieving school leavers depended upon the 
construction of attitude tests for experimental and control 
groups. The pre and post-teaching tests carried out in schools 
in the Strathclyde Region, 1970-72 and 1980-82, supported the 
hypothesis that 'history teaching which places an emphasis on 
procedural skills is accompanied by a greater reduction in the 
incidence of evaluative generalisations about national, racial,
[23
and religious groups than occurs in pupils not so taught,1 but
also provided interesting confirmation of the resilience of
(2)
national stereotypes. These separate experiences cone
together in the thesis.
Images of Germany and the Germans have rarely been peripheral
features of the British 'view of the world' in the twentieth
century. It is likely that more has been written about the
Germans - their behaviour, past or anticipated, and their
(3)'character' - than about any other modem national group.
There has certainly been a "proliferation of theories" designed
either to sustain or to challenge particular perceptions of the 
(4)Germans. J. H. Morgan's prefatory note [1915] to his
annotated translation of Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege, informed 
the reader that "the temperament of the German is saturated 
with... belligerent emotion and everyone who is not with him is
(5)
against him." In March 1990, the reflections of the Foreign 
Correspondent of the Daily Express on developments which had 
culminated in the opening of the border between East and West 
Berlin were published under the title: 'I just wish I could
trust the United Germans.' Although convinced that there was "a 
policeman in every one of them", the correspondent wondered if 
she should saddle the Germans of 1990 with the crimes of their 
forefathers; was it really fair to assume that "every one of 
them has jackboots under the bed, and brown shirts at the back
[3]
of the wardrobe?" She concluded:
"Germans, I love your country. I love your art, 
literature and theatre. I have many very good, close
German friends. Why do you make me not trust you?" ^
With modifications to take account of advances in psychological
theory, J. A. Cramb's view, published posthumously in 1914, that
"the enmity of England and Germany is like one of those springs
that rise fran the nether deep; the more you try to fill them
up the wider they become", reappeared in 1990 as commentators
sought to account for the perceptions of Germany and the Germans
held by Nicholas Ridley, and the tenor of the minuted discussion 
(7)at Chequers.
There was a time when Shelley’s attitude to the Germans - "die
widerwartigen Deutschen" - was idiosyncratic rather than widely
held. Britain and Germany had never been at war with each
other; the respective peoples had strong dynastic, cultural,
religious, and economic connections. But then to German
military power there was added dramatic industrial development,
(8)imperial claims, naval anbitions, and a sense of mission. "A 
new cock in the bam-yard", wrote Price Collier [1913], "is 
never received with great cordiality." He summed up the
[4-1
material and psychological impact on Britain of her relative 
decline:
"When a nation for more than a hundred years has been 
quite comfortably safe from any fear of attack because she 
has been easily first in caimerce, wealth, industry, and 
in sea power, it comes as a shock, even to a phlegmatic 
people, to learn that they are being rapidly overtaken 
commercially, financially, industrially, and as a fighting
(9)
force on the sea; and all this within a few years."
One of the many legacies of the First World War was a canon of 
stereotypes about Germany and the Germans. The short interlude 
between that experience and the rise of Nazi Germany was far too 
short for remediation - although an attempt was made - and the 
nature of the Nazi regime and what it led to, the mark it made 
on the world, reified the stereotypes and in a sense 
"bocbytrapped" the future. Figures 1, 2 and 3 suggest that
reification is facilitated by a process of restocking, 
generation to generation. And the stereotypes, sometimes nicely 
implicit, perhaps even non-conscious, can find their way into 
learned reviews. Michael Howard1 s impression of Paul Kennedy's 
analysis of The Rise of The Anglo-German Antagonism was that
"If his erudition is Teutonic, his writing is in the best
[5]
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FIGURE 
[ 
2] 
THE 
SENTENCE 
COMPLETION 
RESPONSES 
OF 
A 
RANDOM 
SAMPLE 
OF 
'THINKING 
THROUGH 
HISTORY1 
PUPILS.
[7]
FIGURE [ 3 ] THE INCIDENCE OF UNFAVOURAEIE/FAVOURABLE STEREOTYPES IN TOE REPERTORY 
GRID RETURNS OF A RANDOM SAMPLE OF 'THINKING THROUGH HISTORY1 PUPILS.
STEREOTYPE
NUMBER OF
TIMES
SELECTED
NUMBER OF 
NIL
RESPONSES
NUMBER OF 
COUNTER
GENERALISATIONS
NUMBER OF
RESERVED
JUDGEMENTS
TOTAL
VERY CLEAN/ 
CLEAN 7 1 2 10
VERY
HARDWORKING/
HARDWORKING
B 1 1 10
VERY BAD
TEMPERED/
BADTEMPERED
5 1 1 3 10
VERY BOASTFUL/ 
BOASTFUL A 1 2 3 10
VERY RUDE/ 
RUDE 4 1 A 1 10
VERY CRUEL/ 
CRUEL 6 1 3 10
VERY WARLIKE/ 
WARLIKE 6 2 2 10
VERY MEAN/ 
MEAN 6 2 2 10
VERY BRAVE/ 
BRAVE 9 1 10
VERY UNFRIENDLY 
UNFRIENDLY A 3 3 10
VERY SERIOUS/ 
SERIOUS 7 1 2 10
VERY DISHONEST/ 
DISHONEST A 1 2 3 10
[8]
style of British historiography; lively, informative, and 
witty, as vrell as authoritative. It is a deeply humane 
book in the very best sense of the word."
Occasionally, they are put to use in support of a particular 
socio-political point of view. In September 1988 the Annual 
Conference of the British Association for the Advancement of 
Science was warned that
"The seeds of the Nazi Holocaust may have been sown 100 
years ago by German parents who brought their children up 
too strictly", and "a return to Victorian values could 
result in a nation of Nazis."
Hitler had been able to
"Coimand the allegiance of millions who had been raised on
child-care manuals based on mental cruelty... They were
trained to be obedient so successfully, and at such an
early age, that the training never lost its
(12)
effectiveness."
In the innediate aftermath of the 'Ridley Affair* newspapers 
were eager to publish public perceptions of German 
characteristics. Mori revealed that of 606 adults participating
[9]
in telephone interviews on Friday 13 July, 1990, the Germans 
were considered aggressive by 60%, arrogant by 75% and tolerant 
by 37%. It appeared that
"... too many rainy afternoons watching old war films, or 
perhaps more recent battles for the beaches in 
Mediterranean holiday resorts, still condition British
(13)
attitudes to the German character."
Consideration of British attitudes to Germany and the Germans 
may not be as unproductive an enterprise as the mere passage of 
time would suggest.
Using sources broadly representative of the range of British 
attitudes towards Germany and the Germans, the thesis attempts to 
address five main and interrelating themes: the appropriateness
of an idealist-realist dichotomy as a means for classifying 
attitudes, a comparative analysis of the content of the sources, 
the extent to which a British self-image not only lay behind 
attitudes to Germany but also had a profound influence on those 
attitudes, the significance for individual sources of the strain 
towards consistency between expressed attitudes derived from 
declared values and the values themselves, and the issue of 
national character both as a concept and in its applications as 
a descriptor. Themes 1 to 3 are covered in volume one and
[10]
themes 4 and 5 in volume two.
The popular idealist-realist dichotomy, with its general 
tendency to define respective pro and anti-German sub-sets, is 
accepted as a means for bringing extensive and complex data into 
order and allowing for the comparison of one category with the 
other. Such a dichotomy adequately classifies the attitudes of 
a number of sources, particularly at the extremes where 
ambiguity is less of a problem, and is certainly useful in the 
identification of stereotypical positions such as 'peace-cranks' 
or 'warmongers' assigned by one side to the other. It is 
argued, however, that the idealist-realist dichotomy provides an 
unreliable guide to the identification of pro and anti-German 
attitudes, that it does not easily embrace the nuances and 
multifaceted perceptions involved in many attitudes, and that it 
does not provide a reliable model for the accurate placement of 
attitudes on a continuum. Further, in its general tendency to 
identify respective pro and anti-German sub-sets carrying 
connotations of favour and blame, it takes little account of the 
paradox that ideologically neutral positions could define 
Germany as the enemy. The proposition is advanced that 
relationships between states tend to occur within the ambigucxis 
context of competition and cooperation, and an alternative model 
is constructed on that basis. It is suggested that a 
ccnpetition-cooperation model can embrace all attitudinal
[11]
positions towards Germany - mixed and ambiguous as well as 
unequivocal - that it allows for greater flexibility in the 
definition of pro and anti-German sub-sets, and leads to 
consideration of a whole cluster of associated concepts and 
constructs such as aggression, frustration, international 
culture, reciprocity, partnership, and equity.
Through comparative analysis of the content of sources, answers 
are sought to questions such as: how do they differ? - to what
extent are distinctions made between Germans as opposed to the 
application of blanket judgements? - what type of distinctions 
are made? - to what extent is a British self-image involved, 
explicitly or implicitly and, if involved, to what extent is it 
used as an instrument for assessing Germany and the Germans? It 
is argued that the British self-image was dualistic, 
incorporating on the one hand the perception of Britain as a 
material entity with pragmatic interests which had to be 
defended against rivals, and on the other hand an ideological 
construct subsuming a set of intermeshing traits and values. To 
what extent does examination of the sources suggest that there 
was common validation of the ideological component of the 
self-image? Did common validation produce common attitudes? 
What happens when the self-image is projected outwards? What 
attitudinal differences are likely to arise when the image 
'fits* or does not ’fit1 the object towards which it is
[12]
projected?
The assumption that there is a strain towards consistency 
between expressed attitudes derived from declared values and the 
values themselves is discussed critically. Sources which used 
the British self-image as an instrument for assessing Germany 
and the Germans are examined to determine the extent to which 
the self-image sympathetically informed those judgements. It is 
argued that the use of mechanisms to maximise the internal
consistency of the cognitive system and so reduce psychological
. (14)discomfort can be detected in a number of sources.
A tentative approach is made to the concept of national
character. The views of Mazlish [1968] and Steams [1970] are
countered on the grounds that national character profiles can be
built up, subject to stringent theoretical and methodological 
(15)principles. An analytical framework is constructed for the
comparative analysis of the versions of German national character 
contained in the sources. Consideration is given to the 
incidence with which the sources assign traits and 
characteristics such as authoritarianism and sado-masochistic 
personality structures to the Germans. The validity of such 
ascriptions is tested by reflection on the historical record and 
by critical analysis of more formal expressions of theory, 
particularly those of Erich Frcmm and Milton Rokeach. A draft
[13]
German cultural profile is formulated, with the caveat that it 
is partial and provisional. It is suggested that the 
deficiencies of views on German national character may be 
calculated by the extent to which they either regard the 
formulation as adequately descriptive of actual cultural and 
personality configurations, or go beyond it to consideration of 
a number of important issues such as multidimensional approaches 
to legitimacy, the possibility that conformity may conceal a 
wide variety of attitudes and motives, the relative weight to be 
assigned in different situations and at different times to 
instrumental and consummatory values, and what might be 
described as the generalised, non-culture specific and 
non-heroic nature of the human condition in modem society.
In the chapters that follow theories and concepts fran a number 
of disciplines are enlisted both as analytical tools and as aids 
to an understanding of the past. When historians seek 
explanations they are concerned with two main variables, the 
characteristics of the historical agents and the situations to 
which they are responding. There is something of an imbalance 
in work which does not give serious consideration to both. To 
do this, however, requires 'trespass* into the territory of 
other disciplines, predicated upon the assumption that human 
affairs are so complex that the historian, qua historian, is not 
the only one capable of saying seme thing meaningful about
[14]
Consideration of sources broadly representative of the range of
British attitudes to Germany and the Germans required the
application of sociological concepts and theoretical constructs.
It was not possible to ignore the fact that particular
perceptions of German culture - in the shape of patterned
conditions of life and generalised modes of conduct - figure
prominently in these sources. It would have been impossible to
construct a meaningful framework for the critical analysis of
attitudes to authority or of views on national character without
(17) .calling on theory . Posing the question - to what extent and
in what forms did the sources infer dynamic personality 
structures from behavioural regularities? - requires that 
attention be given to the theoretical constructs from the fields 
of individual and social psychology and psychoanalysis. In view 
of what might be regarded as a traditional wariness on the part 
of historians toward such approaches, it is important that the 
reader have a clear indication of the explanatory status 
accorded here to such theories.
Historians have been rightly concerned about "... wild and vague
pattern-makers, often entirely lacking the historical attitude
and only too rarely showing intellectual humility"? about the
tendency in many 1 social science* texts to ccranunicate through
the medium of "a barbarous jargon and a self-made vocabulary
(18)more liable to obscure thought than to express it." The
[15]
analogy of the inverted triangle may be used to describe the 
historian's reservations in face of psychological and 
psychoanalytic theories: extensive speculation about the
motivations and personality structures of large numbers of 
people taken collectively rests on a very narrow evidential base 
derived from the study of a limited number of individuals. 
Speculation about the behaviour of historical agents at its 
non-conscious and non-rational levels is seen as less than 
satisfactory vdien the subjects "can neither affirm, deny, aid,
(19)
nor obscure [the] analysis by responding to it..." It was
the fact that psychoanalytic theories were not subject to
refutability, that they could always be made to fit the
phenomena they were attempting to explain, always seemed to be
confirmed, always produced an "incessant stream of
verifications" that worried Popper [1957]. It is to be
expected that historians will baulk at the simplistic notion
that large numbers of Germans could be identified as having
sado-masochistic personality structures because (i) they were
enthusiastic about a leader who had such a personality structure
and (ii) leaders appeal to the led because there is a necessary
identity between the personalities of those who follow and those
who lead. No less unexpected is the historian's rejection of
the idea that there is no qualitative difference between the
(21)normal and the abnormal personality. Perhaps the most
untenable assumption, from the historian's point of view, is
[16]
that which regards the context in which historical agents find
themselves, and all the environmental variables associated with
that context, as "subsidiary to the residual factors of
childhood experience", factors which are uncovered, in
(22)Allport's words, "by the art of deep-sea diving."' Reich 
[1961] made a standard statement on these lines:
"The typical authoritarian German family, particularly in
the country and small town, bred Fascist mentality by the
million. This family created in the children a structure
characterised by compulsive duty, renunciation and
absolute obedience to authority vhich Hitler knew so
(23)splendidly hew to exploit."
Apart from its neglect of the variability in personality 
development among the members of one family ['the same fire that 
melts the butter hardens the egg'] to say nothing of variability 
between families, hew does such a statement unqualified and 
unrevised, help to explain attitudes to authority in the Weimar 
Republic?
Notwithstanding the reasonableness of such objections, there 
are weaknesses in the case which would argue for the exclusion 
of multidisciplinary theory from historical studies. It is not 
at all certain that the historian's interpretations meet the
[17]
requirement of refutability any better in real terms than other
propositions about human experience. Criticism, however savage,
directed by one historian at another is not quite like
refutation in, say, chemistry, ttiere is more of the ’alleged*
about refutation in history. As an argument without end and a
process of creation, doubt and uncertainty are in the nature of
history. Historians infer cognitive and emotional states from
the behaviour, and outcomes of the behaviour of historical
agents. These inferences, essentially acts of imagination
however controlled, are not really open to refutation because
the activity which produced them [involving the conjunction of
data and personal mental processes] is individual and unique and
as such not freely reproducible by others. And the historian's
subjects are, by and large, no more able to affirm, deny, aid,
or obscure his inferences than they are those of the
psychoanalyst. There is also the matter of double standards.
The brief statement made above in criticism of Reich has its
roots in theory from disciplines other than history. If, as
Langer argued, historians "have habitually thought of themselves
(24)as psychologists in their own right", it seems odd that the 
theory which gives substantive meaning to such an activity 
should ever be disdained. Even a 'camon-sense' grasp of 
psychological principles depends on the fact that a body of 
theory exists. If history may be regarded as 'the study of 
culture at a distance', it is difficult to ignore the cognate
[18]
hypotheses and explanatory constructs of sociology.
A matter relating to presentation should be explained. Since 
content analysis - albeit at varying levels of refinement - was 
involved and since interdisciplinary terrain was being 
traversed, it was decided in the interests of verification that, 
consistent with the coherent development of argument, sources 
should be alleged to speak for themselves.
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PART 2
THE CLASSIFICATION OF ATTITUDES TOWARD GERMANY
CHAPTER 2
A CRITICISM OF THE IDEALIST - REALIST DICHOTOMY 
AND THE DEFINITION OF AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL.
[28]
Paul M. Kennedy (1975) has suggested a conceptual framework, in
the form of an Idealist-Realist dichotomy, within which
attitudes tcward Germany can be analysed and classified. ^  In
summary, the argument which he develops is that idealists had a
view of Anglo-German relations which was coloured by their
oaimitment to the principle of "the brotherhood of man".
Tensions and disputes could be removed by the salves of
arbitration and conciliation. The world was big enough to
acccnmodate the interests of both states. Realists on the other
hand dealt in "...cold hard facts...". And those facts
proclaimed that Britain and Germany were locked in a Machtkampf.
National self-interest had to take precedence over utopian
visions of international morality and goodwill. Idealists
derived their views from a perception of the world as it should
be. The arguments of realists were derived from a perception of
the world as it was. Idealists were of an optimistic and
realists of a pessimistic frame of mind. The former, unlike the
latter, were prepared to make a distinction between nation and
government when dealing with the problem of Germany. Those
(3)".. .general ideological standpoints..." , argues Kennedy, were
at the roots of Germanophile and Germanophobe attitudes, so that
"...during the greater part of the period under discussion,
pro-Germans and anti-Germans corresponded to a very large degree
(4)with idealists and realists respectively."'
[29]
Kennedy's model gives form to extensive and complex data. For 
exairple, it helps to clarify the distinction between two
ideological positions which appeared in the same volume of
. . . (5)Fortnightly Review in 1918. 7 In an article, "The Greater
Ocnnunity" , Mona Caird made a plea for the cultivation of 
"...understanding and goodwill between people of different
(7)
nationality." The Allies should not be motivated by a desire
to exact vengeance, for "...it would surely be preposterous if
[they] v^re to treat the whole German people, without
possibility of proof, as uncoerced accomplices in the savageries
(8)of their rulers..." Her faith in the brotherhood of man was
undiminished by four years of war. "The feeling of human
comradeship comes out if it has the ghost of a chance. Our
(9)business is to give it a very robust and able-bodied chance." 
Frederic Harrison took a quite different view. In response
to those who envisaged Germany taking its place as a 
good-intentioned member of the international carmunity, 
persuaded to the practise of moral behaviour of an 
other-regarding kind, he claimed "...as well preach 
vegetarianism to a maneating tiger in order to convince him to 
leave off his disgusting ways." There was only one solution 
to the problem of Germany. That nation must be crushed, must be 
made to experience utter exhaustion. "Nothing but this", wrote 
Harrison, "will take the wild beast out of them. As to 
convincing them by talk and generous advice - you might as well
[30]
sing psalms to the leopard to induce him to change his spots, 
you might as well invite Satan to study the Sermon on the 
Mount. "(12)
A commitment to international co-operation is implicit in the 
title of Mona Caird's article. A conciliatory rather than a 
punitive policy towards Germans is recarmended. An optimistic 
belief in the concept of !a better nature1 is supported by a 
dedication to reveal it. The attitudes of the German people are 
not to be confused with those of their rulers. Harrison's 
implicit appeal to 'cold hard facts' is suggested by the 
analogies which he uses. Those analogies point to the futility 
of conciliation. It would be conciliation without reciprocity. 
His appraisal of the character of the German nation (note the 
indiscriminatory use of 'them' and the pejorative imagery of the 
analogies) is pessimistic. Harrison can be classed as a 
Germanophobe and Caird, in the relative sense, and also in terms 
of the internal logic of her internationalism, can be classed as 
a Germanophile. Fran this it would appear that there is a good 
match between the Idealist-Realist dichotomy suggested by 
Kennedy and the contrasting perceptions of Caird and Harrison. 
And it is true that the match can be made in other instances.
However, on a number of substantive issues, Kennedy's model is 
open to challenge. The concepts idealist and realist describe
[31]
group or individual perceptions of situations, as for example 
the trend of international and associated domestic events. The 
concepts pro and anti describe group or individual attitudes 
towards objects within the situations, as for example British 
attitudes toward Germany in the context of international and 
associated domestic events. There is no necessary connection, 
as Kennedy's model is near to suggesting, between the concepts 
which describe perceptions of situations and the concepts which 
describe attitudes towards objects within the situations. That 
is to say, there is no necessary connection between an idealist 
perception and a pro-German attitude, a realist perception and 
an anti-German attitude. Although idealist and realist 
perceptions do on occasion coincide with pro and anti-German 
attitudes respectively, this should not be allowed to obscure 
the fact that the coincidence is far from being a consistent 
one. Of particular relevance are those cases where marked 
degrees of idealism and realism do not coincide with pro and 
anti-German attitudes. Various group or individual perceptions 
of a situation could be similar and yet produce quite different 
attitudes towards the same object within the situation. The 
failure to make such distinctions could be regarded as a flaw in 
Kennedy's argument.
It is certainly debatable, for instance, that "...pro-Germans 
and anti-Germans correspond to a very large degree with 
idealists/
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(13)and realists respectively." It is possible to demonstrate
that a number of important advocates of realism, in terms of the 
criteria set out by Kennedy were, by virtue of their realism, 
ideologically neutral in their attitudes toward Germany. Uiis 
is not to infer that they perceived Germany as anything other 
than a dedicated and dangerous rival. It is to suggest that 
they interpreted Anglo-German rivalry as the outcome of 
historical forces which had closed down the options open to both 
sides. In such a situation blame was redundant. Neutrality in 
this sense was in direct proportion to the extent to which 
necessity was seen as the characteristic feature and motivation 
in Anglo-German relations.
In the years leading up to 1914 L.J. Maxse1 s editorials for the
National Review presented a consistent and coherent case for
realism. The National Review could be savage and extravagant in
its criticism. However, this was aimed not at Germany herself
but at all who did not share the journal's ccnrnitment "...to
(14)waken Englishmen out of their dangerous torpor..." in 
respect of the threat posed by Germany. The targets of the 
criticism included those who had an optimistic view of the 
future of Anglo-German relations, those who pressed for the 
resolution, through negotiation and conciliation, of issues 
dividing the two states, and those who appeared to be so 
preoccupied with domestic matters that they did not give
[33]
adequate thought to the significance of the international 
crisis.
In the opinion of the Review, "...the refusal of British
statesmen to recognise the character and purpose of the German
Government arises fran. ..ignorant and invincible
(15)optimism... Such optimism had to be canbatted with vigour
since it served to cultivate, dangerously and erroneously,
"...the fiction of a friendly Germany.. Realistic policy
making was inhibited by leaders ".. .who remain under the spell
of old and respectable traditions, and cherish the warmest
admiration, not merely for the genius who occupies the German
throne, but also for the many sterling good qualities of our 
. (17)Teutonic kindred..." Such leaders were condemned as
(18)"...illusion mongers..." , and "...political
(19)deadheads..." A sensible reappraisal of their attitudes
might reveal to them that they were "inspired by.. .thoughtless 
optimism.. .fatuous sentimentalism... [and] sublime ignorance of 
the world."
The National Review took an implacable stand against "... fatuous
observations.. .as to the uselessness of armaments in this
(21)enlightened age of arbitration..." ; and advocates of 
Anglo-German co-operation who were "...profuse in their 
professions of attachment to the higher interests of
[34]
(22) (23)civilisation..." were derided as "...peace cranks..."
Extravagant criticism of this kind was levelled, irrespective of
party, at ministers who did not share the Journal's prescience
of impending peril or recognise the need to accept its
perception of the national interest: "As a general rule it is
impossible to get the Foreign Office to take an interest in any
purely British enterprise, but call the enterprise
'Anglo-German* and Downing Street is at once prepared to play 
(24)the bagman." Lord Lansdcwne was characterised as one who
"...can conceive of no higher role for the British Empire than
. (25)perpetually to revolve as a satellite round Germany," and of
his Cabinet colleagues the journal claimed that "...it would be
quite in accord with their fatuous record in the past that they
should consider it advisable to 'do something to oblige
(26)Germany*..." The charges of unwarranted optimism and
neglect of national self-interest were not restricted to the 
Conservatives. In March 1907 it was noted with disparagement 
that "...Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman and his colleagues are 
rending the air with their pitiful whines for disarmament...", 
and in August of the same year the Liberal Ministry was 
described, dismissively, as "...largely composed of ignorant 
sentimentalists..." By September 1908 the accusations of 
culpability had been ground to an even sharper edge in Maxse's 
editorials: "The German Government have been encouraged by the 
criminal utterances of the two chief adventurers in the Cabinet,
[35]
Mr Winston Churchill and Mr Lloyd-George, to anticipate a 
further weakening of British national defences by the reduction 
of cur Regular A m y  and the curtailment of our shipbuilding 
programme." Through an article entitled 'Traitors in High 
Places' the readers of the National Review were left in no doubt 
of the urgency of the situation: "•••the country has not a 
moment to lose...it must get rid of the Cabinet which has played 
into Germany's hands at every turn...Another five years of 
Liberal administration would infallibly seal the ruin of the
(27)
Empire." The "spell of old and respectable traditions"
which allegedly had captivated the Conservative Ministry in 1902
appeared to have lost none of its potency so far as the Liberal
administration of 1910 was concerned: "...we have speeches fran
Ministers... in the 1 Parliament-of-man-Federation-of-the-world'
style, demonstrating that the universe is governed by gush
alone, and that if we gush sufficiently all will be
well...According to these simpletons, we are adored by all
(28)nations, especially Germany..."
Yet another pattern of behaviour condemned respective parties of
government in the eyes of the National Review. This was their
apparent preoccupation with domestic issues to the neglect of
international perils. In 1902, for example, the journal
ocnplained about "...microscopic discussions of an Education 
(29)Bill..." The editorial of December 1903 declared that
136]
"Englishmen must not allow their absorption in the Fiscal 
Question to divert them entirely from international affairs..." 
Advice of this kind did not appear to have any lasting effect, 
for in Novenber 1908 there is the admonition that "...our 
Parliamentary podsnaps are, as usual, iitmersed in trifles. They 
divide their time between the village pump and the village pub, 
with an occasional diversion on the right of small beys to smoke 
cigarettes.. .Our popular press devotes its columns to the 
puerile proceedings of the Suffragettes, at what may well prove 
a turning point in our history." The National Review did not 
deny that domestic issues deserved attention, but it was very 
clear in its definition of priorities: "The Constitution must be 
saved, but the country must not be lost."
The foregoing summary of the views expressed from the pages of 
the National Review in the years leading up to 1914 suggests 
that they are located firmly on the realist side of Paul M 
Kennedy’s dichotomy. The attitude toward the future of 
Anglo-German relations was profoundly pessimistic; attempts to 
resolve difficulties through co-operation and conciliation were 
regarded not only as futile but as treasonable; an unambiguous 
order of priorities was defined, with the national interest on a 
world scale coming before the parochialism of domestic 
considerations. Despite this it does not seem appropriate to 
sustain Kennedy's thesis to the point where the National Review
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could be labelled as 'anti-German1.
Maxse's Journal certainly had 'Germany on the Brain', but this 
preoccupation had much less to do with Germanophobia in the 
accepted pejorative sense than with a conviction that inexorable 
historical forces were at work, bringing Germany and Britain 
into a conflict determined by their respective national 
destinies. In every real sense the two states were powerless in 
face of those forces; the option of abject surrender and 
submission had a purely theoretical existence, since to take it 
up would have meant the denial of all spiritual and material 
heritage and aspiration. Anglo-German relations were enmeshed 
in a clash of two supremacies, one in being and one in the 
process of becoming. Both nations were imprisoned by the logic 
of crucial hypothetical imperatives: if Germany aspired to
supremacy she had to challenge? if Britain wished to retain 
supremacy she had to resist.
When the Review referred to 'The German Danger' it was with an
awareness of what was regarded as the immutable internal
dialectic of events rather than with Germanophobia: "...a great
people carries its destiny within itself, and that inward
strength will soon realise its proportionate external expression
(31)in despite of any political obstacle..." This element of
determinism was a recurrent theme: "Great Britain
[38]
is.. .confronted with the development of a new sea-power, founded
on the same economic basis as herself, and impelled by a desire
(32) .to be supreme."' Germany had industrialised, had seen her
population expand, and in consequence had become dependent on
inports of food and raw materials. An increasing reliance on
sea-borne trade had defined security imperatives which could be
met in full only if she emancipated herself from British
dominion over the seas. Britain, on the other hand, could not
surrender her dominion "...and at the same time preserve more
(33)than a shadow of independence." The issues separating
(34)Britain and Germany were not negotiable. Conflict was
inevitable. It was inconceivable that Germany could make a 
downward revision of her aspirations or that Britain could 
relinquish her dominant position. The latter event would be 
possible only if "...the old spirit of the English nation passes 
away."(35)
The National Review was biting in its criticism of opinion which 
was contrary to its own, but it reserved its ideological 
antipathy for those who either supposed that the dialectical 
processes leading Britain and Germany to conflict could be 
negated or redirected by mutual acccnmodations, or did not 
recognise the existence of the processes. It was not, and by 
the nature of its argument could not be anti-German.
[39]
( 3 6 )
Usher (1914) provides a similar example of the limitations
of the Idealist-Realist dichotomy as a formula for classifying
attitudes toward Germany. Hie manner in which he defined the
German threat and referred to those who did not recognise it
places him on the realist side of the dichotomy. "Hie Germans
aim at nothing less than the domination of Europe and of the
world by the Germanic race," he wrote, adding that "...one of
the fundamental errors, of which idealists and advocates of
peace have been often guilty, is to treat this vast project as 
(37)an unreality." But this appraisal of the international
situation did not form the basis for an anti-German attitude.
Usher regarded himself as a "...candid student...not anxious to
support a propaganda..." or to "...cavil and blame...," and as
such asked his readers to ".. .recognise in Pan-Germanism the
expression of a national determination to preserve and
(38)strengthen the corporate life of a great people." Behind
German intentions lay the demands of necessity, demands which
would bear on any corporate entity which was not of a suicidal
bent. Having attained a national consciousness and a national
individuality (this latter concept is left undefined) the next
and necessary step was "...to insure the continued existence of
(39)this corporate individual for all time." In this context
"...Pan-Germanism [was] merely self-preservation." There 
was nothing particularly remarkable in all this. It was "...the 
working of natural forces...", and to a greater or lesser degree
[40]
all states were driven by the motives which influenced 
(41)Germany.' '
There was something fundamental and normal about German 
(42)aims. It was true that those aims threatened the status
quo, but there was nothing sacrosanct about existing conditions;
they were not "...the end and object of the process of 
(43)evolution." Given the ambitions of rival powers, the status
quo was, in the nature of things, a temporary alignment, subject
to the changes which could be brought about by the demands of
national self-interest as perceived by individual states. The
national existence and ambitions of the members of the Triple
Entente would be best furthered by the maintenance of the status
quo because such an outcome would allow Britain, France and
Russia to keep what they already held. But such an outcome
would not satisfy Germany. All this had little to do with
(44)"...ethical precepts..." It was as selfish for the Triple
Entente to insist upon peace as it was for the Germans to demand 
var. <45)
The ideological neutrality of Usher's realistic appraisal is 
sunmarised in the form of an analogue:
"One might almost compare the two coalitions with a trained 
swordsman and a countryman who have somehow gotten into a 
quarrel. The swordsman wishes to settle the point of
[41]
honour by a duel with rapiers under limitations which 
require the combatants to employ only one arm and to use 
only the point, to attack only after due warning, and not 
to press the adversary to the utmost. These conditions 
condemn the countryman to defeat. He wishes to fight with 
his fists, to hit wherever he can and as often as possible, 
to give no quarter, and to continue the fight until one or 
the other is exhausted. The swordsman, gazing upon the 
brawny figure of his opponent, is afraid that, in a 
struggle of that nature, he might not be successful, and 
hesitates to stake his all upon a rough and tumble battle. 
He insists upon fighting like a gentleman, and talks about 
honour, and ethics, and the obligations of civilisation. 
The countryman sees plainly enough that all this is 
intended to rob him of an advantage, and he, therefore, 
declines to be bound by a variety of ethics or a code of 
morals which necessarily condemn him to defeat."
(47)J.A. Cranb (1914) must be regarded as a realist. He 
identified Germany as the enemy. He insisted that dedication 
and strength of will and action would be required to ensure 
Britain's survival in the caning conflict, which he saw as 
inevitable. He was distressed by "...the apathy...the stolid 
indifference of the nation...", when confronted by "...the 
single, devoted purposefulness throbbing everywhere throughout
[42]
Germany." He was dismissive of any notion that co-operation
or conciliation would be effective in the context of
Anglo-German relations. Indeed, it was his belief that "At the
present stage of world history it is, of course, useless to seek
a practical policy in arbitration. It would be a waste of words
even to demonstrate the invalidity of this device. in
Crairb's view, Pacifism "...this effusive sentiment for
peace..." would weaken resolve and make Britain and her
empire easy prey for the enemy. "What", he wrote, "is likely to
be the comparative effect on England and Germany of Pacificism
with its denial of the part played by danger and suffering in
all heroic life? Upon a young and virile nation, a rising
military state, daily growing in power, Pacifism can never exert
much influence for evil; there is no possibility of such a
nation being seriously turned from heroism. But to an old
nation in which the forces of decay seem... already to be
manifesting themselves, might not such a theory, if too ardently
adopted, be fraught with very terrible danger, with very real
(51)and disastrous consequences."
In spite of all this, Cramb's attitude was not anti-German. He 
perceived a kind of necessity underlying relationships between 
Britain and Germany, in the shape of organic laws.
Supplementing those laws was a mysterious, spiritual force,
. (52)defying reason, influencing the destinies of the two states.
In such a situation it would have been out of place to apportion
blame, except in the case of those who could not see the writing
on the wall.
[43]
"In the history of nations", wrote Cranib, "there is a Fate, an
inexorable nexus of things.. .making the sequence of events...new
seem inevitable as sane dark and purposeful drama, now
controlled by laws more akin to Nature...than to the motives of 
(53)human action." The general theory that there were ".. .deep
underlying forces in the inward fate and destiny of 
(54)nations..."' found specific manifestation in Anglo-German
relations, where "...a law, obvious, universal and inevitable in
its application, discloses itself. It concerns the struggle for 
(55)power." Not all events in history, not all relationships 
between states were determined by "an inexorable nexus of 
things" . The organic laws tended to cane into play when rivalry 
between states expressed itself in the shape of mutually 
exclusive destinies. For example, "...in Germany's antagonism 
to Russia there is nothing fateful, nothing organic. It is a 
wound that.. .can be cauterised at any moment, because there is 
not and never has been any innate cause for war between Germany 
and Russia.. .but the enmity of England and Germany is like one 
of those springs that rise up frcm the nether deep; the more you 
try to fill them up the wider they become.
It was no ordinary conflict which lay ahead for Britain and
Germany, no ordinary struggle for power. This much was revealed
\
in that part of Cranib's argument which dealt with pacifism.
[44]
He conceded that the ideal was not without its attractions,
confessed his admiration for the vision of "...nation side by
side with nation, race beside race.. .sedulous in a many coloured
(57)harmonious activity" , and noted that war had been damned as
(58)an evil in itself, as inimical to international prosperity ,
(59)and opposed to social well-being* ' Hew then could one
explain that "...despite the hubbub of talk down the centuries
war has continued. .."?^^ Perhaps it was because there was in
war ".. .something which has escaped the examination of
P a c i f i s m . T h i s  something was the proposition that "...in
human life as a whole there are always elements and forces,
there are always motives and ideals, which defy the analysis of 
(62)reason..." The mysterious force, defying reason, which
governed the destinies of Britain and Germany was "...the idea 
(63)of Bnpire". "Here", wrote Crarrib, " we have this
transcendental force governing the wars of England. And if we 
turn from England to Germany we find the same element which 
transcends reason governing the wars of Germany."
Cranib argued that with the twentieth century Britain had reached
a new stage in her career as an imperial power. The task of
acquisition had been fulfilled. An even greater destiny
beckoned, that of facilitating "...the evolution, not of an
exterior uniformity, but of an inner harmony.. Attention
(66)
had to be directed to the matter of internal organisation,
[45]
to the difficult issue of an Imperial Parliament, to the
establishment of democracy in India and Africa. However, the
fulfilment of this destiny was in jeopardy, for "...there still
beyond the North Sea [was] a stem Watcher, unsleeping,
unresting, bound to her own fate, pursuing her own distant goal
(67)undeviatingly, unfalteringly..."' 1 Again we find the notion
of one supremacy in being and another in the process of
becoming. The world was witnessing "...the confrontation of two
states, each endowed with the genius for empire; the one, the
elder, already sated with the experience and glories of Qnpire;
the other, the younger, apparently exhaustless in resources and
(68)energy, baulked in mid-career.. .and new indignant."
Believing, as he did, that the respective futures of Britain and 
Germany were entwined in the pursuit of mutually exclusive 
destinies, defined by organic laws supplemented by 
transcendental forces which were not susceptible to "...the 
ordinary process of reason.. . " ,  it is not surprising that 
Cranib took a sympathetic view of German aspirations. His 
attitude was not Germanophobic. Putting himself in the shoes of 
the enemy he was, for example, able to appreciate Bemhardi's 
claim that for Germany there were two alternatives and no third 
- "Weltmacht Oder Niedergang". This nation, with its own
genius for enpire, its own destiny to fulfil, conscious of its 
strength and energy, and yet "cooped up between the North Sea
[46]
(71)and the Danube, the Rhine and the Plains of Poland..."' could
not "...acquiesce in England’s possession of one-fifth of the 
(72)globe..."' It was all very wall for Britain to protest that
she had no aggressive designs against Germany; the truth of the
situation, in German eyes, was that Britain’s mere existence as
(73)an Empire was a continuous aggression.'
It was naive to think that Germany's image of Britain matched
Britain's self-perception. Britain might see itself as eager to
enjoy peace in order to fulfil a grand and enlightened
empire-wide destiny, but Germany saw Britain as "...the
successful burglar who, an immense fortune amassed, has retired
fran business, and having broken every law, human and divine,
violated every instinct of honour and fidelity on every sea and
on every continent, desires new the protection of the 
(74)police." Were Germany to submit to this "...it would seem
as if her great soldiers had fought in vain, as if the long roll
(75)of her battles had passed like an empty sound..." To
proposals that she limit the build up of arms Germany responded
that "A nation's military efficiency [was] the exact
(76)co-efficient of a nation's idealism." It seemed to Crarrib
(77)that this was "...a magnificent and manly answsr..."
And what of Britain? Confronted by a nation straining towards 
her destiny, Britain could acquiesce and submit, make
[47]
concessions, suffer one diplomatic defeat after another, and
"...gradually sink to a secondary place in the councils of
(78)Europe and of the world..." This however was a theoretical
rather than a practical option, for the creative power which had
(79)shaped her ancient and famous empire was not dead. It would 
lead her to strive towards her own ultimate destiny. The 
inevitable outcome of two great and mutually exclusive missions 
was war.
Cranib underlined the dangers facing Britain and pointed to the
policies and attitudes which her people and leaders should
adopt. When confronted by a nation "...high in its courage,
lofty in its ambitions, containing within itself apparently
inexhaustible forces..." , Britain's own grand ideals and
purposes should not be contaminated by "...the desire for
arbitration, for the limitation of armaments, a 'naval holiday',
(81)peace at any price..." Britain's war spirit, energy and
sense of heroism should rise above "...the mere craving for life
(82)and its comforts..." Cramb's aim was to rouse his
countrymen to meet and resist the challenge. Only in this way 
could the great struggle between ccnpeting destinies resolve 
itself in Britain's favour.
In all this there was nothing anti-German. Like Britain, 
Germany was fixed in the "... inexorable nexus of things...",
[48]
subject to organic laws and to forces that transcended reason. 
If anything, Germany was, at the time, the more heroic in 
pursuit of her destiny. In Cramb’s case realism did not, and 
could not correspond with an anti-German attitude.
It would be an exercise in sleight of hand to suggest that the 
above examples of realist opinion demonstrate pro rather than 
anti-German attitudes. In each case Germany was identified as 
the source of a major threat which had to be resisted in terms 
of national self-interest. On the other hand, it would be a 
distortion to argue that the examples are representative of an 
anti-German frame of mind. There is in the arguments an 
empathetic appreciation of the imperatives facing Germany which 
leaves little scope for pejorative attitudes.
The reliability of Kennedy’s formula for classifying attitudes
is in question even when the opinion being analysed is markedly
(83)anti-German. E.J. Dillon was a major voice in the debate on 
Germany in the pre-1914 period. His arguments were 
characterised by savage condemnation rather than ideological 
neutrality. His clear perception of the threat posed by 
Germany, his record as a persistent ringer of alarums, his 
irritation in face of credulity and optimism, and the depth of 
his animosity, appear to place him in the realist camp.
[49]
In camon with most writers who had issued warnings about
Germanyfs intentions, Dillon found it impossible to disguise the
sense of frustration which came from being thwarted by the
"...quietism of the masses and their self-complacent
l e a d e r s . T h e  fact that he could claim an intimate
knowledge of German life and affairs whereas others, less well
informed, traded successfully in "...comforting assurances..."
and "...dangerous mirages which lulled the nation's misgivings 
(85)to slumber" , deepened his resentment. "Those who, like
myself," he wrote, "know the country, its institutions, its
language, literature, social life and national strivings, and
who continually warned their countrymen of what was coming, were
(86)put out of court as croaking prophets... over and over again
I expressed ny regret at finding the people of Great Britain
irrationally hopeful and unsuspecting, utterly ignorant of
Germany's systematic strivings and subversive machinations, yet
unwilling to learn from those who were conversant with these 
(87)matters." If Britain was now in grave peril it was the
fault of optimists who had "...objected that the German people
(88)and their chancellor ware peacefully disposed..." National
security had been endangered ".. .because the British nation as a
whole obstinately refused to listen to those who apprised them
of this elemental movement, and of the dangers it concealed..."
In consequence, "...they dispensed with a large land army,
(89)slackened the work of shipbuilding..."
[50]
Dillon’s perception of the situation in terms of the trend of
international and associated domestic events was certainly
realistic in the sense in which Kennedy uses that word. Indeed
Dillon's views as so far expressed would not have looked out of
place on the pages of the National Review. But his attitude
toward Germany as an object within that situation was quite
different from Maxse’s or Crairib’s. There was no suggestion of
necessity, of the closing down of options in face of inexorable
historical forces, no empathetic appreciation. The leitmotiv of
Dillon's argument was that Germany was a power with plain, old
fashioned evil intentions. 'The Scrap of Paper' phrase was, for
example, described as "...a Satanic sneer hurled with fell
purpose into a world of civilised human beings." The
inability of the British to apprehend the true nature of the
evil which confronted them called for the remedy of 
(91) .exorcism, since "they seemed possessed by the demons of
(92)credulity and pacifism." The imagery used by Dillon to
describe the German attempt to engineer British neutrality in 
July/August 1914 is reminiscent of the temptation in the 
wilderness.
"The bid for British neutrality.. .was proffered with an 
intensity of emotion, a high-pitched feeling for the weal 
of the British nation, and a biblical solemnity which must, 
it was felt, tell with especial force with a people whose
[51]
character so often merges in temperament and whose policy
is always suffused with morality. ..the smooth-tongued
tempter...appealed to our loathing for crime...our aversion
to the horrors of war, our love of peace...they adjured us
to hold aloof fran the war and connive at their disregard
of a treaty which they would have been delighted to respect
had not brutal necessity compelled them to ignore it...It
was at the end of the cleverly fashioned disguise that the
(93)cloven hoof protruded."
Dillon's attitude toward Germany was crystalised in his claim
that that country was "...the political Antichrist...", waging
war against "...the wellbeing of Europe and the continuity of 
(94)himan progress."
Despite his distaste for complacency and optimism, his positive
identification of the enemy and its sinister nature, E.J. Dillon
cannot be regarded as a realist when measured against the
totality of the criteria set out by Paul Kennedy. On a number
of vital counts his anti-Germanism was based on idealism. It
was to universal ethical values rather than to the parochial
morality of national interest that he appealed. He held up a
vision of the world as it should be rather than a reflection of
the world as it was. When he complained about Germany's
(95)disrespect for "...the plighted word" it was not primarily 
because such disrespect could have unfortunate consequences for
[52]
Britain as such, but because the honour and trust involved in
pledges given and received constituted "...the inner cohesive
force which holds the elements of society together.. .Destroy
that and you have withdrawn the cement frcm the
(96)
structure..." He defined Teutonism as meaning "...Germany
(97)above everything, including human and divine laws", and it
was frcm this equation that his anti-Germanism emerged. His
argument was founded on ethics, and "In this new faith ethics 
(98)plays no part." Prussianism, which he took to be the creed
animating German policy was anathema, not simply because it 
challenged the national self-interest of Britain, but more
importantly because he saw it as a "...monstrous product of
. (99)savagery.. .enlisted in the service of rank nimorality." In
casting Germany in the role of Cain, Dillon could not ignore the
material harm which such a player would effect on the
international stage, but his condemnation went far beyond this
to deeper issues: "She has deliberately brought about a crude,
naked might-struggle, in which war-lust and brute force are
pitted against the most sacred and imprescriptible rights that
lie at the very roots of organised society."^0) Dillon's
purpose was less a matter of assessing the damage which German
action could inflict upon Britain as an individual state than of
measuring "...the abyss which sunders the old-world
civilisation, based on all that is loftiest in Christianity,
frcm modem German culture.
[53]
It was as an idealist, committed to universal ethical values, 
that Dillon demanded retribution. In face of the "...virus of 
the fell Prussian disease...", humanity as a whole, with faith 
in truth, honour, trust, law, justice and right could not afford 
to be "...either indifferent or l e n i e n t . " G e r m a n y  had 
"...parted company with morality-• f and all who had not
done so must resist.
The Idealist-Realist dichotomy is theoretically suspect in yet 
another sense. Although group or individual perceptions of 
situations can be unambiguous they tend to be so only at the 
extreme. For example, the ultra-realist may see no other 
solution than a zero-sum conflict (i.e. winner takes all) 
whereas the ultra-idealist may see no other solution than world 
brotherhood. Between those extremes lies a wide range of 
ambiguous or multifaceted perceptions. The concepts idealist 
and realist are too vague, and any model in the form of a 
dichotomy too simplistic to make much sense of the nuances of 
the range of perceptions which lie in the middle ground.
Two articles which appeared in Contemporary Review (1908) 
highlight some of the nuances which cannot readily be 
acccmmodated in such a simplistic model, and demonstrate the 
ambiguities which are common in attitude formation. They raise 
doubts about the appropriateness of assigning a pro-German label 
to writers who saw virtue in conciliation. An objective content
[54]
analysis suggests that Harold Spender and Sidney Low were 
arguing an anti-zero-sum-competition case rather than a 
pro-German one, although it has to be accepted that 
contemporaries, for political or other reasons, might have 
regarded their empathetic interpretation of Germany*s actions 
and aspirations, and their pleas for conciliation as evidence of 
Germanophilia.
Spender was critical of the way in which heavy expenditure in 
armaments closed off a number of social policy options and 
reinforced social inequalities. Where a high priority was given 
to armaments, the need for social reform could be neglected, and 
the necessary burden of taxation could fall on the weaker 
members of society. In this sense Spender could be regarded as 
an idealist. Such a neat and convenient summation would not, 
hcwever, get to the heart of his attitude toward Anglo-German 
rivalry. Reduction of armaments and equilibrium in 
international affairs could be brought about by mutual 
understanding and conciliation. This was inhibited by strange 
legends which occupied the minds of men on both sides: "It is
easy for us to laugh at the fictions about ourselves which carry 
authority in Germany; but are we sure that our beliefs about 
Germany have any better ground?" It was natural, then, for
Spender to argue that "...the British must...try to comprehend 
the elements of the German point of view...her deep desire...for
[55]
a voice in world p o l i t i c s . " y e t  it is clear that his wish 
for increased understanding did not lead him to ignore British 
national interest, the alleged ark of the covenant of the 
realist. Whatever ambitions Germany might be allowed to 
realise, sea predominance would remain essential for Britain, 
since it amounted "...to nothing more than a statement of her 
position in the world as an island power, with dominions mainly 
across the sea."^^ Here ws have that measure of ambiguity 
which is difficult to deal with in the idealist-realist 
dichotomy.
Spender’s analysis of the motives behind German policy might 
have been regarded as sympathetic by those of his contemporaries 
who were anti-German; on the other hand it is possible to see 
him as a realist insofar as he recognised the need to examine, 
rationally and without emotion, the springs of German action. 
In this approach, if not in the conclusions which followed frcm 
it, he does not differ in principle from many of the so called 
realists. The emphasis which he laid on making rational 
assessments of the aspirations and perceptions informing the 
policies of a rival state, in order to define a range of 
response options in relation to a range of value options, came 
to characterise the work of political scientists and social 
psychologists during and after the Second World War. The 
idealist in one sense was a realist in another. Paul M.
[56]
Kennedy conceded that idealists sometimes argued that they 
were the true realists, but he appeared to have in mind those 
who saw the promotion of harmony between states as the only real 
hope for civilisation, rather than those who attempted an 
objective study of the realities behind policy and diplomacy. 
Because of this he felt that such reservations did not reduce 
the validity of the Idealist-Realist dichotomy, and so did not 
challenge the thesis that attitudes toward Germany stemmed from 
that dichotomy. But where individuals (and Spender is one of 
many cases) can meet significant elements in opposing sets of 
criteria, that is, where idealists can also be regarded as 
realists without recourse to Kennedy1s minor reservation, then 
the value of the idealist-realist dichotomy as a formula for 
classifying attitudes is diminished.
Spender recommended that Germany be appraised with an awareness 
of 11.. .hew recently she has become possessed of independence and 
unity, with what efforts and sacrifices she has shaken 
off.. .weakness, division and external d i c t a t i o n . A n d  he 
touched on psycho-political interpretation, suggesting a sort of 
national adolescence, in the comment: "She has in many respects 
both the pride and the touchiness of a Power that has newly 
arrived. She has not shaken off the eager self-consciousness 
and the intense self-concentration of early y o u t h . " T h i s  
attempt to understand what lay behind German policy was without
[57]
prejudice to the security of other states, for he took the view 
that "...Great Britain may fairly ask her to recognise and 
respect the Powers that were there before her c o m i n g . . . ; 
but he believed as a result of his analysis that Britain would 
"...make a grave mistake if she refuses to this newcomer, with 
all the virtues and faults of her kind, a place in the sunlight 
of the world." There was nothing to be gained by
complaining that Germany did not need a fleet. The inference 
was that those who offered reasons why Germany did not need to 
develop in this direction were emotional and unrealistic. For 
the fact was that Germany wanted a fleet, and this was because 
she considered that ".. .her immense power in Europe was largely 
counterbalanced by helplessness over the rest of the world's 
surface." This had led Germany to pursue a policy of
national self-interest which Spender regarded as "...frank
selfishness... [but] at any rate, honest.. . " He did not see 
anything sinister in German policy; it had "...all the faults of 
a fitful impulsiveness, more like the spasms of a caged tiger 
than the deep cunning of a fox.. What response option 
should Britain take up? Was there "...any real wisdom or sound 
advantage in driving her to madness by blocking her every
t u r n ? " w a s  the world "...so small that every expansion 
for Germany must mean so much contraction for Great
Britain?" it would be unreasonable to deduce from this
that Spender was pro-German. It seems clear, however, that he
[58]
was renouncing zero-sum competition.
Sidney Low's attitude to Germany reflects similar ambiguities - 
the elements of idealism demonstrated by his advocacy of 
conciliation, and the elements of realism shewing themselves not 
only in his awareness of Britain's national interests brut also 
in his willingness to make a rational appraisal, in 
psycho-political terms [note the title of his article] of 
Germany's motives, in order to inform British responses. And, 
again, the argument is anti-zero-sum competition rather than 
pro-German. Of Germany's 'condition' he noted "...there is 
ambition, undoubtedly, and there is anxiety. These are the two 
passions which just now reign in the Teutonic breast. The 
restlessness, the malaise, of Germany are due to those 
conflicting emotions..." in common with Spender, he
introduces the notion of national adolescence, an indication of 
the facility with which some writers on Anglo-German relations 
made early use of the concepts of psychology. "She is obsessed 
by a fervour of aspiration, of material progress, by a youthful 
eagerness to stretch the mighty limbs she has clothed in steel 
and to find vent for the energies of the seething brain. To 
every nation, as to every man, there ccxnes fran time to time 
this yearning for self-realisation through a c t i o n . " T h e  
shifts, the turns, the curious and disturbing manoeuvres of 
German foreign policy, are not caused so much by aggressiveness 
and anbition as by a permanent attack
[59]
of fidgets."
It was obvious that the activities of Germany would have 
ramifications for others. How should Britain respond? Low
recognised the constraints of national interest: "We cannot
. . (121) permit Germany to relieve herself at our expense..."' ; "it
is no business of ours to calm her nerves by modifying any
(122)policy which happens to suit our purpose."' But he believed 
that Germany's policies were related to a set of circumstances 
that could operate on any state, and that any state would be 
likely to respond to such circumstances in much the same way as 
Germany. Spender had opened his mind to the realities of 
international relations in a period of uncertainty, suspicion 
and tension - the interlocking of challenge and response. He 
referred to the situation in which one side would make a
proposal and the other side would resent "...not so much the
(123)
proposal of the other, but the fact that she made it."' ' Low
had a similar approach: "...we ought to recognise that all our
recent international action has tended in the direction that 
excites German apprehensiveness..." •  "...if a good many 
people here are afraid of their ambition and aggression, a still 
larger number there go in fear of these qualities in 
ourselves." This led him to argue that "...it is no
business of ours to seek to hinder her so long as she does not
interfere with us.. .The operation of bottling up great nations
[60]
is usually disastrous, and Germany bottled would be more 
uncomfortable than Germany with the steam blowing off somewhere 
in colonising and commercial activity. "^6)
Both Spender and Low argued in favour of conciliation and 
accommodation [an idealist position] but neither ware critical 
of national self-interest [a realist position], and both 
attempted to understand the dynamic, interacting nature of 
international relations. This approach, linking the elements of 
idealism and realism produced not a pro-German attitude but one 
which denied the value of zero-sum competition.
The above discussion suggests that the Idealist-Realist 
dichotcrry is inadequate as a formula for the classification of 
attitudes toward Germany. A more precise analytical model is 
required for the study of group or individual perceptions. Such 
a model can be derived from the concepts of competition and 
co-operation.
Figure [ 4 ] is a representation of parallel continuums of 
competition and co-operation, travelling in opposite directions 
in relation to the respective minimum and maximum positions (as 
co-operation increases competition diminishes, and vice-versa) 
and lacking congruence at the extremes (where there is a 
maximum competition there is no co-operation, and vice-versa).
[61]
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|~note: at the 'point of balance' a b = c d ,  
indicating that the attitude held is equidistant 
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Figure T 4 ]  parallel-reverse continuums of competition
AND CO-OPERATION.
[62]
A working hypothesis could take the following form: In any
situation which falls short of a Hobbesian condition of nature, 
relationships between states tend to be perceived, over time, as 
occurring within the ambiguous context of competition and 
co-operation. It is accepted that in certain situations groups 
or individuals may have unambiguous perceptions. For example, a 
situation could be perceived as one of canpetition unmoderated 
by co-operation or vice-versa [the positive extremes of 
competition and co-operation]. Between those extremes each 
element would tend to moderate the other. Hie degree of 
moderation would depend upon the relative merits of competition 
and co-operation as perceived by groups or individuals in 
relation to specific situations and, theoretically, those 
perceptions would coincide with specific points on the parallel 
continuums.
With regard to the perceptions of the writers quoted in this
chapter, it is suggested that Mona Caird is located marginally
right of centre in the area of congruence, since the element of
competition naturally present in a state of war was moderated by
(127)a relatively high commitment to co-operation ; Spender and 
Lew are located marginally left of centre in the area of 
congruence; and Frederic Harrison, L.J. Maxse [and his 
contributors], J.A. Crartib, Roland G. Usher and E.J. Dillon (the 
latter for reasons probably shared by Harrison but not by the
[63]
others) are located at the positive extreme of the canpetition
continuum, outside the area of congruence. At the positive
extreme of the co-operation continuum would stand pacifists and
those whose credo took the following form: "I am not concerned
to know whether seizure by force - theft - is advantageous or
not. It is wrong; I object to it and base my hopes upon the
(128)survival one day of better ideals."
As a tentative conclusion it can be argued that this model has a 
number of substantive advantages over the Idealist-Realist 
dichotomy. It takes explicit account of the ambiguities which 
tend to inform group or individual perceptions of situations. 
Because of this it offers a safeguard against oversimplified 
forms of classification of group or individual attitudes towards 
objects within those situations. It attracts attention to the 
basic functional concepts which tend to form the bases for 
relationships between states (i.e. corrpetitive, 
competitive/co-qperative, co-operative). It premises a greater 
degree of accuracy in the actual locating of one perception 
relative to another, and a more precise means of measuring 
changes in the distribution of perceptions over time. It opens 
up opportunities for consideration of the relevance of the 
cluster of concepts, hypotheses and theoretical models 
associated with the psychology of canpetition and co-operation. 
For exanple, it is held that the onset of competition
[64]
presupposes some form of aggressive behaviour. Frustration 
theories offer explanations of how aggressive behaviour can be 
triggered; in very general terms they rest on "...the 
supposition that an aggressive drive develops as a result of 
interference with goal directed behaviour. The frustrated 
person [and for person we could read state] is then motivated to
(129)
injure the source of the interference." 7 Is the historian, 
concerned with how people perceived relationships between states 
and with the attitudes they formed as a consequence of those 
perceptions, entitled to ignore such theories? Another 
perspective on the development of aggressive/ccmpetitive 
behaviour is provided by social learning theory which suggests 
that behaviour is a learned response. Using the language of the 
psychologists, one way in which such behaviour can be learned is 
through response facilitation, that is to say, behaviour which 
is aggressive/competitive might be ".. .prompted or facilitated 
through the appearance of similar behaviours in esteemed
models " (130) jf for argument we take the phrase "esteemed
models" to imply models whose achievements are regarded as 
worthy of imitation and not to connote any notion of intrinsic 
merit on the part of the models themselves, an interesting link 
between response facilitation and frustration theories could be 
suggested for the case of Germany in the pre-1914 period, and 
the question posed: To what extent were German aims and
ambitions facilitated and translated into policy in response to
[65]
the international achievements of other states, in particular, 
say, Great Britain, then frustrated through interference with 
this goal directed behaviour by the diplomatic activity of other 
states? This question could be of significance in the critical 
analysis of those attitudes tcward Germany which were based on 
the alleged national characteristics of the German people.
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CHAPTER 3
THE PLACE OF APPEASEMENT IN THE COMPETITION 
- CO-OPERATION MODEL.
[71]
The idealist-realist dichotomy as a formula for investigating 
attitudes to Germany has been criticised on the grounds that 
•realist1 opinion (in terms of certain stated criteria) was not 
necessarily anti-German, and that * idealist* opinion was not 
necessarily pro-German. Indeed, some of the most ideologically 
neutral views on Germany came from the * realists*, and sane of 
the most damning views fran the * idealists*. It has been 
suggested that the dichotomy is too simplistic to take account 
of the airbiguities which often lay behind attitudes, although it 
must be accepted that at the extremes of Germanophobia and 
Germanophilia, that is to say, at the poles of the attitude 
range, the dichotomy cannot be challenged on the grounds that it 
does not take account of ambiguities. Ambiguities did not exist 
at the extremes. In order to take account of the ambiguities, 
and at the same time to recognise the existence of unambiguous 
attitudes at the extremes, a model representing parallel and 
reverse, but not totally congruent continuums of co-operation 
and competition, was suggested as an alternative to the 
idealist-realist dichotomy. It is now argued that the validity 
of the alternative model is enhanced, if not confirmed, by the 
fact that it can accommodate what could be regarded, tentatively 
at least, as general trends in British foreign policy from the 
last decades of the nineteenth century to the outbreak of the 
Second World War, and also the opposition bo those trends which 
came either from the extremes of zero-sum competition and
[72]
pacifism or frcm other points on the parallel continuums. Paul 
M Kennedy refers to those trends as ’The Tradition of 
Appeasement in British Foreign Policy1. ^
Kennedy defines appeasement as "...the policy of settling
international (or for that matter, domestic) quarrels by
admitting and satisfying grievances through rational negotiation
and compromise, thereby avoiding the resort to an armed conflict
which could be expensive, bloody, and possibly very 
(2)dangerous." He argues that the policy, said to be
characteristic of the 1930s, "....must be traced...back to the
middle of the nineteenth century...", and that "...the nature of
British foreign policy did not greatly alter in its overall
(3)framework fran that time until 1939..." This presupposes a 
long-standing commitment which did not finally lose credibility 
and break down until the conjunction of the Munich Agreement 
(1938) and the German inarch into Prague (1939) .
Rational negotiation and compromise implies co-operation, but it
also implies competition. If, as Kennedy asserts, appeasement
was "...based upon certain optimistic assumptions about man’s
(4)inherent reasonableness...", this need not mean more than a 
belief that in most situations zero-sum conflict could be 
avoided. It does not deny, in fact it implies, a pessimistic 
awareness that quarrels and grievances are likely to arise out
[73]
of competing perceptions of national interest. It is as well to 
avoid a pessimistic-optimistic dichotomy as it is to avoid one 
based on idealism and realism. Such positions are rarely 
uncomplicated by ambiguity. Pessimism and optimism are often 
part of the same attitude. One point of view can be pessimistic 
about the future unless action is taken timeously, and 
optimistic (part of the justification for taking action) about 
the outccme if the action is timeous. Another point of view can 
be optimistic about the chances of negotiation because of a 
pessimism about a future which does not allow for negotiation.
If it is true that appeasement ".. .has been a particular form of
. . (5)
diplomacy since the middle of the nineteenth century...", 
what lay behind it, what gave it its justification? Kennedy 
suggests that moral considerations, economic aspirations, global 
commitments and domestic situations all had a bearing.
The moral considerations subsumed the concepts of 1 justice' and 
' fair play'. These led to a willingness to accept and 
participate in international arbitration, to abjure war except 
in cases of self-defence, and to place emphasis on conciliation 
and compromise as a means of settling disputes.
This predisposition to apply the principles of morality was 
supported, however, by a set of pragmatic considerations. In
[74]
the mid-nineteenth century Britain was the workshop of the
world, standing at the centre of the global economic system.
She would be the first to suffer if the system was disrupted by
war. Even when under challenge in the late nineteenth century,
and in relative decline vis-a-vis the USA and Germany, she had a
surplus on invisible trade which so compensated for the deficit
in visibles that the balance of payments was healthily in
surplus. War would mean a reduction in exports and an increase
in imports which would make a visible trading deficit even
worse; it would also mean a decrease in invisible earnings. The
balance of payments situation would therefore deteriorate. It
appears reasonable to argue, then, that "The preservation of
peace was, for an economy such as Britain's...a vital national
interest." ^  A derivation of this argument, and one which is
related to issues involving Britain's global position and her
domestic situation, was that a contrary policy would involve
such expenditure on armaments, particularly at a time of
relative economic decline when the rate of growth could not
absorb it, that necessary domestic reforms could not be carried
through and some of the many global commitments could be
neglected. Kennedy argues that for this budgetary reason,
"British governments could normally be relied upon to seek to
end an aims race by diplomatic means, and thus reduce defence
(7)spending."
[75]
The significance of Britain*s global position was that she had
interests in every part of the world, and ".. .multifarious
(8)national obligations..."' Consequently, it would have been 
dangerous to concentrate on any one area or region. In Liddel 
Hart's phrase, Britain was experiencing "...strategical
(9)
overextension". The problem of meeting every need in every 
comer where her interests lay was becoming very serious. It 
was not surprising, therefore, that "...her stretched global 
position was an enormously powerful reason for compromise...and 
for the pacific settlement of disputes.
With the extension and liberation of the electorate in the last
third of the nineteenth century (1867, 1872, 1883, 1884) those
with the vote and more independence to use it as they saw fit
were "...ever more reluctant to deny [themselves] social and
(11)economic reforms m  deference to a large defence budget." 
Introducing social, constitutional and economic reform, all of 
which of course competed with other options such as defence 
expenditure, was a means of staying in power.
Kennedy argues that against this background British foreign
policy was, with rare exceptions (some of them of course being
of outstanding importance) "...pragmatic, conciliatory and
(12)reasonable." Stated simply, "...the peaceful settlement of 
disputes was much more to Britain's advantage than recourse to
[76]
(13)war." Interestingly, this perception of British foreign
(14)policy trends is shared by the German historian, Niedhart.
It is important to note, however, that it is general trends that 
are suggested rather than a universal application to all cases. 
After Palmerston's death in 1865 appeasement was evident in the 
form of internal canpranises (electoral and economic reforms) 
and in foreign policy. Clarendon, Foreign Secretary to Russell 
(1865/66) sought arms reductions in Europe. Gladstone (1868-74) 
pursued a conciliatory policy at the time of the 
Franco-Prussian war. Disraeli (1874-80) does not fit the case, 
adopting a more aggressively forward policy with regard to the 
Eastern Mediterranean, India, Afghanistan and 
Zululand/Transvaal. On his return, however, Gladstone (1880-85)
pursued a policy of "...avoiding trouble and seeking a
(15)reasonable compromise with the demands of others...", 
stepping back fran adventures in South Africa and Afghanistan, 
searching for compromise solutions in India and Ireland. It was 
not possible, of course, to maintain this policy at all costs, 
and Gladstone felt that Egypt had to be occupied to preserve 
order, and that colonial expansion had to take place in face of 
French and German gains in the period 1884-85. In spite of 
this, Kennedy feels that the underlying trend was being 
established and that British foreign policy was being conducted 
for the most part by men "earnestly struggling to solve problems 
on a rational and ethical basis."
[77]
Kennedy considers that the same basic pattern obtained between 
(17)1896 and 1914. The reconquest of the Sudan and the Boer War
should be seen as part of a broad context. In this period
domestic problems called for attention (Meams, Booth, Rowntree,
the emergence of the Labour Party); the relative decline in the
economy was overt; the global responsibilities remained 
(18)numerous. In such a context, "...extreme caution had to be
(19)
exercised over questions involving peace or war..."' Serious 
attempts were made to eliminate antagonisms between Britain on 
the one hand and France, Russia, and Germany. In the case of 
Germany efforts were made to achieve bilateral arms reductions, 
a *naval holiday* was proposed, and colonial concessions 
negotiated. In addition, binding military obligations were 
avoided. Haldane's mission of 1912 was yet another example of 
the British government's efforts "...to solve matters of dispute 
by compromise, rational discussion and mutual 
understanding..." The inevitability of German hegemony in
Europe (including the west) if Britain did not intervene 
defeated this policy in 1914, but it re-emerged in the period 
1919-1938.
All the basic elements reappeared, seme in exacerbated form, and
pervading everything was the impact of the First World War.
. . . (21) Public opinion had been "...psychologically scarred..." 7, and
"the disastrous course of the Great War.. .had made the British
[78]
public more receptive than ever before to the politics of moral
(22)enthusiasm and international amity." The economic motives
for appeasement grew in strength in the inter-war years. There
had been an elevenfold increase in the National Debt between
1914 and 1918. By 1933 service to the Debt amounted to 21.4% of
public expenditure as against 6.1% in 1913. This was a grim
(23)reminder of the financial costs of war. ' The need to devote
energies to the domestic front was also recognised. Further
extensions to the electorate, the arrival of Labour to, and as a
continuing contender for, power, meant that domestic reform
could not be neglected. Governments "...had to respond to
(24)survive electorally." By 1933 46.6% of public expenditure
vent on social services as against 33% in 1913. Although the
absolute amount going to defence had increased (9.3M - 112.4M)
the percentage had fallen from 29.9 in 1913 to 10.5 in 1933.
The strategic/global considerations had increased rather than
diminished. Problems had to be confronted in Ireland, India,
Egypt and Palestine. The economic/psychological situation
"...created an impossible gulf between Britain1 s global
(26)obligations and her capacity to fulfil them." ' All this led 
to the revival of appeasement.
A Foreign Office memorandum of 1926 claimed "...so manifold and 
ubiquitous are British trade and British finance that, whatever 
else may be the outcome of a disturbance of the peace, we shall
[79]
(27)
be the losers." In the late 1920s the Chief of the Imperial
General Staff complained; "...in no single theatre are we strong
enough, not in Ireland, nor England, nor on the Rhine, nor in
Constantinople, nor Batoum, nor Egypt, nor Palestine, nor
(28)Mesopotamia, nor Persia, nor India." ' This same judgment lay
behind the view taken by the Chiefs of Staff in December 1937:
in the face of so many conmitments the policy priority was to
(29)"...reduce the number of potential enemies..."
Interestingly, individuals who were later to establish
reputations as far-sighted patriots when appeasement had been
discredited, made contributions to it in earlier days. Sir
Robert Vansittart, later recognised as the arch enemy of
Germany, did not subscribe to the letter of Versailles. He
advised colonial concessions to Germany as a means of curbing
their "...explosive energies.. Leo Amery, whose thorough
conversion to a stop-Germany policy occurred as late as March
1938 (Anschluss) had earlier (October 1935) declared in a speech
to his constituents, reported in The Times, that he was "...not
prepared to send a single Birmingham lad to his death for the
(31)sake of Abyssinia." ' In the same month he was indicating
support for "...a foreign policy, prudent, conciliatory, and
(32)non-aggressive, seeking a quarrel with no one..." And he
had no objection, to begin with, to appeasing Germany at the
(33)expense of Central and Eastern Europe, since this did not 
appear to pose a threat to Britain in the West. Certainly
[80]
before Munich, but less so after the Anschluss, there was a
fairly general acceptance that German expansion in the east was
in British interests because it would conciliate Germany,
establish a bulwark against Soviet Ccmnunism (this view was not
shared by the Labour Party), and leave western Europe
undisturbed. The Sunday Times of March 31, 1935, announced that
"...this country.. .has no real interest in Eastern
(34)Europe..." In 1938 Alan Lennax-Boyd, Parliamentary
Secretary to the Minister of Labour (reported in The Times, 19
March) argued that Germany "could absorb Czechoslovakia and
Great Britain would remain secure, but Germany could not invade
(35)France without threatening us."
Inter-war friction in Anglo-French relations was due in large
part to different perceptions as to how peace should be
maintained. Those different perceptions stemmed, of course,
fran different sets of national priorities. British policy
allowed for the revision of the Treaty of Versailles. Hugh
Dalton of the Labour Party could mate a distinction between the
take-over of the Rhineland, an act carried out "...within the
frontiers of the German Reich", and Italy*s "...aggressive
war...beyond...frontiers..." in Abyssinia. In his view the
British public was capable of making this very proper
(36)distinction. It was not, of course, a distinction which 
France could accept, given her anxieties over security. The 
Spectator probably echoed general feeling in
[81]
Britain at the time when, on 13 March, 1936, it claimed that "No 
one is disposed to moralise over-much about Germany's.. .breaches
(37)
of the Treaty of Versailles." This was all part of the
British policy to accommodate and conciliate, and it was a 
policy which had overwhelming support at the time. The argument 
did not impress France, however. In the early twenties she had 
insisted upon full reparations in order to make sure that 
Germany remained weak. This did not suit Britain, economically 
or diplomatically. French support of Polish claims in Silesia 
(1921) and then the invasion of the Ruhr (1923) were further 
attempts to vreaken Germany. And the alliances between France 
and Germany's eastern neighbours, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and 
Rumania, were intended to contain Germany. All this ran counter 
to Britain's willingness to allow Germany room for manoeuvre in 
central and eastern Europe. The Franco-Soviet Pact (1935) also 
threatened Britain's plans to appease Germany in the east, and 
indeed raised fears that such French action could lead to war in 
the west. Relations betvreen Britain and France were not 
improved by the June 1935 Anglo-German naval pact which was 
intended to hold German surface ships and submarines at 35% and 
45% of respective British levels.
It appears that there is a case for arguing that there was a 
tradition of appeasement in British foreign policy, and that the 
differences between the pre 1914 period and the inter-war years
[82]
(38)were "...ones of degree and not of kind." ' Appeasement was,
"...after all, the natural policy of a Britain steadily losing
its dominant role in world affairs, steadily becoming
democratised, and steadily recognising that, for a mixture of
ethical and pragmatic reasons, the conciliatory approach in
diplomacy was of greater advantage to the country than the
(39)resort to threats or even to the use of force."' How was it,
then, that "...the most noble term in the diplomatic 
vocabulary..." came to connote "...weakness, fear and 
retreat in the face of bluff..."? Why was it that public 
opinion swung against it and the government found itself forced 
to meet the demands of its parliamentary opponents (from both 
right and left)? And how does the policy of appeasement, and 
the opposition which finally rose against it, fit into the 
co-operation-ccmpetition model? The answers to such questions 
are to be found in reaction to the Anschluss (March 1938) the 
Munich Agreement, and the parliamentary debate which followed it 
(September/October, 1938) and Prague (March 1939).
The Government found itself attacked by a small group of its own 
supporters in the Spring and Sumner of 1938. Those included 
Eden, Amery, Harold Macmillan and Duncan Sandy s. They were not 
implacably opposed to further concessions to Germany, but were 
opposed to any further concessions urmatched by firm guarantees 
an Hitler*s part. This vital issue of reciprocity will be
[83]
returned to. The group had widended by 5 October, 1938 (the
Munich debate division in the House of Cannons), and about 20
conservative M.P.s including Eden, Amery, Macmillan, Sandys,
Churchill, Bracken, Copper, Harold Nicolson and Richard Law (son
of the former P.M.) withheld support from the government in the
division. By March 1938 Leo Amery had moved away fran his
non-interventionist stance and claimed that British security now
demanded "...a policy of Continental e ntanglements."It was
not just a question of the material security of Britain,
however; there was new a moral argument against appeasement.
Ideals and ethical principles were new at stake. Austria had
stood "...for something rather unique in the world, the last
remnant of that old tradition of a united Western Christianity,
(42)a super-national state..." It had been trampled down. An
ideal, with ethical significance had been attacked, the ideal of
(43)"...unity on free co-operative lines..." Duff Copper
justified his resignation as First Lord in terms which linked
consideration of universal values with thoughts on Britain*s
basic security position. He argued that if war had ccxne in
September-October, 1938, "it would not have been over
Czechoslovakia as such, but to prevent the brutal domination of
(44)Europe by one great power." Richard Law, in a speech to the
Commons on 3 October, 1938, used words which implied moral as
well as security considerations: ".. .ruthless. ..most
(45)cruel...most inhuman..." In a radio broadcast on 16
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October, 1938, Churchill used the same combination of arguments, 
calling for a "...swift gathering of forces to confront not only 
military but moral aggression." Appeasement, which had its
justification on moral and pragmatic grounds was new being
challenged on both, from a group whose views tended to be
located at the positive end of the competition continuum. The
real crunch for the policy came when those opponents were joined
by others whose views tended to be located at the positive end 
of the co-operation continuum.
The issue of reciprocity is of very real importance when
discussing the revolt of the co-operationists against
appeasement. The term co-operationist in this context covers
those who tended towards the positive end of the co-operation
continuum, but not pacifists who were at the extreme on that
continuum. Pacifism was a self-contained position which did not
require reciprocity to give it justification. E.H. Carr made a
(47)definitive statement of the co-operationist philosophy.
Carr argued that change was inevitable in international affairs 
because the relative power of countries was constantly shifting. 
Those countries which were growing in strength demanded
concessions, and those countries which were becoming weaker in
relative terms had demands made on them. The usual method of 
adjustment was war, but this option, with all its disadvantages, 
could be avoided if statesmen abandoned rigid positions and
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adopted a more flexible approach, including the willingness to 
negotiate. This flexibility of approach had worked in the 
domestic area where the 'haves' confronted the 'have-nots'. The 
abandonment of rigid positions had produced a situation in which 
both sides shared "... a willingness to submit disputes to 
various forms of conciliation and arbitration.. Here was
the principle of reciprocity, the prerequisite for effective, 
meaningful co-operation.
Co-operationists could give general support to the policy of
appeasement so long as there was no denial of reciprocity.
Appeasement as a policy subsumed an attitude towards Germany as
a member of the community of nations. It was an attitude which,
certainly after the Great War, had a real measure of sympathy in
it. In essence, that attitude was that Germany was a partner in
the process leading to accommodations and compromises. The
(4 9)
concept of partnership is significant. Margaret Mead has
pointed out that in the conceptual language of the British the 
word 'partner' has a specific meaning. In the British 
perception 'partnership' is interpreted in terms of a games 
model in which 'partners' are regarded as being in symmetrical 
relationship. "The British [associate] the word when applied to 
international affairs with a sports context, with [for example] 
the tennis partner who for the duration of the game is treated 
like oneself..." This involves acceptance of the
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same procedural values and the principle of reciprocity. When
it became difficult to sustain the view that Germany was a
partner in this sense, when the run of events gave a clear
impression that Germany was paying scant attention to
reciprocity, and was a taker without being a giver, the
oo-operatiomists mounted a challenge to appeasement. Without
reciprocity there was no partnership? if no partnership, then no
effective co-operation. The principle itself was now at stake.
This encouraged the notion that appeasement had become "...a
craven surrender to threats rather than the wise and rational
(51)application of moral principles."' Appeasement was new under
attack from both ends of the parallel continuums because, in the
end, it was regarded as a policy which ".. .neither satisfied the
(52)moral nor the practical requirements of British policy."
The co-operation-ccmpetition model acccnmodates appeasement as a 
long standing policy and also the challenges raised against it 
in the late 1930s. The ambiguities inherent in the area of 
congruence were present in the policy itself. As long as 
Britain had specific interests these could clash with the 
interests of other states (competition) ? the way to deal with 
such problems, always assuming that ultimate interests [material 
and moral] were not at stake, was through mediation, 
conciliation and ccnprcmise (co-operation). This 
interrelationshp was described by Eyre Crowe when he said that
[87]
British policy was founded on a desire to harmonise national
interests with "the general desires and ideas cannon to all
(53) .mankind." Significantly, Kennedy defined appeasement as
"...a peculiar mixture of morality and calculated national
(54) (55)interest..." , and as "...a very hybrid creature..." The
model can also be used to demonstrate the two stages of
opposition to appeasement, the early stage ineffective and the
later stage effective. In the early stage the policy was
criticised fran one direction because it was not canpetitive
enough, and fran the other direction because it did not go far
enough in terms of co-operation. Such disparate opposition
allowed the government to justify its policy at large as one of
sensible moderation. In the later stage the opposition
coalesced on the grounds that the government was inadequately
competitive in a situation where morality and security were both
at stake.
What has to be noted, however, and be subject to elaboration in 
Part Three, is that cannon cause against the Nazi threat did not 
remove the tensions between those who were thoroughly 
competitive in attitude toward Germany, and those who made 
distinctions between Nazi practices and other traditions in 
German life and experience. Those tensions were rooted in the 
different ways in which different people assigned relative 
weights to the pragmatic and ideological aspects of the British 
self-image.
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PART 3
THE DEBATE ON GERMANY AS A PRODUCT OF THE 
DUALISTIC NATURE OF THE BRITISH SELF-IMAGE.
CHAPTER 4
’US AND THEM’: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE 
IDEOLOGICAL COMPONENT OF THE BRITISH 
SELF-IMAGE AND ATTITUDES TOWARD GERMANY
[91]
(i)
British attitudes to Germany offer a justification for the claim 
that "countries are judged by yet others according to the degree 
by which they have developed in their own i m a g e . T h o s e  
attitudes ware frequently expressed, at times of tension and 
crisis, or at times of conscience-led reflection, in language 
which implicitly or explicitly defined the British self-image. 
This image was essentially dualistic, incorporating on the one 
hand the perception of Britain as a material entity with 
pragmatic interests which had to be defended against rivals, and 
on the other hand the perception of a national ccranunity with a 
set of intermeshing traits and values such as fairness, justice,
considerateness, acceptance of ambiguity, tolerance,
. . . (2)sensitivity, and empathy. In the context of the parallel
continuums model, attitudes which called for a competitive 
response to Germany, that is, attitudes located between 
left-of-centre and the positive extreme of the competition 
continuum, tended to involve both elements of the self-image in 
that they came from either a conviction that Britain as a 
material entity was under severe threat, or from what amounted, 
near and at the extreme, to a fanatical commitment to the 
1 ideological1 element. In this latter case there was a virtual 
synthesis of both elements of the self-image, with the fervent, 
ccnbative defence of values and traits becoming in effect the
[92]
(3)defence of everything Britain was and stood for. On the 
other hand, attitudes which encouraged a co-operative response 
to Germany, that is, attitudes located between right-of-centre 
and the positive extreme of the co-operation continuum, tended
(4)
to emphasise the ideological component. Clustered around the 
centre of the area of congruence were attitudes which 
encouraged a composite response to Germany, derived from both 
aspects of the self-image in more or less equal proportions.
To regard the British self-image as dualistic is not a mere
analytical convenience. Joseph Frankel [1970] has pointed to
the substantive difference between the ' aspirational1 and
'operational1 responses of individuals and groups, including
decision makers, to environmental factors. Aspirational
responses refer to "... the vision of the good life, to sane
ideal set of goals...."; operational responses refer to
interests "... .capable of achievement within the foreseeable
future...", and usually stem fran "...considerations of
(5)expediency or necessity." Geert Hofstede [1984] recarmends
that a distinction be made ".. .between values as the desired and
the desirable ", the desired relating more to pragmatic
issues, the desirable to ideology. ^  David Apter [1965] has
differentiated 'consummately' values, "...based on a particular
set of moralities", and 1 instrumental* values; the adequacy of
(7)which "....can be judged on the basis of efficiency." It
[93]
is not to be supposed, however, that the two components of the
British self-image stood in isolation, one fran the other.
Although the total image was perceived differentially by various
individuals and groups, each component was always awarded same
significance by those who participated in the debate on Germany.
Paul Kennedy's comment that British responses to international
events tended to be "....a peculiar mixture of morality and
(8)calculated self-interest", and J. W. Eaton's reflection that
British actions were characterised by a "...combination of moral
(9)conviction and business sense...", are descriptive of the 
interrelationship between the two elements of the self-image. 
It was, of course, the relative weights assigned to each element 
in the formulation of the 'mixture' that defined the attitudes 
of individuals and groups toward Germany. It was the 
essentially dualistic nature of the British self-image which 
gave rise to debate on Germany and the Germans and located views 
at particular points on the parallel continuums of canpetition 
and co-operation.
The pragmatic component of the British self-image, and its 
significance in relationships with Germany, has been well 
documented. The concern of this chapter, and the three that 
follow, is to examine attitudes toward Germany which either 
implicitly or explicitly suggest that integral to the image was 
the perception of a national ccmnunity with a set of 
intermeshing traits and values. This, in conjunction with
[94]
the pragmatic element, will serve the purpose of identifying the 
underlying tensions within the self-image, tensions which 
fuelled the debate on Germany. It will also clear the way for 
discussion of another important issue: the dilemmas which arise
when expressed attitudes derived fran declared values appear to 
be inconsistent with the values themselves. Insofar as the 
British had the capacity to judge other nations not only as 
rivals who might provide obstacles to the pursuit of pragmatic 
interests, but also as national canrninities to whan they could 
ascribe disapproved traits and values, dilemmas were always 
going to arise. To criticise another nation because it did not 
come up to the standards of the moral element of the British 
self-image was one thing, but to treat that same nation 
unfairly, intolerantly, unsympathetically, was quite another 
thing, and raised problems of consistency. "The urge to keep 
images and the attitudes that attend them in sane sort of 
internally ordered repair...." is an aspect of human motivation 
which has been of particular interest to social 
psychologists. This issue will be addressed in Chapter 8.
The ideological component of the British self-image can be 
readily identified, even when not explicitly expressed in 
attitudes, by locating views of self and others on an 'Us and 
Them1 axis. When we are told "This is what they are like",
[95]
in a way which allows for few if any redeeming features, the 
self-image is identifiable even when not made explicit in 
contradistinction. There is, of course, no need to read between 
the lines when "This is what they are like" is addressed in an 
antagonistic mode and at the same time "This is what wb are like 
is addressed in a non-antagonistic mode. The self-image also 
emerges, implicitly or explicitly, when "This is what they are 
like" is formulated either in a way which allows for a number of 
redeeming/justifying features, or suggests a real measure of 
similarity with "This is what we are like."
In the following analysis of hew the British self-image was 
revealed, the treatment is chronological. It would have been 
possible to arrange the information under headings dealing with 
particular aspects of the image - for example, tolerance, 
fair-play, justice, empathy. Any apparent gain in coherence 
might, however, have been outweighed by the tedium of constant 
recapitulation. The advantage of the chronological approach is 
that authors have their full say without interruption.
[96]
(ii)
The National Review editorials of L. J. Maxse suggest an 
enpathetic understanding of Germany's position. There was an 
attempt to see things fran Germany's point of view, that of a 
nation caught up in a set of inexorable forces, imprisoned by 
the logic of crucial hypothetical imperatives. The fact that the 
conclusions to be drawn from all this supported Maxse's thesis 
that Germany posed a threat of such consequence that other 
British traits and values were made temporarily redundant, does 
not reduce the significance of the process which led to those 
conclusions. And that process involved sympathetic 
understanding.
In order to understand the perspective which Germany appeared to 
have of the world in the first decade of the twentieth century, 
Sidney Lew [1908] constructed an alternative scenario, with 
Britain at the centre of it, and invited his readers to consider 
what their responses would be:
"Suppose Ireland were an independent country, burning for 
revenge, with a navy nearly equal to our own; suppose 
France had even more capital ships than ourselves; and 
suppose that the two powers were in permanent alliance.
[97]
It is possible that in that case wb too should be 
restless, irritable, easily perturbed, fervently anxious 
to do seme thing in order to protect ourselves against the 
menace." (12)
Harold Spender [1908] was also moved to see things from the
German point of view. As things stood, the Germans had a
particular image of the British, and the British of the
Germans. Those images were too glibly accepted on each
(13)side. In stepping across the divide, as it were, Spender
hoped to reveal a more reliable image of Germany. Although
conscious of threat, his exercise in empathy led to the
engagement of other elements of the ideological self-image.
Consideration of recent German history suggested that the
analogy of adolescence was appropriate. In such a situation a
(14)measure of tolerance was necessary. It would be wrong, it
would not be 'playing the game1, to keep her down. An
empathetic awareness of Germany's perspectives and aspirations
characterised the work of Cramb [1914]. A kind of necessity
lay at the root of relationships between Britain and Germany.
Both states were caught up in an inexorable nexus of
(15)things. Dillon [1914] though passionately unsympathetic to
Germany's position, with no concessions made to any form of 
mitigating factor, nevertheless evoked other aspects of the 
self-image - justice, honour, trust, fair play. It was in
[98]
defence of these that Britain was locked in conflict with the 
forces of evil.
Poems published by Charles Hamilton Sorley and Thanas Hard/ in 
1914 and 1915 respectively, carried empathetic understanding to 
a point where the 'Us and Them' polarities disappeared and 
something approaching a common identity emerged. In Sorley's 
view the onset of war in 1914 was due to a blindness which 
affected both Britain and Germany, denying them access to
11...each other's truer form...."
"You only saw your future bigly planned,
And we the tapering paths of our own mind,
And in each other's dearest way we stand,
And the blind fight the blind."
When it was all over, the tragic misunderstandings resolved, 
they would look upon each other ".. .more loving-kind and warm."
(17)
For Hardy, "Kinfolk kin tongued" had been deceived into war.
Further clues to the ideological element of the British 
self-image are to be found in popular fiction plotted on the 
First World War. Cadogan and Craig [1978], in a review of the 
fiction of the two world wars, provide the following examples
[99]
(18)and commentary . Of a story entitled Twenty Fathoms Deep,
published in Nelson Lee, 25 September 1915, they note that the
theme was one in which "British decency is contrasted with
German ruthlessness..." This decency is in evidence when Lee
and his assistant, 'Nipper*, pass 15) the opportunity to kill
German agents from a distance. Lee explains: "Of course we
could level our revolvers this very minute and drop both the
scoundrels where they stand, but that isn't the English
way....". A similar episode occurs in Buchan's Mr Standfast.
Hannay has the opportunity to shoot the German agent, Moxon
I very, and thereby subvert a particularly ruthless and damaging
scheme, but he lets the chance slip. The problem was that
Ivery was clear in his sights, a sitting target, and therefore
unprepared. Hannay could not shoot under such circumstances for
(19)to do so would have been contrary to the rules of the game.
In Christine Chandler's Our Lonely Soldier, published in Little 
Folks, April 1919, children play an unfortunate and hurtful 
prank on the kindly hero, Private Horace Smith. Smith is quite 
taken aback by what he obviously regards as behaviour 
inconsistent with the upbringing of the children: "Well - I 
wouldn't have believed as how English children could have acted
like that... If you'd been little Huns, now n(20)
Mark Sabre, the hero of A.S.M. Hutchinson's If Winter Comes, 
published in 1921, Cadogan and Craig write that his troubles
[100]
arose fran "... a habit of giving serious consideration to the
(21)other chap's point of view..."
. . .  (22)Writing in 1915, A. G. Gardiner was unequivocal in his
condemnation of the public policy of Germany. Reports of
atrocities in Belgium had "...shocked the conscience of the world
and left Germany a criminal at the bar of humanity... Today the
wild beast is loose, and Germany has released it frcm every
restraint... The crimes of Louvain, Dinant, Aerchot... The
collective punishments... are declarations to the world that
Germany kncws no law of God or man in the pursuit of her
object.... It is as though we are in conflict with a people who
(23)live on another plane, move in another realm of morals..."
(24)It was all the more remarkable that at such a time Gardiner 
was prepared to make a very clear distinction between government 
and people, between public policy and private feeling, and that 
he recognised a hope for the future in "... that other motif 
that runs through the German nation counter to the triumphant 
motif of Bemhardism..."
He was led to this view by an awareness of the way truth and 
rational discussion could be distorted and silenced in the 
emergency of war, and by appraisal, implicit and explicit, of 
the British self-image. Of the impact of war on the critical 
faculties he wrote: "In the fierce stress of battle we have no
[101]
time to discriminate, and we brand the whole German nation with 
the Scarlet Letter. We know it is false; we know that Burke*s 
great saying about the indictment of a nation is as true of 
Germany as of any other people: but for the moment we are
living under the dominion of a tyrannic passion which 
repudiates... reason as though it were a t r a i t o r . i t  is 
possible to piece together Gardiner* s perception of the 
ideological element of the British self-image by examining 
passages containing implicit references to it and linking them 
with explicit statements made elsewhere. For example, writing 
of the difficulty of understanding "... the mental condition of 
the man who, thinking as Bemhardi thought, sits down to tell 
all his thoughts to the world..." he concluded:
"It is this philosophic detachment, coupled with an entire
lack of the humour and imagination which enable you to
'put yourself in his place' and to see the other man's
point of view, which has puzzled the English mind in the
(271conduct of Germany."
The inference is clear. The British were endowed with that 
humour and imagination which made them capable of empathising 
with others. At another point Gardiner referred to reports that 
"... an the battlefield and at sea there have been glimpses that 
[the Germans] are better than the devilish doctrine that employs
[102]
(28)them as its instruments." The fact that "the English
people have been quickly responsive to such episodes, as in the
case of Captain von Muller of the Emden", is taken as
confirmation that "the healthy mind hates in spasms, but...
lives by its affections." A particular image is being ascribed
to the British people when it is claimed that they "...made much
[of von Muller] who fought without hate and without bitterness,
with chivalry and good temper", and in so doing demonstrated
that "it is possible still to be both a brave man and a 
(29)gentleman." When arguing that "... the God of blood and
iron", who underwrote the public policy of Germany was 
"...divorced from all moral considerations, frcxn mercy, from 
justice, from pity", Gardiner was assigning such values to 
the British.
There were also less oblique references to the traits and values 
of the British, as for example:
" We have not made brute force a national idol... .We may
still broadly claim that wherever we have gone we have 
carried the spirit of freedom and the authority of the moral 
law.n(31)
(32)and " We shall not answer infamy with infamy."
[103]
So perceiving the British self-image, and on guard against that
tyrannic passion which repudiates reason, Gardiner determined to
be fair to Germany. There was to be no inconsistency between
attitudes and values in his case, "do not let us forget to be
just", he wrote, and justice called for self-criticism as well
(331as fairness to the German nation.
"In claiming that in this conflict of ideals it is we who 
have our faces turned towards the light, it is not 
suggested that we are free fran the idolatry of 
Force... [the] growth of material power... unchecked 
by an equivalent growth of moral power or social 
conscience [had resulted in] a certain tyrannous 
exploitation of self based largely on the possession 
of material power. The Prussian spirit is not 
confined to Prussia. It is everywhere... That, and 
not the German people, is the ultimate enemy." (34)
For Gardiner, there was 1 another Germany*, quite distinct from 
that associated with public policy. In Karl Liebknecht and the 
German Socialists he saw evidence of the spirit which animated 
this * other Germany*. "There has been much scornful criticism", 
he wrote,
[104]
"of the docility with which the German Socialists have 
answered the call of the Prussian drill sergeant. ’See 
what nonsense this Socialism is’, it is said. ’See how it 
all vanishes into thin air at the sound of the trumpet...1 
The obedience with which the German Socialists, after 
marching for generations to the polls against the Prussian 
Junkers and their military machine, fell into step behind 
the Junkers at the call of the bugle seems to reduce all 
their agitations and theories to idle wind. It encourages 
writers like the enigmatic Dr. Dillon to say, as he says 
in the Contemporary Review, that there is nothing to 
choose between the government and the people. But this is 
to take a shallow view of the facts. The storm fell upon 
the socialists of Germany as suddenly as upon us... They 
saw only one thing, as we did, that their country was in 
danger; and they resolved, as we did, to subordinate 
everything to the instant duty of saving it from ruin.
We can illustrate the position with a parable. You may
quarrel very heartily with your family about the internal
economy of your house; but if the house is in flames you
will preterminate those quarrels and join forces to put out
the flames. You may suspect that the fire is due to the
mischievous stove arrangements against which you have
waged a vain struggle; but that will not make you less
(35)eager to quench the fire."
[105]
There was hope for the future in Liebknecht, "the symbol of the 
Germans with whom we are going to be reconciled." This was 
because "millions of people in Germany are thinking his 
thoughts"; thoughts which, according to Gardiner, were 
crystallised in the conclusion of the speech which Liebknecht 
submitted in writing to the President of the Reichstag, 2 
December 1914:
"Under protest against the war; against those who are
responsible for it and have caused it; against the
capitalistic purposes for whom it is being waged; against
the plans of annexation; against the violation of the
neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg; against the absolute
reign of the rights of war; against the social and
political violation of their clear duty of which the
Government and the ruling classes stand guilty, I shall
(36)vote against the war credits asked for."
Here was that other motif that ran through the German nation, 
counter to the triumphant motif of Bemhardism.
Gardiner made two sympathetic contributions to the debate on 
Germany. One, summarised above, advanced the view that the
[106]
crimes of Germany were the crimes of a system and not of a 
people. The other took the form of a generous assertion that 
any weaknesses in the German character were to be explained not 
by reference to innate dispositions but to the force of 
circumstances. This brought him, very properly, to 
consideration of culture and to the problem of differential 
sharing in culture. His argument, and its inadequacies, will be 
discussed in a subsequent chapter. What may be said at this 
point is that those inadequacies suggest that it was not 
theoretical rigour that brought Gardiner to his conclusions on 
Germany; it was a psychological need to align his attitudes 
tcward Germany with his perception of the British self-image.
In the significantly titled, A War of Contrasts, Sidney Brooks
[1915] set the "...spluttering, insensate hatred of England
which is new the coirmon passion of seventy million
(37)Germans..." against what he regarded as the more sober, 
reflective and tolerant attitudes of the British. So far as 
hate was concerned, the ordinary Englishman was "....very far 
fran reciprocating it. Rightly or wrongly he goes a long way 
tcwards exonerating the German people frcrn canplicity in 
bringing on the war. He distinguishes, perhaps somewhat 
innocently, between Prussia and the Prussians on the one hand, 
and the rest of the German states on the other. He conceives 
himself to be at war less with the rank and file of a nation
[107]
than with the spirit and leaders of a localised military 
caste.
A mature sense of proportion, a basic good-heartedness, a 
readiness to see good in others, are taken by Brooks to be 
characteristic traits of the British.
"No nation, perhaps, is so little capable of keeping a
grudge alive or of nourishing irrelevant and distracting
antagonisms, or so willingly allows the mellowing hand of
time the fullest play... It is one of the most palpable
contrasts between the Germans and ourselves that they can
hate, can find luxury in the emotion, and derive strength
from its expression, and that the basic impulse to such
displays is lacking in our temperament. Whether it is
that we are more impervious to ideas than they are, or
less given to visualising them, or that our nerves are
under better control, or that our national character is
more mature, or that our instinct for the qualities that
tell in a crisis is sounder, the fact remains that this
particular German characteristic has no counterpart in the
British psychology. It is an excess so alien to our own
consciousness that we find difficulty in connecting it
(39)with grown-up rational beings..."
[108]
Fair-play, a jewel in the catalogue of British traits and values
was quite incomprehensible to the Germans. To them, "....it
seems frivolous or forced, a calculated affront where it is not
another proof of our lamentable decadence. They spat fran them
in contempt the praises we bestowed on the Captain of the Emden
as a skilful and gallant commander who played the game... To
impute to them or to any of their officers on land or sea the
qualities of sportsmanship is to rasp on the feelings of the
nation..." Similarly, the British capacity to empathise
with others was foreign to the Germans. They "...understand
things and facts, but they do not, as we do, understand men.
They lack the power of dramatic sympathy to enter into other
(41)peoples1 feelings and emotions..."
E. C. Bentley [1915] in his analysis of The German State of 
Mind, made implicit reference to British traits and values when 
he listed the facets of "...the mental condition into which 
Germany had got itself after several generations of patting 
itself on the back and stewing in its cwn juice. The 
ignorance, the want of understanding, the monstrous vanity, the 
moral cowardice, the debility of reasoning, the feverish 
inconsistency, the total surrender to the basest emotionalism, 
the general lack of nerve and vicious temper..."
[109]
At the same time he disclaimed any intention of making "... a 
condemnation of all Germans in heaps.... I have been, and still 
am, a strong admirer of what is admirable in the qualities and 
achievements of that wonderful people. I know well that
(42)
millions of Germans never desired the peace to be broken."
Oblique references to the traits and values said to characterise 
the British are littered throughout the following passage, which 
concludes with one of his few explicit comments on the way in 
which Britain and Germany differ. The general theme of the 
passage is *German brutality'.
"I do not refer particularly to German methods in warfare. 
They are only one result of a general leaning towards 
violence, which has always been present in the soul of the 
people... Nobody can live for a week in Prussia without 
feeling the presence of this tendency. It is in 
everything, from the [official] spluttering about 'hacking 
through' a particularly defenceless state, to the 
unembarrassed air with which a sixteen-stone Berliner will 
crowd a woman out of the comer seat in a train, or the 
whole-hearted gusto with which a troop of mounted police 
will charge, laying about them with the flat of the sabre, 
right through an entirely peaceable assembly... Ruthless 
enplqyment of superior strength of any kind to one' s own
[110]
advantage, and a taste for the exercise of force in
general, are so much a matter of course to that strange
people that little things which make the ordinary British
observer's fists tingle are constantly said and done in
(43)everyday life without exciting any carment."
Frances Evelyn Warwick [1915] introduced her reflections on 
Prussia and The Woman with a demonstration of her desire to be 
fair to the Germans. Her unwillingness to "...bring an 
indictment against a whole nation..." took the form of a 
leitmotiv.
"We who have travelled in Germany, not once, but many
times, knew full well that hardness and cruelty are not
associated with the majority. If we admit the simple
German of the south is not cruel at heart... rather a
dreamer and a sentimentalist, with strong love for
domestic pleasures, we find that the policy of
'frightfulness' must be ascribed to the Military Party,
consisting for the most part of Prussians with
(451headquarters in Berlin."
Referring to reported outrages against wanen in German occupied 
territories, she asserted:
[111]
"Undoubtedly these stories, if they could reach the heart 
of Germany would thrill tens of thousands of honest men 
with indignation and disgust; I do not believe for a 
moment that they represent the inclinations of the whole 
nation."(46)
Of domestic life in general, Warwick was prepared to believe 
that "in tens of thousands of German hemes the wife and 
daughters are loved and honoured..." In this commitment to 
fairness and balance Warwick was reflecting an important facet 
of the British self-image. [She was also, incidentally, 
congratulating large sections of the German camunity for 
accepting traits and values associated with Britain]. And she 
did so in another way. In looking critically at the 
connections between public policy and the ascribed role of women 
in Prussia, she implied that the connections were quite 
different in Britain.
"The German has forgotten the respect and reverence he
ewes to his own women folk.... in the rank and file of
military circles, even among the men who hold official
positions and boast of a certain standing, woman has been
dethroned.... No good looking woman is safe in Germany
from the ill-bred stares and comments of the men with whom
she must travel in train or tram... they are liable to be
elbowed into the road if men walking abreast can occupy the
(47)whole of the pavement."
[112]
Arthur E. P. Brcme-Weigall [1915] regarded Germany as a country 
whose point of view was completely different frcm that of 
Britain, and vhose actions were governed by a code which did not 
remotely resemble the British code. The British self-image
is made quite explicit, revealed layer by layer in contrast to 
each damning criticism of the "cancer of German ethics." He 
went so far as to suggest that the outbreak of the war had been 
fortunate for "the fair body of mankind", providing as it did 
an opportunity for timely diagnosis and remedial surgery. The 
problem with Germany did not reside in militarisn, since this 
was "...an eccentricity apparent to all men, a kind of St Vitus1 
Dance which could not escape astonished observation." The 
complaint lay deeper, in the cancer of logic, in
".... the German inability to recognise the paradox upon 
which life is based, the facing of cold fact, the removal 
of the veil which makes the vision of existence tolerable, 
the calling a spade a spade... All the atrocities which 
the Germans have ccmmitted are due to their devotion to 
apparent fact, and to their belief that fact is the 
beginning and end of existence; all the protests which 
the other nations of the earth have uttered are prompted 
by our knowledge that there is something which lies behind 
fact... The Germans follow the process of thought to its 
logical consequence; we shun that conclusion and create
[113]
rules of conduct which cannot be justified in logic. The 
Germans define life and act only upon materialistic 
reason; we leave life undefined and render tribute to the 
intangible.... we believe that culture means the 
ostracising of the crude and bestial element in human 
life; but the Germans, on the contrary, are of the 
opinion that culture is the frank recognition of those 
elements."
It is clear from this that his image of the Germans was that of 
a people who could not deal with uncertainties, doubts, 
ambiguities and imponderables - those features of human 
experience which, if accepted in a rational frame of mind, are 
the seedcom of tolerance. Where the Germans, in a competitive 
situation, would push the logic of competition to its extreme, 
the British vrould intrude the notion of fair play, the rules of 
the game, and so avoid that extreme. The distinction was then 
reinforced:
"The Germans have no sensitiveness.... the High State of 
their civilisation has led them to discard sentiment and 
to face fact in a logical manner; and that paradoxical 
delicacy which makes life tolerable to us has been 
abandoned by them as being illogical..."
[114]
Brcme-Weigall identified this passion for logic in domestic 
life, in popular literature, and in the arts, but his prime 
target was its expression in German ideas of military discipline 
and etiquette.
"The Teutonic mind, admitting only cold fact and 
discarding ideals, had recognised that the nations of the 
earth are but rapacious packs of animals preying upon one 
another.... The British nation, on the other hard, whose 
civilisation tended towards the ideal rather than to the 
material, blinded itself to so harsh an aspect of life, 
and hoped for the best."^^
Nature did not hold individual life in high regard. What 
justification, then, could there be for treating life as 
precious. Individuals were as leaves on a tree, and leaves must 
fall. It therefore mattered little if they were shaken off, or 
broken off by force. In face of such thinking it was clear that 
"any desire [on the part of the British] to limit the horrors of
(52)
war seems to them to be the most ridiculous of paradoxes."'
War was not a game. The intention was to impose horror on the 
enemy, and success in such an enterprise could involve deceit 
and cheating. It followed that there was no place for 
inhibiting notions such as ’fair play1. It was in contrast to 
such "logical deductions of the German mind... the most utter
[1153
disregard for the illogical sentiments which sweeten life [that]
our methods of thought assume a character altogether more human
(53)
and inviting."' As viewed by the British, civilised life was 
a paradox; it could not be reduced to a formula. In defence of 
civilised life, German ethics had to be utterly destroyed. And, 
of all nations,
"England, impractical, illogical, idealistic, laughing 
England [was] most fitted to strike with the sword of
(54)
Righteousness."
The distasteful application of logic to the conduct of war, a 
practice said to distinguish the Germans fran the British, was a 
theme also treated by J. H. Morgan [1915] in the introduction to
(55)
his translation of The German War Book.
"Let the reader.... study carefully a dark sentence in 
that section of The War Bock which deals with 'Cunning and 
Deceit'. There the German officer is instructed that 
there is nothing in international law against [steht 
volkerrechtlich nichts entgegen] the exploitation of 
assassination, incendiarism, robbery and the like, to the 
disadvantage of the eneny. There is nothing in 
international law against it! No, indeed, there are many 
things upon which international law is silent for the
[116]
simple reason that it refuses to contemplate their
possibility. It assumes that it is dealing not with
brutes but with men. International law is the etiquette
of international society, and society, as it has been
gravely said, is conducted on the assumption that murder
will not be ccnmitted. We do not carry revolvers in our
pockets when ve enter our clubs nor finger them when we
shake hands with a stranger. Nor, to adopt a very hcmely
illustration, does any hostess think it necessary to put
up a notice in her drawing room that guests are not
allowed to spit upon the floor. But what should we think
of a man who committed this disgusting offence, and then
pleaded that there was nothing to show that the hostess
had forbidden it? Human society, like political society,
advances in proportion as it rests on voluntary morality
rather than positive law. In primitive society everything
is ’taboo1, because the only thing that will restrain the
undisciplined passions of men is fear. Can it be that
this is why the traveller in Germany finds everything
’Verboten', and that things which in our own country are
left to the good sense and good breeding of the citizen
(561have to be officiously forbidden?"
Havelock Ellis [1915] made distinctions between the British and 
the Germans, but he also made distinctions between German and
[117]
German. He had a sympathetic appreciation of the problems facing
the various states of the Empire in relation to Prussia, and he
held out the hope that Germany was not hermetically sealed in
with the values and practices which characterised her recent
history. In this analysis criticism was moderated by a desire
(57)to avoid categorical condemnation.
It was the misfortune of the nation that "... the spirit of the
drill sergeant... the eternal spirit of Prussia... has for the
(58)mcment dominated the whole of Germany...." It was in
subordination to the state that the Germans were so strikingly 
different frcm the British:
"An Englishman.... no more dreams of worshipping the state 
than of worshipping his own trousers. Both the one and 
the other he regards as useful.... he would not be without 
either on any account... but he regards them as alike made 
for him and to his own measure. The idea that he was made 
for them and that he must abase himself in the dust before 
their divine superiority is an idea at which he would 
smile."(59)
At the same time, Ellis perceived two traditions in German life 
- individualism and docility - traditions which accounted for 
what he termed "the, strikingly duplex character of the German 
spirit....."
[1183
"The German spirit oscillates between extreme nationalism 
and extreme internationalism. The opposing claims for the 
dominance of the individual and of the state in Germany,
the cosmopolitanism and the particularism of Germany....
may well represent varying aspects, from different angles, 
of the same national temperament, the obverse and reverse 
of the German spirit.
Those opposing claims, pulling Germany in different directions,
could be traced to the profound differences between Prussia on
the one hand and the Rhineland - the west and the south - on the
other. The differences were highlighted by the leading figures
of each region, "... the two supremely representative German men
of modem times....", Bismarck and Goethe. The tensions
inherent in this division meant that ’Germany1 had resented,
sometimes even loathed Prussia. It took crisis to bring them
together. "Thus it has come about - although it has not always
been so and doubtless will not always be so - that of late the
(62)spirit of Germany has been the spirit of Prussia." 
However, the dislike of Prussia could not be completely removed, 
even in a national emergency. Many Germans did not want the 
war. If they remained silent it was "out of patriotism in the 
moment of crisis.... but they represent a vast number of their
(63)
.... fellow countrymen who love peace and home..." ' In 
this, there was hope for the future, for,
[119]
"Beyond and above the Germany of Clausewitz and 
Schamhorst, of Bismarck and Moltke, of Treitschke... 
There is the great and imnortal Germany of lies sing and 
Kant, of Goethe and Wilhelm von Humboldt, of Heine.... It 
is a Germany that will be created anew...."
Implicit in articles written by Bertrand Russell [1915,1916]
were the notions that Germany should be treated fairly, that
judgements should not be one-sided, that her situation should be
regarded with sympathetic understanding and tolerance.
Reasoned, impartial analysis indicated that both Britain and
Germany bore responsibility for the conflict. The problem was
that both were ".. .wholly blind to their own faults, and utterly
(66)fantastic in the crimes which they attribute to the enemy."
Each nation saw itself as peace-loving, and using its power in 
pursuit of worthy aims. Each saw the other as perfidious and 
jealous, conducting a premeditated conflict. Each believed
that the only possible resolution was in the utter humiliation of 
the other.
"The mood in which Germany embarked upon the war was 
abominable, but it was a mood fostered by the habitual 
mood of England... by our resistance we shewed that we 
shared their standards...",
and cold pride on the one hand was opposed by hot envy on the
Attitudes toward Germany in the prewar period had been 
characterised by an intolerance stemming fran a legalistic 
insistence on the maintenance of the status quo. Minds had 
been closed to the reality that "in a world where nations grew 
and decay, where forces change and populations become cramped, 
it is not possible or desirable to maintain the status quo 
forever.11 Industrial conflict comes about when the
wage-earning class desire change in opposition to what they 
regard as an unfair status quo, and the privileged class defend 
the status quo in the name of peace. In this way the blame for 
class warfare is shared. "And in exactly the same way, England 
shares the responsibility for Germany’s war."
A sympathetic understanding of Germany’s position would show
that since it became a great power "... it has been handicapped
by naval inferiority and by the necessity of defending two
frontiers. It is these accidents of history and geography,
rather than innate wickedness, which have produced German
aggressiveness. The aims of German policy are closely similar
to those which we have always pursued, but its methods cannot be
the unobtrusive methods which we have usually adopted, because
(71)such methods in the circumstances, would achieve nothing."
[121]
In consequence of rapid development, Germany became more
dependent on irrports of food and exports of manufactures.
Foreign trade had to be safeguarded, and this required a
strengthened navy. But a strong German navy frightened Britain
and made her hostile. As a result, the German navy, to be
effective in face of British hostility, had to be strengthened
still further in relative terms. This Britain would not
tolerate, and so from the German point of view "... all
industrial progress and all colonial expansion [remained]
perpetually at England’s mercy. If we ask ourselves how we
should feel if we were similarly at the mercy of Germany, we
(72)shall perhaps understand why the Germans hate us."
A particularly interesting approach to Germany was taken by J.
(73)Ellis Barker [1916]. It is an approach which supports the
model for classification of attitudes defined in Chapter 2. 
Barker accepted that the allies were engaged in a "life and
death struggle", and that "... the Anglo-Saxon race [was]
. (74)fighting for its existence." He carplained bitterly that
those, including himself, "who unceasingly tried to warn the
(75)nation.... were treated as alarmists, cranks..." Those
attitudes place him at the positive end of the ccmpetition 
continuum. But he was far frcm being anti-German in the 
accepted sense of the term. In fact, seme of his passages on 
German institutions and practices were profoundly laudatory, and
[122]
he was very discriminating when he came to assign responsibility 
for the events leading to the war. His criticism of the British 
way of doing things, as opposed to the German way, may be 
regarded as an unusual but nonetheless revealing Garment on the 
ideological self-image. His praise of certain German 
institutions and practices, and his concomitant criticism of 
related British institutions and practices, is illustrative of 
the generosity which many saw as part of the self-image - the 
capacity to be self-critical and see good in others.
His criticisms remarked, implicitly, upon those British traits
and values associated with democratic forms - tolerance of wide
ranging opinions, respect for divergent points of view. The
organisation and efficiency of Prussia was looked on enviously
by Barker. The war had revealed the weaknesses of democracy, and
(76)the Prussian example "may indicate the cure."
"In democracies party spirit proves only too often more 
powerful than patriotism. While party interests are 
promoted those of the nation are disregarded and suffer 
neglect. Besides, democracies are administered not by men 
of action but by men of words, by amateurs whose position 
depends on the popular will and upon the popular whim.... 
Organisation in time of crisis can be efficient only if the 
men in power can command, and if those over whom they have
[123]
authority are certain to obey. Democracy is government by
argument. It does not organise, but it disorganises "
(77)
Barker deplored what he perceived to be the crucial weakness of
British democracy? it left the nation without a guide, without
a single will to animate the whole administration of the state.
In Germany, the whole nation acted "like a single man, and every
other consideration [was] subordinated to the national
(78)interest." In science, art, and law, efficiency and
organised promotion marked the German approach, whereas in
Britain "education remained amateurish.... men toyed with
science.... the laws are a maze, and justice is seme times
(79)unobtainable because of.... its uncertainty..." British
democracy was self-indulgent, depending for action on voluntary 
methods and persuasion. If the life and death struggle was to 
be survived, organisation had to be met by organisation, 
absolutism by absolutism. .
When he came to assign responsibility for the war, Barker
restricted his focus to the Kaiser. In 1890, Germany dominated
the continent of Europe, but this was "willingly borne, because
(81)she was believed to be peaceful and contented." However,
after Bismarck's fall, and despite the former Chancellor's 
ongoing criticism of "... the pernicious policy, the incompetent
[124]
statesmen, and the dangerous influence which, he feared, would
cause Germany's downfall....", William II interfered, picked
(82)unnecessary quarrels, created dislike and suspicion.
Although Bethmann Hollweg and other colleagues worked to
preserve the peace of Europe, they were "overruled by their 
(83)master", who imparted to Germany's policy "his cwn nervous
restlessness."
In its own idiosyncratic way, The Foundations of Germany adds to 
the profile of the ideological self-image.
Thomas F. A. Smith [1916] introduced his examination of The Soul
of Germany with a caimitment to the tenets of the British
self-image. He claimed that during his years in Germany he had
lived himself into his surroundings and bee one part of them.
This had involved "a great deal of self-conquest.... incessant
alertness in looking at things frcm the other man's point of
(85)view.... unlimited patience and inexhaustible sympathy."
The extent to which this conmitment informed his attitudes to 
Germany, the relative weight he assigned to it, is a matter for 
a subsequent chapter; but his reference to such traits and 
values, and its location in his text, may be seen as an 
acknowledgement that he was aware of the ideological 
dispositions of his readers. And there was no disguising the 
fact that when he identified German traits and values he was
[1251
highlighting those of the British in contradistinction.
Smith set himself the task of revealing the "differences between
English and German standards of honour, morality, cannercial
honesty, reverence for wcmanhood, sympathy for the downfalien,
chivalry to the weak, conceptions of right and wrong...."
The German was singularly incapable of looking at things from
the other man's point of view. It followed that "true
sympathy" was a feeling which did not characterise his human 
(87)relationships. Where the British would place conscience as
a guide to action in relation to others, the Germans placed
Ehrgefuhl [the * feeling' of honour]. The distinction was
instructive since it defined the respective ground-rules for
interaction. Where conscience more often than not led to
other-regarding action, Ehrgefuhl led to ".....marked egoism or
diseased vanity", and was a measure of "the ease with which a
(88)German may be offended." As evidence of the marked
sensitivity and active quarrelsomeness of the Germans, Smith 
referred to the figures for 'insult' cases [distinct from libel 
in the German Code] published by the Imperial Statistics Office 
in Berlin:
[126]
Year Persons Charged Number Sentenced
1907 83,013 60,895
1908 82,011 59,830
1909 82,827 59,673
1910 84,058 60,344
1911 86,573 61,899
For insulting and threatening officials, not included in the 
above figures:
Year Persons Charged Number Sentenced
1907 35,226 27,418
1908 34,453 26,803
1909 32,999 25,677
1910 31,775 24,668
1911 30,466 23,745
(89)
The ideals expressed in the popular phrase 1 fair-play' had never
penetrated the imagination of the Germans. Whereas the
Englishman abhorred the idea of bullying, such behaviour was a
(91)recognised feature of German culture. The conclusion which
Smith drew from his analysis was that if Germany were victorious 
in the war, her methods and principles would overthrow all 
humane ideals. It remained "Britain’s mission to prevent that 
catastrophe and at the same time to vindicate among nations the 
principle which she first taught to individuals - the traditions 
of fair play."^^
The disposition to discriminate, to limit liability, to deal
[127]
fairly with the enemy - even at a time of national emergency -
is evident in the introduction to Volume 1 of The Gresham
History of the Great War [1917]. "It is essential", wrote the
General Editor, "to distinguish broadly between Prussia and
Germany.... we had no particular quarrel before the war with the
German nation as a whole.... regarded as a quiet, domestic race
that would have been wholly admirable if left to itself. It was
not against this Germany that we drew the sword; it was against
(9 3)
the mail-fisted military caste of Prussia."
T. S. Kncwlson [1918] wrote a scathing commentary on German 
traits and values, and in so doing revealed something of the 
British self-image. The Germans believed that they were so far 
ahead of all other nations that they were, in a special sense, 
the custodians of all knowledge and greatness. To the charge 
that it would be absurd to imagine that a whole nation "could 
believe such twaddle about itself", Kncwlson responded: "True, 
so far as any nation other than Germany is concerned, but it is 
just the doctrine that a German can believe; indeed his 
mentality is of such high suggestibility that he would believe 
anything if you based it on a system and made it look
(94)
authoritative." This notion of superiority led to the
surrender of individual ethics to state ethics. The mind of the 
average German was more concerned with "the list of Ihou Shalts 
and Thou Shalt Nots than with freedom, independence, or
[128]
individuality." It was not surprising therefore, that from the 
cradle to the grave, "The Teuton lives for a great scheme; he 
is a screw, a nut, or a bolt in the machine of a vast state 
efficiency." This meant "the death of spontaneity... and 
spontaneity is vital if a nation is to have.... those finer 
mental forces...." The absence of such finer forces showed up 
in German education. Were British knowledge put on the scale 
against German knowledge, the avoirdupois would be on the German 
side - and this would be the preferred outcome so far as Britain 
was concerned. Knowledge that was too unwieldy in volume to
fulfil its function of refinement was alien to British
. . .  (95)sensibilities.
However, Kncwlson could not bring himself to damn Germany beyond 
redemption. There had been something of real value there before 
the nation had been Prussianised. Like Havelock Ellis, he 
located the hope of Germany in the west and south, and held out 
the prospect of revival. Having made this concession he yet 
entertained a doubt;
"What of a new Germany? Will not a better political 
ideal, a freer existence with a larger scope for personal 
initiative, result in a more striking intellectual life? 
When there is less guidance from the overlords and more 
opportunity for the natural self, may we not expect a
[129]
revival of the older German love of Beauty and Truth? It 
would be reasonable to answer in the affirmative, for 
Germany has a deep intellectual life that could be potent 
if properly developed - not by a system but by individual 
freedom. And yet there are purgings to be gone through 
before such a condition is possible."
The sources so far used for the definition of the 
ideological element of the British self-image have been 
taken from periods in which Britain and Germany were 
mutually involved in international tension or conflict. 
It has to be noted that common validation of the traits 
and values said to characterise the British did not lead 
to common attitudes toward Germany. This was because 
attitudes toward Germany depended less on the validation 
of the traits and values than on their salience as 
operational constructs and on the weight assigned to them 
relative to other factors, for example, the pragmatic 
aspect of the self-image. In the 1920s Wien Britain and 
Germany were not mutually involved in international 
tension, and even in the 1930s Wien they were, attitudes 
to Germany were, in part at least, the consequence of a 
conscience-led phase of reflection. In this phase it is 
clear that some who had earlier assigned relatively low 
weight to the ideological self-image in their assessment
[130]
of Germany and hew she should be treated, adjusted that
. . .  (97)weighting an an upward direction. It may be assumed
that in the same phase those who had assigned relatively
high weight to the ideological self-image were confirmed
and reinforced in that position. As the conscience-led
phase of reflection gave way to another period of tension
and conflict there was a return to the situation which had
prevailed before and during the First World War - ccninon
validation of British traits and values, but divergent
attitudes toward Germany.
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find his parents who lived in Hofstade. All the houses 
were burning except the one in which this man's parents 
lived. [When they unlocked the door they found the 
parents, and a boy and girl, dead.] Each of them had both 
feet cut off just above the ankle and both hands just above 
the wrist."
D85 [Given by a Post-Office official, describing an 
incident at Vfeede].
"I saw two little children [girls] three or four years old, 
standing beside the road with a woman who appeared to be 
their mother. As the Germans came up, two of them drove 
their bayonets through the bodies of the two children..."
D88 [Given by a Belgian soldier, describing an incident at 
Eppeghem].
"... dead body of a child of about two years of age... A 
German lance, similar to those used by Uhlans and other 
German cavalry, was in the child's body, and was stuck into 
the ground through the body."
D94 [Given by a Belgian soldier, describing an incident at 
Boort-Mserbeck].
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A German soldier shot at a little girl of from four to six 
and, "... seeing that he failed to hit the child by firing 
at her... he ran at her and bayoneted her in the stomach."
D117 [Given by a Belgian soldier, describing an incident at 
Capelle-au-Bois].
"I heard a cart coming along the road about 800 metres 
away. I saw a German officer go forward and stop the cart. 
We were few in number, so could not go close, the Germans 
being in greater force. [A boy and a girl shot]. The 
mother picked up the dead bodies... and drove into the 
Belgian lines."
D130 [Given by a Belgian plasterer, describing an incident 
in the vicinity of Malines].
German soldiers broke down the door of a peasant’s house. 
"The peasant came and asked what they were doing. His 
hands were tied behind his back and he was shot at once 
without a moments delay. The wife came out with a little 
sucking child. She put the child down and sprang at the 
German like a lioness. She clawed their faces. One of the 
soldiers took his rifle and struck her a tremendous blow 
with the butt on the head. She fell dead. Another took 
out his bayonet and fixed it and thrust it through the 
child. He then put his rifle across his shoulder with the 
child upon it. Its little arms stretched out once or 
twice."
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(i) H.A.L. Fisher was a member of the Bryce Carmission. 
In common with his colleagues he was aware that the 
depositions on alleged atrocities had not been made 
under oath; that the evidence found in diaries 
confiscated from German solidiers contradicted the 
depositions in important respects; that follcw-up 
investigations failed to find corroborating evidence 
in the field. Further, he was party to the decision 
not to corns face to face with the witnesses making the 
depositions, or to interrogate the lawyers who had 
taken them down. Notwithstanding this, Fisher 
associated himself with the published report.
See Trevor Wilson, op.cit.
Wilson considered this to be "an example of the manner 
in which the pressures of war could affect the
[140]
standards of conduct of honourable, enlightened, 
fastidious Englishmen." Ibid. p.370.
After the war H.A.L. Fisher was a member of the
Anglo-German Association.
(ii) There is a clear suggestion that Bartlett had suffered
seme form of painful psychological problem brought
about by temporarily held attitudes which clashed with 
the declared self-image. He confessed that he "... 
wrote a book of war sketches so lurid and fervent that 
whenever I remember it I pause to thank heaven it is 
out of print."
Vernon Bartlett, Nazi Germany Explained [Gollancz 
1933] p.66.
(iii) Philip Kerr had served Lloyd-George in the drafting of
sections of the Treaty of Versailles. In an address at
Chatham House, March 1936: "My own view is that in the 
present crisis British public opinion says that 
Germany has essential justice on her side, that France 
has the law on her side."
Lord Lothian, Address published in Germany and the 
Rhineland
[Special Supplement To International Affairs, April 
1936] p.50.
CHAPTER 5
THE CONSCENCE-LED PHASE OF REFLECTION
That there was a period between the wars when attitudes toward
Germany appeared to be the result of conscience-led reflection
did not escape the highly critical attention of such as A. L.
Rcwse, L. B. Namier, and Robert Vansittart. Their contribution
to the debate will be considered later. By way of introduction
it may be noted that Martin Gilbert and Richard Gott [1963],
describing British attitudes in the interwar years, used a
procession of significant phrases, all of which say something
about the British self-image: "Germany lay on many
consciences;"^ "Ashamed of what they had done;"^ "a sense
of d i s q u i e t ; " I t  was wrong to crush her further;" ^
(5)"adopt as fair an attitude as possible."
All the features of the ideological self-image, from empathetic 
understanding of the sufferings of former enemies to a 
detestation of double standards, were present in the work of 
Philip Gibbs [1921]. ^  There was also the strain of a troubled 
conscience; and there was anger, particularly at the apparent 
ease with which the values associated with the self-image were 
jettisoned in favour of vengeance. Writing in the irrmediate 
aftermath of the war, Gibbs launched what amounted to a 
psychological assault on his readers; he held a mirror up to 
British conduct and challenged them to look at themselves. The 
overall intent of The Hope of Europe was to enter a passionate 
plea for cooperation between peoples, to lay down the
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1 scriptures1 for a faith capable of "annihilating the folly of 
the past"; and it was not by chance that the book concluded 
with ten affirmations denying "....the old baggage of racial and
historical hatreds, diplomatic intrigues and sacrifices,
. . . . (7)military traditions and superstitions." ' It was in the
service of this plea that he made his specific caiments on 
Germany.
Gibbs associated himself with those whose aim was to inspire the
peoples of Europe to make "a clean jump across the abyss that
opens before them, instead of crawling slcwly to it, and falling
in." He knew that in doing so he ran the risk, as others did,
of being listed with the "impractical visionaries! Dreamers out
of touch with reality! Sentimentalists regardless of plain
(8)facts! Revolutionists with rose-water...." - and so he was
at pains to establish his credentials. As a war-correspondent,
all his soul had been with the fighting men, and he had risked
his life with them. No one had been more sickened than he by
the "tales of horror, and by cruelty undenied and undeniable."
He had seen the manner of German destruction, "day by day, year
/a)
by year, in ruined cities and ravaged fields." It was
certain, if anything in history was certain, that nothing would 
ever reverse the verdict of Guilty against the German Military 
Caste; they had planned, desired, and made the war. This
caste, centred in Prussia, had "brutal qualities" which
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resulted in a "degradation of morality", and a kind of "marked
(ID
defiance of all that is gentle." Endowed with the
confidence of such a record, Gibbs aligned himself with what
Lord Robert Cecil had termed "the old standards of English
justice and honour", standards which called for "moderation
towards the beaten enemy.... based on reason rather than
passion", and with H. W. Massingham's hatred of cruelty to the
(1 2)
weak, the ignorant, the underdog. And never were the old
standards more in need of application. In 1918, "The lowest 
passions of humanity [had been] prodded up by the Press and by 
politicians", and the people had yielded when appeal was made 
"to the brute in them."^^
In passages describing the condition of the civilian population 
before and at the Armistice, the worsening of that condition 
with the continuation of the Blockade, and the consequent 
response of the German people, there is to be found in the words 
of Gibbs a sense of stricken conscience, a profound distaste for
an atypical kick at a ‘man who is down', and an almost withering
shame in face of what he perceived to be inhumanity and
injustice. They are passages dramatically informed by the 
values of the British self-image.
"The more I see of different peoples up and down the 
world, the more I understand that they cannot be held
[144]
guilty for the acts of their rulers... There is no 
'England1 when foreign folk say 'England' does this, or 
does that, thinks this or that. There are millions of 
English people who do and think differently, or have no 
share in what is done or thought in particular cases.... 
So the German housewife, watching her children develop 
bulbous heads with rickets [what they call 'the English 
disease'] because of our blockade, had very little to 
do... with the gas attack at Ypres, and the peasant 
hustled frcm his plough to front line trenches... [with] 
Von Tirpitz and the U-Boat war. 'But they supported 
their Government', says the logical man. 'They did not 
rise and overthrew their devilish leaders'. That is true. 
But English folk decline to be branded because their 
government has done things which they detest, villainous 
things, without honour, dirty things which cannot bear the 
light of day. The clerks, the shopgirls, the farmers' 
boys, the mechanics, have not overthrown [their] 
government... They have neither the power nor the 
knowledge.... Most of them are too busy with their little 
needs of life to bother about it....
We do not yet realise - those, at least, who were not in 
Germany at once after the Armistice - how sharp was the 
tooth of hunger which bit them, and how it gnawed at
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them.... The middle classes indulged in chemical products 
- 'ersatz food' - which gave them a false sense of 
satisfaction for a time, but no red corpuscles. They saw 
their children withering, weakening. In the poorer 
classes there was real starvation, and the women and 
children were victims of tuberculosis and every other 
kind of illness due to lack of milk and fats... working 
girls would drop asleep... through sheer anaemic weakness.
For the children of the cities the last two years of war 
and the first year of peace were doom years.... They.... 
were so rickety that they did not grow bones in their 
bodies, but only gristle."
Against a standard of 3,300 calories per day for a working man 
of middle weight, German workers were reduced to 1,985 in 1916, 
to 1,344 in the winter of 1916-17, and to 1,100 in the simmer ■ of 
1917. In the final year of the war 50,391 children between the 
ages of one and fifteen years died in Prussia, as against 27,730 
in 1913. Deaths from tuberculosis increased during each of the 
four full years of the war, with steady movement frcm the 61,000 
in 1915 to the 97,000 in 1918. Gibbs, sympathetically 
considering the experiences of "the clerks, the shopgirls, the 
farmers' boys, the mechanics", their lack of power and knowledge 
as he saw it, to offset by action the "villainous things", the 
"dirty things" perpetrated in their name - addressed the question
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inherent in all acts of empathy: 'What would .1 have done in such 
a situation?"
"So the German people suffered, and the worst thing that 
wanen suffered, and many men, was to see their children 
weakening and dying, or never gaining in health and 
strength. No wonder, poor souls, that they wished well to 
a U-Boat war which should break the blockade and let food 
in.... To break that net anyhcw, by any violence, by any 
cruelty, was justified in the souls of German men and 
women besieged through the years of war and watching the 
blight upon the children they had brought into an evil 
world. So, if I had been a German father, I should have 
thought...."
All hope that the Armistice would bring relief from the Blockade 
proved an illusion. It continued, and defeated hope made the 
suffering even worse. "The German folk were bitter against us 
for that", wrote Gibbs, "I think they had a right to be bitter, 
and that the verdict of history will be against us for that. We 
had beaten them into absolute surrender. Our force was enough 
to impose our terms without the need of baby-starving. Nor is 
it a defence to say that the Germans would have been harsher 
with us if they had won. Gentlemen do not regulate their 
conduct by the standard of those whan they condemn as
brutes.."
[147]
To the contrary point of view, expressed in the words, "Let them
die... why should ws feed boy-babies who will grew up to be
Huns", Gibbs replied that in the cruelty of its logic it was an
(15)attitude "new in modern England."
Gibbs was one of the first writers to regard the evidence of the
Bryce Commission as suspect. It was to be expected that "the
deep tides and currents of war enthusiasm", intensified by
hatred of the enemy and love of one's own country, should be
(16)"inflamed and kept at fever pitch by atrocity stories", but 
what was the truth of the matter so far as a cautious mind could 
ascertain:
"I could never get evidence of any of them. All the 
evidence I could get myself throughout the war, in the 
places where they were alleged to happen, was against the 
truth of them. No living babies had their hands cut off, 
nor women their breasts. That is certain, in spite of 
faked photographs. No Canadians were crucified... There 
were no German 'corpse factories", though our Chief of 
Intelligence patronised the myth. I myself enquired for 
atrocities in Lille, Liege, and captured villages in which 
we rescued civilians who had lived for years in German 
hands. I could not get any evidence at all. The 
civilians themselves, while cursing the Germans as a sale 
race, did not charge them with abominable acts resembling
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in any way the atrocity stories of the newspapers. I am 
convinced that much of the evidence in the Bryce Report is
(17)
utterly untrustworthy.1
A sense of fairness is evident in the way Gibbs apportioned
responsibility for the outbreak of the Great War. Statesmen of
the Entente powers disclaimed responsibility, "pleaded dove-like
innocence", but they had helped to maintain, defend and
intensify the old conventions of international rivalry.
Imperial aggrandisement and immediate material advantage was
foremost in their minds. There was no real appeal to the
conscience of humanity, no leading voices raised in favour of a
reasonable alternative to slaughter. It was all too easy to say
that humane ideals would have been inappropriate in face of a
Germany occupying the role of "wild beast of Europe, with
devouring instincts"; why had no sustained effort been made to
"tame the wild beast in the heart of Germany"? The statesmen
of Europe, without marked exception, were akin to ape-men,
"peering out of their caves, gibbering and beckoning to friendly
apes, frothing and mouthing to hostile apes." Had Aesop,
Swift, or Lafontaine expressed the European System in parable,
(18)
the images of jungle-life and ape-life would have been used.
Gibbs argued that a great opportunity had been missed in 1918. 
In defining that opportunity he made implicit reference to the 
ideological self-image - to the traits and values of sympathy,
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tolerance, justice. He conceded that if the Treaty of
Versailles were judged "upon the plane of thought no higher than
that of the statesmen who formed it... according to the old
ethics", then no better treaty could have been made. The old
ethics demanded that each of the victor nations make the best
bargain in terms of crude self-interest, immediate advantage,
"without much thought to the future." They were like players in
a card-school, grabbing the pool which "the German gamblers had
lost when their last bluff was called," each willing to quarrel
over its distribution. It followed that any criticism of the
treaty was futile, if "conducted on the basis of the old
philosophy." No one involved had opened their minds to the
notion that after the massacres, the destruction of youth, "only
mutual helpfulness between one nation and another, former
friends and enemies, could bring a chance of recovery...."
There had been an opportunity to liberate the German people from
bondage to evil ideas, to bring them into "a new era of
(19)fellowship", but it had been missed.
On the issue of the traits and values alleged to be 
characteristic of the Germans, Gibbs' views were constrained by 
the need to make balanced judgements, the desire to raise, in 
the interests of fairness and avoidance of hypocrisy, facets of 
British conduct and practice which required close examination. 
Of the Germans he wrote:
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"....never did I believe in their monstrosity, or their 
place apart in the human family, as ogre changelings...
The German people, as a whole, the peasants and the 
clerks, and the manufacturing fel lews were but victims of 
a damnable deception and of a still more damnable 
philosophy, imposed upon them by military minds of a rigid 
and almost religious caste; and that those Prussian 
junkers were only rather more logical and very much more 
efficient, in the fulfilment of their ideas, than certain 
English militarists whom I had happened to meet along the 
way of life - an opinion in which I have since been 
confirmed by certain Generals in Ireland and others like 
them in cerebral structure of anthropoid type."
There had been cruelties on the German side. If this was down 
to the unpleasant extremes of human passion, those same extremes 
were at work in Ireland. If German use of poison-gas was a 
debit to them, it was no credit to Britain that she had used it 
too - and it appeared that with the war over experimental 
establishments in Britain were at work to produce a gas more 
deadly than any previously used. If callousness, arrogance, and 
inhumanity had featured in German behaviour,
"Well, we find more cruelty in human nature, outside 
Germany, than once we cared to believe. In Russia it is
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not unknown, though Russians were so good and kind when 
they were still fighting on our side. Even in England,
and in Ireland, there are potentialities of cruelty which
. . (21) are not quite reassuring to our self-complacency.
....If the Prussian believed before the war that he was
the noblest type of human being, and that the Empire he
had founded had the close support of God, and that his
destiny, his very duty was to rule less civilised people,
it must be admitted that there have been Englishmen with
(22)the same conceit of themselves.11
The privations of the German people, and their struggle against
odds to regain a significant place in the world, brought out a
flood of sympathy which sometimes merged into outright
admiration. At the time of the Franco-Belgian invasion of the
Ruhr, John Ley land [1923] reported that the Germans did not
quail "before this new oppression.... Tom by internal strife,
they yet preserve an unbroken front. The very attack that has
been delivered upon them has stimulated extraordinary qualities
(23)of resistance..." In Leyland's eyes, France was the
troublemaker of Europe, kicking Germany when she was down, 
taking unfair advantage of her difficulties. France had 
favoured the setting of an inpossible sum for reparations 
precisely because she knew Germany could not meet it. The 
inevitable defaulting would then, and had, provided her with the
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opportunity to invade. In this way the 'hidden agenda1 of 
French policy would be realised - the complete destruction of 
Germany and the concomitant aggrandisement of France. The 
Treaty of Versailles was not enough for the French; "in the 
opinion of most of the jurists of the world they have broken it 
already, but new they wish to destroy it entirely. It 
guarantees the frontiers of Germany, but they wish to seek their 
'natural frontier' of the Rhine, just as the Government of the 
French Revolution stretched out their ambitions to the 'national 
frontier' of the Schelde."
But, in Britain, Germany new had a friend: "It is our interest
to develop friendly relations with that country.... The war has 
long been over, and those who knew the German people know well 
that of all peoples they are nearest to ourselves.... The solid 
mass of the German people.... are destined yet, whatever 
tragedies they may go through, to beccme again a great people, 
none the worse for having been tried as by fire. The world will 
do well to regard them as friends and not as enemies. It is not 
to the interest of anyone that Germany should be 
disintegrated."
In C. H. Herford's [1927] irrpressions of the forces at work in 
post-war Germany there are to be found numerous indications of 
his ccximitment to the traits and values of the British 
self-image. It was his intention to provide his readers with a
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revised perspective on Germany, a perspective uncontaminated by
the unreason associated with the emergencies of war and by the
emotion-charged circumstances of making peace with a defeated
enemy. Behind this intention lay a firm belief in justice. It
would not be right to ignore the good things that were happening 
(26)in Germany. When those 'good things' were defined it
became clear that Herford's attitude toward Germany was 
influenced not only by an explicit desire to be just, but also 
by a belief that the changes being wrought in that country were 
bringing its basic values into closer alignment with those of 
Britain. This attitude was reinforced, and the encouraging 
signs made all the more significant, by sympathetic reflection 
on the difficulties which Germany had faced.
"Few modem nations have suffered a catastrophe which
subjected all the bonds of national cohesion to so
terrible a strain as Germany, between November 1918 and
June 1919, suffered from the military overthrew, the
(27)blockade, the Revolution, and the Dictated Peace."
The war had left "moral wreckage as wall as material ruin in its
(28)train." In such a situation it was natural that horror and
indignation would breed hope and idealism in seme, disillusion, 
despair and relaxation of moral standards in others? it was 
natural that seme would seek solutions at the extremes. The real
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challenge in all this was that Germany "found itself thrown back
upon its own intellectual, moral and cultural resources....",
but the challenge had been successfully confronted, because
(29)those resources ware ntmense. They subsumed "...the
enduring values and virtues of German civilisation."^^
The evert signs of regeneration ware many. Although soma of 
idealist disposition had their vision "shaped by memory" and
looked backward into the past for inspiration, others had their
. . (31)visions "shaped by imagination and hope." Evidence for this
departure from old ways was to be found in the likelihood that
for half the nation "defeat was a release; and for a large
. . .  (32)section the humiliation of the army was a triumph..."
Important changes were also occurring at the intellectual level.
H. S. Chamberlain's, The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century,
had been demolished by Hertz in his Passe und Kultur, which had
tom apart the "... paste-board Jericho of racial superstition",
and "sapped the authority of one of the most dangerous of the
(33)illusions that lead to war..." There had been a
complementary repudiation of "the whole complex of ideas and 
passions embraced in the 'imperialism* of the fallen Reich: in
particular, aggressive nationalism and its acconpaniments..." 
This repudiation did not mean that bitterness and resentment 
fostered by the treatment of the nation at Versailles had 
subsided? nor did it mean that Germans would surrender their
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desire to win for their country parity among the nations of 
Europe; but it did mean "...the adoption of international 
goodwill, of loyalty, not only to 'King and Gountry' but to 
humanity...."
Intellectual circles of the post-war period were also providing
evidence of a revolt against "those characteristics of modem
German mentality which tend to atrophy or sterilise spiritual
life... the rigidity.... of theological dogmatism.... the
aridity of a scholarship punctillious in the search for
'sources' but scornful of spiritual values... the ego-centric
hardness of a capitalism obsessed with the vision of material 
(35)power..." The Volkshochschulen movement founded in 1918,
and the legislation humanising labour relations by giving
workers more autonomy and responsibility, were products of this
revolt. Now that a start had been made, horizons were being
extended and new visions entertained. "VJhat", asked Professor
Eugen Rossenstock of Breslau, "if there had to be ordinances
designed to do justice not only to the worker as he is, to his
actual wants and needs, but to the worker as he is to be?
(36)Ordinances which will set free his creative power.."
Such changes of far reaching importance had cane about despite 
rather than because of a naive belief on the part of the Allies 
that Germany could be carpel led to adopt them. In demanding that
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Germany, and she alone, disarm, the Allies had made change less
rather than more likely, for such obvious unfairness had deeply
wounded not only her pride but also her hope of security and
sense of justice. Germany would no doubt struggle to redress
such wrongs, but not in the old ways. The crushing sufferings
of wartime, "culminating in the final debacle which rendered
all those sufferings, all the magnificent pretensions which
involved them, futile, [had] produced a profound abhorrence of
(37)war itself." This much was clear from a study of the
writings of Viebig [Das Rote Meer and Tochter der Hekuba], 
Latzko [Friedensgericht], Frank [Der Mensch 1st Gut], Kaiser 
[Gas] and Toller [Hinkemann].
Arthur Ponsonby's Falsehood in Wartime [1928] was not simply an
exercise in historical revision, nor simply a matter of setting
the record straight. It was also a confession that politicians,
press, and public in Britain had been party to gross distortion
of the truth during the war; it was also, in effect, an act of
contrition, a plea of 'guilty1 to the charge that the sense of
balance, fairness and justice had temporarily deserted many
people, frcm the "deliberate individual liar" to newspaper
(38)editors, correspondents, and high officials of State.
Ponsonby concluded that there could be "no more discreditable
period in the history of journalism than the four years of the 
(39)Great War." Even allowing for the emergencies of the war
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and the claims of expediency, it remained alarming that 
"prominent people of repute, who would have shrunk fran 
condemning their bitterest personal enemy on the evidence, or 
rather lack of evidence, they had before them, did not hesitate 
to lead the way in charging a whole nation with every 
conceivable brutality and unnatural crime"
Individual liars, initially supported and given wide currency by 
corporate groups, made significant contributions to the record. 
Kate Hume, eventually tried in the High Court of Dumfries on a 
charge of uttering a forged letter, was responsible for the 
fabrication of a story [1914] in which her sister Grace, 
allegedly serving as a nurse in Belgium but subsequently found 
to be safe and well in Huddersfield, was the victim of 
outrageous brutality at the hands of German soldiers. Grace, so 
the story ran, had lost both her breasts in a savage bayonet 
assault, and with her last fading reserves of energy had written 
a letter describing her torment. The story was taken up and 
made much of by The Star, The Evening Standard, Pall Mall, The 
Westminster Gazette, The Globe, and The Times. The latter 
source, before becoming suspicious, described the evidence as
(41)
"particularly well authenticated."' Letters fran Ps.O.W. in 
Germany were said to contain coded messages instructing those in 
receipt to remove the postage stamps, whereupon there were 
revealed comments such as "they have tom out my tongue", and,
[158]
"They have cut off both ny feet, so that I cannot escape."
All this was without grain of truth.
More corporate assaults an the imagination were initiated and 
carried out by the Press or Official propaganda agencies, aided 
and abetted by Government spokesmen who evaded searching 
questions as to their veracity. The 'Corpse Factory' story, 
purporting to give a scientific account of how glycerine, 
lubricating oils, and animal foodstuffs were produced fran giant 
vats filled with German war-dead, conveniently mistranslated 
Kadaververwertungsanstalt so as to obscure the fact that it was 
the remains of dead horses which were used for this purpose. 
The deception, later admitted, was successful in portraying the
(43)
enemy as totally lacking in normal human sensitivity. The
Times, in May 1915, reported on the crucifixion of a Canadian
solder, "pinned to a wall by bayonets thrust through his hands
and feet", and as the story developed, informed its readers that
"....written depositions testifying to the fact of the discovery
of the body are in possession of British Headquarters Staff."
The lie was eventually identified as such by the Canadian 
. . (44)authorities. Newspaper reports to the effect that a
civilian in Sempst had been forced to witness the rape of his 
thirteen year old daughter by five or six German soldiers, and 
then the bayoneting of her and his nine year old son, were later 
denied in sworn statements by officials of the Belgian carmune.
[159]
When asked to comment on an atrocity perpetrated on a youth in 
Temath, the mayor stated: "....it is impossible that such an
occurrence [the chopping off of a boy's hands] should not have
(45)
been reported to me; it is pure invention."' 7
Historical redress, in the straightforward, well-documented form 
provided by Ponsonby was a codification built on earlier 
reservations about the truth of atrocity stories, and it found 
its way into the bibliographies of many later publications. 
Its probable influence on those who assigned high weighting to 
the ideological component of the self-image may be seen in their 
increasing unwillingness to accept Schwarzweissmalerei 
judgements on Germany and the Germans. The grosser errors of the 
past vent like lances to the tender conscience. Its wider 
influence may only be guessed at, but in a period of reflection, 
distant in ethos from the wilder passions of war-time experience 
and "the stress of excitement and indignation", it is
perhaps reasonable to assume that a number of people now 
measured the moral legitimacy of their individual behaviour 
against the adjusted historical record. On both counts 
Ponsonby1 s little book could be said to have reinforced the 
necessary conditions for the reassertion of the ideological 
self-image.
The publication of Britain and Germany [1928], a symposium of
[160]
essays dedicated to the "...ventilation of questions which
(47)concern both peoples", was symptomatic, on the British side, 
of a desire to approach recent history in an smpathetic frame of 
mind. The limitation in the above sentence is more apparent 
than real and is made for contextual purposes, with no intent to 
suggest that sympathetic understanding was absent from the 
contributions of German authors. John Mander [1974] commented 
that in this "well-meant and once famous book...
"There is plenty of goodwill on the British side. But 
there is no meeting of minds.... Rather, a stark contrast 
between a blend of arrogance and self-pity on the German 
side, and a deal of cooing and fluttering on the 
British..."
This hardly stands up to close scrutiny. It is possible, on
one interpretation, to regard the views expressed by Harold
(49)Begbie and Rolf Gardiner as "cooing and fluttering", but
the implicit suggestion that the German contributions were 
marked by "... arrogance and self-pity", and those from the 
British side by generosity of spirit, cannot be sustained.
Reviewing the collection of essays in the Preface to the English 
Edition, Gardiner commented, with seme justification, that "the
[161]
British...not infrequently adopt a haughty, patronising air." 
And it would be difficult to regard Alec MacDonald's 
contribution on English and German Humour as an example of 
"cooing and fluttering." The Englishman had no need to boast or 
brag, he concluded, because he was armed with an inner 
confidence, his conceit was real "and goes deeper than words." 
The German, on the other hand, was assailed by doubt beneath a 
superficial confidence:
"Locking at the gilt and stucco remains of the Imperial 
glories in Berlin, an Englishman cannot help wondering if 
this Titanic boasting were not fundamentally but an 
expression of a pathetic doubt whether the Hohenzollems 
were, after all, the highest manifestations of 
mankind.n<50)
(51)In discussion of British characteristics, 'Diplcmaticus'
revealed not only central features of the British self-image - a
sense of emotional balance, tolerance of difference - but also a
suspicion that the absence of such qualities in German society
was a matter for concern. He referred to the pervasive
influence of 'romanticism1, involving a "mistrust of... things
(52)generally held to be based on reason". Hie Jugendbewegung
was a prime exairple of romanticism at work. It bore "nearly all 
the symptoms of a religious movement in its primitive,
[162]
revolutionary, fighting stages: a certain amount of intolerance
. . (53)and of prejudice, an amazing energy..." ' The problem with
romanticism was that it could give rise to "generalisation and a
riot of associative emotions, leading us right away from the 
(54)truth." diplcmaticus1 concluded that the British were not
"Iirpressed by the conscious aspect of romanticism. To be 
intensely self-conscious seems to us to mean that we are 
not sure of ourselves - a kind of inferiority complex. To 
strive to keep our literature 'pure' of foreign elements,
whether Jewish or otherwise, would seem to us to admit
. (55)that it could not stand on its cwn merits."
It is true that he rounded off his essay optimistically, and 
consistent with his declared attachment to balance, by positing 
the mutual benefits that could accrue to Britain and Germany 
from a fusion of German enthusiasm and collective energy with 
the tolerant self-confidence of the British, but again it would 
be stretching a point beyond the limit to consider his 
contribution an example of "cooing and fluttering."
The reserve shewn by seme of the German contributors hardly 
merits the description of arrogance and self-pity. Von Hertig's 
assertion that "in the matter of British-German understanding we
[163]
are still looking for a suitable building site", and
Werner Picht's conviction that "..the task of cultivating
sympathetic feelings must be supplemented by the carmunication
(57)of accurate information...", ware cautious and realistic
rather than strident statements. Horst Michael did claim that
in the years before the First World War British obstructionism
(58)"aroused the greatest indignation in Germany", and that his 
nation felt ccrrpelled to "escape fran the danger of being 
oppressed and misused by England", but to class this as arrogant 
and self-pitying would be a negation of sympathetic 
understanding and, in any case, he also argued that both 
countries we re making "false and inadequate assumptions...both 
were thoroughly short-sighted... .both lacked a measure of 
universal political responsibility and wise
self-limitation."
Gerhard Mueller's essay on The Organisation of German Schools 
bore no trace of arrogance. It was, rather, an example of 
critical self-examination. Of the products of German schools he 
wrote:
"There was probably no scholar in the world of greater 
probity or steadfastness. But then there was scarcely a 
human being who lived in such seclusion from the world. 
Thoroughness bred onesidedness and led to a deplorable 
narrcwness of outlook...."
[164]
Erich Obst wrote of the rage of Germany against Versailles, of
the hatred felt for those who had "mortified and tormented
Germany", but considered that such passions, if intelligible,
were quite unhelpful. Intellectually, he appreciated that there
was a need for reconciliation, but, instinctively, he held back
fran "exchanging confidential handshakes with enemies of
(61)yesterday as if they were the friends of tomorrow."
Reconciliation depended on the restoration of Germany's dignity
as a nation. Revisions were necessary in the Treaty of
Versailles. Article 231 had to be retracted and the "Hun
(62)
legend" laid to rest. It was precisely because the British
contributors who addressed such issues agreed with the German
claim that "...cooperation [was] possible and useful only on a
(63)basis of complete rehabilitation..." that a meeting of minds 
did take place.
Margaret Mackenzie, defining the British way of life and conduct 
related to it, for her German readers, referred to an 
"extraordinary tolerance" and sense of balance which grew out of 
a mixture of "nonconformist conscience and sporting 
instinct." This mixture was recognisable in the work of G.
P. Gooch and Dudley Heathcote. Gooch, in his contribution, 
informed his analysis with a critical self-awareness that 
Germany did not stand alone on the issue of responsibility. A 
sense of balance, a sympathetic understanding of the pressures
[165]
bearing on Germany as well as on Britain, characterised his 
review of events leading to war. He did not see a long 
tradition of unwary aggressiveness in German history. Had 
Bismarck's cautious, though ultimately self-regarding, policy 
been continued, a war between Britain and Germany would have 
been unlikely. At the same time, it was impossible to ignore 
the inperatives facing the great powers. Germany, quite 
naturally, wanted to play a larger role in the wider world. 
This involved taking risks, sane of which were 
counter-productive and "necessarily alarmed" Britain. He 
assigned to Germany "the larger part of the responsibility for 
the lamentable estrangement" between the two countries, and did 
not feel that he could exaggerate "the folly and 
short-sightedness of German policy since the fall of Bismarck", 
but he conceded that British statesmen also committed "serious 
errors", and deplored the fact that in both countries there were 
journalists "who seemed to take an unholy delight in sowing 
suspicion and imputing evil motives." Dudley Heathcote
reinforced the image of the British as a people who scorned 
opportunities to 'kick a man when he is down' when he gave what 
he called "two striking examples of British forbearance and ... 
the desire of our authorities not to offend unnecessarily the 
feelings of a people that had been profoundly humiliated..." On 
one occasion, notices v^re to be posted in Cologne instructing 
German civilians to salute British Officers. Adenauer, the
[166]
Qberburgermeister, requested that the order to post the notices
be rescinded, and the occupying authorities agreed. On another
occasion a French general was infuriated when a band played
'Deutschland uber alles1 outside the Headquarters of the
Rhineland Military Ccnmission. The English officer present
listened intently and then adjudged that the band was playing
'Rule Britannia1. Heathcote concluded that there was every
reason to believe that the "deplorable estrangement" was being
(67)replaced by "more amicable feelings..."' 1
To return to John Mander's assessnent of the book. It has to be
noted that his purpose was to demonstrate that Sir Robert
Vansittart was not "overdoing it" when he argued, in Black
Record [1940], that the British and Germans lived at opposite
poles with "not a main idea in ccnmon....no real mental 
(68)relations..." He was satisfied that the contrast between
the essays submitted from each side in the 1928 publication bore
(69)out "all that Vansittart has to say on the subject..." To
offer Britain and Germany in the service of this view was 
perhaps to misunderstand, if not misrepresent, the process of 
enpathetic understanding - a process which involves serious 
consideration of another's point of view, but no necessary 
surrender of all that goes towards making up one's own position.
The publication of the English translation of Erich Remarque's
[167]
Im Vfesten Nichts Neues [1929] helped to lay the "Hun legend" to 
rest in the conscience-led period of reflection. Modris 
Eksteins [1980] wrote that "the great discovery....foreign 
readers made through 'All Quiet...1 was that the German 
soldier's experience of the war had been in its essentials, no 
different fran that of the soldiers of other n a t i o n s . T h e  
London Mercury [January 1930] complained of ".... the apparent 
tendency among the British public to sentimentalise over the 
Germans...11, and called upon its readers: "Let us not out of
mere sentimentality, concentrate our gaze upon the Germans at
(71)the expense of more cultivated peoples." But this had
little effect. 'All Quiet...1 topped up that well of sympathy 
which "promoted at a popular level what historical revision was
achieving at an academic and political level: the erosion of
(72)the idea of a collective German war guilt."
Bartlett [1933] was critical of Nazi Germany. He went so far as 
to identify the Nazi State as the central problem of
international affairs. His response was to argue in favour of
conciliation and cooperation, but not at any price. He
appreciated that the conciliatory approach could fail, and that 
total unremitting commitment to it could have disastrous 
consequences. He was, however, attached to the ideological
aspects of the British self-image, and perhaps the most obvious
[168]
consequence of this attachment was his willingness to empathise 
with the German people in their experience of particular 
historical phenomena. If there was a hint in his work that 
circumstances did not explain everything there was also a strong 
suggestion that they accounted for a great deal. In this his 
point of view was quite distinct from that of writers who 
tended to regard the events of the Weimar experience as 
peripheral to what they saw as the crux of the matter - the 
longstanding characteristics of the German people. In real 
terms neither position is wholly satisfactory in itself since, 
on the one hand, individuals do not bring blank cultural or 
personality records to the situations they encounter and, on the 
other hand, personalities are not inimitable and entirely proof 
against the exigencies of social circumstances. The distinction 
in approach is an important one, however, since the capacity to 
'stand in someone else's shoes' presupposes that the 'someone 
else' is part of an historical situation, partaking in 
particular experiences, subject to particular stresses, faced 
with particular choices. Empathy demands that due consideration, 
not passing lip-service, be given to human experiences.
Bartlett confessed that there was a distasteful aspect to his 
attempt to explain Nazi Germany: "I have... sought for
explanations of much that disgusts me and fills me with
[169]
(73)despair." If all people, irrespective of nationality,
could be prey to base instincts, "the vein of sadism runs deeper
(74)in the German character than in that of most other people."
He was deeply concerned about the attitudes toward and on the 
nature of war being disseminated in Germany, and quoted with 
revulsion the views of E. Banse:
"Nobody should be in doubt that war stands between our
prevailing need and our coming fortune. But war is no
longer a fresh and jolly campaign... it is gas, plague,
tank and aircraft horror; it is hunger and poverty,
baseness and lies, deprivation and sacrifice. The only
nation that can endure it is one whose every member has
known for years and is convinced in the depths of his soul
that his life belongs to the state and only to the
state... Everyone must understand that there is nothing
extraordinary or criminal about war, that it is not a sin
(75)against humanity."
In face of this, what possible grounds could there be for 
arguing in favour of conciliation and cooperation? It would be 
possible, Bartlett wrote, to "take the easier way, and... argue 
that these Germans are a race apart whose reactions are so 
different from our cwn.."; the problem here was that such an 
approach tended "to range every German behind his Government,
[170]
(76)and to turn pacifists into fire-eaters.11 This would be
particularly unfortunate if, as he believed, most Germans were 
not by inclination supportive of the reprehensible elements of 
the Nazi movement. He analysed the movement's support as 
follows:
"There are, as far as one can see, three main tendencies
that are making themselves felt... There are, in the first
place, the people on the Right, the industrialists....
Then there are their opponents, young men of the middle
and working classes who mean the Hitler movement to be a
revolution and not a reaction. Thirdly, there are those
whose only motive is hate... It is men in this third
category whose bullyings and beatings have done so much to
(77)discredit the whole movement."
If there were distinctions to be made between sections of
support within the movement there was also the matter of the
broad mass of the population. Bartlett subscribed to the views
of Major-General Sir Neill Malcolm who, in the course of
describing the torture of Ebert's son in the Borgemoor bei
Papenburg camp, wrote: "I believe that there are very many
right-minded Germans who knew little or nothing of the... .camps;
I believe that there are others who do know and heartily
(78)disapprove." Where Malcolm referred to "...that large mass 
of right-minded Germans", Bartlett wrote of "the great majority
[171]
of Germans [who] have no idea of these atrocities that have so
(79)lowered the reputation of Germany abroad." If conciliation
and cooperation ware to be viable aims it was important that 
such people be considered, and nothing done to force them into 
the arms of the Nazi Government. There was another practical 
reason for moving carefully. Germany was "...neurasthenic and 
hysterical, and no doctor attempts to cure neurasthenia or
hysteria by clouting the patient over the head.... if one 
concentrates upon the need for meeting the German point of view 
it is only because Germany is the pathological case.... She is 
the patient who must be cured if we are to avoid war."
Fairness [subsuming the notion that self and others should be 
assessed in terms of the same criteria], justice, and generosity 
of spirit should figure in attitudes toward Germany. A little 
sympathetic imagination - that capacity to enter into the
situation of others which was an important element in the
British self-image - might lead to understanding of what lay
behind the neurasthenia, and once the causes had been revealed, 
it might be possible to remove them.
"I sometimes think our inability to understand the Germans 
today arises from the fact that we expect them to be so 
different fran ourselves when, in fact, they are so like
[172]
In the first years of the war, under emergency conditions,
prejudice and distortion, hysteria and cruelty, were not unknown
in Britain. "It has to be remembered that the state of mind in
Germany today is exactly that which was found in all countries
during the war... One of the dirtiest things about war is the
way in which it so distorts the magnificent passion of
patriotism that kindly old English women believe they are doing
right in hounding seme other equally kindly old woman into an
internment camp because she has a German name. We have to go
back to all those wartime pettinesses we would rather forget
before we can begin to understand the behaviour of many Nazis
(82)today." Since the end of the war there had been virtually
no opportunity for the Germans to recover their mental balance. 
A position of obvious inequality and, related to it, a 
perception of insecurity, had been compounded by the economic 
and moral repercussions of the Inflation. In quoting Pierre 
Vienot's account of the Inflation, Bartlett claimed that it 
was the best description he had read of the effect of that 
collapse.
"Let nobody imagine that this purely material fact could 
lead to material misery, and that then, when exorcised, and 
when the misery was healed, it left no traces. The effect 
of such a memory... is never corrected in the course of a 
lifetime. Inflation made every German experience the
[173]
impossible. It destroyed in him the notion of certainty.
(83)If that was possible, anything was possible."
Hew should the world respond? Either it should decide that
Germany should endure her inequality, tolerate her feeling of
insecurity and remain in "the bonds we tied round her at
Versailles... .or we decide that Germany must be given back her
freedom." To do the latter certainly involved risk. One
could never be sure beforehand if ".... a bold concession, a
generous attempt to meet the German point of view...." would in
fact rid that nation of " her damnable inferiority
(85)complex." There was, therefore, no guarantee that
conciliation would consolidate peace. On the other hand, to
maintain the status quo so far as Germany was concerned involved
no risk whatsoever; it involved the absolute certainty of war.
If concessions were made, and if instead of calming Germany they
aroused in her a desire to dominate, the moral position of
Britain and the world would be strengthened. An important first
step would be to demonstrate to Germany that "the principle of
equality of rights" animated the thinking of the British and the
French, by showing readiness "...now, or at a definite date not
(86)too remote, to disarm broadly down to Germany*s level", were 
this not done, then
[174]
"... .hew can Germany be expected not to worry about her
security when her neighbours, so much better armed and
equipped, talk all the time about theirs! ....It is a
paradox, but I believe it to be true, that Germany will be
less of a danger to peace when her neighbours are less
(87)obviously stronger than she is."'
In the 1930s, G. P. Gooch was a consistent advocate of the
traits and values subsumed in the ideological self-image. He
believed in cooperation, the rational settlement of disputes,
and was conscious that fairness and give and take were essential
to such an enterprise. "Civilisation is a co-operative
(88)achievement", he wrote in 1933, and this achievement
involved "a great deal more than mere abstinence fran war. It
demands mutual aid all along the line, the sharing of our
(89)economic resources no less than of our political power."
Although he hated the Nazi regime, considering that it
overwhelmed the individual body and soul, dwarfed personality
and stunted spiritual growth, sympathetic understanding,
tolerance, and the claims of justice informed his views on
Germany. In 1935 he analysed the events and forces which had
(91)led to the establishment of dictatorship in Germany. His
conclusions were markedly different from those of many other 
writers addressing this issue at about the same time, in that he 
located the causes in the lifetime of those who were part of the
[175]
contemporary experience rather than tracing them back into the
alleged traditions of German history. The German people had
been punnelled by "the combination and interaction of political
passions, economic misery, and psychological strain." The
dictated peace had added to "the inevitable bitterness of
defeat; forced cessions of territory smarted like the
amputation of a limb; armies of occupation were an ever present
humiliation; military and financial controls.... were a
perpetual reminder of a foreign yolk; the attribution of sole
guilt for the outbreak of the war to the losing side outraged
the feelings of peoples deeply convinced that they had fought
(92)for their existence against malevolent foes." He likened
the peace settlement and the reparations burdens to a victory
war-dance on the prostrate bodies of defeated and impoverished 
(93)enemies.
All this had happened when the nation was emerging from a life 
and death struggle, in which compromise had been branded as a 
crime, heroic virtues exalted, the tenets of the Sermon on the 
Mount discarded. The cult of violence, the brutalisation of 
mind and soul could not be set aside easily. The war experience 
had cultivated a craving for quick results, and it was natural 
that there should be impatience with the more leisurely 
processes of peace in which swift action was inhibited by 
deliberation. "In such an atmosphere of confusion and 
impatience it was inevitable that millions of distracted people
[176]
(94)should cry out for a man", for a solution 7 The trauma was 
deepened by subsequent events, by "a sequence of shocks and 
humiliations difficult for a proud nation to endure" - French 
encouragement of separatism in the Rhineland, the use of black 
troops in the occupied zone, the invasion of the Ruhr, and then 
the Inflation. And with the collapse of the economy "went the
(95)
loss of their psychological equilibrium."
Gooch returned to the same theme in 1939.^^ The Treaty of 
Versailles had fallen on a "hungry, bleeding, distracted 
nation." Article 231 was "not only a historical blunder but a 
psychological mistake", for the concept of the Shameful Peace 
[Schandfriede] "became the symbol of national humiliation" and 
a "deadly errbrace." Britain shared the responsibility for all 
this with France, but France had not been satisfied. 
Determined to keep Germany down, not content with having 
participated in her defeat, France resolved "to keep her poor 
and weak." All sense of reality had been lost, and dragon's
(97)
teeth were sewn "in the tortured soil of the new Europe."
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CHAPTER 6 
THE REVITALISATION OF THE DEBATE
[182]
By 1936 there was an observable reaction to the conscience-led 
period of reflection, relatively spasmodic to begin with but 
then reaching crescendo proportions in the work of Rowse, 
Namier, Vansittart, and their followers. The significance of 
the ideological element in the self-image was not repudiated in 
this reaction - indeed its significance was often confirmed by 
the criticism levelled against it - and it still served, at 
least implicitly, as a standard for assessing Germany and the 
Germans. What set the reaction apart from what had tended to be 
the characteristic attitudes of the inter-war period up to this 
point was its revitalisation of the argument based on deeply 
ingrained weaknesses in the German temperament, with much less 
emphasis, and sometimes hardly any at all, being placed on the 
recent past as a source of explanation, and a marked diminution 
then final rejection of any willingness to make distinctions 
between Germans. As this trend gathered the momentum of a new 
orthodoxy it stimulated a dramatic response. There is a sense 
in which the arguments of the late 1930s and the Second World 
War years over 'Germans and Nazis', occurring as they did at a 
time of increasing terror and ultimately in a condition of 
national emergency, demonstrate the potency of the ideological 
self-image. That there should be, at such a time, fierce and 
undiluted condemnation of the potential then actual enemy, lock, 
stock and barrel, was unremarkable. All hopes of peace were 
going or had disappeared, all hopes and expectations of
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imnediate relief, faintly or firmly held, had gone. It was 
natural that into the gap there should flood resurrected or 
newly discovered hatred. What was remarkable, however, was the 
public expression of a point of view which still insisted upon 
making distinctions between different types of Germans, which 
apportioned responsibility but not in blanket form, which did not 
require the suspension of the critical faculties, which - in 
essence - took the form of a statement rooted in ccnmitment to 
both elements of the self-image: 'Let us defeat the enemy, with 
all our force, and as quickly as possible, but do not let us 
lose ourselves in the process?1 This type of debate was not 
something new. Arguments about the validity of distinctions 
between people and regime, sometimes taking the form of a 
dispute over the appropriateness of the notion of 'two 
Germanies' were, as has been seen, of very long standing. It 
was the particular nature of the Nazi regime which added a sharp 
cutting edge to the debate in the late 1930s and during the war 
years.
Harold Nicolson [1936] allowed that recent circumstances had 
placed great stress on Germany, but the reader is left with the 
strong impression that stress alone - however unique in its 
severity - could not have resurrected the 'German problem' had 
it not acted upon innate weaknesses.
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"The Germans have always been nervous, they have always 
had a strain of instability in their characters....and I 
think we must recognise - and this is not meant to be an 
insult, but a sympathetic ccmnent - that in the German 
temperament of today there is a strong strain of insanity. 
We have got to get that into our heads. It was inevitable 
that this should have occurred. You have an heredity 
already unstable. You expose the product of that heredity 
to a strain such as human history has never known. They 
had to face the war, inflation, the blockade, a series of 
strains and stresses such as we have never conceived of in 
our own history . Then at the end comes this revivalist - 
this ... imaginative, unreliable man, who tells them that 
all their sorrows were purely due to some strange lack of 
confidence in himself. If they will put themselves 
entirely into those firm and tender hands, then the 
bleeding heart of Germany will again be sound....
I go back to the problem of the German mentality. I say 
that under this religious revival, which Hitler has managed 
to create and evolve, under this mystic Wotanic conception 
of a Germany marching blindly towards the abyss, under 
this extraordinary evocation and excitation of all that is 
most neurotic in the German soul [for I contend that this 
neurosis has reached a sort of paranoiac stage] Germany has
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becane, and let us say so with all sympathy, a mental 
case..."^
J. W. Eaton [1937] disclaimed any prejudice against Germany.
The dictated peace, the continuation of the blockade, the
intolerable difficulties of the inflation, the fearful, jealous
and sometimes vindictive actions of France, had stirred in him
"a sympathy with a nation which had put up such a gallant fight
(2)
against long odds." There was much to admire in the new
Germany. The Arbeitsdienst, Winterhilfdienst, Mutterheim and 
Kraft durch Freude organisations appeared worthy, and suggested 
a collective concern for social co-operation and national 
welfare. But hew had Hitler come to power? Were all the 
reasons located in the war period and its aftermath? Or were 
there not, "as with other nations, still more important reasons 
to be found in her history and in certain traits in the national 
character...?" Eaton believed that the German people had never 
had
"....any clear conception of what political and individual 
freedom means. They [had] not yet shown any capacity to 
achieve a democratic government nor a willingness to pay 
the cost. On more than one occasion in the past, when a 
crisis has arisen, they [had] failed to uncover any 
political principles which might have given them
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confidence and trust in one another.... It [was] new as in
the past to a strong and confident leader that they
[locked] to bind them together and lead them forward....
Their conception of reform [was] still that of something
which canes fran regulations and instructions from above,
not through their own persistent efforts and sacrifice."
(3)
A. L. Fcwse [1937] considered that ".... the whole of European 
history in the past century...." was so much evidence that there
was something wrong with Germany, "something profoundly wrong."
(4) .He conceded, in a passing reference, that there were
"external factors aiding the process" that brought Hitler to
power, but hew could one explain the fact that the German people
(5)had not made "a better stand for the Republic." The answer 
lay in German tradition.
"... no country can shew such a tradition of thought that 
has so consistently distorted the evidence of carmon-sense 
experience... no country in the world has had such a 
tradition of thinkers who believed only in the assertion 
of the will as against reason and common sense, in the 
supremacy of force, the desirability of war, the State as 
the terminus ad guem of all politics, the be-all and 
end-all of all social endeavour, the denial of freedom and
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international order, the futility and even the inmorality
/gj
of international peace...."
Hitler had succeeded because he was "in all his moods a medium 
of the German people, a mirror to express their rasping 
inferiority complex, their envy, their brutality, their
(7)
unreliability...."
Rcwse enployed the concepts of his opponents in order to
discredit them. He agreed that there were 'two Germanies1, two
(8)traditions, "...engaged in a struggle for the German soul."
But it was an unequal struggle, made too much of by those who 
sought to establish distinctions between regime and people. One 
side in this struggle for the German soul was much too strong 
for the other - which at crucial points tended to show itself 
ineffective and spineless - and this had been the case for 
centuries, a futile struggle going on since the confrontation 
between Arminius and Imperial Rome. His definition of the 'two 
Germanies' is interesting in itself, for the inequality of the 
struggle appears to be symbolised in the number of active phrases 
he assigned to each category. On one side there were two active 
phrases: "... the forces of reason and culture... the will to
cooperate with the rest of Europe..."? on the other side, 
eight active phrases: "...the forces of barbarism, the denial 
of reason and culture, the cult of violence and aggression, the
[188]
inflamed inferiority complex, the envy, the jealousy, the
(9)
Schadenfreude, the megalomania.. In relation to those 
dominant features, Hitler was "the very mirror" of the German 
soul.
Rowse cast his eye over centuries of German history, pausing at 
certain points to measure the relative strengths of the forces 
which competed for possession of the German. In the beginning, 
there were parts of Germany fortunate enough to come under Roman 
rule - the Rhineland, Bavaria -
"But there remained the interior depths of the country 
with its barbarian population of Teutons... .unaffected by 
the influence of civilisation... [and] from that solid 
core of Teutonic resistance, those interior depths, [had] 
come a succession of anti-Europeans, leaders whose mission 
it has been to encourage the Germans to... resist Europe, 
to assert their own differences, to make a virtue of 
their barbarism as against reason...."
At the time of the Reformation "... the dichotomy in the German 
soul" was once more evident, and once more the strength was on 
the wrong side. On the one hand there was the spirit of 
Luther",... the apostle of blind unreasoning faith, of thinking 
with the bowels, of nationalism and force...", and on the other
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there was the spirit of Erasmus, "... the protagonist of reason
and moderation, of toleration and reform, of peace and a
Christian international order." On the one side there was De
Servo Arbitro, "..revelling in the insistence upon the necessity
for submission....", on the other De Libero Arbitro, preaching
freedom of will. Of the triumph of De Servo Arbitro Rowse
commented: "How German; how disgusting!" And of Luther he
wrote that he had been wall described as "the typical German,
the man who of all others sums up the character of the German
people. Hitler is in the direct line of succession to Luther." 
(11)
At the time of the Enlightenment there was the same dichotomy
and the same outcome. Kant's "pacific cosmopolitanism" was
overwhelmed by Frederick's "calculated fraud, treachery and
violence." Later, Goethe, "the great European...", was
overtaken by the "loathsome German megalomania" of Hegel. And
Marx, with his "internationalism pointing to the future" was no
match for Bismarck with his "blut und eisen putting back the
clock in European politics..." Finally, there was Weimar.
Its hopes of "social progress and peaceful international
cooperation" had been destroyed by a "relapse into barbarism...
(12)deliberate terror and brutality..."
The dichotomy obvious in German society at large also manifested
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itself in the individual. And in every case the resolution of 
the conflict was in favour of the pernicious elements, so that
"Those who know Germany know that there is seme thing in
the German people that... likes kicking a man when he is
down. That does not mind torture and brutality, that
respects success at all costs, thinks breaking your word
is a sign of cleverness, and aggression a sign that you
have providence on your side, that rejoices at the thought
of being on the side of the big battalions, and does not
(13)care who goes to the wall."
It followed that there was no escape from the fact that the Nazi 
creed and code answered to " something deep down in the German 
nature... the fact is that the Germans are a singularly 
credulous and gullible people, without any critical 
standards.... [in] their sutmissiveness, their readiness to obey, 
their lust to be led... they are an excessively obedient, docile
(14)
people." In Rowse's view, Nietzsche had it right: "If
only they have a heady wine for the senses they will put up with
bad bread. Intoxication means more to them than nourishment." 
<15>
Tradition had made of the German a homicidal maniac. All the 
characteristics of the German mind,
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".. .the inverted sentimentalism the reverse side of which 
is their brutality, the unsureness of themselves that 
expresses itself in their disgusting exhibitions of 
aggressiveness towards others, their persecution of 
minorities, their creation of anti-Semitism into a 
deliberate policy - a pathological disease, a crime 
against civilisation..."^^
all these things were symptoms of a neurosis that had brought 
them to the edge of madness. Rowse returned to the same theme in 
a review article in 1941. "All through her history Germany has 
displayed a strong Undercurrent of resentment, resistance,
jealousy, Schadenfreude against the West The mentality of
militant aggression, with the whole complex of doctrines that 
goes with it, German superiority... hatred of rationalism... is
not merely the dominant tradition of Germany in the past
. . (17)century; it is the German tradition par excellence." It
was for this reason that Nazi brutality had gained such a hold
in Germany. It answered to something that lay deep in the
German people.
However much they abominated the Nazi regime as an instrument of 
persecution, oppression, and a threat to general liberties, 
individuals and groups for whom the ideological self-image had 
high salience as an operational construct could not be expected
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to swallow blanket condemnations of this kind. But more were to
cone. Between January 1940 and April 1942 a range of journals
(18)carried L. B. Namier's views on Germany. 1 For Namier there
was no distinction to be made between government and people in
Germany. Taken together, acting together, rulers and ruled were
part and parcel of "... a nation singularly brutal and 
(19) .ruthless..." That this had not always been appreciated by
policy makers and public at large in Britain was due to a number 
of things, among them the apparent desire to square attitudes to 
Germany with perceptions of the ideological self-image. If, as 
is contended belcw, Namier's views were so laced with linguistic 
conjuring tricks and double standards as to make his case 
aggressively propagandist, this increases rather than reduces 
the importance of his attitudes, for it provides yet another 
exanple of that overstated position frcm which many in Britain 
felt the need to retreat, even in the throes of war.
Namier's case against Germany and the Germans was a cultural
one. The key was to be found in "the differences between the
forms of ccnmunal life which nations have developed..." He
conceded that a wide variety of social forms ware to be found in
all nations. but focused attention on what he termed the
"dominant patterns which express the national character." Once
established, "...these patterns powerfully react on the
(21)individual and mould him in turn." Although humane
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elements were to be detected in the German tradition, those
elements had never occupied a dominant cultural position. He did
not deny that "decent, kindly Germans" existed; but they had
been "singularly ineffective", and had "failed to inpress their
pattern on the nation and to 'generalise1 their type or
(22)creed..." Far frcm being a force of any real significance
in national affairs, the decent, kindly German was a
(23)"...charming figure of... rcmantic legend." It could not
be complained that Namier ignored cultural considerations but, 
like Rcwse, he made no attempt to explore the very complex 
relationships that can exist between 'dominant patterns' and 
society at large - for example, the differential extent to which 
norms and values are internalised. Had he done so, he may have 
arrived at a similar conclusion; on the other hand he may have 
been forced to hedge his conclusions with reservations. It may be 
legitimate to speak of national character, insofar as different 
nations may demonstrate different dominant cultural patterns, 
but seme 'characters' may be more 'national' than others, the 
base of one dominant cultural pattern may be narrower than 
another - more subject to challenge than another, and levels of 
participation in dominant cultures may differ radically - 
variables being degree of positive participation, degree of 
prudent participation, degree of acquiescence.
Namier's rather simplistic approach led to the straightforward
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assertions that William II and Hitler both truly voiced "... the
(24)same elements in Germany's national development and spirit",
that Hitler's rise to power was due to him having given
expression "... to seme of the deepest instincts of the 
(25)Germans", and that "the achievements and the guilt of
Germany are not to be ascribed to one individual, nor even to a 
Party; they are the vrork of the German nation." There was no 
defensible justification for "... dissociating any substantial 
part of the German nation from the Nazis." It was likely, of 
course, that after defeat, "... many Germans [would] deprecate 
and deplore..." Nazi policies, but this would be no more than 
evidence of the German belief that "Las ter ist ein 
mythologischer Ausdruck fur schlechte Geschafte." In
response to the claim that there were "...two fatal extremes in 
Germany - a too submissive and deferential attitude on the part 
of the underdog, and the love of power and a ruthless and 
tyrannical use of it on the part of the top-dog", he wrote
"this view of the Germans... is based on accurate but 
superficial observation, and in distinguishing sharply 
between the willing slave and the ruthless bully, 
establishes a misleading, and potentially dangerous, 
dichotomy; these are not two mutually exclusive -types, but 
two facets of the German character, closely 
interconnected, indeed inseparable, complementing and
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reinforcing each other; and on their combination is built 
up the Prussian State and the German nation. In the 
Prussian State machine everyone is both slave and 
master... the less personal life and freedom the German 
enjoys, the more important it is for him to feel a member 
of the master nation... this is his compensation: even
the most submissive and deferential of Germans partakes in 
the ruthless tyranny exercised by his state and nation at 
heme and abroad... It is the lack of moral courage, 
self-assurance, and independence in the individual German 
which makes him seek safety, self-assertion, and 
superlative power in and through his state and nation, and 
which makes him glorify than beyond all bounds of sense 
and reason. Finding in them the desired compensation, he 
serves them with a patience and devotion such as more 
individualistic races find it difficult to muster and 
maintain."
On one level of interpretation the way in which Namier expressed 
his views is analogous to the performer who creates an illusion 
by sleight of hand. "Totalitarian systems", he wrote, "have 
certain marked advantages over freer forms of government." One 
such advantage was derived frcm "the unmeasured freely flaunted 
brutality of... professional thugs, which intimidates and like 
the boa constrictor fascinates rabbits among the leaders and the
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(28)public." In this passage apparently innocent concepts are
used to convey a message. It is probably reasonable to suppose 
that most normal people in civilian situations where they are 
personally vulnerable will, talcing all the options into account, 
be intimidated by brutality if it is directed against them. 
Prudence may wall dictate that they try to escape the 
consequences of resistance by avoiding direct confrontation, by 
disguising their true feelings. This is not a courageous 
response to the threat of brutal force, but it could be argued 
that it is an eminently human and intelligent response. But 
Namier's Germans were not run-of-the-mill normal people in that 
sense. They were not only intimidated; they were fascinated. 
In everyday usage one might indeed speak of rabbits being 
'fascinated' by a boa constrictor, but the use of the word in 
Namier's context comes close to suggesting a pleasurable 
experience on the part of the victims. Undertones of masochism 
can be detected. It is probably more precise to speak of 
rabbits being iirmobilised by fear, just as ordinary people in 
certain situations may be immobilised by brutality. But Namier's 
Germans ware not ordinary people. And was the use of 'rabbits' 
entirely innocent? Such creatures may be said to display the 
characteristics of weakness, timidity and sutmissiveness.
On the subject of how dominant cultural patterns may be 
established Namier argued that "A nation can crystallise above or
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below the average moral level of the individuals who compose 
(291 .it." This was by way of preface to the assertion that the
dominant cultural pattern of Germany was one that had crystallised 
below the average, and once established reacted powerfully on 
individuals, dragging their moral awareness to a still lower 
level. The use of a simple mathematical concept appeared
to confer authority to the argument. But how is an 
independently verifiable estimate of the average moral level of 
a nation arrived at? Are numerous high moral grades 
counterbalanced by a few depraved elements, or vice-versa? 
Faced with such an intractable problem it was mere trickery to 
presuppose that such an average moral level existed in order 
that there could be assigned to it a particularly lew value.
There was some theoretical validity to Namier's claim that 
dominance and sutmissiveness may be complementary features of a 
single personality. But was that hypothesis on dualism in a 
single personality the sole basis for his rejection of the 
notion that most Germans occupied the one role of under-dog? 
There is, of course, enough that is pejorative in that notion. 
There is something distasteful about ingrained sutmissiveness 
and deference. Namier could not leave it at that, however, for 
to do so opened up the possibility that altered circumstances 
could make something better of the Germans. Their 
sutmissiveness and deference could make them amenable subjects
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of a much less ruthless, much more civilised regime. If 
instructed to act as decent, kindly Germans, they might just 
have done so. For Namier's purposes they had to occupy the 
dualistic role, for only in that mix was there little hope of 
redemption.
In another passage Namier wrote:
"Whenever the German national character is discussed,
someone will invariably remark that he has known such
decent, kindly Germans, and will protest against
'generalisations', without perceiving that it is he who is
advancing an unwarrantable generalisation in arguing
about the character of a nation from that of
individuals... it is unsafe to argue from particles to 
(311aggregates..."
It is true that generalisations about the German national 
character were challenged by those who did not subscribe to 
Namier's views. But to raise questions against a generalisation 
is not necessarily to fashion yet another, contrary 
generalisation. What Namier did, almost by stealth, was to 
insert a conclusion which had not been postulated by his critics, 
namely, that in aggregate Germans were decent because individual 
cases of decent Germans could be cited. Quite without 
justification he accused his challengers of transductive
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thinking.
"There are people", wrote Namier, "who treat all evil as
extraneous and adventitious: to them a sick person is a healthy
person plus a disease, not a body in a condition which, whether
temporary or permanent, is its own. A similar 'demonology'
treats the present Germany as a country of normal, decent people
bewitched by Hitler; whereas in reality Hitler's unparallelled
rise is due to the fact that he has given expression to sane of
(32)the deepest instincts of the Germans." Statements of this
kind tend to distort reality. Where he confined himself to the 
strict medical analogy he was on firm enough ground, but it was 
inproper to suggest that 'bodies' and 'societies' share similar 
organic properties. He appeared to act as a social pathologist, 
lay out the corpse of the Weimar Republic, and postulate that 
death was due to a disease of the bloodstream or a malfunction 
in the central nervous system. Such a process has seme merit as 
a scaffolding for thought as long as the practitioner remembers 
that he is qualified as an historian and not as a physician, 
that the corpse is imaginary, that even in imagination it does 
not share the organic properties of its model, and that 
historical analysis is concerned with relationships between 
personalities and environments. To locate the causes of a 
complex set of historical circumstances exclusively in 
personality is to be ahistorical. Furthermore, there was a neat
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twist in the passage quoted above. There is always sane 
prospect of health for a sick person, because that person is not 
in itself the disease. There was no prospect of health for 
Germany, for Germany was the disease, and Hitler merely its 
symptom.
If there was sleight of hand in Namier's work there were also 
double standards. There is an interesting passage in which he 
cogently explained certain cultural traits of Jews in relation 
to the circumstances of their lives, and highlighted the 
inadequacy of the stereotypes used by gentiles to describe 
Jewish behaviour. In the quotation belcw the word 'Jew', used 
by Namier, has been omitted, and I invite the insertion of the 
word 'German'. Many historians would see in this passage, so 
adjusted, a not unreasonable description of the German 
experience as Germans perceived it, in the first thirty years of 
the twentieth century. Namier could not make such a concession, 
even tentatively.
"What a life, to be continually on trial and under 
examination! Uncertainty breeds anxiety and anxiety 
promotes critical attention... most of the peculiarities 
.S with which the [ ] is taunted [and sane times tainted]
are the result of a deeper malaise. Harried, he is 
blamed for being restless; kept out or kept down, he is
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described as pushing and assertive; hurt, he searches for
compensations and is called vain, blatant or
self-indulgent; insecure he yearns for standing, power and
wealth; which sometimes protect him, but more often
(33)expose him the more to attack."
His very sound objections to racist views did not deter Namier 
frcm entering the occasional genetic ccmnent if it had 
connotations that would support his assertions:
"German faces are marvellously symmetrical.... no other 
European nation ever attains that square, stolid facial 
symmetry."
And in terms of his general position on racism, there was
something of a contradiction in the claim [addressed
particularly to the Germans] that "Everyman has only one method,
(35)as he has only one face; he is b o m  with both." Namier
treated environmental circumstances with cavalier inconsistency. 
In the demagogical, militarist and anti-semitic movements in 
France "... which centred around Boulanger, Deroulede, and 
Drumont", he saw "almost every theory, delusion or trick in the 
Nazi repertory..."
"...the same nationalist exasperation and effervescence, a
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similar mixture of radicalism and reaction, the same 
reviling of the Parliamentary Republic, of its sins and 
'corruption', the same hysterical adulation of the 
individual..."
But, in the case of France he referred to internal and external
circumstances which counteracted those trends and allowed a
generation to grew up "no longer beset by the poignant memories
(36)of 1870.." One would have expected him to concede that
environmental circumstances, internal and external to Germany,
made an important contribution to the ultimate success of
Nazism. Those comments he made were, however, marginal, being
limited to the remark that the Weimar Republic "received little
(37)consideration" from the victorious powers.
The nature of Namier's argument forced him to deny to his study
of the Germans one of the techniques essential to the historian
- the act of sympathetic imagination. And here we are faced
with a contradiction, for Namier fully appreciated the value of
an errpathetic approach. If gentiles would but use it, he
argued, if they were - through an act of imagination - to "find
themselves circumstanced as the Jews were at present..." their
(38)attitudes towards Jews could not remain as they were.
It has been noted that Namier resented arguments which moved
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fran the particular to the general. What, then, is one to make 
of his claim that
"It is the lack of moral courage, self-assurance, and 
independence in the individual German which makes him seek 
safety, self-assertion, and superlative power in and 
through his state and nation, and which makes him glorify 
them..."(39)
A search for concrete evidence, rather than assertion and 
reassertion, of the dualistic nature of the 'German' personality 
[dominant - suhmissive] reveals one example relating to an 
individual:
"A friend of mine, while gate crashing in the park of a 
German luxury heme was rudely accosted [dominance] by a 
gardener who spotted him as an intruder; with admirable 
presence of mind and understanding the German character, 
he sharply replied [dominance]: 'Should anyone ask you
what I am doing here, you will say that you don't know.' 
'Yes, sir1 [submission] answered the German, and walked 
off satisfied..."
One of the most interesting features of Namier's work was his 
recognition that the British had a particular image of
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themselves. He accepted that "Englishmen hate being unfair or 
(41)rude." The very literature of the nation revealed its
desire to retreat from clear-cut, overstated positions which
left no margin for doubt or debate. "English prose", he wrote
"however clear and simple, has also to be elliptic; at least
the seirblance of a free margin must be left for the thoughts of
the reader. The Englishman says 'I like apples*, the
(42)meticulously precise German: *1 like eating apples1." It
was not to be expected that his views on the Germans, so cut and 
dried and, on analysis, so threaded with linguistic tricks and 
double standards, would reccmmend themselves to those who hated 
being unfair and who felt that "at least the semblance of a free 
margin" should be left to the receiving mind.
One of the chief contributors to the debate on Germany and the
Germans, and perhaps the most important in that his extreme
Germanophobia stimulated such an interesting response, was Sir
Robert Vansittart. He had been a student in Germany in the
1890s and, perceiving himself to be the victim of Anglophobia,
"...came to believe that the Germans wanted Britain *s
(43)destruction." In the early thirties he subscribed to the
general feeling that the letter of Versailles was indefensible, 
but as the decade progressed he became an implacable enemy of the 
Reich. The debate in which he played a major part centred on 
questions such as: What form of occupation should be inposed on
[205]
Germany when the war ended?; What level of reparations should
be demanded?; To what extent should retribution be exacted?;
What form of re-education process should be devised? On all of
those questions Vansittart took a hard line. In 1940 he
advocated that Germany be dismembered, otherwise "...small
nations would continue to get their throats cut by this accursed
German race... [of which 80% at least were]... the political and
(44)moral scum of the earth." In December 1940, he gave seven
broadcasts on German history and character for BBC overseas 
radio. These broadcasts were later published in a best selling 
pamphlet under the title Black Record: Germans Past and
Present [1941]. In the same year he published Roots of the 
Trouble and, free of government employment wrote letters and 
articles for newspapers and helped to found and organise groups 
such as The Never Again Association, dedicated to the prevention 
of a lenient peace on the conclusion of the war.
The thesis of Black Record was that throughout history the 
Germans had been and were aggressive, militaristic, 
untrustworthy, and consistently responsible for war and 
misfortune. Ingrained in them were the traits of the 'Butcher 
Bird', whose characteristic behaviour was to spring on smaller, 
unsuspecting prey.
"It is necessary to discard once and for all what
[206]
Sainte-Beuve rightly called the 'vague and. lyrical' view 
of Germany diffused by Madame de Stael, and to keep 
strictly to the record - the worst ever.... German 
barbarism first crushed Latin civilisation at the battle 
of Aodrianople in the year 378, and it has again crushed 
Latin civilisation in France today....
A fact early and Universally recognised was that the 
Germans ware not only very dirty fighters but they never 
kept a pledge or treaty. Gibbon has ccrrmented on this 
characteristic. It is worth noting that the first German 
national hero to make himself a name for treachery was 
Hermann in the year 9.... By the time they got to their 
famous warmonger, Frederick Barbarossa, in the twelfth 
century, the only bone of contention was not whether they 
should remain at peace, but which race should they 
conquer and dominate....
The lust of world domination has been working in them for 
generations... I have seen the idea of the German empire 
emerging... It has had three elements to work on, all of 
which are well-known to those with any knowledge of German 
psychology. The three are Envy, Self-pity and Cruelty....
There is no horror that Germans have not ccnmitted; and
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the hurricane of cruelty must be succeeded by the wave of 
indignation. Beware therefore lest another sham 
reformation is staged. Take nothing for granted. Make 
sure for yourselves and for your children.
This bird of prey is no sudden apparition. It is a
species. Hitler is no accident, he is the natural and
continuous product of a breed which from the dawn of
(45)history has been predatory, bellicose...."
Vansittart believed that the Germans, as a people, had been
impregnated with militarism, imbued with a sense of superiority,
and convinced that their mission was to enslave mankind for the
good of mankind. They had been persuaded that this great end
justified any and every means, however reprehensible those means
might appear to others. This process had produced "... a race
of hooligans which is the curse of the whole world.n
Despite this, Vansittart objected to the criticism that he was
condemning an entire people. His answer was that he did not
(47)hate all Germans, just "... the bloody minded bulk."' 7 In an 
article for the Sunday Times [August 1941], Vansittart said of 
the Germans: "... cruelty is in their bone and breed",
and in Roots of rRie Trouble he wrote: "...all the miseries of
the world's last three generations have issued fran the German 
land and the German soul.... the nature of the German nation is
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(49)hideously warped and diseased..."
Except for a group so tiny as to be insignificant in
quantitative terms, those who disagreed with Vansittart did not
do so because they had any sympathy with the Nazi regime. The
vast majority of people agreed with Neville Chamberlain that
they weuld be fighting evil things, "....brute force, bad faith,
injustice, oppression and persecution",^^ and "virtually
everyone in Britain agreed that Nazism must be eliminated and
(51)Germany disarmed and occupied by Allied military forces."
Very few people, if any, believed that re-education could be 
carried through easily or rapidly. But the Prime Minister 
probably spoke for a large section of the cccnnunity when he said 
that Britain was not fighting the German people but a tyrannical 
regime which had betrayed them. Vansittart of course had his 
supporters, seme of whan were already carmitted to similar 
views, and others who became converts. Harold Nicolson believed 
that in every German soul there were "...strange pockets of envy 
and suspicion." Gilbert Murray, the Oxford classicist, asserted 
that German history was "... an ingenious mixture of all 
elements calculated to stimulate self-pity, self-worship, 
desperate pugnacity." Duff Cooper argued that since its 
creation the German nation had been a menace to the world and 
that at the end of the war the Allies should make sure that no 
German nation existed. Beaverbrook asked the British and their
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(52)allies to cultivate a "...stem and righteous hatred."
Lillian Doull wrote: "This cant about not being at war with the
German people must cease. If the German people are so
peace-minded, Hitler could never have maintained his
concentration camps or perpetrated atrocities on the enormous
(53)scale that he does." G.R. King reminded his readers that
"The cry at the beginning of the last war was, ’We have no
quarrel with the German people; it is just their government1.
By the end of the war the British and the French had a bitter
hatred of everything German. Consequently the peace terms were
very hard on Germany, though not hard enough to prevent her from
becoming dangerous again. Is this going to happen again this
time? The cry once more is that we have no quarrel with the
German people, but Hitlerism must be destroyed. To ensure peace
after this war there must be no Germany left on the map of 
(54)Europe." V. Medus demanded that "’Smash Germany* should be
the order of the day. Utterly destroy them. It's the one and
only way to ensure everlasting peace. 'We fight Hitlerism and
(55)not the German people' is piffle."
Apart from the attitudes based on the ideological self-image, 
there were tactical reasons for opposing the Vansittart thesis 
and making distinctions between the German people and the Nazi 
regime. It was thought that such distinctions would help to 
drive a wedge between the German masses and their leaders.
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When it was perceived in official circles that this might not be
the outcome, a tactical adjustment of view took place. It was
not so much a question of the non-existence of a valid
difference between people and regime as a growing conviction
that in practical terms the distinction could not be exploited
to advantage. Significantly, the BBC which had previously
promoted the distinction in its broadcasts dropped the word
'Nazi' from its news bulletins to Germany. There was a division
of opinion within the Foreign Office. On the one side it was
held that to speak of good and bad Germans was dangerous in that
it could subvert the war effort; on the other side it was
argued that the Black Record approach would only "...cement the
(57)
German people behind their rulers." Frank Owen, editor of
the Evening Standard, subscribed to the latter view, and said of
Vansittart, "...he brings back to Hitler's side thousands of
(58)Germans who were leaving it." It is interesting to note
that the Nazi propaganda machine welcomed the views of 
Vansittart and his supporters. Particularly in the late 1930s 
the Nazi leaders had felt the need to ccmbat the notion that the 
people and the regime were in any way distinct. In a speech at 
Weimar, 7 November 1938, Hitler insisted: "..there are no forces 
in Germany which turn against the regime. There is only one 
force. The National Socialist Movement, its leader and his 
followers in arms"; and three days later, at Munich, he fused 
people and leaders with the words: "....no one can destroy the
[211]
regime without destroying the German people." The Hamburger
Tageblatt of 10 November 1938 proclaimed: "The whole German
people...eighty million strong, was present... in the Burgerbrau
f59)Keller and will always be present wherever the Fuhrer is." 
Goebbels was delighted by the claims made in Black Record and 
supporting publications:
"This fellcw Vansittart is really worth his weight in gold 
to our propaganda. After the war a monument ought to be 
erected to him somewhere in Germany with the inscription:
'To the Englishman who rendered the greatest service to 
the German cause during the war'."^^
Edward Hulton [1940] in an article entitled Whan are we 
Fighting?, was concerned by the shift away from making 
distinctions.
"The attitude of our people at the beginning of the war 
was magnificent. They saw the clear distinction between 
the Nazi Party and the German people. No contest has 
ever begun more free fran idiotic jingoism. Of late the 
self-styled realists have raised their ugly heads. Mr 
Duff Copper tells us that there is something innate in the 
German character which renders the German people liable to 
accept that particular form of bad government which
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ultimately leads to war... Sir Herbert Williams, M.P., 
tells us 'it is the German people that are the enemy'.
The Evening News issues 'A Warning to Day Dreamers'. We 
are told that we are sentimentalists with a maudlin faith 
that the Germans are a gentle people in the clutches of a 
gang of blackguards. 'The brutal truth', the Evening News 
has discovered, 'is that the German people delight in the 
infamies of their leaders'. Our government are now going 
back on their former protestations. Mr Winston Churchill 
blundered into the use of the term 'Huns'... Even Mr 
Chairberlain at the Mansion House, on January 9, declared 
that the German people must realise that the 
responsibility for the prolongation of this war was 
theirs. A few weeks ago only a tiny minority would have
identified the German people with the Nazis. But already
n . (61) people are wavering.
The most significant response to the argument contained in Black
Record, and by extension to the work of Rcwse and Namier, was
(621that produced by Victor Gollancz [1942]. On one level he
delivered a major assault on Nazi creed and practice; on 
another he challenged the style and substance of Vansittart's 
case. He stated, without equivocation, that winning the war was 
more important than winning the peace. If extremes of hatred 
and vengeance were prerequisites for military victory, his voice
[213]
would not be raised against the full exercise of such emotions. 
Nazi success would mean the imposition of "a way of life totally 
incompatible with the moral aspirations of humanity." In
the struggle with Hitler's regime, "..the gains of two thousand 
years and more [were] at stake, and [we] are determined, 
whatever the immediate cost in blood and torment and treasure, 
that they shall be preserved." However, in addition to
using material weapons in the fight against Nazism, Britain had 
to use spiritual weapons also. He was convinced that the views 
expressed by Vansittart, and taken up by others, were fatally 
flawed in that they compromised with the spirit of the thing 
they vrere fitting. 'Vansittartism', indeed, impeded victory, 
for it robbed the British war-effort of "a dynamic as powerful 
for good as the Nazis' is for evil....11 The vulgarity of
the thesis developed in Black Record - its wild generalisations, 
its precise and unjustified limitation of responsibility for the 
major ills of the world to Germany, its ahistorical undertones, 
its intolerance, its incitement to hatred and its demand for 
revenge - diminished those who subscribed to it and was 
destructive of the ideological component of the British 
self-image. 'Vansittartism' was likely to prolong the war; the 
outpourings of hatred associated with the position made ordinary 
Germans fear what would happen to them if the Allies were 
victorious and above all other things, that was "the most potent 
factor in the preservation of Hitler's power." In defence of
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the values on behalf of which Britain was fighting, a committed 
stand had to be made against the claims made in Black Record. 
It would take seme effort to "swim against the stream"? but with 
all that was good in the British way of life and thinking at 
stake, the effort had to be made. Were Vansittart to carry the 
day by default, then the silent voices would bear "The supreme 
guilt."(66)
Fairness, and the nature of his cwn attack, compelled Gollancz
to reject sane of the arguments of those who were on his side in
the debate on 'Vansittartism'. He was determined to counter,
"tooth and nail", the notion that there was nothing to
distinguish the Allies from the Nazis in a war which was
mutually imperialistic in origin. He agreed that the war was
"unquestionably irrperialist... [in that] it arose out of the
clash of competing monopoly capitalisms...", but on a number of
criteria it was not only possible but right to make
distinctions. Britain was on the defensive, Germany on the
offensive? Britain had no vision of world conquest, Germany
entertained such ambitions? Britain could be said to stand for
progress, Germany for reaction and terror? in a British
victory there was hope for the world, in a German victory
(67)despair. Nevertheless, it was a central part of his
argument that "...the drive for profits of carpeting capitalisms 
is a general poison which infects the international body..."
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The broad causes of the war, whatever immediate distinctions
could be made between parties to it, were part of a "general
(68)imperialist setting."' Inevitably, this raised the issue of 
responsibility, and hew it should be assigned; and in doing 
that it raised the related issue of how Germany should be 
treated once the war had been won.
Gollancz attacked Vansittart* s position on both of those crucial
issues. First, he confirmed Germany’s central and deliberate
role in events leading up to the Second World War. But he was
not prepared, as was Vansittart, to place a definitional stop
after this statement, and so imply that all the issues had been
covered by it. Were the Allies clear of all blame? Had not the
Franco-British policy at Versailles "...laid the first
foundations of 1939, and laid them firmly?" Had they not, in
the provisions of Versailles, "....deliberately crippled a
nation of sixty million souls: as deliberately as Hitler
(69)launched the present war?" Had not the French, encouraging
German default in order to gain territory, contributed to the 
Great Inflation by invading the Ruhr - an inflation which was 
"to leave its mark on the whole German people: bear it in mind
when you think of 1 9 3 3 . " Second, he argued that when it 
came to the planning of ground rules for the welfare of the 
world in post-war years, the particular responsibility carried 
by individual states - Germany included - had less bearing than
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the general responsibility of world capitalism. Preoccupation
with special German responsibility would cloud the issue and
divert attention fran the fact that "the solution of the general
vrorld problem [was] the simultaneous condition for the solution
(71)of the German problem..." The prevailing economic system,
which encouraged greed, "reinforces it, consecrates it, makes it 
the norm of human behaviour", should be replaced by 
international socialism.(72)
Since the prospect of fraternity and brotherhood held out by
international socialism could only be realised in a world where
individual states were treated as equals, it followed that any
* holding down1 of Germany would be illogical . It was the aim of
international socialism to "...combine the individual productive
strands [so that] the richest international garment may be
woven... Discrimination against one of the greatest of industrial
peoples, for whatever reason it may be undertaken, must
(73)necessarily defeat this aim."
In response to Vansittart's claim that on Germany's Black Record 
were listed the war scares of pre-1914 and culpability in 
respect of the Great War itself, Gollancz can be seen to call 
on the principle of cause and effect, and on the premise that, 
short of international consensus, defence of the status quo is 
not self-evidently altruistic.
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"Every year is, in the nature of things, preceded by another",
and it was ahistorical to focus, as Vansittart had done, on
events such as the Kaiser*s visit to Tangier, without giving due
weight to the fact that this followed hard upon negotiations
between France and Britain which realised profit to the former
(74)in Morocco and to the latter in Egypt. Further, although
it was possible to judge the behaviour of states on a plurality
of criteria, "...as between a country that is pushing out for
pcwer and wealth, and a country that is determined to retain the
power and wealth she has got by past exploitation, there is not,
(75)in that regard, a ha'porth of moral difference."
The hope that Gollancz entertained was that Germany would
regenerate itself fron below; that ordinary people would
overthrew the forces of reaction. Britain should be pursuing
policies which lubricated such processes rather than have them
seize up. Everything possible should be done to persuade
ordinary Germans "that they have everything to gain, and nothing
(76)
to fear, from the overthrew of Hitler's tyranny..." 
Instead, Vansittart and those who publicly subscribed to his 
views ware bringing Germans and Hitler close together. Gollancz 
saw evidence that the bonds between Hitler and the German people 
had been "grossly exaggerated and that any real solidarity [was] 
myth." For every internal opponent who was inprisoned or 
executed, "there must be very many who would revolt if they
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dared, but whose courage stops just short of this..." If, in
spite of heavy penalties incurred by civilians tuning in to
foreign broadcasts, the BBC maintained "an elaborate round the
clock programme" beamed at Germany, then it was reasonable to
(77)assume that many were listening. Analysis of comments made
by Hitler and Goebbels revealed that all was not well. In
December 1941 Hitler had referred to "internal doubters", and in
the same month Goebbels had written scathingly of citizens who
were more concerned with their own "negligible daily troubles"
than with the great issue of the day - the fate of the 
(78)nation. Vansittart and others denounced reference to such
evidence as an attempt to connive with those who wanted Germany 
to be 'let off lightly1. Why hadn't the German people risen up 
against the Nazi regime, they asked. If Hitler and the Germans 
were not as one, why was he still in pcwer? To such questions 
Gollancz responded with one of his own:
"I should like to ask these heroic ladies and gentlemen 
who are so shocked because Hitler has not already been 
overthrown - just how could the German people have done 
it?"
In their daily lives they had to contend with the Gestapo, "The 
most awful weapon of espionage, delation, and terror that has 
ever been forged...", but beyond that there were wider
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considerations:
"Onoe war has broken out, even potential revolutionaries 
becane divided in mind, hesitant, unwilling to precipitate 
defeat - especially [this a thrust at Vansittart] if they 
are led to believe that defeat will mean not freedom but 
annihilation.... I confess that self-righteous indignation 
about the cowardice of the German people, in the situation 
in which they find themselves, makes me feel a little 
sick.,,(79)
Vansittart had described the Germans as docile, obedient and 
acquiescent in relation to the butchery and sadism perpetrated 
in their name. Gollancz wondered about the distribution of the 
alleged traits of sadism and submission in the German 
population, and identified in Vansittartfs analysis of national 
characteristics a problem already noted by others in the work of 
Namier. If, for the sake of argument, one supposed that the 
majority of Germans were docile and obedient, but not in 
themselves sadistic, then post-war policies of the kind 
ree a tin e n d e d  by Vansittart would be cruite inauoroDriate.
"For if especially obedient people will follow men who 
lead them to war they will follow men who lead them to 
peace.... We are talking about the great masses of
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ordinary, cannon people: the mother with her baby, the
little clerk, the worker at his bench. We all have 
aggression in us; but do you really believe that, given 
even a barely tolerable life: given no cunning appeal to
the sense of glory or the sense of fear: given an 
environment that brings out the best instead of the worst: 
given the possibility of finding an outlet for his 
aggression in happy, constructive work and ordinary 
enjoyment; do you really believe that, given these, the 
average Herr Schmidt of Hamburg will be any more likely to 
satisfy his aggression by starving and murdering and 
torturing his fel lew men than the average Mr Smith of 
Clapham?"
Gollancz implored his readers to resist the propaganda of hatred
associated with ’Vansittartism'. It clouded judgment and was
bad in itself. War was, of course, a dirty business: "We
cannot keep our hands clean; we must kill and torment the flesh
of our brothers, lest liberty, and the capacity of man to rise
above his animal nature, should perish utterly from the earth."
But the 1 spirit' in which this necessity was met was of crucial
significance, for therein would lie the distinction between the
contending forces. "We can keep our hearts pure; and by as
much as we fail to do so, by as much as we hate, by so much does
(81)Hitler win.11 Where Vansittart encouraged hatred of the
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criminal, Gollancz recommended hatred of the crime. He was
resolute in his abomination of Nazi practices, and noted with
irony that many newspapers - now virulently anti-German - had
been aware of those practices in the 1930s and had overlooked or
condoned them when the imperatives of war time emergencies had
not obtained. In passages at times reminiscent of Socratic
principles, Gollancz argued that crimes should be punished, but
"punishment should not involve hatred; hatred at best is
irrelevant to punishment.... or, at worst and more frequently it
perverts the punishment and robs it of any beneficial effect it
(82)might otherwise have had." For civilised people,
punishment had two main objectives: first, society had to be
protected; second, the criminal had to be reformed. The
intrusion of vengeance was not only incompatible with those
objectives, additionally and reprehensibly it amounted to
"seizing a respectable occasion for giving the rein to our own
sadistic inpulses, or.. ..seeking relief from a tormenting
conscience by externalising and trying to annihilate our own 
(83)guilt." To hate the criminal was, in a sense, to "gratify
ourselves, enhance our own sense of power over a fellow 
creature, give the rein to our own aggressiveness. We use the 
evil in him as a justification for no longer making the effort to 
restrain our own..." To hate the criminal was to "increase the 
amount of self-assertion in the world." To hate the crime, but 
not the criminal was, on the other hand, to diminish the
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expression of self-assertion. Hitler was tempting the world to 
worship self-assertion, and the line taken by Vansittart was 
making his work easier. Hie Nazi doctrine was an invitation to 
humanity to loathe itself; its cult of hatred promoted 
"contempt for reason.. .equal justice and objective truth, and 
above all... detestation of pity and mercy and humility and all 
the little humanities of decent average men and women." 
Gollancz resolved that he would not be beaten in the fortress of 
his humanity by Hitler:
"I refuse to hate him. And as the Jews are the special
(85Vobject of his hatred, as a Jew I doubly refuse."
Wherever Vansittart was successful, whenever a man who had not 
previously hated anyone new hated the Nazis, Hitler had claimed 
another victim. Gollancz was aware that Black Record had 
anticipated this line of argument, and he responded with:
"Is all this 'sentimental' and unrealistic...? It is the 
haters that are sentimental or emotional, for it is to 
their most primitive and stronger emotions that they give 
the rein. Those who plead for the restraint of these 
emotions, because in abandonment to them they see nothing 
but destruction and death: those who insist that we must
lock beyond inmediate gratification, and must guard
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ourselves even now as instruments for giving life to 
ourselves and others: these are the starkest, and most
unsentimental of realists. It is indeed a Nazi triumph 
that to luxuriate in hatred should be regarded as 
realistic, and not to do so as sentimental."^^
Ultimately, the real danger inherent in Vansittartfs views was 
that they were subversive of the long standing traits and 
values of the British people - reason, balance, fairness, 
sympathetic understanding and generosity of spirit. It was in 
defence of the ideological self-image that Gollancz stood 
against him.
"At a time when objectivity is everywhere menaced by 
Fascism, the false history and grotesque view of the 
modem world that Vansittartism presents to the. credulous 
are lamentable enough: but it is in the emotional mood
which is induced by its selection of facts and 
interpretation of events that its greatest peril lies. 
For, seeming to appeal to reason, it is to two emotions 
that it in truth appeals - the bad one of hatred and 
thirst for revenge, and the good but so easily 
pervertible one of moral indignation... whatever its 
motives, .... Vansittartism is producing not a reasoned 
examination of international problems, about which men
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may honourably differ, but a mood of savage hatred and 
blind vindictiveness against the men and women, and even 
the beys and girls, of Germany. The process had not gone 
very far. I like to think that the British people are 
too kindly and decent for that. But who knows where, in 
the perspective of a long war, this contagion may 
end.»<87)
Vansittart's thesis was also challenged by Thouless [1942], In
response to those who refused to make distinctions between
Germans of one kind and another, he argued that clear thinking
and a carmitment to the principles of rationality demanded that
(88)"we must make distinctions where differences exist.."; in
opposition to those who would not transcend the limits of their 
cwn prejudices when making judgments on nations, he claimed that
"each observer has a different frame of reference... if our 
wish is not to win an argument but to understand reality, 
there is much to be said for not considering [an] event 
only from the point of view of the frame of reference that 
we happen to occupy, but for considering also how it would 
appear from the point of view of other possible frames of 
reference."
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Vansittart's unwillingness to make distinctions between
different Germans placed him perilously close to Hitler. For
Hitler there were no good and bad Jews, no kind and unkind Jews,
no honest and dishonest Jews: "All of the wide differences
between one Jew and another - which are much the same as the
differences between different Germans or between different
Englishmen - is obliterated in the picture of the one single
detestable and invariable figure - the Jew." In Nazi
doctrine the reasonable proposition that seme Jews were likely
to be bad and dishonest had become transformed into the totally
false proposition that all Jews could be so described. It was a
similar act of transformation in Vansittart's thesis which had
"supplied the creed for hostility against... the Germans..."
Black Record was, of course, blatantly propagandist, and those
with such intentions found rational conclusions "too moderate to
(91)be of much service to a general anti-German sentiment.” 
Vansittart's case had to be seen as "a stimulus to action, not 
as a precise statement of fact." Acceptance or rejection of 
that case would depend on whether his readers wished to be 
"stimulated into action by... fictions", or whether they wished
to "think clearly even in wartime and even about our
' n (92) enemies.
Thouless laid considerable emphasis on the value of empathy. 
For the student of clear thinking, "the attempt to look at
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things as they appear from other points of view than one’s own
(93)[was] not a mere intellectual exercise", but a necessity.
This was not to argue that the point of view of another, say an
opponent in war, would define the situation as it really was,
would describe the truth about a disputed issue. On the other
hand, it was unlikely that a frame of reference defining reality
and describing truth "would be occupied by either of the two
parties to the dispute. The views of both sides are likely to
be unduly influenced by their own situations, so that there is
likely to be gain to both of them if they make the imaginative
effort necessary to consider hew the situation would look from
(94)the point of view of the other." This imaginative effort
involved a systematic determination to escape frcm the 
limitations of one's cwn frame of reference.
"A person - whether German or British - whose reaction to
air bombardment is expressed in such words as: 'The
brutes, dropping bombs on innocent wanen and children', is
looking at the situation exclusively frcm the limits of
his cwn frame of reference. On the other hand, the
attitude - by no means unknown in Great Britain and
possibly also to be found in Germany - expressed in such
words as: 'Poor fellcws, they have to do their jobs just
as our own aviators do', is one that is transcending the
(95)limits of the speaker's cwn frame of reference."
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Douglas-Smith [1942] considered that the British people were
firmly resolved "to defeat and smash Hitler and the Nazis", but
that the methods by which the victory should be achieved were
(96)still "the subject of hopeless indecision."' This indecision
manifested itself on two levels, strategic and attitudinal.
Attitudinally, the problem took the form of a question: ’Is cur
enemy the German people or the Nazi Party?1 Those like Rowse,
Namier, and Vansittart, who argued with no more than marginal
reservations, if any, that the Germans were all alike, that they
were fanatically devoted to Hitler, and that their national
characteristics left no scope for 'good Germans', wanted to see
Germany and the Germans crushed. There were others who made
distinctions between the German people and the Nazis. The
question had to be answered, and "the destinies of England and
(97)the world depend on the conclusion which is reached."
Douglas-Smith had little sympathy with the case expressed in 
Black Record. He quoted Heinrich Fraenkel's comments on its 
author:
"Sir Robert Vansittart does not know the German people. I 
wonder if, on all his sojourns in Germany, he ever 
travelled on a bus, or in a tram-car, or a third-class 
railway ccrnpartment... if ever he spent seme time in 
living with a lower middle-class family? if ever he spent
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as ranch as a day and a night in one of the huge tenement
/ g o )
houses of a Berlin working-class district."'
And he drew the attention of his readers to the descriptions of 
Fascist brutality at the 1934 Olympia Rally provided by Rev.
H.R.L. Sheppard and Sir Terence O’Connor.
"The people who did these things were Englishmen. You can 
get hooligans to do these things in all countries. The 
case against German inherent cruelty simply falls to the 
ground... The case against Germans, as Germans, is a 
farce."(99)
If the attitudes subsumed under the general heading of 
'Vans it tart ism1 came to govern the minds and actions of the 
Allies, then
"...even the wobblers, even the Germans who are only with 
Hitler up to a certain point, will rally behind him in the 
last great battle of the west. And even Confessional 
Protestants, Roman Catholics, and Jews- the Liberals and 
the Social Democrats, before the threat of another 
Armistice Blockade and another Treaty of Versailles, may 
well decide: Better even Hitler than the foreigner who
canes once more to invade and to oppress."
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Barraclough [1946] was representative of that branch of general 
thinking on what should happen to Germany after defeat that laid 
the emphasis on co-operation and conciliation. Though his 
particular expression of the view was not published until after 
the war, it was the outcome of participation in the lengthy 
war-time debate on post-war policy options. He concluded
that the problem facing Europe in the aftermath of war was "to 
build a Germany of the German people, representing not the will 
of a predatory minority, but the sober interests and aspirations 
of the German speaking millions..." The clue to his
attitude and the principles underlying it is to be found in a 
passage where he quotes frcm the declaration as the Social 
Democrats to the Prussian Diet, June 17, 1916:
"We do not see our wellbeing in the creation of an 
imperialist Greater Germany, or of a Mitteleuropa, but in 
mutual political and economic relations between the 
nations, fostered by the extension of democracy... the 
cannon people of no country have willed the war... If the 
governments of the belligerent countries still refuse to 
make peace, they act in antagonism to the great masses of 
the population who long to return to peaceful work. We 
demand that the German Government, before all governments, 
should take the first step and should relinquish their 
plans of conquest."
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This, wrote Barraclough, "...was the authentic voice of the 
German people.1 To speak of an authentic voice presupposes
that there were other voices in Germany representative of other 
value systems. To admit this distinction, to define value-based 
opinions as pluralistic, lays on the writer the kind of 
obligation which Gardiner tended to ignore - namely, to provide 
some cultural justification for the differences. It calls for 
analysis of the possible reasons why groups might have 
participated differentially in the dominant [i.e. power/sanction 
supported] value system of the society. One other condition has 
to be observed. The authentic voice, to be so defined, should 
be one with a history which can be reflected upon. Barraclough 
met these obligations.
He met the requirement of longevity by tracing the expression of 
his authentic voice over a period of time. Only a few examples 
are given below. Of the 1890s he wrote:
"...the satisfaction which Germany desired was the 
transformation of imperial autocracy into popular 
self-government and the destruction of the privileges of 
the junker class on which the Emperor* s power 
rested..."
The apparent contradiction which arises from the use of the
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generic 1 Germany' in such a way as to exclude frcm it a part 
which was a member of the whole can be resolved by assuming that 
the word, in this context, was used to mean the authentic voice. 
The 4,250,000 votes in 1912 which made the Social Democrats the 
largest single party in the Reichstag were taken as evidence 
that the voice remained active. Then there was the Zabem 
Affair of 1913:
"When the commander of the garrison in this petty Alsatian 
tcwn arrested and imprisoned seme of the inhabitants in 
defiance of the law, his exhibition of military arrogance 
stirred all Germany."
What we have to assume, with cultural considerations in mind, is 
that 'all Germany' is an inappropriate phrase, since seme 
section or sections of society, carmitted to the 
military/autocratic ethic and willing to defend it publicly in 
all cases, would have supported the commander's action. We 
should take Barraclough to mean that the authentic voice, 
consistent in its expression of liberal values was, on this 
occasion, joined by another voice [or voices] which, although 
carmitted to the military/autocratic ethic was worried either 
because the ethic was being pushed to an intolerable extreme 
and/or was being harmed by bad publicity. When the Zabem 
Affair was discussed in the Reichstag, the vote went 293-54
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against Bethmann's defence of the Army. Then, during the Great 
War, "... in spite of ruthless repression, the anti-war movement 
gained ground more quickly in Germany than elsewhere. "^6) ^
June 1915 close to 1,000 Social Democrats appended their names 
to a denunciation of the governments annexationist policy. 
This was followed by publication of Liebknecht1 s leaflet, 'The 
Main Enemy Stands at Heme1. The principal demands’ of the 
200,000 industrial workers who came out on strike in Berlin and 
Leipzig in April 1917 were for "...the introduction of a 
democratic regime and immediate peace negotiations on the basis 
of 'no annexations'." The strike of munitions workers in 
January 1918 was the "... direct reply of the German people to 
the insolence and intransigence of the German negotiations at 
Brest-Litovsk...", and the strikes in general "constituted... a 
clear manifestation of the spirit of the German people, which... 
sought a peace of reconciliation."
When Hitler became Chancellor on January 30, 1933, "...it was 
not through the support of, but rather as a result of a 
conspiracy against the German people. I n  power, Hitler 
"...feared the people, as much as the forces of German reaction 
feared the people, and therefore he stifled every free 
expression of popular will because.... he recognised the deep 
cleft between his own objectives and the aspirations of the
German people." And, finally, "...by repressing opposition, by
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perverting education.... he fastened on Germany a regime hostile 
to all the German people had striven after...."
What underlying cultural or sub-cultural variations within 
Germany went towards the formation of the authentic voice and 
its oppositions? Sociological (class), economic 
(occupation, life-cpportunities), and confessional factors 
militated against a broad sharing of the dominant 
(power/sanction supported) values of society. In general, the 
lower classes ware for change, and so challenged the dominant 
values. This challenge was dissipated to some extent by the 
fact that one section of the working classes, gradualist in 
outlook, worked for change not through overt action but through 
a faith in their ability to permeate the system with reform 
ideas. For the rest, they ware, to varying degrees, reflected 
in their responses to particular issues, associated with the 
dominant values. The Catholic ccnmunity, and so to a large 
extent the supporters of the Zentrum, were wary of social change 
if it took a form "anathematized by church." The junkers and 
the industrial and comnercial middle classes who could on 
occasion be bitterly divided on social goals, subscribed to the 
dominant values insofar as reaction was "... a rallying point 
for all who had something to lose by popular government..."
Without prejudice to any criticism which might be levelled
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against his views, it has to be conceded that Barraclough met 
the two obligations contingent upon his use of the concept 
authentic. As he interpreted events, that voice had been 
consistently raised over a period of time; further, the need to 
provide same cultural justification for the differences in 
value-based opinion had not been ignored. But it has to be 
noted that to meet those two obligations is to do no more than 
set up the necessary conditions for the definition of an 
authentic voice. For example, other voices expressing other 
value-based opinions could claim longevity over the period 
discussed by Barraclough, and he himself had indicated that 
those other voices were related to cultural complexities. Why, 
then, did one of these not constitute the authentic voice? One 
way or another a sufficient condition had to be found. 
Barraclough appeared to find it in the British self-image. Why 
were all the other voices false? They were false because, 
unlike his authentic voice they did not match with the 
ideological component of the British self-imge. To varying 
degrees they promoted exclusive rather than popular interests, 
they perpetuated oppression rather than aiding the development 
of freedom, justice and fairness; they were selfish rather than 
other regarding, they supported the military/autocratic ethic 
in opposition to peace, conciliation, and co-operation. 
Ultimately, his authentic voice deserved to be so called because 
it was aligned with central features of the ideological 
self-image.
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In the spring of 1943, Mass Observation polled a representative 
sanple of the British population and returns indicated that 43% 
of those questioned "...either hated or had no sympathy for the 
German people. By February 1945 the figure had increased
to 54%. Significant in themselves, the returns also direct 
attention to the 57% and 46% respectively who did not respond 
with hatred and lack of sympathy. In sane measure this is 
testimony to the resilience and determination of those who 
assigned a relatively high operational weight to the ideological 
self-image. The challenge of ’Vansittartism’ had been faced at 
a time when it was not easy to do so, and large numbers of 
people had remained unwilling to win the war at the risk, as 
they perceived it, of * losing themselves1.
The resilience of the ideological self-image was tested in other 
ways. There had been another challenge; less dramatic and 
perhaps less threatening in the public sense, but no less 
conpelling in respect of the relationship between expressed 
attitudes and the values frcm which the attitudes were derived. 
This challenge came from the way Britain was perceived by 
others, and in particular by Germany.
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CHAPTER 7
THE CHALLENGE IN VOICES FROM THE OTHER SIDE.
[242]
An ideological self-image is projected outwards, as an 
instrument for assessing others, in two distinct ways. In one 
projection it 'fits' the assessed group, which is regarded in a 
favourable light, with the associated attitudes being 
ccnplimentary. In the other projection there is a 'mismatch', 
between the self-image and the traits and values of the assessed 
group. ^  In this latter case, the light in which the assessed 
group is regarded is not predetermined by the nature of the 'fit' 
as it is in the former. The assessed group may indeed be 
regarded in an unfavourable light, with associated attitudes 
being pejorative; on the other hand, criticism, stemming fron 
the mismatch may be moderated by understanding, offset to seme 
extent by tolerance and an attempt to be even-handed.
One can identify sources which regarded Germany in a favourable
light and gave expression to complimentary attitudes. W.
Horsfall Carter [1933] vras aware of the differences between the
traits and values of Britain and Germany, but he was
(2)complimentary in his attitudes, sometimes dramatically so.
For Carter, National Socialism wras "... a passionate crusade for
(3)a regeneration from mthin..." There followed a passage 
containing a metaphor which, at one and the same time referred 
to the creation of new political 'furniture' and the advent of 
messiahs:
[243]
"... the younger generation in Europe, and particularly in 
Germany, has become entirely conscious of the essential 
modifying factor of our times: namely, that science has
created a world of abundance which is being ignored or 
traduced to make a banker's holiday. Today the carpenters 
are ready: their names are Franklin Roosevelt and Adolf
Hitler."(4)
For two or three generations men had been pursuing false gods 
and false doctrines; money making and competition. Standards 
of material comfort had risen, but spiritual values had been 
sacrificed. This was an indictment against capitalism, but also 
against socialism, which did not deny the materialist scale of 
values so much as advocate a different distribution of wealth.
"...It wras in just such a mood of revulsion from the idols
of 'prosperity'.... that able bodied Germans returned fran
the trenches. They glimpsed the prospect of a nation
eschewing utilitarian principles and setting the example
of a national life based on fellowship and selfless
service... They found, on the contrary, that in Germany
'big-business' was only intent to try and take up the
threads where they had been snapped in 1914, whatever the
(5)cost to the rest of the ccmnumty."
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Although unable to have official recognition, "... the 
inarticulate aspirations of the immediate post-war period began 
to take shape", and came to fruition in a movement set on 
preserving the nation's individuality through self-help, 
combined with "... a real and living socialism designed to make 
the future German body politic a co-operative ocxnnonwealth in 
which there should be no exploitation of class by class or of 
one section of the community by another section." ^
Referring to features in Picture Post [1939], a reader's letter 
complained:
"Your articles about Germany make me sick. Were the
purpose not so painfully obvious, I should feel like
joining the I.R.A., and setting off a bomb in your
premises. After all, you half-baked socialist
intellectuals have such a lot to lose by the natural rise
of real truth, and real justice; and by that I mean the
Fascist People's State. Germany is the only practical
socialist country in the wrorld. Liberty, and justice, and
freedom are the watchword of every German new that class
hatred and class privilege, the brainchild of the
(7)democratic hypocrite mentality have vanished."
However favourably Germany w*as regarded by such sources it
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remains true that in the period under study none, with the 
possible exception of Hamilton Sorley [1914], Thomas Hardy
/o\
[1915] and Harold Begbie [1928] came close to suggesting
that there was a fit between the traits and values of the
British and the Germans. This view is confirmed rather than
contradicted by the fact that seme sources saw hope for the
(9)future in a synthesis of British and German values. In
classical dialectic it is the quite distinct thesis and 
antithesis that come together to form the synthesis. Self-image 
identity between Britain and Germany, where it existed, was 
almost wholly confined to the pragmatic aspect, as in the work 
of Maxse and Cramb.
Examples of unfavourable responses and pejorative attitudes to 
Germany, based on a perceived mismatch between respective traits 
and values have been given above. Attention has also been given 
to those sources which, although taking account of the mismatch, 
demonstrated an empathetic understanding of Germany’s 
predicament at particular points in time, recommended 
even-handedness, and put an emphasis on justice and fair play. 
Such sources abjured categorical condemnations, moderated 
criticism with tolerance, accepted ambiguities, and were not in 
the business of wholesale acceptance or rejection of Germany in 
terms of fit between respective traits and values. It is 
reasonable to assume that for individuals and groups in this
[246]
category there was an intellectual and psychological caimitment 
to consistency between expressed attitudes derived fron declared 
values and the values themselves. Given the very premises on 
which their position rested they were likely to be troubled by 
charges of hypocrisy, cant, arrogance, and double standards.
Such charges were made regularly and were difficult to ignore. 
Kuno Franke [1915] saw double standards at work in Britain’s 
condemnation of Germany’s colonial aspirations as ”... dangerous 
and intolerable aggression." The condemnation was ccming from a 
country which had
"...throttled the independence of the South African 
Republic, established a Protectorate over Egypt, 
partitioned Persia... encouraged France to build up an 
irrmense colonial empire in Cochin China, Madagascar, 
Tunis, and Morocco, allowed Italy to conquer Tripoli, and 
helped Japan to tighten her grip upon China."
Dewey [1916] noted that the image the British had of themselves 
was not always the image others had of them: "Since their
activities, as distinct from their consciousness have been 
commercial and imperialistic, it is not surprising that the 
hypocrisy, the unctuous pharasaism of the British have become 
proverbial...." ^ ^
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J.M. de Beaufort [1917] translated a German pamphlet entitled 
Eine Fabel, "... very widely distributed, especially in neutral 
countries." The text and illustrations of the fable depicted a 
deceitful, devious and dissembling Britain, jealous and envious 
of an energetic and youthful Germany, hypocritically engaging 
other nations in quarrels with the newcomer in order to maintain 
its long unchallenged status. Once upon a time there was a 
very large forest in which all sorts of animals lived, in peace 
and harmony. The most important were the Lion [Great Britain], 
The Great Cock [France], the Bear [Russia], the Double-headed 
Eagle [Austria-Hungary], and the Little Cock [Belgium]. The 
Lion was in supreme command, but commitment to his rule was more 
prudential than conscientious.
One day the Great Cock, looking quite knocked-about, bleeding, 
and minus some feathers, arrived at the Lion’s den. He had been 
in a fight with a newcomer, a Young Eagle [Germany], and warned 
the Lion that this stranger was a threat to the ruler’s status. 
From that day on, the Young Eagle seemed to cross the Lion’s 
path - getting to the feeding grounds first, blotting out the 
sun - never acknowledging the ruler's claim to sovereignty. 
This added anger to the fear and envy which already filled the 
Lion's heart and mind. He was enormous in size and strength, 
but he could not fly! And underneath all his show he was a 
coward. So he determined to plot against the Young Eagle. He
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told the Bear that the Young Eagle was planning to steal his 
food and the best Bear lairs in the forest. The only solution 
was to fight; the Bear could count on the support of the Lion 
and the Great Cock. There was one problem. How could the 
interloper and usurper be enticed to solid earth. Hie Lion had 
the answer: the Bear should attack the Double-headed Eagle.
Since that creature was loved by the Young Eagle, he would cane 
to its aid.
"Good!" exclaimed the Bear enthusiastically? but after a few 
moments reflection he asked: "But what are the other animals of 
the forest going to think when the three of us fall upon the 
Young Eagle?"
"Hm, that is true," acquiesced the Lion. "We must try and 
find sane excuse." And, rising, he angrily shook his mane 
and beat his tail. "I have it," he suddenly growled. 
"The Big Cock will challenge the Young Eagle. He knows I 
am going to help him. Well, the Young Eagle cannot reach 
the Cock without flying over the establishment of the 
Cockerel. That will give us sufficient excuse to fall 
upon the Young Eagle."
"How clever, hew very clever you are!" growled the Bear. 
"I shall of course do as you advise."
The Lion left quite satisfied. "One more call," he
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reflected," and then I can go to sleep again." His last visit 
was to the Cockerel.
"I have just had some dreadful news," he cried out on 
meeting the Cockerel. "Before you are many days older,
the Young Eagle will try to fly into your little kingdom 
and take possession of it. You must oppose with all your 
power this sinful act."
"But hew," the little Cock wanted to know, "am I going to 
stop the flight of an Eagle?"
"I shall be there to help you", said the Lion
(12)magnanimously...."
Michael [1928] returned to the theme of double standards
when he sketched Britain* s traditional view of European 
and World Politics. Independence from Europe and a
positive, sometimes controlling role in other parts of the 
world was what best suited Britain. But the prerequisite
for independence from Europe was a stable balance of power
on that continent. Despite the fact that it was natural
for nation to struggle with nation for predominance in
Europe, Britain did all in her power to nullify this process.
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(13)
In other words, Britain ‘wanted it both ways'.' The potency
of criticism in this vein was measured by Begbie [1928]:
"England.... has become extremely sensitive concerning the taunt
(14)of political perfidy..."' Notwithstanding the sensitivity, 
it appeared that she still indulged in the attitudes and 
behaviour which gave rise to the accusations. Carter [1933] 
addressed the issue of moral imperialism:
"If Germans, by and large... enjoy regimentation, revel in
drilling, marching and military organisation, and take a
peculiar delight in work, which, they will tell you, is
akin to the equally purposeless passion of the English for
sport - hence the very real popularity of the compulsory
national labour service - that is their own affair...
What right have we to affirm that the service of freedom -
which happens to be our particular pride - is superior in
the scale of values to the freedom of service?... those
who complain of the suppression of 'liberty' or
'democracy', meaning thereby what Englishmen... understand
by the terms, seem to be totally oblivious to the moral
imperialism of which they are guilty in seeking to inpose
their scale of values on a country possessing quite other
(15)values but of equally respectable tradition."
Eaton [1937] concluded that "England's combination of moral
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conviction and business sense may explain quite satisfactorily 
to herself and her friends the vagaries and vacillations of her 
foreign policies, but these same elements have been responsible 
for her past reputation on the continent for hypocrisy and 
dissimulation."
That such a reputation was current and not a thing of the past
was confirmed by the publication in Britain of an anthology of
. . .  (17)Nazi views on British traits and values. The peremptory
headline in Per Alemanne, 12 November 1938, "Silence, Please,
You Paragons of Virtue!" is expressive of Nazi scorn for and
inpatience with the British self-image. Though it is not
surprising that German newspaper comment of the Nazi period
regarded the relationship between the British self-image and
British political behaviour as evidence of cant and hypocrisy,
the reaction is an interesting one. It confirms, admittedly
through refraction, that the British perceived themselves as
being fair, just and tolerant, with all that such traits and
values imply in terms of sympathetic even-handedness. It may
also provide clues to the psychological disposition of a regime
conscious of newly acquired power yet frustrated to seme extent
in the desired use of it by traditional power. And, for some
British sources, the moral challenge implicit in the German
reaction to British perceptions of self has to be seen as
contributing to the discomfort that comes from the accusation of
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inconsistency - notwithstanding Stephen King-Hall's assertion
that "... it is difficult to imagine a more mischievous or
(18)slanderous account of the English and their ways..."
The following review of the opinions expressed in Beware of the
English [1939] is so arranged that the major themes may be
identified. Those themes refer to Britain's schoolmasterish
behaviour, her self-righteousness, her habit of applying double
standards, and her capacity for cant and hypocrisy. Britain was
depicted, with irony, as assuming the role of "supreme moral
Pope" in world affairs, and referred to as "... this great and
(19)divinely appointed controller of the world." At
Saarbrucken, 9 October 1938, Hitler declared that "... tutelage 
of foreign governesses is something that Germany cannot and will 
not stand," and returned to this theme at Munich, 10 November 
1938: "The German regime is a private affair of the German 
people, and we forbid all schoolmasterish supervision."
Per Alemanne, 12 November 1938, reported: "Once again the
English governess is full of indignation. Not, as we might 
suppose, over the massacres in Palestine, but over the alleged 
persecution of the Jews in Germany... Authoritative circles in 
Germany have already made it clear to these incorrigible moral 
preachers that this continual interference... shows a 
regrettable lack of tact." On this occasion Britain's double
[253]
standards, as perceived by Germany, were highlighted by her
claim to act as moral arbiter. The Westfalische
Landeszeiturg, 22 November 1938, advised its readers that "The
English Press [had] showered a hail of hostile and
schoolmasterish criticism on German Jewish decrees...", and the
Volkischer Beobachter, 4 December 1938, posed the question: "Who
are they exactly , these sanctimonious guardians of the morals
(21)and conscience of the whole world?" The Danziger
Vorposten, 19 December 1938, describing the experiences of one 
of its reporters, asserted that "A stay of even a few days in 
London brings home to one the utter impudence of the 'Governors 
attitude1 adopted by English politicians towards Germany1 s 
domestic affairs.
Having recorded hew the British appeared to view themselves, the
Berliner Lokal Anzeiger, 15 January 1939, considered the
ideological self-image both unworthy of careful analysis and a
pretence to distract attention from deeper motives which were
entirely self-regarding: "We cannot and will not enter into a
discussion of this philosophy. But it must be remembered that
it masks a... policy of self-interest that sticks at nothing.
There is never for a single moment the slightest desire for
(23)impartiality or objectivity or, indeed, reason." Britain's
alleged habit of applying double standards, and the cant and 
hypocrisy attendant upon this practice, was dealt with at length
[254]
in the Nazi press. Per Alemanne, 12 November 1938:
"The English... with typical puritanical hypocrisy 
[remain] silent on the subject of events in the Holy Land.
No words are wasted on the shooting of twenty Arabs in a 
single day and the passing of death sentences on half a 
dozen more. But if in Germany same Jewish undesirable is 
placed in a concentration camp, then everyone is dutifully 
indignant... So, Silence, Please, you democratic 
hypocrites... turn your attention to your own doorstep, 
you paragons of virtue and guardians of the world1 s 
morals, and see that too much filth and refuse does not 
collect there."
British sources, complaining about inhumanity in the conduct of 
the Nazi regime were roundly chastised by the Berliner 
Illustrierte Nachtausgabe, 19 November 1938:
"Parliament and Press in England are once more entirely in 
their element. They use the retaliatory measures of the 
German Government for the Jewish murder of a young German 
diplomat as a pretext for an unbridled campaign of 
atrocity stories and provocation under the cloak of 
'humanity and morals'... we ... select one single example 
fran the most inmediate past, of which to remind those
[255]
lovers of humanity on the other side of the Channel. What 
was it like during the Great War, when Great Britain 
inflicted a terrible hunger blockade on defenceless women 
and children? Then no finger was raised in England... no 
cry of protest echoed throughout the lands of world 
democracy against the war of extermination which was a 
mockery of all rational justice. In those days the 
apostles of humanity possessed good nerves... No 
democratic hearts were touched by the fact that 700,000 
wcmen, children and aged people in Germany pined away in 
misery and died of weakness... But the starvation of 
Germany during the war was nothing compared with the 
inhumanity of continuing the blockade for months after the 
Armistice had been signed.
Just as the representatives of world democracy were in no 
position in 1919 to speak of guilt and atonement, so to-day 
they should be chary of using the words 'humanity' and 
'morality'."(25)
Hie same theme was taken up by the Berliner Lokal Anzeiger, 9
December 1938:
"Where was Anglo-Saxon humanity when the devilish hanmer 
of German oppression was forged at Versailles? Where
[256]
were English tears when the blockade was decreed and
carried out which was to starve Germany's wcmen and
children?... Was it in German starvation camps that wcmen
and children were exterminated? Or in English
(26)concentration camps during the Boer War?"
Under the headline, 'Distress is Apparently Not Interesting', 
the Westdeutscher Beobachter, 4 December 1938, contrasted 
British interest in German domestic affairs with the concern 
shewn for local problems:
"Where are the brave representatives of the British people 
in Parliament new? Where are these men ... who are always 
ready with the words 'justice', 'mercy', and 'love of 
one's fellow men'? It was not this week a question of 
discussing the distress of the Jews and making 
accusations about things which are no concern of English 
members of Parliament. This week there appeared on the 
order of the day in the House of Cannons a matter which 
should have touched the hearts of the elected 
representatives of the English people far more deeply - a 
matter which cast a dark and very ugly shadow on the 
self-ocmplacency of the House. Ihe problem debated... was 
that of the English Distressed Areas... as the debate made 
clear, the extent of these districts is growing... In the
[257]
mining districts of Durham the average figure for 
unemployment is 25 per cent of the population. This 
figure reaches as much as 44 per cent in several districts 
in South Wales... What a dreadful picture! But what a 
subject for parliamentary eloquence; what a chance of 
exercising justice, mercy, love of one's fellow men; what 
a golden opportunity to use greatness, might and riches to 
a practical end! If only, in what concerns England, they 
would unite in action as they unite in cheap verbiage on 
other occasions... But just imagine - at times during this 
debate, this very important and perhaps vitally important 
debate for the future of England, only 19 [let us say it
in wards, nineteen] out of a total of 615 members took
4. (27) part.
Per Stunner, 26 December 1938, used the words of St. Matthew to 
describe those in Britain who appeared to ignore their cwn 
domestic problems, and the culpability of their cwn nation in 
international affairs:
"... Scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! 
for ye are like whited sepulchres, 
which indeed appear beautiful outward, 
but are within full of dead men's bones,
[258]
and of all uncleanness. Even so ye also
outwardly appear righteous men, but within
(28)ye are full of hypocrisy and iniquity."
The Hakenkreuzbanner, 21 March 1939, was particularly scathing 
in its response to British protests about the occupation of 
Czechoslovakia:
"The democracies of the West have no right because of what 
has happened in Bohemia and Moravia to stir up against us 
their peoples and the rest of the world in so underhand a 
fashion. England in particular has every reason to mind 
her own business. When she declares that tiny Czechei was 
no danger to the great Reich we cannot help asking whether 
a rising in Waziristan or in some comer or other in India 
is a danger to the security of the mighty Empire. Why does 
England repress these risings with knout and sword?"
In this context the writer could find no words other than 
"abysmal Phariseeism and immoral double-dealing" to describe 
British attitudes. He reminded his readers of "... the days 
when Great Britain attacked the tiny Boer states and subdued 
them with fire and sword", and hew, similarly, "Albion [had] 
murdered, plundered and enslaved the Irish people." And it was 
"with horror, anger and revulsion" that he called to memory "the
[259]
time when England and the democratic West allowed Senegalese
negroes to strike German women and children in the Rhineland and
the Ruhr with rifle butts and riding whips." Where, he
(29)concluded, '‘was the horror of the democratic world then?"
B.Z. Am Mittag, 22 March 1939, considered British perceptions of 
freedom and morality, against what it took to be the historical 
record:
"Does freedom consist in... flogging Arabs... in 
bombarding and blowing up entire villages in Palestine or 
in persecuting the Irish... Has England forgotten that 
concentration camps... were first used in 1900 during the 
Boer War?... It is the same Britain - quite unselfishly, 
of course, and purely on moral grounds - which protected 
her interests in the Far East. She did not omit, 
naturally, by a most justifiable sale of opium, cocaine 
and heroin, to dangle before the poor Chinese, at least in 
his dreams, the illusion of that freedom of vhich the 
British mercenaries had robbed him for the greater glory 
of the Empire..
It appeared to the writer that reflection upon the British 
experience proved that "... the most moral men are as a rule 
those who have had a wild life behind them." There was an old
[260]
proverb which held that the worst whores - those who had 
capitalised on their opportunities - became the most pious of 
people when past their prime. This was true of nations as of 
individuals:
"The English are very fond of talking about political morality. 
They possess everything they need for their natural life. In an 
age when little was said about political morality, they gathered 
together a world empire. And new they uphold that empire with 
moral cliches."
Das Schwarze Korps, 13 April 1939, was also interested in 
political morality and its applications.
"What is political morality? If political morality 
concerns not one's own people but all humanity, then the 
English were imnoral to the highest degree when they 
crushed Ireland, raped a highly civilised nation of 300 
million souls in India... bought half a continent in 
Africa with glass beads and whisky... No carmandment of a 
biblical pan-human moral doctrine exists which allowed the 
English to conquer, buy or fraudulently acquire a quarter 
of the globe..."
Die Bewegung, 23 May 1939, made the claim that
[261]
"It is... genuinely English to provide the whole world 
unasked with a moral code whose strict observance by other 
peoples is dananded, but which at the same time is as 
elastic as chewing gum and can be unobtrusively stuck under
the edge of the table when it might be applied to the
. . .  . (33)situation in England and to English practices."
Broadly speaking, there were three ways in which the charges 
reviewed above could be countered. First, the witnesses for the 
prosecution, as it were, could be branded as liars. This was 
the message conveyed by the words put into the mouth of Ivan, 
The Russian Engineer, in The Demi-Paradise [1943]
"Much of the world thinks you care only about money. You
care much more about cricket, nightingales... a good job
well done. Much of the world thinks you are perfidious,
hypocritical, but you are warm and kindly. The world
thinks these things because you want it to. It pleases
(34)that dread sense of humour of yours."
It was also the approach used by Rowse [1937, 1939]. He 
claimed that Germany was attempting to justify her cwn rapacious 
conduct in the 20th century by arguing that the growth of the 
British Qtpire had depended on similar tactics. To this he 
responded that the Qnpire "largely grew up in consequence of the
[262]
trading activities of a maritime and industrial people; and for 
the rest, what it acquired in war was mainly acquired as the 
result of our wars of successful defence against aggression." 
Furthermore, the German ploy was "utterly unhistorical in its 
way of judging", since the code of conduct, the standards and 
manners of the twentieth century were not those of the 
eighteenth.
Behind the distortions and lies of German propaganda lay envy of 
Britain's greatness and a malicious pleasure in putting about 
falsehoods:
"It is ridiculous to suppose, seriously, that [our] long 
record of success has been due to 'English gold', or our 
'Machiavellianism', or our diabolical cunning... A real 
knowledge of our history, and not merely a superficial 
interpretation of it... would have shown how little these 
criticisms were justified; and clear thinking would 
usually have shewn that their strongest root was in 
jealousy of our success as a nation, in 
Schadenfreude..."
The glory of British foreign policy was that "hypocritical 
self-interest" had not been its driving force. It was a 
community of interest, embracing Britain and other nations,
[263]
which had maintained a balance on the continent :
"Superficial critics on the continent are forever harping
on its 1 Machiavellian1 character. This is completely
wrong; it so happened that the interests of our own
security co-incided with those of other Powers that wanted
(37)to preserve their own independence."
Alternatively, the case for the defence could be so constructed
that the previous record and practices of the witnesses were
shewn to negate their evidence by destroying their credibility.
This, in effect, was the strategy used by Namier and Vansittart,
and it should be noted that in this particular context there is
no intention to infer that the strategy was illegitimate.
However, it was, by definition, an unsatisfactory strategy for
those with an intellectual and psychological commitment to
consistency between expressed attitudes derived from declared
values and the values themselves. Their defence, taking
account of the premises on which their position rested, involved
rational self-evaluation, and, in turn, a willingness to
contemplate culpability. One of the most interesting statements
(38)of this position was made by Edward Grigg [1938].
It is clear that Grigg was conscious of the complications that 
could arise from the outward projection of an ideological
[264]
self-image. He engaged in a critical re-appraisal, the outcome 
of which was an insistence that there should be a measure of 
consistency between self-image and policy. Grigg's reappraisal
brought him to the conclusion that Britain should make an 
attempt to co-operate with Germany, but that co-operation was to 
be based on strength both moral and material. This is one of 
the senses in which his rational re-evaluation of the self-image 
is so important. By no stretch of the imagination could he be 
regarded as a 'peace crank'.
Grigg made a savage attack on the inadequacy of Britain's
security arrangements and general state of preparedness. In the
case of Germany, more than any other country, "... the diplomacy
of conciliation will be futile unless our organisation for war
(39)and our national morale command her genuine respect." It
would not be possible for Britain to defend democracy short of
war "... unless here and now, while peace is still unbroken...
we shew a devotion and readiness for service equal to those
which inspire peoples under dictatorship."Britain was
prey to too many illusions and to a debilitating complacency.
First there was the notion that preparation for war would cause
war; then there was the belief that foreign policy was a
substitute for national reorganisation and rearmament. The
(41)motivation needed "to make freedom safe in cur time," was 
being sapped by "... a passionate and always deepening belief in
[265]
(42)the efficacy of the League of Nations. It was "Useless...
to rely on collective security unless we have done our utmost to
(43)
ensure our own security..." Government and Local
Authorities appeared to lack ccnrnitment to the moral and
material strengthening of the nation; the former hesitated and
(44)the latter pottered. Britain was the only great Power "...
which might conceivably be reduced to surrender by ruthless air
attack, and yet, because of our political divisions we allow
month after month, year after year, to pass in the discussion of
ineffectual and half-hearted plans of organisation..." This
"... dangerous and damaging exhibition of military folly and
(45)political fear..." was "... allowing a renewed belief in
British decadence to becorre more prevalent than it ought to
be..."(46) Drifting was the supreme danger, and Britain seemed
to "... drift in blindness, drift in folly, drift in delusive 
(47)calm..." This was bad enough "... as a spectacle of
political indecision and administrative half-heartedness", but
"... as a moral s p e c t a c l e " i t  was even worse. Viewed from
the outside the British were a people "... which would rather be
(49)slack and comfortable than safe and strong." Grigg
condemned the Peace Pledge Union pamphlet which called upon its 
readers "to decline to take part in air-raid precautions..." 
and he attacked pacifists who did not face up to the fact that 
their ideas, if accepted, would place Britain in the position of 
having to agree to every demand made by an aggressor "...
[266]
(51)
whatever the cost to our freedom and our ideals..."
Grigg argued that "... national organisation is 
indispensable..." Britain's industries, ports, transport system
and civilian population had to be made "... proof against sudden
(52) .
air attack..." It was foolish to claim that action should
be taken only if war broke out. Time was of the essence, and it
was necessary to act before the event, so that if the country
was forced into war "... all the necessary functions of defence
should come into operation smoothly." The anti-aircraft
defence services [artillery, searchlights, balloon barrage] had
to be established at all ports and transport centres, at all
water, gas and electricity supply points, and trained personnel
had to be prepared and ready, for there was "... bound to be
confusion if all the men and wcmen required for this wide range
of duty..." were not "... classified and allocated in 
(53)
advance" Although the British people had long accepted
compulsion in the areas of education, tax paying, etc., they 
still resisted compulsion directed against persons in relation 
to service during peacetime. It was clearly not the principle 
of compulsion that was objected to, "... but only the purpose
(54)
for which compulsion is used." The people would have to be
educated to appreciate that the nation was under threat, a
threat which could be dealt with through conciliation but only if 
conciliation was founded on strength. A Register of Citizens,
[267]
classifying the skills and expertise of the entire adult
population should be established. "The strongest motive in
people like ityself ", wrote Grigg, "who are fathers of sans, for
advocating national organisation in time of peace is a burning
and consuming desire to save our sons fran the ordeal through
(55)
which we ourselves passed."
If national organisation was one of the crucial means whereby 
Britain could secure herself, conciliation was another. This 
brought Grigg to his critical reappraisal of the British 
self-image. Behind his awareness of the need to align that 
self-image with attitudes towards others, in seme sort of 
consistent relationship, one can detect a tinge of embarrassment 
which could not have been unrelated to the accusations levelled 
against the policies and practices of the nation.
Grigg saw a love of justice, fair play, and a caimitment to the 
rule of law residing at the heart of the British self-image. 
"Justice and the Rule of Law are the constant burden of all our 
carrment on world events, and we are quick to resent any 
suggestion that our devotion to them is not entirely
|cn
disinterested." Two immediate problems presented
themselves: was the British love of justice and fair-play
expressed with impartiality and free of double standards - a 
definitional requirement - or was it subject to the distortion
[268]
of the "one-eyed crusaders?" Were justice, fair-play and law
always compatible? Grigg was convinced that the British should
take their stand for justice - as they had always done - but
should not be content with "a definition of justice which
suggests that the democracies are always right and dictatorships 
(57)always wrong." Since justice was so much a part of
self-image, double standards should be renounced:
".. .we must beware of thinking, speaking and acting as
though we had one code of behaviour towards democratic
states and another towards dictatorship. Justice and
fair play are due to every nation, whatever their systems
of government... We shall not preserve the peace and
therewith the liberties of Europe by a policy which
suggests that what we regarded as unjust to the German
people while the Weimar Republic survived is no longer
unjust now that the Weimar Republic has collapsed. There
must be equal justice and consideration for every state,
(58)whether we admire its constitution or not."
This is a classic statement of the definitional logic of the 
ideological self-image.
Grigg*s argument then turned to the relationship, in the 
international context, between justice and law. Such concepts,
[269]
he thought, "... may seem to us synonymous, but others may
think them poles apart." He was convinced that "mere legalism"
and a "Pharisaic view of international sin and sinners"
militated against the impartial expression of justice. For law,
read the Covenant of the League of Nations. "Hie grain of the
Covenant", might be "... straight and true for much of its
length, but it contains a fatal knot at the very point where the
strains upon it ware bound to be most fierce. That knot lies in
the provisions which guarantee the territorial integrity and
political independence of every member state and make change
almost impossible without a breach of the Covenant itself."
There was a danger that the recitation of the credo 'justice and
law1 would lead to the assertion 'and the greatest of these is
law'. The overt signs of this assertion could be recognised in
"... the extreme difficulties of persuading large sections of
opinion in this country... to show any form of magnanimity to
(62)nations which they condemned as Law Breakers." A rigid
emphasis on the law could appear to the world as a lack of 
interest in justice. That emphasis on the law could in fact be 
construed as an expression of selfish interests. "The map of 
the world cannot in our time be 'settled' with the finality 
which seems desirable to nations with a wide ccmmand of all they 
want. As a great World Power we have all the economic 
opportunity, the range of political influence, the scope for 
spreading our language, our culture, and our political ideals
[270]
that any Power, however great, could possibly desire... and like
all rich men we naturally take the view that the present
distribution of the world*s good things is just. It is
therefore easy for us to be on the side of Law in International
(63)Affairs." Grigg quoted the view of Sir Robert Borden, the
Canadian Prime Minister, that the provisions of the Covenant 
constituted "... a bar to change and evolution which the forces 
of Life would inevitably upset." In Grigg*s opinion events
had proved Borden a thousand times right. The text of the 
Covenant made it inevitable that in the view of sane nations law 
and justice were in conflict. An effort would have to be made 
to "... free ourselves from the legalism and rigidity of the 
Covenant", and find "... a new and less rigid code of
policy...", for it had to be recognised that "... no treaty 
settlement can permanently determine the mutual relations of a 
large number of nations, large and small, for the unanswerable 
reason that growth and change are essential conditions of 
life.»(66)
All this led on to the view that Britain should "... admit the 
faults in our cwn post-war 'settlement*, and particularly the 
most glaring of these faults, which was to stereotype the 
division of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire into a constellation 
of new and sovereign states with inadequate economic resources 
and, in many cases, indefensible frontiers." Having done that,
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Britain should strive "to secure that the process of growth and
change proceeds in an orderly manner." Since the situation in
Central Europe was "incompatible both with stable peace and with
economic recovery", that area should be restructured into "some
larger political and economic organisation", and Germany "as the
dominant Power in Central Europe should become the head and
(67)centre of such an organisation by peaceful means." 
Safeguards were, of course, essential. Although Germany could 
not be denied "a sphere of political and economic influence 
comparable to that enjoyed by the other Great Powers", Britain 
would have to "ensure that the process by which they acquire 
such a sphere is peaceable and diplomatic in character, and that 
the smaller nations which form part of it preserve their 
essential liberties."
Still more had to be done. One of the causes of tension between
Britain and Germany lay in the difference between the respective
economic outlooks. Germany pursued an autarkic, nationalist
economic policy which inhibited "anti-patriotic economic
activities, including the rapid movement of funds from country 
(69)to country." As ’closed-exchangers' they were in conflict
with the * free-exchangers1 such as Britain who pursued an 
international economic policy. It was held that free exchange 
was a liberal and co-operative policy, but it could be construed 
as a means of "masking as international conciliation a movement
[272]
which in reality seeks to undermine regimes distasteful to us in
other countries " ^ )  Grigg was convinced that "the next
stage in human development lies in the organisation of a few
strong politically and economically homogeneous groups, and that
peace is much more likely to be maintained by accomodation and
mutual tolerance between such groups than by any other 
(71)method." Britain1 s policy should be "to live and let
live... seeking to enable different systems to co-exist 
(72)peacefully..." Germany and Japan, in Central-South East
Europe and the Far East, respectively, should have left to them
(73)"the gardens they believe essential to their existence."
Britain could facilitate such an acccnmodation by setting aside
her 'dog in the manger' attitude towards her
'most-favoured-nation' agreements with other countries. On a
number of occasions the desire of states to join together in
preferential trading organisations had been frustrated by
Britain's insistence on her 'most-favoured-nation* position.
"The known attitude of the United Kingdom Government has stood
in the way of the realisation of various projected regional
(74) .arrangements m  Europe." Britain should waive its most
favoured nation status, where it existed, in respect of nations 
which desired to set up a system of mutual preference. Were 
this to happen, it would demonstrate to the world that she was 
"no longer determined to insist on maintaining [for herself] a 
highly protected... system ... without regard for the
[273]
. . (75)comparatively limited economic scope of other Powers."
It has been the purpose of this and preceding chapters to 
demonstrate that underlying expressed attitudes to Germany and 
the Germans was a package of traits and values associated with 
the cultural condition ’being British*. The package was made up 
of such related items as justice, fairness, tolerance and 
empathy, and has been referred to as the ideological self-image. 
Two points have been established: first, Germany and the
Germans were so often 'measured* against this British self-image 
that it became more or less a standard instrument of 
assessment; second, because of its regular use as a measuring 
device the resilience of the self-image was reinforced? that is 
to say, being referred to repeatedly, either implicitly or 
explicitly, the image took on the character of a self-evident. 
On the assumption that there is a strain toward consistency 
between expressed attitudes derived frcm declared values and the 
values themselves, particularly when those values are regarded 
as central to self-image, important consequences follow from the 
two points made above. Stated as hypothetical imperatives, 
descriptive of likely behaviour, they read: [1] if it is 
believed to be self-evident that the British are just, fair, 
tolerant and capable of empathy, then consistency demands that 
such traits and values should not only serve as standards for 
assessing Germany and the Germans but should also
[274]
sympathetically inform the assessments? [2] if such traits and 
values, serving as standards for assessing Germany and the 
Germans do not also sympathetically inform the assessments, then 
one would expect efforts to be made to remove the inconsistency 
inherent in this unbalanced relationship between attitudes and 
values.
It is a relatively straightforward matter to demonstrate the 
strain toward consistency in those writers who made distinctions 
between different groups of Germans and/or between the German 
Government and people, for in their case the self-image was 
invoked as main justification for making the distinctions. 
These writers who did not make such sympathetic distinctions 
present more of a problem. And it is a problem that must be 
resolved, for if consistency between expressed attitudes derived 
from declared values and the values themselves is to mean 
anything, it should apply to both sides in the debate on Germany 
and the Germans - though not of course in an identical way. To 
argue otherwise would be to make the untenable suggestion that 
all those who failed to make distinctions ware incapable of
acting in accord with the ’norms of reason1 as defined by R. S.
(76)Peters [1974] This issue is addressed in the following
chapter.
APPENDIX
[275]
Bow the British were depicted in cartoons in the Nazi Press
The following examples are from W. G. Knop [ed.], Beware of The 
English! [Hamish Hamilton, London, 1939]. They have been 
selected as generally representative of the main charges 
levelled against British attitudes and policies.
The job applicant in [1] is "an incorrigible moral preacher", 
quite insolently blind to his own deficiencies. The 'John Bull' 
figure in [2] has an avuncular and hearty presence, and a smile 
for the world as he offers a dove of peace. But this is mere 
outward appearance, the whited sepulchre, masking the true 
characteristics of intolerance and hypocrisy, and a cruel policy 
of self-interest. Graphics [3], [5], and [6] point to double 
standards in the British view of the world and to the 
sanctimonious, lecturing interest they had in the affairs of 
other countries, particularly Germany. The Britisches 
Weltreich might be burning down, social problems at heme might 
demand urgent-attention, and yet the British eye was directed at 
'sins* elsewhere. In [4], sentimental affectation and cant go 
hand in hand with brutality.
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ENGLISH HUMANITY IN THE MIRROR
2. Fran 12 Uhr Blatt, December 1938. 
Reprinted in W. G. Knop (ed.), p.45.
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HOUSEHOLDERS AT HOME
Damn it all, look after our own house instead of ever­
lastingly peering at the neighbours* pots and pans.
3. Fran B. Z am Mittag, November 1938. 
Reprinted in W. G. Knop (ed.1, p.40.
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“ Darling, don’t forget to drop a packet o f bandages for 
the poor Arab children with every bomb.”
4. Frcm Kladderadatsch, March 1939.
Reprinted in W. G. Knop (ed.), p. 145.
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m rs . B r i t a n n i a ,  t h e  g o v e r n e s s  *. “ Why do you keep bring­
ing me news from the Empire? When I want to register 
moral indignation, I need reports from Germany/
5. Fran Munchener Illustrierte Presse, March 1939. 
Reprinted in W. G. Knop (ed.), p.142.
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The unemployed: “ I say, John, you might occasionally 
keep your eye on England.”
(The board over the hutch says: 2,000,000 unemployed 
in England.)
6. Fran N. S. Kurier, January 1939.
Reprinted in W. G. Knop (ed.1, p..99.
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CHAPTER 8
HANDLING INCONSISTENCY: THE PROBLEM OF COGNITIVE 
DISSONANCE ARISING FROM THE DUALISTIC NATURE OF THE
BRITISH SELF-IMAGE.
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(i)
Cannon to the various branches of 'consistency theory' is the
notion that a person "... behaves in a way that maximises the
internal consistency of his cognitive system." ^  The general
principle underlying the work of Heider [1944, 1946, 1958] was
that "... an unbalanced set of cognitions is associated with
'tension' and the arousal of forces which tend to restore or to
(2)attain states of balance." The contribution generally 
regarded as most ccmmitted to stressing the tendency toward 
consistency betvreen an individual's belief system and his actual 
behaviour is that of Festinger [1957, 1964]. Aronson [1968] 
pointed to the essential simplicity of the core notion in 
Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance:
"... dissonance is a negative drive state which occurs
whenever an individual simultaneously holds two cognitions
[ideas, beliefs, opinions] which are psychologically 
(4)inconsistent."
Festinger suggested that individuals have cognitions about 
themselves, those around them, and the world at large. Any two 
such cognitions may be consonant with each other - that is to 
say, the relationship between them may be one of consistency. 
This is a relationship which produces 'psychological canfort'.
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On the other hand, any two cognitions may be dissonant with each 
other - that is to say, the relationship between them may be one 
of inconsistency. In respect of the latter condition, Festinger 
wrote: "The existence of dissonance, being psychologically
uncomfortable, will motivate the person to try to reduce
. (5)dissonance and achieve consonance." Put in another, less
technical way, psychological discomfort would be produced if a
person believed something to be good but acted as if it were
bad. ^  This would be a negative state which the individual
would wish to reduce, if he cared at all about presenting to the
world a logical and coherent relationship between his attitudes
and behaviours. On the face of it, it seems reasonable to argue
that "human beings seem to prefer their perceptions to make
sense...", and that "when an individual believes in one thing
and yet acts contrary to this belief, he is motivated to reduce
the conflict. Bramel [1968] and Rokeach [1973] carried
(8)the theory forward to issues involving the 'self-concept*. 
Rokeach argued that the most significant type of dissonance was 
that which involved the self-conception. He gave as an example 
the University professor who prided himself on his logic, this 
perception being an important part of his self-image. The 
professor then discovered that his students found his lectures 
incoherent and his conclusions unrelated to his premises. His 
self-image was violated. Depending upon the importance of the 
self-image or self-conception, and it is perhaps reasonable to
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to suppose that for most people its importance is considerable,
inconsistency may well be great and psychological discomfort
accentuated when there is ”... a discrepancy between how one
(9)perceives one's self and the actual performance." A 
particularly interesting proposition in this context is that 
"dissatisfaction is felt when the individual does not match up 
his actions to his own standards and the way he would like to 
see himself." It has been argued that this type of
inconsistency "... has duplications for the individual's 
self-concept, and manifests itself in a guilt reaction."
If there is a tendency to restore or attain states of balance, a
motivation to reduce dissonance and conflict between cognitions,
a predilection for psychological comfort as against disccmfort,
there remains the question of hew this resolution is achieved.
Underlying the following resume of seme possible modes of
resolving inconsistency dilemmas are the assumptions that "...
in a given situation, there is usually more than one way for a
(12)person to reduce dissonance", and that if a situation
permits several different responses to occur, "... an individual
might conceivably use one response to the virtual exclusion of
(13)others, or he might use several simultaneously." [see
Figure [5 ].
A number of social psychologists group modes of handling 
inconsistency dilenmas in two broad categories - AVOIDANCE and
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Som e M echanism s For Handling C onsistency dilem m as
1  Avoidance 11 Confrontation 1
'Stopping Thinking’ 
Denial
Effecting ch an ge in 
one or both of the 
inconsistent cognitions
Rationalisation integration
Compartmentalisation Transcendence
Derogation Bolstering
Ritualism
Figure p s  ~ \
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(1'4)(XJNFRGNTATION. If an individual considered an inconsistency
to be 1 significant1, he might, through the use of psychological
mechanisms, avoid the implication of the inconsistency "... by
perceiving or interpreting the discrepant element in such a way
that it no longer [appeared] to be inconsistent with the
(15)potentially challenged element." On the other hand, an
individual may "actively confront the inconsistency and remove
it," by employing mechanisms which bring the inconsistent
(16)elements "back into line with each other." It is important
to note that in certain circumstances an individual could bridge 
the categories and handle significant inconsistency by a 
combination of avoidance and confrontation strategies.
Hardyck and Kardush [1968] consider that for individuals
suffering the psychological discomfort of inconsistency,
'stopping thinking* is the preferred mode of escape. When such
a mode is not only available but possible - that is, when
"passive forgetting... or ... a more active process of
suppression" would not of itself create further problems - it is
preferred because it involves the least effort. In situations
where the above reservation applies, "ceasing to think about one
connection between two cognitions can cause no perturbations in
whatever cognitive structure exists. It cannot, therefore,
introduce new dissonance into the system and, besides, it
(17)requires little cognitive work."
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The problem is that the reservation may not apply. An
individual's self-conception may block off this particular
escape route and/or, "reminders from other people of the extreme
salience of a connection between two dissonant cognitions may
(18)prevent [the individual] from stopping thinking." ' Denial as 
a mechanism for the resolution of inconsistency engages the 
individual at the centre of a potential dilenma in a refusal to
entertain "the very existence of the inconsistent element or of
. . (19)the inconsistent relationship between the two elements."
Since inconsistent elements and relationships achieve
'existence' fron information about them - information which, as
it were, gives them life - "the mechanism of denial may operate
to prevent or limit the information pertaining to the fact that
the individual is, indeed, participating in an activity which is
repugnant to him." As in the case of 'stopping thinking',
the availability of this mechanism may be restricted by the
individual's self-conception and the significance of the
information in relation to self-conception. A particular
individual may not be able to resolve the problem of
inconsistency by 'killing-off' the information which defines it.
Aronson argued that experimental work in the field of
consistency theory suggested that man is a "rationalising animal
- that he attempts to appear rational, both to others and to 
(21)himself.n An individual faced with a potential
inconsistency dilenma, arising frcm the interaction of two of
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his values, might resolve the conflict through rationalisation:
for example, "... if he has engaged in an action that violates
one of his values he may persuade himself that this action was
in fact different fran what it may appear to have been - that it
had a different intent, or a different effect... and that it is,
(22)therefore, not really inconsistent..." When an individual
engages in the process of rationalisation he is in effect 
attempting to bring his thoughts and actions into conformity 
with reason. Although this process can operate culminatively at 
the various stages of a complex exercise in decision making, it 
is in carmon experience, frequently activated at the end of the 
line, when a decision has actually been made. Experiments 
conducted by Brehm [1956] produced a classic example of 
post-decision rationalisation. In most complex exercises in 
decision making the individual is faced with a number of 
alternative strategies, each with advantages and disadvantages, 
each exerting pull. The attractiveness of one alternative over 
another can often be marginal, and this in itself can give rise 
to doubts and anxieties. Brehm found that individuals, having 
made a difficult choice, handled post-decision doubts and 
anxieties by re-evaluating alternatives in such a way as to make 
their choices appear reasonable. The positive aspects of the 
chosen course were emphasised and the negative aspects 
de-emphasised; at the same time the negative aspects of the 
non-chosen course were emphasised and the positive aspects
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(23)de-enphasised . Anxieties arising from inconsistency can be
avoided by the mechanism of Canpartmentalisation. Dissonant
cognitions can be retained but insulated from each other by
erecting a barrier between them. Since incanpatibility, even
though objectively present, can be Recognised' only through
contact, the placing of discrepant cognitions into "... separate
and impermeable mental niches..." so insulates them from each
other that they are not brought into "emotionally disturbing 
(24)juxtaposition." Kelman and Baron suggest that support for
this type of separation can be enlisted from "institutionalised
patterns that prescribe behaviour... in the context of a 
(25)particular role." For example, a person acting in the role
of committed patriot could use the type of behaviour prescribed
by that particular role to insulate the kind of thought and
action associated with it from the kind of thought and action
associated with other held values. The problems arising from
perceived inconsistency can be avoided through derogation and
ritualism. Suppose that an individual, participating in
discussion or debate, is experiencing an inner struggle caused
by tensions between actions based on one value and the pull of
another, discrepant value. The tension could be relieved by
either derogating the discrepant value or, more likely, by
derogating the sources of information associated with it. In
either case, the "challenging impact" of the inconsistency is
(26)neutralised. Alternatively, a troublesome confrontation
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between two inconsistent cognitions may be avoided "by engaging
in certain ritual behaviours that hide the inconsistency...
Rituals allow him to do what he ought to do - in a highly
visible and often dramatic fashion - but, by being routinised
and formalised, his actions are drained of their emotional
(27)impact." And so the impact of the inconsistency is blunted.
Inconsistency may be 'confronted' and a resolution achieved by
effecting a change in one of the discrepant cognitions. The
classic example in experimental literature involves the two
inconsistent cognitions 'I smoke cigarettes' and 'cigarette
smoking can cause cancer'. For the individual unwilling to
exclude the first from his cognitive repertoire there remains the
possibility of modifying the second. In this particular context
the modification often involves the removal of the 'sting', and
this can be effected by the use of mechanisms already discussed
- derogation and rationalisation. The evidence supporting the
problematic cognition may be classed as suspect, or the use of
filters may be cited as a means of removing the element of risk.
Alternatively, the uncomfortable cognition may be rendered
irrelevant, and therefore modified through reduction in
significance, by a reappraisal of the self-image. The
individual "might actually make a virtue out of smoking by
(28)developing a romantic, devil-may-care image of himself", as 
someone who flaunted danger, who thought nothing of it. It
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will be noted that such mechanisms effect relative change in the 
second cognition [smoking can cause cancer] through the creation 
of a battery of new cognitions designed to support the first [I 
smoke cigarettes]. The actual 'structure1 of the second 
cognition does not change, although its significance or
relevance changes. There are other, more subtle ways, of
effecting change in a cognition. They involve reformulations of
the actual structure, and will be discussed in section (iii) of 
this chapter.
Cognitions which are inherently inconsistent can be brought into
line with each other and made to co-exist in more or less
comfortable contact through the process known as integration.
Through this particular mechanism "... a genuine resolution of
(29)conflict is achieved." Such a resolution would require that
both cognitions not only retained significance but were also 
able to engage simultaneously. This might involve the 
development or highlighting of other cognitions in the form of 
facilitators. For example, an integration of the inherently 
inconsistent values of competition [mutually exclusive goals] 
and co-operation [mutually interdependent goals] could occur in 
the context of tennis doubles through significance being 
attached to the facilitating cognition: 'The goal is not more 
important than the means of attaining it.'
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Transcendence as a mechanism for confronting inconsistency 
"... involves the introduction of a superordinate principle, 
which serves as the context for evaluating the inconsistent 
relationship. The twc elements, when viewed in their own terms, 
remain inconsistent with one another. This very inconsistency, 
however, is required by a higher principle that transcends the 
two elements, and it thus becomes acceptable or even desirable. 
A prime example of this mechanism can be noted in the social 
legitimisation of otherwise unacceptable behaviour, such as 
killing in time of war. The soldier may be quite aware of the 
inconsistency between his action in taking the lives of others 
and his values regarding the sanctity of human life. This 
inconsistency, however, is viewed in the context of a 
transcendent principle, such as that of defending one’s country 
and way of life. When viewed in that context, the inconsistent 
behaviour is required, acceptable, and even noble. To forego 
one's scruples, to do 'what has to be done' even though you find 
it personally objectionable and distasteful - in short, to be 
inconsistent - is in itself virtuous in this context. Thus, 
neither the inconsistent elements nor the relationship between 
them are changed, but they are inbedded in a different context 
which gives a different meaning to the inconsistent 
bdiaviour."
When two cognitions oppose each other in an inconsistent
relationship the individual may handle the situation by lending
additional support to one and not the other. The inconsistency
. . .  (32)
remains but is greatly reduced in significance. For obvious 
reasons this mechanism is referred to as bolstering. In seme 
situations ways may be found to bolster one of the inconsistent 
cognitions by associating it with statements or behaviour
supportive of self-esteem.
It is important to note that the above resume of modes of
handling inconsistency is not exhaustive and is set in a context
which acccnmodates psycho-logic as well as formal logic. In
formal logic the truth of a proposition may be ascertained
without any reference to the desirability of the proposition.
Formal logic is a two-valued system involving the concepts
,truel and * false*. Individuals faced with propositions tend to
respond to them with different gradations of assent or rejection
(33)
rather than treat them as absolutely true or false. People
have to compromise the demands of logical and psycho-logical
thinking, for their beliefs "must satisfy needs other than
correspondence to the objective world of logical
(34)
consistency." Referring to norms which he saw as "integral
to the life of reason..." in that they marked off rationality 
"... as a level of life distinct frcm the non-rational, the 
irrational and the unreasonable", R.S. Peters [1974] wrote:
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"There is, first, the influence of the rational
individual's concern for consistency and avoidance of 
contradiction."^^
At the same time, he was aware of Freud's concept of 'wish' and
agreed that 'wishing' could be "... unchecked by logical
contradiction and causal association... unhampered by a proper
sense of time, space and reality." Peters argued that "...
when we talk about wishes we are prepared to withdraw the
applicability of a range of categories that go along with the
rationality model. Typically," he wrote, "we wish for things
like the moon, where realistic questions of taking means to ends
do not have to be raised... Freud postulated that this form of
cognition still persists in us, after we learn to think and act
(36)in accordance with the purposive rule-following model..."
What this amounts to is recognition that in certain
circumstances an individual may act inconsistently in terms of
formal logic but experience no awareness of inconsistency in
terms of psycho-logic. "Logical inconsistency... could be
readily converted to psycho-logical consistency in that the
individual could make sense out of discrepant elements under
(37)appropriate circumstances." An example apposite to the
discussion in section (iii) of this chapter may be cited. 
Suppose that the logical inconsistency was between a method for
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achieving a goal and the goal itself; that the goal was a world 
in which nations co-operated with each other in tune with the 
notion of the brotherhood of man and the principles of fairness, 
tolerance and sympathy; and that the means of achieving this 
desired end involved the use of every underhand, savage and 
unscrupulous trick in the book. In the absence of recognisable 
attempts to handle inconsistency it would be inadvisable to 
assert that an individual pursuing such an end by such means 
experienced the dilemmas contingent upon psycho-logical 
dissonance. On the other hand, there might be relative security 
in the proposition: where the observable behaviour of an
individual gives cause to assume that (i) he is aware of 
inconsistency between cognitions and (ii) he is employing 
mechanisms to handle it, we may infer that he experiences a 
dilemma in psycho-logic, and that the dilemma could be 
reinforced by the demands of formal logic.
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(ii)
As with most theories which claim to provide an explanation of
human behaviour, those which purport to account for it under the
general heading of cognitive consistency have been challenged on
the grounds that they do not offer satisfactory insights into
all instances of observed behaviour and, more damagingly, that
(38)they distract attention from more caimon-sense truths. It
has been pointed out that consistency theory, of itself, cannot
explain "... individual differences in the behaviour of people
placed in identical dissonance-arousing conditions," since each
individual inhabits a 'private world' ingress to which depends
(39)upon an understanding of personality structures. Different
people perceive inconsistencies differently and "... it is 
likely that differential perception is, in part, a function of 
the individual's personality s t r u c t u r e . O n e  individual 
will be more susceptible to the experience of dissonance than 
another; of those who do experience dissonance, seme will shew 
more readiness to reduce it than others; of those who shew most 
readiness to reduce it, sane will prefer one mode or sets of 
modes for handling it, and others demonstrate quite different 
preferences. This, of course, is less a criticism of 
consistency theory as such than an encouragement for the caning 
together of consistency and personality theorists in the 
research enterprise. Nevertheless, in emphasising the
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importance of individual personality it forms the basis for a 
more substantive challenge to the general applicability of 
consistency theory.
Sane critics have attacked the notion that inconsistency, even
(41)when perceived, is always bothersome. It is claimed that in
seme situations inconsistency is not only tolerated but "...
(42)sought out, rather than avoided." Advocates of the
'variety' thesis consider that "... novelty, unexpectedness,
change, and complexity are pursued because they are inherently
satisfying... Life is much too complex to be properly lived and
understood through a reliance on easy consistencies... To
theorise that the pursuit of consistency is the major
(43)directionality of life is to underestimate man."' Such
advocates tend to agree with Ralph Waldo Bnerson's dictum that
(44)"consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds." Attention
has been drawn to the fact that in some areas of human
experience "the individual's activity tries to maintain a
condition of inbalance. One of the extreme conditions under
which this is noticed is the kind of behaviour which we call
creative... the perfect balance of a geometrical design [as well
as attribution of balance to human relations] is usually
(45)considered bad art or not art at all." Experimental
studies in exploratory and alternation behaviour have shown that 
"... variety seems to produce a positive affective response in 
people", that it is so enjoyable that it is pursued, and in
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being enjoyable and pursued "seems necessary to normal 
functioning and development." ^  ^
Doubts about the validity of consistency theory have not been 
confined to those areas of human experience involving the 
artistic temperament or the exercise of curiosity. 1 Ordinary1 
men, behaving in 'ordinary1 ways, pursuing mundane life 
interests, are brought into the argument. The impact of 
inconsistency dilemmas on such individuals are not denied, but 
assigned levels of importance which normally vary from moderate 
to marginal and only reach critical status in special 
circumstances. Freedman [1968] is representative of this view:
"... consistency models present us with a very cognitive 
man who is extremely concerned about and devotes a great 
deal of energy to maximising cognitive consistency... I 
think that men do tend to reduce inconsistencies in their 
lives and among their beliefs... I do not agree, however, 
that the tendency to strive toward cognitive consistency 
is as important, ubiquitous, or continuous as these 
theories seem to be saying... under seme circumstances 
these inconsistency reducing activities are quite 
important and may even be a major determinant of 
behaviour... but in my opinion these would be very special 
circumstances. I think that most of the time tendencies
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toward cognitive consistency are of relatively minor
importance, are not in fact going on continuously, and
consequently have relatively minor consequences for
. . (47)behaviour or even for attitudes and opinions."
In a similar way, Daryl Bern [1970] expressed his reservations 
about the general applicability of consistency theory insofar as 
it posits that individuals experience a strain toward cognitive 
consonance.
"In my view, a vision of inconsistency as a temporary 
turbulence in an otherwise fastidious pool of cognitive 
clarity is all too misleading. My own suspicion is that 
inconsistency is probably our most enduring cognitive 
commonplace. That is, I suspect that for most of the 
people most of the time and for all of the people some of 
the time inconsistency just sits there. I think that we 
academic psychologists, including the consistency 
theorists, probably spend too much time with bright 
college students who are as eager to achieve a respectable 
overall unity in their cognitions as we, their 
instructors, are eager to impress them and ourselves with 
the same admirable coherence of thought... I believe, in 
short, that there is more inconsistency on earth [and 
probably in heaven] than is dreamt of in our psychological 
theories."
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It should be noted that the criticism from variety theorists 
rests more on their desire to see the acceptance of paradox 
introduced to the explanatory model rather than on a desire to 
have inconsistency resolution removed from it. Noting that 
variety theory and consistency theory as separate approaches were 
incongruent, Maddi effected a plausible synthesis. Of his own 
feelings when confronted with this problem he wrote:
"... it is a marvellous and mysterious organism that 
includes two such opposing tendencies. The excitement and 
wonder aroused by paradoxes such as this is very close to 
the kind of thing variety theorists see as the positive 
affective value of novelty...,"
on the other hand,
"... the incompatibility is disconcerting, and this is the 
kind of thing stressed by consistency theorists... 
everyone has tendencies toward both consistency and 
variety... the specific conditions, in the personality 
and the situation... determine when one tendency as opposed
(49)
to another will be apparent."
Maddi*s reference to specific conditions in the personality and 
the situation is of particular importance. When writers use
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expressions such as "very special circumstances" it is difficult 
to avoid the impression that they mean circumstances which lie 
outside the norm, and which, in normal lives, have a relatively 
irregular incidence. It is as well to note that where an 
individual*s self-image in itself, or in relation to particular 
social roles, is involved in the issue of consistency these 
so-called special circumstances may be part and parcel of his 
day to day life experience.
There is every reason to believe that the level of tolerance of
inconsistency will be lew if it has "important implications for
the self or for salient roles." Singer [1968] marked the
difference between bothersome and non-botherscrne inconsistencies
in the extent to which they were ego-involving:
"...dissonance... between self-image and the possession of an
unfavourable and unwanted characteristic... would be quite
(51)bothersome and irritating." Allen, approaching the problem
of dissonance from the side of role, argued that "consistency
among cognitions, and between behaviour and belief, is
role-appropriate behaviour for a socialised person in western
(52)society." Berger [1963] had proceeded along similar lines:
"... for normal people [that is, those so recognised by 
their society] there are strong pressures toward 
consistency in the various roles they play and the
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identities that go with these roles. These pressures are
both external and internal. Externally the others with
whan one must play one’s social games, and on whose
recognition one’s cwn parts depend, demand that one
present at least a relatively consistent picture to the
vrorld... There are also internal pressures towards
consistency, possibly based on very profound psychological
(53)needs to perceive oneself as a totality."'
In development of the views of Allen, Singer and Berger, 
consider the following model as a starting point:
x says to y: "Do this!"
y refuses.
The question arises: Why did he refuse? A range of answers
might include:
(A) x did not say please;
(B) x did not have authority to give the command;
(C) y was lazy, indolent, and could not be bothered;
(D) y did not like the thought of doing what he was
asked to do.
Response (C) is highly idiosyncratic; but note that in a
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culture which devalued indolence this response could be regarded 
as socially unacceptable behaviour, making engagement in 
purposeful activity a cultural imperative. Responses (A), (B) 
and (D) are all associated with cultural imperatives? and it 
might be said, additionally, of response (D) that it is tied up 
with y's self-image or self-justifying consciousness which acts 
as a sort of standard [though not always if ever perfect] 
against which the appropriateness of personal attitudes and 
actions may be judged. In any given situation the effectiveness 
of the standard as a means of producing crisp, dilenma-free 
judgments could be reduced by a number of factors - including 
the problem of anbiguity. It is reasonable to suppose that on 
many occasions the situations in which people find themselves 
are ambiguous, and that judging between quite different types of 
action or quite different attitudes, seen as appropriate in 
their cwn right, would involve a gamble. Having made this 
qualification it remains that to act against cultural 
imperatives, and in particular to act in a way that denies the 
self-image is to lay oneself open to the stress contingent upon 
inconsistency. To act consistently is itself a cultural 
imperative, since cultures tend to encourage consistent 
behaviour. It is evident that this is so when we spend a moment 
or two trying to imagine a culture in which inconsistency was 
the norm. Consistency principles are themselves internalised 
in the form of cultural imperatives, to such an extent that when
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inconsistency occurs it is natural to want to reduce it. For 
inconsistent behaviour carries certain consequences which amount 
to pains and penalties. To be regarded as inconsistent is to be 
labelled deviant or at the very least awkward to deal with - is 
to lose arguments in the perception of others, or, 
alternatively, to suffer humiliation [ranging from mild to 
severe, depending on personality] by having to change ground. 
To the extent that individuals would wish to avoid such 
consequences, then to something like the same extent would they 
wish to be regarded as consistent in their behaviour.
Bern's analysis has a certain attraction, for in our individual 
experiences there may well have been occasions when in response 
to the internal challenge posed by inconsistency we have 
answered, 'So what?1 But it cannot go unchallenged. As it 
stands it is unjustifiably elitist. It is no doubt true that 
the daily strains tcward consistency are more obvious in the 
psychological territory of the university lecturer than in that 
of less intellectually fastidious and pedantic folk, but this 
may mean no more than that the university lecturer, because of 
his particular location and the nature of those with whan he 
interacts day by day, is forever aware that the pretentions of 
his self-image are on trial. More ordinary folk may not be 
laying their pretentions on the line so formally or so 
regularly, and so the strain tcward consistency may not be so
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ever pressing for them. But in their cwn way they will have 
self-images, and on those occasions, less frequent though they 
be, when their images are at stake, the strain toward 
consistency is likely to be severe enough. If we set aside the 
matter of frequency there is little reason to put the academic 
at one extreme and the ordinary person at the other. A 
supplementary point must be added here. Even if it had proved 
impossible to challenge Bern's suspicion that consistency theory 
was limited in its applicability to serious students of serious 
issues, it would have to be said that it is just such people who 
are in large part the subject of the present thesis.
Secondly, though it may be uncharitable and certainly ironic to 
say so, Bern's view on the limitations of consistency theory 
could be regarded as inconsistent with his notion of hew 
self-perception is developed and consolidated. If he was 
serious in his assertion that
"We have learned to identify many of our internal states 
only because outside observers first inferred those states 
frcm observable external cues and then taught us how to 
label the internal situation that they assumed was 
acoonpanying those cues,"
and that as an ongoing process an individual identifies his cwn
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internal states by partially relying on
"the same external cues that others use when they infer 
his internal states,"
then he has to accept the presence of a very special form of 
reciprocity in interpersonal relations that could not exist 
without a reasonable level of consistency. If Bem*s carments on 
the nature of self-perception are to stand up they must at the 
very least presuppose a degree of compatibility between the 
perception of the external cues held by the individual 
responsible for them and the perception of those cues held by 
other observers.
Consistency theory, then, appears to say something meaningful 
about psychological needs and the relationship between those 
needs and social behaviour. It could also be said to make a 
successful appeal to common-sense. Its value as a tool for 
historical analysis, however, is not widely accepted. In a 
dismissive ccnment, Mazlish [1968] questioned the validity of the 
theory in this context:
"The new theories of group psychology, or at least the 
non-Freudian ones, appear to me to have little 
applicability to history. What is known as the theory of 
Cognitive Dissonance does not help to explain historical 
phenomena."
It is a central proposition of this chapter that Mazlish is 
wrong.
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( i i i )
Given the overwhelming evidence to suggest that the British 
self-image as an entity subsumed a broadly accepted ideological 
ccnponent, and that this component put a premium on fairness, 
justice, tolerance and sympathetic understanding, consistency 
theory may well "help to explain historical phenomena;" in that 
the need to align attitudes with ideological self-image led many 
to retreat from wholesale condemnations of Germany and the 
Germans, even at the height of two world wars; contributed to 
feelings of guilt and consequent acts of compensation during the 
inter-war period; and, on the other side of the debate, forced 
most of those who did make wholesale condemnations to engage in 
manoeuvres, sometimes crude, sometimes subtle, designed to 
maintain the integrity of the ideological self-image and retain 
a grip on consistency.
The significance of the ideological self-image as a powerful 
organising concept did not escape the attention of the 
anti-Germans, including policy makers, who promoted anti-German 
attitudes at specific points in time. The inter-related values 
of that image were often directly appealed to as a standard of 
assessment against which Germans as a whole were seen to be 
sadly lacking. Where the appeal was not direct and explicit, 
that is, where the alleged virtues of the British were not
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specifically mentioned, its presence could be detected 
nonetheless in the way in which inter-related qualities 
diametrically opposed to the self-image were assigned to the 
Germans. When the backs of the Germans were being 
metaphorically beaten, the ideological self-image was too good 
and heavy a stick to be ignored. Analysis of anti German
attitudes throughout the period under examination suggests that 
most of those who expressed them were so conscious of the 
uncomfortable logical or psycho-logical consequences of making 
use of the ideological self-image that they strenuously
attempted to achieve a 1 compensatory consistency' through the
use of mechanisms discussed in section (ii) of this chapter. At 
specific points in time when the alleged virtues of the British 
might have undermined political strategies, those virtues were 
classified as disfunctional. For example, at the point of 
surrender in 1945 when the civilian population of Germany's
ruined cities were experiencing profound hardship and seemed 
likely to attract the sympathy of British civilians, newsreel 
commentaries insisted that sympathy would be wasted on such 
people and so should be withheld. This type of action would 
have been quite superfluous had it not been based on the 
perception that the ideological self-image was something to be 
reckoned with. At specific points in time when the alleged 
virtues of the British could be used to facilitate political 
strategies those virtues were seen as having real market value
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and were promoted in press, newsreel, and feature film. What 
could be regarded as a particularly straightforward example of 
this latter strategy is to be found in Michael Relph1 s 1947 
Ealing Production of 'Frieda*. Robert, a R.A.F. Officer has 
been assisted in his escape from a P.O.W. camp by a German girl, 
the Frieda of the title. At the close of the war they narry and 
Frieda accompanies her husband to England. It has been said of 
Robert's sister, Nell, that her response to this event was "... 
in keeping with her Vansittartist philosophy. A
conversation between Nell and a family friend runs:
Nell: "It's Robert's happiness I'm thinking about, above
all. There can be no lasting happiness for him with 
this girl."
Friend: "But you don't knew her!"
Nell: "But I knew she's a German - That's the point! She's
a German, that's all that counts. You can't take 
Germans individually... because there's a link - a 
common denominator in every one of them; something 
that twice in our time has set the world ablaze. Call 
it the - essence of Germanism, the German mind. Call 
it what you like. It's common to every German, man, 
woman and child, and we're blind idiots if we believe 
otherwise. It's inborn, in the blood."
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Nell's point of view appears to be supported by statements made 
to Robert by Frieda's brother, a confirmed Nazi:
"All Germans are one - what you see in me you will see in
her and in her children."
This anti-German flavour is maintained for most of the film, 
challenged but not very successfully by those who befriend 
Frieda. The character of Nell is so strong and certain that it 
appears as though all others are being deceived by Frieda. Then 
comes the real point of the film in the form of a dual-purpose 
message. The family maid remarks: "We're all different, but 
when a German is a bad lot we say - 'That's Germany'." The 
implication is plain; it is possible to distinguish one German 
frcm another; it is not true that they are all alike. It will 
therefore be possible to work with Germany in the new post-war 
Europe. And the one thing that characterises Britain is, above 
all, its forgiving spirit - sometimes difficult to reveal, but 
always there. This is shewn in the last reel conversion of Nell 
the Germanophcbe: "No matter who they are, no matter what
they've done, you cannot treat human beings as less than human 
without becoming less than human yourself." Infinitely more 
effort would have been required in this type of propagandist 
activity had it not been based on the assumption that the 
ideological self-image had a fair measure of resilience.
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One way or another, then, the anti-Germans, including policy 
makers, were highly conscious of and put to either positive or 
negative use the concept of an ideological self-image. How did 
they deal with the problem of consistency? Discussion of this 
question will be assisted if two preliminary points are kept in 
mind.
First, it has to be conceded that seme anti-Germans would not
concern themselves unduly with the problem of consistency. Bern
cites the suggestion in Abelson [1968] that "an individual's
beliefs and attitudes are often composed of encapsulated,
isolated, 'opinion molecules'," with each molecule having three
components, a belief, an attitude, and a cementing conviction
that the belief and the attitude are supported by others. To
put it another way, "each opinion molecule contains a fact, a
(57)feeling, and a following." Because such 'opinion
molecules' are isolated from each other, "... they do not need
to have logical interconnections between them, and they are
(58)notoriously invulnerable to argument..." Belief systems
structured in this way are of course productive of prejudice. 
Hypothetically, an anti-German might have had buried away among 
many 'opinion molecules' two which co-existed quite comfortably 
because, in 'molecular' isolation from each other, they were 
relieved of the need to be logically aligned:
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(a) I feel that the British are to be congratulated 
(feeling) because, as most people knew (following) 
they are sympathetic, fair, just and tolerant (fact).
(b) Nobody I knew has any time for Germans (following) and 
neither do I (feeling). They will destroy us all if 
we give them the chance (fact).
Supposing an individual already had long standing experience of 
such a molecular belief system which, amongst other items 
included molecule (a) above, the subsequent incorporation of 
molecule (b) would not produce the psychological disturbance 
associated with inconsistency. It should be noted that this 
condition bears some similarity in effect to 
ccmpartmentalisation, but is not in any other way like that 
mechanism. Ccmpartmentalisation is a way of handling perceived 
inconsistency; 'molecular isolation' is a condition which keeps 
the individual 1 in the dark' about inconsistency. It should 
also be appreciated that an individual providing a heme for the 
isolated cognitions given in the above example could not hope by 
any objective standard to convince or enlist the support of 
others who respected and acted in accordance with the norms of 
reason. To the extent that anti-Germans wanted to carry the day 
with the apparent 'reasonableness' of their case, to scmething 
like the same extent they had to accomodate themselves to the
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principle of consistency.
Secondly, it has to be remembered that in much the same way as
those values of groups and societies which are shared by members
are shared differentially, so the notion of an ideological
self-image shared by both sides of the debate on Germany and the
Germans was shared differentially. It is generally accepted
that "... most of us... share many of the same values, and cur
differences of opinion stem frcm the relative importance we
(59)assign to them." When we say, 'Yes, I agree that x is
important and must not be lost sight of - but at this point in 
time the most important consideration is y, we are assigning 
weights to values. We are not saying that those weights are 
necessarily constant in respect of all situations. By weighting 
(differential sharing) we are bringing values into congruence 
with the situation as we perceive it.
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In the clear understanding that a descriptive illustration and 
not a causal explanation is being offered, this point can be 
represented [see figure 6 ] by an adaptation of the 1 value 
quadrants' used by Milton Rokeach . Suppose that what is 
shared is a dualistic self-image made up of, on the one hand, a 
concern for tolerance, justice, fairness, empathy [ideological 
interests], and on the other hand, a concern for power, 
effectiveness and security [material interests]. Individuals 
assigning high values to both interests occupy quadrant [A]; 
those assigning a higher value to material than to ideological 
interests occupy quadrant [B]; in quadrant [C] are located those 
who place a relatively low value on both interests; quadrant [D] 
is occupied by those assigning a higher value to ideological 
than to material interests. Although intended as no more than a 
descriptive illustration of the way in which values might be 
shared differentially, Figure [6 ] has the capacity to suggest 
ways in which the discussion might proceed and develop in 
complexity. For example, in the context of attitudes toward 
Germany and the Germans it should be possible to show, subject 
to refinements made belcw, that:
1. Individuals who assigned relatively high values to both 
ideological and material interests would, in their 
attitudes, be likely to express this balanced value 
position in such a way as to locate them centrally in the
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area of congruence of the parallel continuums of 
competition and co-operation; see Figure [ 7 ]. This 
position could be said to be one of equilibrium or balance 
between expressed attitudes derived from declared values 
and the values themselves. In short, it could be said to 
be of itself a position which satisfied the strain toward 
consistency.
2. Individuals who assigned a relatively higher value to 
material than to ideological interests would, in their 
attitudes, be likely to express this unbalanced value 
position in such a way as to locate them to the left of the 
equilibrium point, either within or outwith the area of 
congruence. To the extent that ideological interests had 
contributed to the perception of threat to material 
interests, [e.g. 'in having no concern for tolerance, 
justice, fairness, empathy - the Germans threaten us] 
and/or had served as a standard for assessing Germany and 
the Germans, this position could be said to be one of 
imbalance between expressed attitudes derived from declared 
values and the values themselves. Those who occupied this 
position would be likely to make an attempt to achieve some 
form of consistency.
3. By definition, individuals who assigned relatively low
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values to both ideological and material interests did not 
participate in the general debate on Germany and the 
Germans.
4. Individuals who assigned a relatively higher value to 
ideological than to material interests would, in their 
attitudes, be likely to express this unbalanced value 
position in such a way as to locate them to the right of the 
equilibrium point, either within or outwith the area of 
congruence. To the extent that material interests had been 
called in support of ideological interests [e.g. if we do 
not remain a world power the survival and distribution of 
our values will be in peril], this position could be said 
to be one of imbalance between expressed attitudes derived 
from declared values and the values themselves. Those who 
occupied this position would be likely to make an attempt 
to achieve seme form of consistency.
Important theoretical refinements must be made if the link 
between the competition - co-operation model and the value - 
sharing quadrants is to avoid over simplification. For seme 
individuals occupying extreme positions outwith the area of 
congruence, whether to left or right, questions of inconsistency 
resolution would not arise. 'Molecular isolation1, for
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example, could protect an individual adopting an extreme 
anti-German position, even if there existed scmewhere in his 
cognitive system the notion that tolerance and empathy were 
important in themselves. Additionally, an individual located 
left of the equilibrium point, with competitive attitudes 
increasing and co-operative attitudes diminishing or 
disappearing, could occupy that position not because material 
interests were regarded as relatively more important but because 
the values associated with ideological interests were regarded 
as paramount. Such an individual might take the following 
stand:
'I am not prepared to condemn all individual Germans out 
of hand, but as a collective they must be strenuously 
resisted if our basic values are to be preserved.1
Similarly, an individual located right of the equilibrium point, 
with co-operative attitudes increasing and competitive attitudes 
diminishing or disappearing, could occupy that position not 
because ideological interests were regarded as relatively more 
important but because the values associated with material 
interests were accorded the higher priority. Such an individual 
might take the following stand.
'I know that justice, fairness, tolerance, etc., are of
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great value, but think of the destruction of human and 
material resources that will result if we get involved in 
a war with Germany. *
It should not pass unnoticed that such positions represent 
attempts to achieve sane form of consistency.
With those refinements in mind we can return to the question: 
hew did those involved in the debate on Germany and the Germans 
handle the potential for inconsistency inherent in the dualistic 
nature of the British self-image? Although attempting to cover 
the whole period under review, and a broad range of mechanisms, 
the following discussion has to be selective. And two important 
points should be kept in mind: (i) there is an assumption, based 
on the content of views outlined in previous chapters that those 
involved in the debate were, and remained aware that they faced 
inconsistency dilemmas; this means that ‘stopping thinking', 
and 'denial1, as mechanisms, are not considered? (ii) sane 
individuals were pluralistic in their use of mechanisms for 
handling inconsistency dilemmas; this means that they will be 
referred to more than once.
As might be expected, derogation was a frequently used 
mechanism. It served the purpose of reducing the potential for
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inconsistency by raising doubts about the reliability of those 
vdio pressed the claims of the discrepant cognition and, in sane 
way similar to the function of bolstering, seemed to consolidate 
self-esteem. In the context of the debate on Germany and the 
Germans, derogation, as used by those located left of the point 
of equilibrium, may be seen as an argument that the case for 
tolerance, justice, fairness, etc., had been assigned a
disproportionate weight and had so tipped the scales that the 
legitimate material interests of the nation were being
neglected. Maxse referred to those who challenged his position 
as ignorant and invincible optimists, illusion mongers, 
political deadheads, peace-cranks and simpletons - obscuring the 
real issues with thoughtless and fatuous sentimentalism, pitiful 
whines for disarmament, and criminal utterances. Cramb wrote 
dismissively of the effusive sentiment for peace. Dillon 
complained of the quietism of the masses and their
self-complacent leaders, of croaking prophets conjuring up 
dangerous mirages. He was carmitted to the exorcism of the 
demons of credulity and pacifism. Sidney Brooks used the same 
mechanism, if in milder fashion, when he referred to decent 
Englishmen who, somewhat innocently, were prepared to see good 
in the Germans. Smith agreed that "Freedom of speech is a 
precious jewel of which Englishmen are justly proud", but he 
thought it was being abused. The ill-informed wanted to make 
distinctions between Germans, but "the result of their
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ignorance... and open abuse of their right to free speech is
this: many thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands, of
Englishmen must sleep their last sleep on the blood-stained
battlefields of Europe... As usual, the charlatans remain in
security... while the victims ... are being shot and bayoneted
to make good the evil caused by a fatal combination of ignorance
and free speech." It was high time that those sympathetic
to Germany at such a time of crisis should be "deposed from
(62)their pedestals of ignorance."
Brcme-Weigall, reflecting on events leading up to the First
World War, and the influences being brought to bear on opinion,
considered that "The British nation... blinded itself ... and
(63)hoped for the best." Rowse wrote of the "liberal
illusionism about the Germans and the German mentality", coming
from people "who did not knew Germany or German history, the
German language or German thought. Because of this
illusionism, "the English were beginning to sit superfluously in
sack-cloth and ashes for a war [1914-18] which they did not
begin, had never wanted, and were not prepared for." Of
the inter-war period, referred to in this thesis as a
conscience-led phase of reflection, Rowse felt "... hard put to
find another period comparable to it in folly and disgrace, in
corruption of the very source of judgment, in lack of vision and
(66)criminal obtuseness." It was implicit in Namier*s argument
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that a disastrous overweighting of the claims of the ideological
self-image had created a surrealistic condition in which "People
in this country who abhorred [Hitler’s] actions volunteered to
shoulder his guilt", so that we and our misdeeds were to blame
for his rise." The problem had been that "... in the grey
aftermath of the war sensitive consciences cried out for a
millennium which alone could have justified ex-post the
(67)slaughter of millions." Vansittart wrote bitterly of
(68)"ill-informed meddlers" who were "a menace to mankind." The 
persistent effort "being made to suggest that the German nation 
is not in this war, and that in reality we are only faced by the 
Nazi party..." was a lunacy. "Our innocents at heme ccme of the 
ancient and rechristened stock of Wishful Thinkers. It is 
heId-and-hugged that there are millions of Germans eager to rise
(69)
up for us." A major contribution to the outbreak of war had
been made by "hosts of clever people" in Britain who had "lost
themselves in mazes of their cwn building." New engaged in
war, Britain was in danger of being destroyed by its own
(71)deluders - "the ignorant, the biased, the mendacious."
Bolstering was also a frequently used mechanian. If the
position held could in some way be justified by adoption of the
role of ’suffering servant*, ego defences were reinforced. 
Maxse had sacrificed a great deal of his time and energy
attenpting to rouse Englishmen from their dangerous torpor, and
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Dillon had struggled to awake from slumber his nation* s
misgivings. Barker numbered himself with those "who unceasingly
tried to warn the nation", and "were treated as alarmists,
(72)cranks, and anti-Germans." The most striking examples came
from Rowse and Vansittart, the latter combining bolstering and
derogation in equal measure. Writing after the events, Rowse
[1946] cast himself in the role of one of the few 'voices in the
wilderness.' For one to occupy such a role, believe and be able
later to claim that one was accurate in the assessment of
critical events, is ego-boosting and inconsistency reducing.
"It was impossible," he wrote, "to make oneself heard in that
period of confusion and humbug, of organised cant and hypocrisy:
(73)nobody paid any attention: nobody listened."
"... it was quite impossible - whatever talents or gifts 
of clearheadedness and historical perspicuity one might 
have - to rouse one's countrymen, lulled as they were, 
befuddled and bamboozled..."
Vansittart, so far as one can gather from his written work,
perceived himself as the expert par excellence who had not been
listened to: "... there can be no writing on the wall when the
(75)wall is as dense... as Snout in Midsummer Night's Dream."
Of his personal frustrations he wrote, "... everyone must expect 
his share of knocks in controversy, and no one should resent
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being hit below the belt by those who can reach no higher. I 
have had ny share of them. It is a curious and sinister fact 
that nothing has been more unpopular than telling the truth 
about a country that for generations has been bent on destroying 
you... Even new, if you read certain types of publications 
produced in this country you would think that we were seme sort 
of criminals, instead of men who had simply and accurately 
warned their fellows..."
The process of achieving a form of consistency between 
discrepant cognitions by emphasising the positive and 
de-emphasising the negative aspects of one, and de-enphasising 
the positive and emphasising the negative aspects of the other - 
a process involving rationalisation - was evident in a number of 
sources. The argument was advanced that the pursuit of material 
interests was not as antithetical to the values of the 
ideological self-image as might be supposed; for the pursuit of 
material interests, given the circumstances obtaining, was 
really the best way of ensuring the survival of those values. 
It was foolish and positively dangerous to inform one's dealings 
with Germany with the notion of the brotherhood of man. There 
would be no reciprocity. A temporary surrender to hate in 
defence of precious traits and values was necessary and in the 
nature of a just cause, for Germany's threat could not be 
removed by the exercise of sympathy and justice. Bentley
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pointed out that "the idea of the brotherhood of man simply does
(77)not exist for the prophets of Germanism." Brcme-Weigall
welcomed the fact that it was being borne in upon "The slew mind
of the people of England that this war [1914-18] is being waged
against a nation whose point of view is completely different
from that of the allies, and whose actions are governed by a
(78)code which does not remotely resemble our code." By
fighting tooth and claw, without concessions, against this
(79)
enemy, Britain was "fighting for the heart of the world."
Smith argued that the hope, entertained by those committed to
the ideological self-image, of co-operation between Britain and
Germany "... was destined from the very nature of things to
remain a dream." Germany could not be addressed in terms
of the 'rules of the game', for she did not recognise them.
Whenever attempts were made to act with sympathy and fairness
towards Germany, the enemy "played cunningly upon this side of
(81)English character..."' Britain was faced with "an
(82)
irreconcilable, uncompromising, arrogant rival,"1 7 who had
"returned our fair-dealing and friendly overtures with low
(83)cunning, brute force and hate." It was precisely for the
sake of the values that Britain held dear that she had to act 
harshly. For, "If Germany is victorious her methods and 
principles will have overthrown all the humane ideals which 
Christianity has taken nearly twenty centuries to evolve." 
Rowse encouraged his readers to accept that "the only way to
[332]
meet Machiavellianism is with Machiavellianism." Co-operation
with Germany was not an alternative, "... for it is not even
possible, except on their own terms... they do not believe in
international order. Their own will, their own interests, are
their only law." To expect mutual reciprocity of decent
sentiments in Anglo-German relations was to pursue a phantom.
The Germans were "... the self-declared breakers of 
(85)agreements..." The German mentality did not bear trifling
with: "... it is no good trying to catprcmise with it; the only
(86)
safe thing is to root it out." There was nothing more
dangerous for Britain's future than ”... the combination of
(87)English good nature and ignorance..."' Vansittart advised
that Britain was dealing with a nation "... riddled with
(88)aggression... its soul pock-marked with envy..."' 7 It had
"traded upon the ingrained British aversion to belief in evil, 
one of the deepest and most dangerous traits in our 
composition."
Examples of what could be construed as ritualign are to be found 
in sources such as Bentley and Smith who, in the expression of 
generally condemnatory views introduced what amounted to 
lip-service adherence to the traits and values of the 
ideological self-image. Of much more consequence was the manner 
in which some sources effected a change in one of the 
inconsistent cognitions. Employment of this mechanism, designed
[333]
to reduce inconsistency by restructuring one of the elements 
responsible for it, can be detected in the work of de Beaufort 
and Rowse, but the classic example is to be found in
Vansittart. The basis for the use of such a mechanism often 
resides in the view that there is more than one valid way of 
interpreting a 1 cannon scripture1. Bie act of restructuring
carried out by Vansittart is of such significance that it 
deserves a preliminary discussion. By way of analogy, it seems 
reasonable to argue that
"the central doctrines and beliefs of Christianity would
appear to provide basic premises upon which Christians
could base racial tolerance, compassion and
(91)understanding."
But the findings of Stark and Glock (1968) in their study of the 
nature of religious commitment in the United States, as reported 
by Bern (1970), suggest that
"... there are other central beliefs in Christian doctrine 
which - when interpreted by the layman at least - 
contribute to racial prejudice rather than diminish it.
The most central of these beliefs appears to be a radical 
version of the freewill conception of man.
[334]
The freewill conception of man sees him as a free actor, 
essentially capable of rising above the circumstances of 
his environment by virtue of his own efforts, free to
(92)
choose and thus free to effect his own salvation."
In terms of this particular perspective cn, and interpretation
of Christian ethics, it appears to be quite consistent "to put
the blame for disadvantage upon those who are
(93)disadvantaged." And so, according to the lights of the
student, there is more than one valid way to interpret 'canton 
scripture1.
Writing on a closely related theme Berger refers to the "... 
geographical co-incidence between the Black Belt and the Bile 
Belt" in the American South.
"... roughly the same area that practises the southern racial 
system in pristine purity, also has the heaviest concentration 
of ultra-conservative, fundamentalist Protestantism...
Protestant fundamentalism, while it is obsessed with the idea of 
sin, has a curiously limited concept of its extent. Fevivalistic 
preachers thundering against the wickedness of the world 
invariably fasten on a rather limited range of moral offences - 
fornication, drink, dancing, gambling, swearing. Indeed, so
[335]
much emphasis is placed on the first of these that, in the
lingua franca of Protestant moralism, the term 'sin1 itself is
almost cognate with the more specific term 'sexual offence*.
Whatever one may say otherwise about this catalogue of
pernicious acts, they all have in cannon their essentially
private character. Indeed, when a revivalistic preacher
mentions public matters at all it is usually in terms of the
private corruption of those holding public offices... Now, the
limitation to private wrong-doing in one's concept of Christian
ethics has obvious functions in a society whose central social
arrangements are dubious, to say the least, when confronted with
certain teachings of the New Testament and with the egalitarian
creed of the nation that considers itself to have roots in the
same. Protestant fundamentalism's private concept of morality
thus concentrates attention on those areas of conduct that are
irrelevant to the maintenance of the system, and diverts
attention from those areas where ethical inspection would create
(94)tensions for the smooth operation of the system."
Leaving analogy aside and returning to Vansittart. He wrote:
"Do not always be wandering hew to be safely just to her 
(Germany). Make up your minds that you are going to be 
just first to Germany's victims, and to Germany after... 
Both justices are possible, but only if taken in the right
[336]
order... The simple Samaritan took good care of the 
victim. His care for the soul of the aggressor was second 
and unchronicled. The Modem Levite does not pass by on
the other side, he crosses the road to shake hands with
(95)
the aggressor."
In this fascinating passage Vansittart conceded that justice and 
sympathy were crucial and valuable elements in the ideological 
self-image. But he also made a distinction between two forms of 
justice, the justice of the Levite, that is, technical letter of 
the law justice, and the justice of the Samaritan, that is, 
humane spirit of the law justice. The justice of the Samaritan, 
Vansittarts reconstructed cognition of justice, was the justice 
of the heart, the justice of true generosity and feeling. Of
course, "the simple use of the heart in politics is not always
easy; it will even be suspect... Do not fear to be sweeping; 
else ycu will lose yourself in refinements."
Transcendance as a mechanism for handling inconsistency dilemmas 
is recognisable in the work of Maxse, Cramb, Dillon, Harrison, 
Bcwse and Vansittart. The inconsistencies between particular 
cognitions [material interests and ideological interests] are 
set in proper context and devalued as matters for concern by a 
superordinate principle - in seme sources the need to face the
[337]
challenge of inexorable historical forces, in others the need to 
resist the 'wild beast' or the smooth-tongued tempter, the 
political Antichrist. Exceptional circumstances apply and 
necessitate a re-ordering of priorities. The situation is not 
dissimilar to that described to Thrasymachus by Socrates in the 
Republic when the question arose about 'giving a man his due' 
when the man was in a mentally unstable condition and his due 
was an axe. Peters refers to the "... process ... of modifying 
one's ends and rules in the light of circumstances" and argues 
that
"Rationality is, for example, evinced in qualifying an
absolute disapproval of lying when confronted by a case
where exceptional circumstances incline one to think that
there are overriding grounds for lying - e.g. the immense
amount of suffering likely to be brought about if the
(97)literal truth is told on a particular occasion."
Adapting this to the case of the anti-German conscious, in the 
context of the debate, of the requirement of consistency, we 
have him qualifying an absolute disapproval of intolerance, 
unfairness, injustice, etc., when confronted by a case where 
exceptional circumstances incline him to think that there are 
overriding grounds for intolerance, unfairness, etc. - e.g. the 
immense amount of human suffering and material damage likely to
[338]
be brought about if Germany and its perceived aims were treated 
with tolerance and fairness, to say nothing of empathy.
Integration can be noted in Dillon - material interests and 
ideological interests synthesising to produce a dramatic call to 
arms in defence of all Britain was and stood for - and in sources 
such as Warwick, generally representative of a marriage between 
tolerance, sympathy, fairness, and a pragmatism stemming frcm a 
clear perception of material interests. As a mechanism it is 
most profoundly evident in the work of Gollancz, particularly in 
those passages where the insistence that evil must be caribated is 
qualified by a conscious decision to exclude large sections of 
the enemy population frcm that category; where a determination 
to hate and extirpate the crime stands in conjunction with an 
equal determination not to hate the criminal.
Most of those who were involved in the debate on Germany and the 
Germans were aware of the dualistic nature of the British 
self-image, and of the potential inconsistency dilemmas which 
this could threw up. For those who consciously used the traits 
and values of the ideological component of the self-image as a 
means for assessing the Germans, the potential for inconsistency 
was particularly marked. The purpose of this chapter has been to 
persuade that consistency theory provides useful tools for the 
analysis of how consistency dilemmas were resolved.
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9CHAPTER 9 
NATIONAL CHARACTER: THE CONCEPT
[1]
The purposes of this chapter are threefold: first, to examine
the grounds on which it might be reasonable to assert that 
individual societies are characterised [that is to say, 
'marked1 ] ^  by kinds of configurations or patterns that make 
them demonstrably different from other societies; second, to 
consider the important reservations that have to be made about 
such an assertion, particularly in regard to what may be 
properly deduced frcm it; third, to formulate a definition of 
'national character' that is consistent with conclusions reached 
at stages one and two.
[1]
One social group may be distinguished frcm another in terms of
the behaviours of their respective members. Focusing on the
individual, we may ask why he acts as he does and what
conditions lead him to act as he does. As Krasner and Ullmann
[1973] note, "at first these two questions seem similar but the
kinds of investigating behaviour that follow frcm each have very
(2)real differences."' The what question directs attention to 
observable regularities, to "... the behaviour patterns of the 
group as a whole... the nature of its organisation as embodied 
in its institutions, its collective achievements and its public
[2]
policy?" the why question directs attention to what can be
inferred from behaviour, to answers that lie, at least in part,
within the individual, to "... differences in the distribution
of certain traits or perhaps of types in different groups, as
when we say that the Germans are more docile than the English...
or that the Irish temperamentally dislike regimentation."
The differing foci of the what and why questions reflects the
"continual struggle" that has gone on in research activity
"between those looking for the locus and impetus of behaviour
within the individual [for example, in traits] and those seeking
the locus of action outside the organism [for example, in 
(4)situations]," and brings investigators to "... the interface
. . (5)of individual psychology... and the social sciences."
Greenstein [1969] saw the competing disciplines [for example,
Psychology and Sociology] dividing the field along two axes:
"Psychology... deals with the personal system, sociology with
the social system... Psychology is concerned with those
determinants of behaviour that arise frcm within individuals,
Sociology with the effects of the environment, especially the
human environment, on individuals* behaviour."^ That there
should be the prospect of defining some common ground between
those two approaches to an understanding of human behaviour is
due largely to the fact that the * space * between polarised
statements is occupied by theoretical positions that gradually
shade into each other.
[3]
Where Freud considered that behaviour was determined by the
inner workings of man, by internal forces, Skinner [1971]
dismissed the notion of an inner man, rejected "hypothesised
internal events", and saw behaviour as determined by
environmental forces. ^  Where Linton [1945] ^  argued that
the social status [or various status roles] of an individual was
a more effective guide to the springs of his behaviour than
(9)•personality*, Mackinnon [1951] saw various status roles as 
the contents of an individual*s wardrobe. Different suits or 
dresses were taken out for different status occasions, gave an 
impression of the body underneath, but in no way constituted the 
real body - the tame contours of which were to be found in an 
examination of personality.
It is difficult to ignore the situational dimension in the 
explanation of hunan behaviour. One of the most potent supports 
for this view comes frcm Berger [1963]. In a chapter, 
significantly titled * Society in Man', he argued that "society 
not only determines what we do but also what we are", and it 
does so by assigning roles to its members:
"To use the language of the theatre, from which the
L
concept of role is derived, we can say that society 
provides the script for all the dramatis personae. The 
individual actors, therefore, need but slip into the roles 
already assigned to them before the curtain goes up. ...
[4]
The role forms, shapes, patterns both action and actor.
It is very difficult to pretend in this world. Normally, 
one becomes what one plays at".
In Berger's view it was social forces which conferred and 
sustained the individual's identity. Although individuals came 
into the world with a genetic heritage, their identities were 
conferred "in acts of social recognition" rather than in terms 
of biological or physiological 'givens'. And once conferred, 
the identity had to be socially sustained.
"One cannot hold on to any particular identity all by 
oneself. The self-image of the officer as an officer can 
be maintained only in a social context in which others are 
willing to recognise him in his identity... Cases of 
radical withdrawal of recognition can tell us much about 
the social character of identity..."
For Berger, the value of role-theory lay in its perception of 
the person as "a repertoire of roles." It followed that "if 
one wants to ask who an individual 'really' is in this 
kaleidoscope of roles and identities, one can answer only by 
enumerating the situations in which he is one thing and those in 
which he is another."
[5]
It is no less difficult to ignore the personal dimension in the 
explanation of human behaviour. Greens tein conceded the 
significance of environmental situations, but also pointed to 
the importance of personal psychological predispositions.
Behaviour could, on occasions, be "critically dependent upon the 
personal characteristics of key actors..." He took as an 
example the nature of Republican politics in the United States 
in 1964, and while agreeing that "an account of the main 
determinants of the Republican nomination that year, and of the 
nature of the subsequent election campaign, would have to 
include much more than descriptions of the personal 
characteristics of the party leaders and members", pointed to 
the impact of such factors as "the willingness of one of the 
strongest contenders for the nomination to divorce his wife and 
marry a divorced woman? the indecision of one of the party* s 
elder statesmen? a politically damaging outburst of temper in a 
news conference... The self-defeating style of the man who 
received the nomination.
In response to the claim that * personality* cannot be said to 
operate as an important determinant of behaviour since 
"individuals with varying personality characteristics will tend 
to behave similarly when placed in cannon situations", 
Greenstein outlined "types of situations that actually encourage
[6]
the expression of personal differences in behaviour" - for 
example, situations which because of their newness 
[unfamiliarity], or complexity, or contradictory nature, give 
rise to antoiguity. Additionally, he held that the expression 
of personal variations is fostered in situations "in which there 
are no sanctions attached to the alternative courses of 
behaviour." Indeed, even when environmental sanctions existed, 
individuals with "intense dispositions" [excluding the disposition 
to conform] would tend to ignore the sanctions and "behave 
consistently with their varying dispositions." Greenstein then 
made an important distinction between a particular item of 
behaviour on the one hand, and the degree of conscientious 
performance and manner of enactment on the other:
"Turning finally to behaviour itself, the kind of 
behaviour ws choose to observe as our dependent variable 
will affect the likelihood of observing personal 
variations. For example, variation... is much greater... 
in the zealousness of performance of actions and the style 
of performance than in the mere fact that a particular 
kind of action... is performed. And to the degree that an 
act is demanding, it is more likely to exhibit personal 
variability."^12^
Potter [1954] had referred to the recognition of the
[7]
complementarity rather than mutual exclusivity of psychology and
sociology - as determinants of behaviour - as "one of the epic
(13)advances of modem social science." This complementary
relationship was underlined by Lazarus [1963]:
"The sources of man's behaviour [his observable action] 
and his subjective experience [such as thoughts, feelings, 
and wishes] are twofold: the external stimuli that
impinge on him and the internal dispositions that result 
frcm the interaction between inherited physiological 
characteristics and experience with the world. When we 
focus on the former, we note that a person acts in 
such-and-such a way because of certain qualities in a 
situation.
Still, even as we recognise the dependency of behaviour on 
outside stimuli, we are also aware that it cannot be 
accounted for on the basis of the external situation
alone, but that in fact it must arise partly from personal
. . M (14)characteristics."
Where Freud and Skinner had occupied trenches on opposite sides 
of no-man* s-land - the one arguing that personal psychological 
predispositions determined behaviour and the other that 
environmental forces were paramount, still others had moved
[8]
beyond Berger*s identification of social roles with self to a 
synthetic appreciation of another kind, namely that (1) the 
social situation was always of significance and (2) at the same 
time individual psychological configurations, the product of 
physiological factors and social experience - historically 
determined - could have an autonomous bearing on behaviour.
In discussing ways in which one society may be said to be 
distinct frcm another; in reviewing the problems sterming from 
inappropriate deductions based on such distinctions? and in 
formulating a definition of national character - this chapter 
adheres to the notion that both situation and personality are of 
crucial significance to an understanding of human behaviour.
Careful observations of any society would reveal what Inkeles
(15)and Levinson refer to as "patterned conditions of life."' In
this context 'patterns' are indications of what Sapir [1927]
termed generalised inodes of conduct", imputed to society rather
than to the individual", and of what Kluckhohn [1941] saw as
structural regularities "to which there is some degree of
(17)conformance on the part of a number of persons." Phrases
such as modes of conduct, structural regularities, and degree of 
conformance, suggest a measure of commonality in the experience 
and behaviour of the members of a society. This measure of 
ccnmonality constitutes the culture of the society. Dealing
[9]
only with works published in English, Kroeber and Kluckhohn
[1952] listed and analysed 160 definitions of culture in
anthropological, sociological, psychological and other social
(18)science texts. ' The concept was introduced and formalised in
English by Tylor [1865, 1871] as "that complex whole which
includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any
other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of 
(19)
society." Boas [1930] took culture to embrace "all the
manifestations of social habits of a carmunity, the reactions of
the individual as affected by the habits of the group in which
he lives, and the products of human activities as determined by
these habits." Such definitions were surrmarised
economically by Klineberg [1935] when he described culture as
"that whole 'way of life' which is determined by the social 
(21)environment." The 'sharing' implicit in conforming
behaviour, and in modes of conduct that are generalised, was 
made explicit by Mead [1953] when she defined culture as "... 
the total, shared, learned behaviour of the members of a group 
or society..
How might we approach the culture of a particular society in 
order to reveal and record those aspects of behaviour that make 
it distinct frcm other societies? Frcm the situational 
perspective, this redirects our attention to the conditions 
which lead to particular forms of action. Cotgrove [1967]
[10]
argued that "the behaviour of actors in a social system will be
oriented to their perception of what others expect of them", and
so what a person does is likely to be representative of a
(23)"consensus on means."' As such, there is a high probability
(24)that it will be "expected and approved by his peers." When 
individuals follow behaviour patterns representative of a 
consensus on means, they are conforming to social or cultural
norms, to rules of conduct that "prescribe seme means and
. . (25)prohibit others." cultural norms are regulatory devices.
As such they can be identified and described in their
observance. They provide a picture of the "set of rules and
usages... which define what is considered normal" in the culture 
(26)being observed. Once identified and described, those
regulatory devices can highlight 'deviant' behaviour and call 
attention to the sanctions employed against such behaviour. All 
modem societies have sets of rules and usages that establish or 
reflect a consensus on means. While it would be unreasonable - 
taking all possible cases of norm-referenced conforming 
behaviour in modem societies into account - to expect the 
components of the nonnative pattern of one society to be totally 
different frcm that of another, the differences which will exist 
are always likely to be of an order which permits cross-cultural 
distinctions; and in many cases those differences will be 
profound.
However much we might accept that behaviour is always a function
[11]
of both person and situation, there remains the question of the 
relative potency of the variables as determinants of particular 
forms of behaviour. Where one 'makes a start1 in the explanation 
of behaviour probably reflects a judgement on the relative 
potency of the determinants. For example, when looking at 
behaviour primarily related to social norms, the starting point 
is the situation; when looking at behaviour as expressed in 
traits [see below], the starting point is the person. It may be 
assumed that there is also a starting point which assigns more 
or less equal potency to person and situation? behaviour 
associated with attitudes, values, and goals might be approached 
frcm the intermediate position.
"Attitudes are likes and dislikes. They are our affinities for
and our aversion to situations, objects, persons, groups, or
any other identifiable aspects of our environment, including
. . (27)abstract ideas and social policies." An attitude defines a
point of view toward something, for example, well-disposed or
(28)ill-disposed, favourable or unfavourable. Values are
desired ends? a value is a "... preference for or a positive
attitude toward certain end-states of existence [like equality,
salvation, self-fulfilment, or freedom] or certain broad modes
(29)of conduct [like courage, honesty, friendship or chastity]." 
Whenever two or more people share values,they are party to a 
"consensus on ends."^^ Apter [1965] made the distinction
[12]
between instrumental values, what could be regarded as the more
immediate, preferred end-states, and consumnatory values, the
more distant and less accessible end-states associated with
(31)particular sets of moralities. For example, instrumental
values could cover preferred end-states such as personal
security, material wellbeing, physical canfort; consumnatory
values could cover the whole range of moral positions frcm which
various writers have selected those which best suited their
(32)vision of the 'Good Society*. Goals are also end-states;
indeed they may be regarded as 'terminal values'. Once a
terminal value has been achieved, the precise goal related to it 
[e.g. getting a good job, a wife, a military ccnmission, etc.] 
disappears. The pursuit of consumnatory values is unlikely to 
lead to an actual terminus.
Attitudes, values, and goals seem to be so clearly associated
with both the social situation and the underlying dispositions of
individuals that it is difficult to approach them from anything
other than a composite starting point. Bern [1970] probably had
this in mind when he asserted that "... our likes and dislikes
have roots in our emotions... and in the social influences upon 
(33)us." Having given lengthy and sympathetic consideration to 
the part played in this context by 'internal' conditions such as 
thinking [conscious, non-conscious, unconscious] and feeling, 
the dynamic organisation of individual psycho-logic "that ties a
[13]
man's opinions together" and gives sane indication of hew
beliefs, attitudes and values are interrelated, the "underlying
processes by which... feelings, the emotional components of
beliefs and attitudes are acquired, transmitted, modified, and 
. . (34)eliminated", Bern turned to the influence of situational
factors. He suggested that the central beliefs, attitudes, and
values held by individuals "lose nearly all their mystery as
soon as the dominant social influences in our backgrounds are
revealed." He argued that in his own case, "any alert observer
of the American scene" could have his opinions "well-pegged"
once he learned that he was an urban Jew with liberal parents, a
graduate of a 'left-wing' university, and a behavioural
scientist at an urban university on the East-Coast of the United
States. He concluded that a catologue of the social influences
on individuals was more or less equivalent to a catalogue of
(35)their major beliefs, values, and attitudes.'
Kelman [1961] also brought person and situation together in his
discussion on forms of behaviour associated with the processes
(36)of compliance, identification, and internalisation. 1 As a
point of entry to Kelman's ideas, suppose that an individual 
makes three statements, one expressing an attitude, one 
identifying a value, and one defining a goal:-
I like 'x'
I believe that 'y1 is conducive to the public 
good and should be pranoted.
We should all be aiming for the realisation of 
'z'.
What might bring an individual to acceptance of those positions?
Hew might his behaviour, in coming to those positions, be
characterised? Kelman argued that an individual might adopt the
propositions "... because he hopes to achieve a favourable
reaction... he may be interested in attaining certain specific
rewards or in avoiding certain specific punishments... For
example, an individual may make a special effort to express only
'correct* opinions in order to gain admission into a particular
group or social set, or in order to avoid being fired from his
government job." The individual, in such a case, would not
adopt the positions because he believes in their 'content1, but
because they are "instrumental in the production of a satisfying
(37)social effect." Positions adopted on such grounds would be 
associated with an act, or acts of compliance. On the other 
hand, an individual might adopt positions because he wishes to be 
identified with another person or group. The act of 
identification is not carried out because the 'content' of the 
positions is "intrinsically satisfying", but because the act "is 
a way of establishing or maintaining the desired relationship to
Attitude:
Value:
Goal:
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the other, and the self-definition that is anchored in this
(38)relationship." Alternatively, an individual might take up
pertain positions because they are "congruent with his value
system." In this case, the ‘content1 is intrinsically
rewarding and "is congenial to his own orientation." Attitude
'x*, value 'y' and goal 'z' are internalised, though not
necessarily on rational grounds; "an authoritarian individual
may adopt certain racist attitudes because they fit into his
(39)paranoid, irrational view of the world. " 1 ' Although 
individual 'personality* is most obviously at work in the 
process of internalisation, with attitude, value, and goal 
positions being adopted because they are congenial with the 
person's 'orientation' and "congruent with his value system", it 
is also at work, in company with situation, in respect of 
behaviour characterised by compliance and identification. Will 
particular personality 'types' be given to compliance, 
identification, and internalisation? If an individual's 
behaviour represents a mixture of all three processes, will his 
particular personality 'type' determine the form of the mix? 
The 'satisfaction' derived from a particular social effect will 
be largely psychological? behaviour which establishes and 
serves to maintain "self-definition", is likely to have roots in 
individual personality, insofar as the notion of individual 
personality subsumes the notion of a unique self-identity.
[16]
One culture may be considered distinct frcm another in respect
of the range, distribution, and relative salience of its
attitudes, values, and goals. Except under very special
circumstances [e.g. a threat to existence so extreme, pervasive,
and immediate as to give rise to a profound sense of collective
identity] it is unlikely that the attitudes, values, and goals
of the individual members of a large and canplex society would,
if set together, even approximate to consensus. Different groups
within society defined, say, in relation to particular roles and
status, different sub-cultures defined, say, in relation to
geography, or social class, or religion - or seme combination of
these - would be likely to demonstrate variations in attitudes,
values, and goals. Value dissensus could be the product of
a number of different social phenomena; for example, as Moore
[1969] argued, "pluralism itself may be valued", with the result
that "in some aspects of social life, integration rests on
tolerance rather than on substantive agreement." Located
within the variations there would be, of course, attitudes,
values and goals which had particular salience for the future of
the society as an enduring entity. These would be the ones
which attracted "... at least apathetic compliance an the part
of substantial segments... and conscientious compliance at least
(41)on the part of those exercising power." Were attitude,
value, and goal profiles1 to be compiled for any one society, 
they would show range [variation], distribution [from most
[17]
widely held to least widely held] and relative salience [social 
significance in terms of conscientious and apathetic compliance] 
and would be likely to differ from similarly constructed 
profiles for another society.
Attitudes, values, and goals are not in themselves observable. 
As 'mental programmes' [Hofstede, 1984], they have to be 
inferred or operationalised.
"We need to find observable phenomena from which the 
construct [i.e. attitude, value, or goal] can be inferred.
In some types of research our operationalisation leads to 
quantitative measures; in other types, to descriptive, 
non-quantitative measures. Whichever we aim for, any 
operationalisation of 'mental programmes' has to use forms 
of behaviour or outcomes of behaviour. The behaviour we 
use can be either 'provoked' [stimulated by the researcher 
for the purpose of the research] or 'natural' [taking place 
or having taken place regardless of the research and the 
researchers]. Also, the behaviour we use can be verbal 
[words] or non-verbal [deeds]."
Figure [1 ] outlines the types of techniques that can be used to 
provoke behaviour, from which attitudes, values, and goals can 
be inferred. These can be conplemented by examination of
ATTITUDE1 MEASUREMENT TECHNIQUES 
FIGURE [ 1 ] — — --------------------------------
Ccrpiled frcm the text of S. W. Cook and C. Seilltiz, A Multiple 
IiVHrator Approach to Attitude Measurement [Psychological Bulletin, 
Vol. 62, 1964, pp. 36-55].
1. M E ASURES IN W H IC H  INFERENCES ARE V R AWN FROM S E LF-REPORTS OF BELIEFS, FEELINGS, BEHAVIOURS, ETC.
EXAMPLE OF MEASURE NATURE OF INFERENCE
An individual is asked to reveal - either in his 
own words or through acceptance or rejection of 
standardised items - his beliefs about the 
attitudinal object, how he feels toward it, hew 
he behaves or would behave toward it, how he 
believes it should be treated:
It is assumed that the relationship between 
attitude and expression is a direct one and that 
the attitude corresponds to the manifest, 
common-sense implications of the stated belief 
or feeling. For example, a stated belief that 
the object has characteristics usually 
considered to be desirable is taken as 
reflecting a favourable disposition toward it 
and vice versa.
2. MEASURES IN W H I C H  INFERENCES ARE V R AWN FROM O B SERVATIONS OF O V ERT BEHAVIOUR.
EXAMPLE OF MEASURE NATURE OF INFERENCE
Subjects may be asked (i) to sign a petition on 
behalf of an instructor about to be discharged 
. for menbership in the Ccmrrunist Party;
(ii) to contribute money for the improvement of 
conditions for migratory workers;
(iii) whether they would be willing to have a 
Negro room-mate. Such devices differ frcm 
self-report measures in that in the behavioural 
measures the subject either actually carries out 
the behaviour or is led to believe that his 
agreement to do so will lead to real-life 
consequences.
All definitions of attitude specify that 
behaviour can be taken as an indicator of 
attitude. The visual assumption is that there is 
a simple correspondence between the nature of 
the behaviour and the nature of the underlying 
attitude; for example, that friendly behaviour 
toward a member of a given class of objects 
indicates a favourable attitude toward the 
object-class.
M E ASURES IN W H IC H  INFERENCES ARE VRAWN FROM THE INVIVIVUAL'S REACTION T O  OR INTtKPKtTXl ION 
2 * OF PARTIALLY STRU C T U RE V  STIMULI [PROJECTIVE TESTS]
EXAMPLE OF MEASURE NATURE OF INFERENCE
The subject is not asked to state his own 
reactions directly; he is ostensibly describing 
a scene, a character, or the behaviour of a 
third person. He may be presented with a 
photograph of a merrber of the object class 
[usually a person of a given social group] and 
asked to describe his characteristics; or lie 
may be presented with a scene and asked to 
describe it, to tell a story about it, etc.
Asked to provide an explanation or 
interpretation for which the stimulus presented 
gives no clear clue, the subject must draw on 
his own experience or his own dispositions, or 
his cwn definitions of what would be probable or 
appropriate; that asked to attribute behaviour 
to others, especially under speed conditions, 
the most readily accessible source of hypothesis 
is the individual's own response disposition.
4. ME AS U R E S  IN W H IC H  INFERENCES ARE V R AW N  FROM PERFORMANCE OF 'O B J E C T I V E ' TASKS.
EXAMPLE OF MEASURE NATURE OF INFERENCE
The respondent is presented with specific tasks 
to be performed; they are presented as tests of 
information or ability, or simply as jobs that 
need to be done. F o r  example, the subject is 
asked to sort items about the attitudinal object 
in terms of their position on a scale of 
favourableness - unfavourableness, ostensibly to 
help in the construction of a test instrument.
The assumption is that performance may be 
influenced by attitude, and that a systematic 
bias in performance reflects the influence of 
attitude.
c MEASURES IN W H IC H  INFERENCES ARE VRAWN FROM PHYSIOLOGICAL R E ACTIONS [E.G. GSR - GA LV A N I C  S K I N  
5 * RESPONSE. SALIVATION. PUPILLARY VILATION. ETC] TO  THE ATTITUVINAL OB JE C T  OR R E P R E S E NT A T I O NS  OF  IT.
EXAMPLE OF MEASURE NATURE OF INFERENCE
Rankin and Carrpbell [1955] compared GSRs 
obtained when the experimenter was a negro with 
those obtained when the experimenter was a white 
Westie and DeFleur [1959] recorded GSR, vascular 
constriction of finger, amplitude and duration of 
heart beat and duration of heart cycle, while 
the subjects were viewing pictures of white and 
negroes in social situations. Hess and Polt 
[1960] have photographed pupillary constriction 
in response to unpleasant stimuli and pupillary 
dilation in response to pleasant stimuli.
It is assumed that the magnitude of the 
physiological reaction is directly related to 
the extent of aroused or the intensity of 
feeling; thus, the greater the physiological 
response, the stronger and/or more extreme the 
attitude is presumed to be.
*R.E. Rankin and D. T. Campbell, Galvanic Skin Response to Negro and White 
Experimenters, [Journal of Abnormal Social Psychology, 51, 1955, pp.30-33]; 
F. R. Westie and M. L. DeFleur, Autonomic Responses and Their Relationship 
to Race Attitudes, [Journal of Abnormal Social Psychology, 58, 1959, pp. 
340-347]; E. H. Hess and J. M. Polt, Pupil Size as Related to Interest
~ C  TTJ —  *1 --- «i -• r+m . • - '  v _ . 
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'natural* behaviour - either through direct observation of 
social relationships or by study of cultural 'products', what 
Gorer [1953] termed "symbolic material" [literature, drama, 
cinema, painting, sculpture, etc.]
"Such symbolic material is susceptible to a variety of
analytic techniques: the tendency of the work as a whole -
the moral or message - can be deduced and stated; the
subjects of crisis of drama can be catalogued; individual
characters [in narratives] can be studied to demonstrate
what motives are consciously considered to be the sources
of what action, what types of behaviour are caimended and
what disapproved of... where motives are thought to be
self-evident, so that the author, writing for his
compatriots, feels it unnecessary to explain his
character's behaviour, it can be assumed that this
presumption is shared by the readers. In popular books,
plays, and films what is 'self-evident' to the audience is
(43)most revealing to the analyst."
The study of cultural products as a means of highlighting 
cross-cultural differences has been advanced by such as Bateson 
[1943] and Kracauer [1947] with regard to film, by McGranahan 
and Wayne [1948] in respect of popular drama, by Thomer [1945] 
with regard to language, by Lineva [1943] in relation to
[20]
folk-songs, and by Erikson [1950] in respect of political
(44)literature. Gorer pointed to the significance of language
for cross-cultural studies: "The fact that a person has learned
Russian... as his mother tongue means that his thoughts and
concepts will be limited and defined by the vocabulary and
syntax of the language; in certain important ways he will view
and interpret the universe differently to the way he would do if
he had been brought up with English, or Chinese or Eskimo as his 
(45)mother tongue." Friedrich [1974], considering "the tribe's
most canplex creation, its language," quoted Yehudi Menuhin in 
support of the view that German attitudes and values were in 
seme way related to its language: "The German language is an 
abstraction. The language about music - I don't like it. Music 
is a living thing, but the German terms are always abstract. 
German has the words for philosophy and for romantic poetry, but 
not for music. The cultural words are all derived frcm Latin 
words... everything civilised comes from Latin roots. And the 
grammar. When you start a sentence in German, you have to know 
at the beginning what the end will be. In English, you live the 
sentence through to its end. Qnotion and thought go together. 
In German, they've divorced. Everything is abstract. That was 
how they made abstractions of Jews. They didn't kill them as 
individuals, the way we shot our Indians, but as an 
abstraction." That the German language may be perceived by
some to provide clues to inner dispositions and mental
[21]
programmes was confirmed by John Huston*s rejection of the 
suggestion that the mysterious and elusive B. Traven, author of 
The Treasure of the Sierra Madre, was German by birth or 
education:
"... I have never felt anything Germanic in the Traven
books... The Traven books don’t have a Germanic ring to
them. There*s not that care and precision, there’s a kind
(47)of Largesse, even wastefulness about them."
Cross cultural differences may be identified in the 
different ways that similar themes are approached in 
painting and sculpture. Gorer was interested to discover 
what "psychological mechanisms... influenced the choice in 
any given case." He noted that
"in the religious pictures and statues of one country, 
great emphasis is placed on Jesus as an infant or child, 
and the Virgin Mary as a young girl; in another on Jesus 
as a mature and bearded man, and Mary as a mature and 
maternal woman; in a third on Jesus as tortured and 
crucified, Mary as an older and grieving woman.
Inferences based on observation of a combination of ’provoked*
[22]
and 'natural1 behaviours have suggested that cross-cultural 
differences in attitudes and values can be recognised in 
parent-child relationships. Bateson [1942] hypothesised that 
the patterns of parent-child relationship, expressed in 
complementary behaviours such as succouring-dependence, 
dcminance-submission, and exhibitionism-spectatorship, differed 
from culture to culture. The English upper- and middle-class 
system could be represented:
Parents Children
Dominance Submission
Succouring Dependence
Exhibitionism Spectatorship
On the other hand, the pattern in the United States could be 
represented:
Parents Children
Dominance [slight] Submission [slight]
Succouring Dependence
Spectatorship Exhibitionism
[23]
Bateson argued that the American pattern of parent-child
relationships differed frcm the English "not only in the
reversal of the spectatorship - exhibitionism roles, but also in
the context of what is exhibited. The American child is
(49)encouraged by his parents to show off his independence."
The German pattern was seen as similar to the American, with 
these important reservations: parental dominance was stranger in 
Germany, and the child's exhibitionism took a different form. 
The German boy was "dominated into a sort of heel-clicking 
exhibitionism which takes the place of overt submissive 
behaviour." Bateson concluded that "differences of this
order... may be expected in all European nations." Following 
Bateson, Gorer [1943] considered that behaviour learned in the 
parent-child relationship was likely to transfer to other 
situations. In his study of parent-child relationships in 
Japan, Gorer linked family experience and the conduct of 
international affairs. Gorer's picture of typical Japanese 
family life was one in which the male child was subservient and 
deferent toward male elders, but aggressive or commanding toward 
females, whether siblings or parent.
"Because of this differential treatment received from and 
allowed toward his two parents, the Japanese boy grows up 
in a divided universe where he must continuously use 
careful discrimination. To the male part of the universe
[24]
- that is, all males of superior age and status - he must 
respond obediently, passively, and unquestioningly... In 
contrast to the male world of dominance and submission, 
there is the female world... which can be controlled... by 
aggression or threats..."
Experience of this "divided universe" had ramifications for 
Japanese syntoolism and philosophy. Femininity was associated 
with concepts such as 'dark1 and 'passive', masculinity with 
'light' and 'active'; land was male, and sea female. Gorer 
argued that the dichotomy which split the world of the male 
child in Japan served as a guide, in adulthood, for categorising 
other races and societies. Some were worthy of implicit 
obedience [male]; others could be made to yield to aggression 
and threats [female]. The masculine virility of the white 
races, once taken for granted, had been challenged by the defeat 
of Russia in 1905. The response to the invasion of Manchuria 
confirmed the female character of the Anglo-Saxons. Then, "on
Decenber 7, 1941, this theory was put to the test; and the
. . (51)democracies still held their feminine role."'
Moving away frcm parent-child relationships, but remaining with 
early life experiences - those of school-days - Joll [1968] 
suggested similar links with the conduct of international 
affairs:
[25]
"Grey’s ... unspoken premises remained the ethical code of 
a high-principled, slightly priggish Wykehamist, and it is 
to his school days that we must look for a key to his 
fundamental attitudes. As he himself wrote later of his 
boyhood at school at Winchester: '... The ways of the 
place, its traditions and the country in which it is set 
were all getting a hold upon my heart. . . 1 It is to his 
education and the education of the class to which he 
belonged that we must look for the key to much of Grey’s 
later political behaviour; and this suggests that we 
should in general pay more attention to the links between 
educational systems and foreign policy, between the values 
and beliefs inculcated at school and the presuppositions 
on which politicians act later in life. ... Can we, for 
example, find out something about French political 
attitudes by studying the exercises in classical rhetoric 
to which pupils in French Lycees were subjected? And 
how far did the Prussian regulations of 1889 which 
stressed the need for greater attention to recent German 
history ... condition the attitudes of a whole 
generation?"
Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck [1961] proposed that the attitudes, 
values, and goals of one culture could be distinguished frcm 
those of another by examination of ways in which different
(
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groups dealt with the "limited number of cannon human problems
(53\
to which all people at all tunes must find some solution." 
Those common problems were embedded in questions such as: What 
is the character of human nature - evil, perfect, or evil but 
perfectable? What is the relationship of man with nature - man 
in subjugation, man and nature in harmony, or man in control? 
What is the temporal focus of human life - past, present, or 
future? Mead [1948] adopted such an approach when writing on 
Anglo-American misunderstandings that had arisen during the 
Second World War.
"Another sort of misunderstanding which influenced 
communication was the difference between the British and 
the American sense of the real world. Ihe British see the 
world as something to which man adapts, the American as 
man-controlled, a vast malleable space on which one builds 
what one wishes, from blueprints one has drawn, and when 
dissatisfied simply tears the structure down and starts 
anew."
Americans were willing to think about the immediate future, but 
unwilling "to think very far ahead"; the British were willing
(54)
"to think ten years ahead." In another approach to
cross-cultural analysis, Mead showed hew there was a marked 
difference "between the American and the British sense of a
[27]
scale of values." When Americans were asked to discriminate 
between objects, however complex, they tended to do so on a 
single scale of value, "from best to wcrst, biggest to smallest, 
cheapest to most expensive", and so on. A question such as 
'what is your favourite colour?', intelligible to an American 
would, by itself, be meaningless to an Englishman because an 
answer would depend upon a series of sub-questions such as 
'favourite colour for what? - a flower, a tie?* Mead explained 
the American tendency to reduce complexities to single scales in 
terns of "the great diversity of value systems which different 
immigrant groups brought to the American scene; seme common 
denominator was needed, and oversimplification was almost 
inevitable."*55)
Hofstede [1984] carried out a major study on cross-cultural 
differences in work-related values. One of the important 
dimensions of human culture which he identified and measured was 
uncertainty avoidance.'
"Uncertainty about the future is a basic fact of human 
life... Extreme uncertainty creates intolerable anxiety, 
and human society has developed ways to cope with the 
inherent uncertainty of our living on the brink of an 
uncertain future. These ways belong to the domains of 
technology, law, and religion; ... Technology includes all
[28]
human artefacts; law, all formal and informal rules that 
guide social behaviour; religion, all revealed knowledge 
of the unknown. Technology has helped us to defend 
ourselves against uncertainties caused by nature; law, to 
defend against uncertainties in the behaviour of others; 
religion, to accept the uncertainties we cannot defend 
ourselves against... Different societies have adapted to 
uncertainty in different ways... The main underlying 
dimension is the tolerance for uncertainty [ambiguity] 
which can be found in individuals and which leads some 
individuals in the same situation to perceive a greater 
need for action for overcoming the uncertainty than 
others."
Hofstede compiled what he called an Uncertainty Avoidance Index 
(57)[UAI]. In cultures with a low Uncertainty Avoidance Index,
that is, those which had a greater tolerance for uncertainty, 
there was a greater readiness to live by the day, less emotional 
resistance to change, no necessity to view loyalty to an 
employer as a virtue, and a willingness to break rules if there 
were good reasons for doing so. In cultures with a High 
Uncertainty Avoidance Index, that is, those which had a weak 
tolerance for uncertainty, there was more worry about the 
future, more emotional resistance to change, pressure to view 
loyalty to an employer as a virtue, and a belief that rules
[29]
(58)should not be broken. Hofstede concluded:
"Uncertainty avoiding countries will have a greater need for
legislation than will less uncertainty avoiding countries.
We can, for example, oppose Germany [UA165] to Great
Britain [UA135]. Germany has an extensive set of laws
even for emergencies that might occur [ 1 Notstandgesetz ];
Great Britain does not even have a written 
(59)constitution."
The cultural "map" of a social system [taking 1 system* to be a 
whole whose parts are interrelated], its ’shape and form*, may 
emerge frcm study of the web of interrelatinships between its 
structural elements or sub-systems. [See Figure [ 2 ]]. And one 
social system [say, a national society] may be distinguished 
frcm another in terms of the shape and form of the respective 
maps. Cotgrove considered that it was the major task of 
sociology "to bring to light the interrelations between the 
elements in systems" - between the political, economic, 
educational, kinship, and belief sub-systems of a society.
The stated purpose of a 1953 text on Character and Social 
Structure, was "... to present a systematic statement... in 
which political, economic, military, religious, and kinship 
institutions and their historical transformations are connected 
with the character and personality, with the private as well as
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[31]
the public lives, of those living in... s o c i e t y . " H a l f
Dahrendorf1 s study of Society and Democracy in Germany [1968]
is, on one level, a demonstration of how the various sub-systems
of German society - political, legal, military, administrative,
economic, educational, kinship - had interrelated in the
first-half of the twentieth century to produce a cultural map
with a particular shape and form, one "plagued by a propensity
for absolutes", and as such distinct frcm those of other
societies which, to varying degrees, were "characterised by the
search for institutional means to control the powerful in order
(62)to keep the political system open for ever new solutions."
Dahrendorf1 s analysis provides a quite special case of 
sub-system interrelatinship. As he perceived German society, it 
was not so much a matter of sub-systems touching each other, but 
of the harmonisation of procedures, practices, and ideas across 
the sub-systems, a harmonisation which gave a particular shape 
and form to the cultural map of Germany frcm the Imperial period 
to the defeat of the Nazi regime. Harmonisation of practices, 
procedures, and ideas served the search for ultimate solutions 
and certainty:
"Many institutions of German society have been... set up 
in such a way as to imply that somebody or some group of 
people is 'the most objective authority in the world1, and
[32]
is therefore capable of finding ultimate solutions... in 
this manner, conflict is not regulated, but 'solved'...
The principles by which the inevitable antagonisms of 
interest were regulated in the various areas of the social 
structure were dictated without exception by the search 
for certainty... the settlement of contest was sought 
everywhere in its abolition rather than in reasonable 
regulation."
Glock [1965] defined belief systems as symbol systems, 
superordinate meaning systems, which give 'meaning and 
coherence1 to norms. The ideas which Dahrendorf saw as
having superordinate meaning for Germans were those associated
/gc\
with the "German ideology of social harmony..."
Individualism, at least in public affairs, ran a poor second to
"the conmunity of the whole people." The ideal of
Volksgemeinschaft - with its connotations of mutual
participation, common interest, ccranunion and partnership, fed
the "... nostalgia for a world whose uncomfortable conflicts
(67)have been replaced by ultimate solutions." And what more
ultimate solution could one imagine than Hegel's negation of the 
negation which signalled the end of the dialectic process and 
the end of conflict? The executive component of the political 
system reinforced those beliefs and translated them into day to 
day practice. It cultivated an "exaggerated faith in the rule
[33]
of law as an institution beyond all conflicts... aversion to 
discord... evasion of the uncomfortable diversity of 
uncertainty..."
"There are certain words that come up time and again in 
connection with economic and social policy in Imperial 
Germany; and whoever cares about the greatest happiness 
of the greatest number, freedom of the individual and his 
rights... liberalism, and competition, must note them ...: 
Nation, state, tight control, the interest of the whole, 
adaptation, and subordination."
While promoting the view that certainty stood at the centre of 
German affairs, could act as a guide to action, could clarify 
all issues, the executive component, and in its service the 
institutions of education, also affirmed that certainty could 
not be grasped or comprehended by all. Only some could be
"... experts of certainty. Authority belongs to them, for they
(71)
are made for its possession." It was but a short-step from
(72)this to acceptance of a "hierarchy of access to truth", 1 and 
to the flowering of the 1 nach vorschrift1 mentality - the 
predisposition to do things according to the instructions.
The acceptance of a "hierarchy of access to truth" sustained the 
super/subordinate relationships which, in exaggerated form,
[34]
seemed to pervade German institutions in general and sub-systems 
of the society in particular, and, at the same time, contributed 
to 'harmonisation1 by immobilising forces which had potential 
for disruption. Even after discounting for caricature, it 
appeared to Dahrendorf that
"... indigenous and foreign images of the German family 
are agreed in their emphasis on the patriarchal heme of 
the Wilhelminian era, in which the mother is restricted to 
Kinder, Kuche, Kirche and the children are held on tight 
reins...
The family, like any other institution, may be regarded as 
a system of conflict regulation. Occasionally one 
encounters the notion that the German father is, or at 
least used to be, a combination of judge and state 
attorney: presiding over his family, relentlessly
prosecuting every sign of deviance, and settling all 
disputes by his supreme authority. There is an element of 
caricature in many descriptions of the German father... 
[but]... this is not to deny that the caricature does 
strike peculiarly German conditions in sane respect, as in 
the notion, long embodied in the structure of the family, 
that the others, the children, the wife, are minors in 
every respect. It is no accident that Tonnies, like Hegel
[35]
before him and the vulgarised sociology of the Nazis after 
him, took the family to be the purest form of 
Geroeinschaft".
Super/subordinate relationships pervaded the sub-systems of
German society through the medium of the ubiquitous service
class in education, administration, the law, politics, the
(74)economy and religion. ' Dahrendorf noted that there was 
hardly an institutional order [level or area] in which there
were no Beamte, and even where such a level or area could be
. . .  (75)identified, Beamte status and procedures were simulated.
The mentality of the service class had been investigated by
Theodor Geiger [1932]:
"What weighs most heavily from a sociological perspective 
is that even for the official who is subordinate in the 
last position, the unbuttered bread acquired by a 
starvation salary is spread tastily: by that minimi
share which he has in the omnipotence of the state 
represented by him as well. It is so easy to explain 
psychologically that this tiny share of power means the 
more and is demonstrated the more studiously as prestige, 
guarded and defended the more jealously, the more 
oppressed the position of the individual official is in 
terms of level of remuneration and internal function. The
[36]
less a person is capable of asserting his position and
developing his personality in the occupational sphere of
activity, the more he is hampered in his initiative by
strict subordination and the more he is subject to the
commands of those above him, the more unapproachably does
he protect the counterdistance toward a public which has
to be 'dispatched*, the more he is delighted by
shoulder-pieces, swords, and other insignia of an
official-impersonal aloofness; the more he is also hurt
by the deprivation of these symbols of social 
(76)recognition."
Within the hierarchical structure of the service class there was
scope for competition - but not for the type of competition that
created anything new. Nothing was changed by competition for
status within the German service-class. The map of society
remained the same; all that altered was "the individual's place
(77)of residence in it." For Dahrendorf, harmonisation of
ideas, procedures and practices across the sub-systems of German 
society had meant that "... the citizen... the adult church, the 
child taken seriously, the democratic school... were all long in 
coining.
Potter [1954] addressed the issue of a 'distinctive American 
character' through a similar, though less extensive kind of
[37]
social systems analysis. Because he was concerned to 
demonstrate the effects of economic abundance on individual and 
group behaviour, the sub-system interrelationship which most 
interested him was that between economy and family:
"Inevitably, the guidelines vfoich the parents inculcate in
a child will depend upon the roles which they occupy
themselves. For the ordinary man the economy of scarcity
has offered one role, as Simon N. Patten observed many
years ago, and the econony of abundance has offered
another. Abundance offers 'work calling urgently for
workmen?1; scarcity found the 'worker seeking humbly any
kind of toil? 1 As a suppliant to his superiors, the
worker under scarcity accepted the principle of authority;
he accepted his own subordination and the obligation to
cultivate the qualities appropriate to his subordination,
such as sutmissiveness, obedience, and deference. Such a
man naturally transferred the principle of authority into
his own family and through this principle instilled into
his children the qualities appropriate to people of their
(79)kind - sutmissiveness, obedience, and deference."'
To shew how economic abundance had made a profound mark an the 
American kinship system, Potter invited his readers to consider
[38]
the situation of a six-month-old infant. The way in which such 
an infant was nourished had been revolutionised. Bottle 
feeding, dependent for its effectiveness on refrigeration, 
sterilisation, and temperature control technique, had more or 
less replaced breast-feeding, and this change had "encroached 
sanewhat upon the intimacy of the bond between mother and 
child", errphasising "the separateness of the infant as an 
individual", a separateness which "the entire culture reiterates 
constantly throughout the life of the average American." 
Economic abundance, reflected in the increased number of houses, 
and so living space, available for newly married young people, 
"almost destroyed the extended family as an institution in 
America and has ordained that the child shall be reared in a 
‘nuclear1 family, so called, where his only intimate associates 
are his parents and his siblings..." Again, separateness, 
apartness, were being reinforced. Technology, in the form of 
central heating, "displaced the woollen undergarment and the 
vest", removed the need to break the infant to his swaddling 
clothes "as a horse is broken to the harness", and gave the 
American infant "physical freedom by giving him physical warmth 
in cold weather." Mothers, pressured by conditions of scarcity, 
limited in access to technology, had hastened the fitness of 
their children to toilet themselves. Modem technology and 
economic abundance made it "far easier for the mother to indulge 
the child in a regime under which he will improve his cwn toilet
[39]
controls in his own good time." Conditions of scarcity created 
circumstances in which the woman "was economically dependent 
upon, and, accordingly, subordinate to, her husband or her 
father. Her subordination reinforced the principle of authority 
within the hone." Abundance extended economic independence to 
women and "enabled them to assume the role of partners rather 
than of subordinates within the family."
Although his primary focus was on one aspect of sub-systems 
analysis, Potter was conscious of the wider web of connections:
"... the fact is that the authoritarian discipline of the
child, within the authoritarian family, was but an aspect
of the authoritarian social system... Such a regime could
never have been significantly relaxed within the family so
long as it remained diagnostic in the society. Nor could
it have remained uimodified within the family, once
(81)society began to abandon it in other spheres."
Potter was so aware of the importance of ideas with superordinate
meaning that he devoted seme space to a comparative analysis of
the connotations that the concept ’equality’ would have for
(82)Americans and Europeans. Within the American belief system 
a heavy emphasis was placed on mobility:
[40]
"In America... status, as fixed differential social 
position, has long been in disrepute. Ever since the 
Revolutionary War, it has borne the hateful implications 
of privilege and subservience... whereas the principle of 
status affirms that a minor position may be worthy, the 
principle of mobility, as Americans have construed it, 
regards such a position both as the penalty for and the 
proof of personal failure. This view is often pushed to 
a point where even the least invidious form of 
subordination canes to be resented as carrying a 
stigma..."
In arguing that democratic principles owed less to "sheer 
ideological devotion" than to "the creation of econanic 
conditions in which democracy will grow", Potter was pointing to 
interrelationships between the political and econanic 
sub-systems of American society. This connection was
underlined by the cormendatory citing of J. Franklin Jameson's 
claim that America "came to be marked by political institutions 
of a democratic type because it had, still earlier, cane to be 
characterised in its econanic life by democratic arrangements 
and practices
Inkeles and Levinson were well aware of the insights on human 
behaviour and experience to be gained from the study of
[41]
'culture1 and 'social structure', and conceded that any
distinction between those abstractions and between them and a
(86)third, personality, was analytic rather than phenomenal;
but they insisted that "beyond the task of studying the
regularity with which certain value or patterned behaviour
sequences are manifested in any culture, there remains the task
of determining the regularity with which certain personality
(87)patterns among individual members may be manifested."
Allport, and Adorno et al [1950] pointed to the importance of
culture as a causal factor in the formation of personality, but
also highlighted the autonomous or 'free standing' nature of
(88)personality once formed. Allport took personality to be a
function of heredity and environment, with the two causal
factors being interrelated as multiplier and multiplicand
[personality = F [heredity] x [environment] ]. Were either
(89)factor zero in quantity, personality would be non-existent.
An understanding of the 'social frame' within which an
individual stood was essential to an appreciation of that 
individual's personality, for to sane extent, whether he were 
adaptive or not, his personality would reflect social norms - 
the prevailing standards. But it would be misleading to
suppose that "a mere report on cultural setting and membership" 
would be sufficient in itself as a means of entry to the 
personality, "... for no individual mirrors exactly and
[42]
exclusively his social environment. Even within a narrow and
homogenous cultural circle individuality is amazingly varied in
form. Personality is more than 'the subjective side of
c u l t u r e ' A d o r n o  argued that personality, though
unquestionably a product of the social environment of the past
[though not of this alone], developed as a structure within the
individual, and became "something which is capable of
self-initiated action upon the social environment and of
(91)selection with respect to varied impinging stimuli..."'
In a classic statement Allport listed fifty definitions of the
(92)concept 'personality'. In searching for one which would
highlight individuality - the quality which he took to be "the
outstanding characteristic of men" - he accepted that others,
starting from different premises [for example, philosophical,
juristic, sociological] could arrive, respectably, at different 
(93)destinations. For his own part, Allport distinguished
between those definitions which gave psychological meaning to
the concept and those which did not. Of the psychological
definitions, those he found most valuable were the ones which
referred to "...organisation of dispositions and sentiments...
style of life, ... modes of adaptation to one's
surroundings.. .progressive growth ...development and...
(94)distinctiveness."' ' His own definition incorporated those
ideas:
[43]
"...personality, psychologically considered, is what an 
individual is... Personality is the dynamic organisation
within the individual of those psychophysical systems that
■ . (95)
determine his unique adjustments to his environment."
'Organisation* was an essential component of the definition. 
Without it there could be no escape "from the sterile 
enumerations of... omnibus definitions"; and since this 
organisation within the individual was "constantly evolving and 
changing", and, by definition, implied "the correlative process 
of disorganisation", it had to be construed as dynamic; 
'psychophysical systems' were involved since personality 
entailed "the operation of both body and mind, inextricably fused 
into a personal unity", and comprised "habits, specific and 
general attitudes, sentiments, and dispositions of other 
orders.. Adorno, et al, took a similar line: "... the
forces of personality... are primarily needs [drives, wishes, 
emotional impulses] which vary from one individual to another in 
their quality, their intensity, their mode of gratification, and 
the objects of their attachment, and which interact with other 
needs in harmonious or conflicting patterns. There are primitive 
emotional needs, there are needs to avoid punishment and to keep
the good will of the social group, there are needs to maintain
. . .  (97)harmony and integration within the self..."
[44]
Inkeles and Levinson, reflecting on enduring personality 
characteristics, listed traits [of particular significance for 
Allport], inodes of dealing with impulses and affects, 
conceptions of self, and the like. Allport's theory of
/go\
personality was essentially a trait theory:'
"... men experience a desire to represent by name such 
mental processes or dispositions of their fellows as can 
be determined by observation or by inference. Ihere is a 
demand for depicting personality as accurately and as 
faithfully as possible, for with a suitable term, 
corresponding to authentic psychological dispositions, the 
ability to understand and to control one's fellows is
(99)
greatly enhanced."
Allport discussed a wide range of personality traits - traits of 
altruism, ascendance, courtesy, extroversion, generosity, 
gregariousness, honesty, introversion, neuroticism, orderliness, 
persistence, reclusion, self-assurance, self-deception, 
solitariness, suggestibility, etc. In response to critics who 
suggested that traits were not psychological entities but only 
convenient names given to types of behaviour which had elements 
in cannon, Allport argued that an individual was
characterised by traits whether or not this was perceived by 
others. Traits did not depend for their existence on "sane kind
FIGURE [ 3 i
[45]
A SELECTION OF PERSONALITY TRAITS ASSIGNED TO GERMANS BY SOURCES REVIEWED IN
CHAPTER 2 : A CRITICISM OF TOE IDEALIST-REALIST DICHOTOMY AND TOE DEFINITION
OF AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL 
CHAPTER 4 : 'US AND THEM' : TOE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TOE IDEOLOGICAL COMPONENT
OF TOE BRITISH SELF-IMAGE AND ATTITUDES TOWARD GERMANY 
CHAPTER 5 : ' TOE CONSCIENCE-LED PHASE OF REFLECTION
CHAPTER 6 : TOE REVITALISATION OF THE DEBATE
CHAPTER 7 : TOE CHALLENGE IN VOICES FROM TOE OTHER SIDE.
[A] IB] [C] [D] [E]
Acquisitive
Adolescent
Aggressive
Ambitious
Antagonistic
Apprehensive
Barbaric
Bestial
Brutal
Ccmpetitive
Courageous
Credulous
Crude
Cruel
Cunning
Deceitful
Deferential
Discourteous
Dissembling
Dishonest
Dishonourable
Docile
Domineering
Dreamers
Efficient
Egotistical
Emotional
Envious
Evil
IF] [G] [H] [I] [J]
Frustrated
Feverish
Gullible Hard
Hypocritical
Hysterical
Humourless
Ill-tempered Jealous
Inmature
Innoral
Inpolite
Impulsive
Inconsistent
Indignant
Inferiority [sense of]
Intolerant
Insensitive
CM] [N] [0] IP] [Q]
Masochistic
Materialistic
Militaristic
Nervous
Neurasthenic
Neurotic
Obedient
Obsessive
Offence [quick to take] 
Organised
Paranoid
Patriotic
Proud
Purposeful
Pugnacious
Quarrelsome
[R] Is] [T] tu] tv]
Rapacious
Resentful
Restless
Rcnantic
Ruthless
Sadistic Taste (lacking] 
Satanic Thoughtless 
Savage Treacherous 
Self-aggrandising 
Self-assertive 
Self-conscious 
Self-confidence [lacking] 
Self-discipline [lacking]
Self-pitying
Self-worshipping
Selfish
Sensitive [morbidly]
Sentimental
Submissive
Suggestible
Suspicious
Uncertain
Unfriendly
Ungallant
Unimaginative
Unkind
Unreasoning
Unreliable
Unstable
Unsure [of selves] 
Unsympathetic
Virile
Vain
It would be an easy matter to pointup apparent contradictions by rearranging the traits into, say, 
four columns:
Relating to Mental State Relating to disposition 
to guile
Relating to lack of 
personal autonomy
Relating to interpersonal 
relations or cross - 
cultural relations
Anxious 
Apprehensive 
Nervous 
Neurotic 
Restless, etc.
Cunning 
Deceitful 
Dissembling, etc.
Credulous 
Deferential 
Gullible, etc.
Acquisitive
Aggressive
Competitive
Intolerant
Quarrelsome
Militaristic
This possible reformulation is not intended as a criticism of those who contributed to the list: 
"... traits often contradict each other. People may be both ascendant and submissive, perhaps 
submissive only towards those individuals bearing traditional symbols of authority and prestige; 
and towards everyone else aggressive and domineering." Note also that "in every personality there 
are traits of major synificance and traits of minor significance..."
G. W. Allport, Personality, A Psychological Interpretation [Holt, New York, 1937] p.330
[46]
of relationship between two people. Did Robinson Crusoe lack 
traits before the advent of Friday? Will the last roan to remain 
alive on earth abruptly lose his traits when his companions 
die?" Allport postulated that in every personality there
were traits of major significance and traits of minor 
significance. If a trait was particularly pervasive and 
outstanding it could be regarded as a nardinai trait? on a 
descending scale of significance came central traits and 
secondary traits. The appeal exercised by the concept of
trait is demonstrated in Figure [ 3 ] which lists a selection of 
personality traits assigned to Germans by sources reviewed in 
chapters 2, 4 to 7.
Allport made a distinction between traits which had motivational 
significance and traits which were merely stylistic. It was not 
a telephone call or a friend1 s voice at the other end of the 
line that led an egotist to monopolise the conversation, "to 
talk for half an hour about his latest exploits." The response 
sprung from motivations, from "deep-seated traits of 
personality."^^ Politeness was not normally regarded as a 
motivational trait:
"One does not leave the house and seek out other people in 
order to be polite to than. One may seek out others 
because one is sociable, and restless without their
[47]
company [motivation]; having sought them and being now in 
their company one may behave toward them in a polite 
manner [style]... Nor is a man often forceful for the 
sake of being forceful; rather he employs a forceful 
style of behaviour wherever he is, for other reasons 
[motivation] aroused to action.
Allport noted that there were instances where the concepts trait 
and attitude were interchangeable, where it was "a matter of 
indifference" whether a certain disposition was called an 
attitude or a trait. He cited the example of introversion and 
extroversion, concepts regarded "both as traits of personality 
and as attitudes toward reality." Yet, there were real 
distinctions to be made between attitudes and traits? a 
particular point of view toward frog's legs, arctic exploration, 
divorce, or Fascism would be classed as an attitude, whereas a 
"conservative, radical, ascetic, indulgent, reserved, or 
expansive manner of behaving" would be classed as a trait. If a 
man is affectionate toward his dog, it could be said that he has 
a kindly attitude toward it. If thoughtfulness and sympathy 
toward men and beasts were general characteristics of his 
behaviour, it could be said that he has a trait of 
kindliness.
Hew might one individual be said to differ from another in
[48]
personality terms? Mcock [1968] suggested that investigators 
should "lock for the major differences between individuals at 
the level of drive, trait,... or s e l f - i d e a l . " T h i s  mention 
of drive and self-ideal, and earlier references to "conceptions 
of self" [to "what the person thinks he is, what he would like 
to be, and what he expects, eagerly or anxiously, to 
become]", to "modes of adaptation to one's surroundings",
to attempts to "maintain harmony and integration within the 
self", inevitably calls for ccnment on Freud's psychoanalytic 
theories.
In Freud's view, personality was a structure [with conscious and 
unconscious dimensions] made up of three interrelating elements, 
id, ego, and super-ego. The dynamic relationships between
the elements were productive of anxiety creating conflict, the 
resolution of which was important for psychic health - which 
included, among other things, an 'acceptable' notion of 
self. Much of human behaviour could be explained by
inferring the employment of psychological mechanisms to reduce 
anxiety and achieve emotional stability. This internal
effort, in normal circumstances, is part of an unconscious 
process, but there are circumstances in which the anxiety 
created by the conflict threatens to break into consciousness. 
In such situations the psychological mechanisms designed to 
maintain stability can become seriously maladaptive. Such a
[49]
condition is recognised [inferred] from psychqpathological 
symptoms in behaviour.
In Freudian analysis, the id is the depository of biological and 
instinctual drives - sex, aggression, hunger, thirst, need for 
warmth, etc. It has been described as "the container of all 
that is inherited or instinctive or fixed in the constitution of 
man."(^^) Those instincts and drives have energy, and make 
"imperious... demands" for gratification. The ego is
that element in the personality structure vhich recognises 
external reality; it is the source of self-consciousness. As 
such, it is "concerned with adaptation to reality and the 
avoidance of external dangers." in a sense, the ego
represents a psychic security system, operating in "defence of 
the [self] against others and against the unconscious impulses 
of the id, which, unrestrained, could endanger the individual1 s 
life." External reality, in the shape of the ’standards*
of acceptable behaviour, sets limits to the overt expression of 
basic instincts and drives, limits which cannot be crossed with 
impunity. Here we touch the role of the super-ego, the
"... internalised representation of... societal 
requirements as to which objects and behaviours are 
permissible as [outlets] for instinctual satisfaction, and 
which are not, and which are ’ideal* as a way of
32
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satisfying the instincts.
In its security system role, the ego has to contend with the id 
as and when it seeks - "totally without reference to other 
consequences for the organism" - gratification for instincts and 
drives. Uiis particular form of interaction between id and
ego carries with it the threat that the id will overwhelm the 
ego, "with consequent acting out of socially unacceptable sexual 
and aggressive impulses." This type of threat stimulates
what Freud termed neurotic anxiety.
The super-ego poses its own problems for ’balance* in the 
personality. It may become a tyrannical magistrate, threatening 
"severe punishment, not only for the overt expression of id 
needs when they are inappropriate, but also for id expression at 
any time, or even the thought of id-directed behaviour."
This threat stimulates what Freud termed moral anxiety. In the 
interests of the individual’s emotional stability, the ego 
attempts to keep neurotic and moral anxiety from entering the 
conscious dimension of personality by operating its psychic 
security system - the defence mechanisms. Figure [ 4 ] provides 
examples of such mechanisms and suggests possible adaptive and 
maladaptive outcomes.
In addition to mechanisms intended to reduce anxiety evoked by
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[53]
conflict involving id/ego and id/super-ego, we have to take 
account of mechanisms designed to maintain ego-strength - 
mechanisms which could be said to serve, in a very direct way, 
the interests of the self-concept. Levitt suggested that "in
order to maintain a reasonable emotional adjustment, a person
. . . (121) must be at least minimally satisfied with himself...
Adcock elaborated;
"Once his self-reference frame has developed [the person]
is constantly faced with the problem of achieving an
actual self commensurate with his level of aspiration...
when he finds himself slipping in this respect he
experiences profound dissatisfaction and will resort to
several methods of lowering his level of self-aspiration
with the least damage to his self-esteem or will endeavour
to find seme substitute satisfaction. A study of these
(122)throws important light on ego functioning."
Figure [ 5 ] outlines seme examples of self-concept sustaining 
mechanisms.
So far as personality is concerned, one individual may be said 
to differ from another in terms of traits [particularly in 
respect of dominant or central traits], in the intensity of 
either neurotic or moral anxiety, in the capacity to maintain
[54]
emotional stability [in the face of such anxiety] through the 
efforts of the ego, in the nature and intensity of 
psychopathological symptoms consequent upon damage to the ego’s 
security system, in the ’distance1 between self-concept and 
ideal concept [aspirations], and in the nature and intensity of 
the psychopathological symptoms evident when the ’distance’ is 
intolerable.
Hew would such differences be measured? It should be obvious 
that both individual and ’social frame’ analysis is necessary. 
So far as the latter is concerned, attention would be directed 
to social norms, to sub-system interrelationships, etc. With 
regard to the former, Hofstede has summarised 4 approaches 
capable of many subdivisions. Two of his approaches are 
concerned with words, and two are concerned with deeds. See 
Figure [ 6 ]. ^ 3 )
[55]
Four available Strategies for Operationalising Constructs
Words 1) Interviews; Content Analysis of 
speeches, discussionsQuestionnaires;
Projective tests; documents.
Direct observation;Deeds 3) Laboratory
experiments Use of available
Field experiments descriptive
statistics.
Figure [ 6  ]
Each approach is designed to tap features of individual 
personality* be they attitudes, values, traits, self-concepts, 
or a centoination of these. Interviews could subsume depth 
analysis; the Adorno et al study employed questionnaires but 
also a •clinical' interview during which subjects were 
encouraged to talk freely about their wishes, fears, childhoods,
[56]
relations with parents, etc. This was designed to reach below 
the surface manifestations of personality. Laboratory 
experiments have been dealt with earlier. Field experiments 
could cover 'miniature life-situations', with behaviour being 
studied in natural day to day terms. Content analysis could 
subsume study of a wide range of social and personal records. 
Direct observation could take the form of rating by a number of 
'judges'. An appendix to this chapter provides examples of test 
instruments, and a further example appears in chapter 10. With 
regard to selection of method, it has been said that "the wise 
investigator will not place his faith in any one exclusively, 
but will use several to cover more ground. Hofstede
refers to the need to "avoid putting all one's eggs into the one 
basket."(125)
The line of argument so far developed in this chapter, touching
on the analysis of culture and personality as a means of making
distinctions between people (s), could be said to be "directly or
indirectly oriented to one central type of question: What makes
an Englishman an Englishman? An American an American? A
Russian a Russian?" ^ 6) appears to be little doubt that
(127)such questions can be answered. Brown [1944] asserted
that a nation's history and social structure combined to
"develop and encourage certain types of mental outlook... among
(128)its individual mentoers." In the opinion of Kluckhohn and
[57]
Murray [1949] "the statistical prediction can safely be made 
that a hundred Americans... will display certain defined 
characteristics more frequently than will a hundred
(129)
Englishmen." Demos [1971] advised that "each culture
fosters the development of certain dominant... traits or
styles."*13 *^ Peters (1974), noting that all individuals are
"brought 15) in an elaborate system of codes and conventions"
concluded that their behaviour would differ, cross-culturally,
to the extent that it reflected those parts of their respective
(131)codes that were "stamped" on them.
For all this, the reservation expressed by Ginsberg [1942] is of 
crucial significance in respect of the sources covered in 
chapters 2 to 7 of this thesis:
"... when we turn to the attempts that have been made to 
subject... characteristics to scientific analysis the 
results are generally so indefinite as to raise a doubt 
whether the characteristics in question exist at 
all."*132*
Section (ii) of this chapter examines seme of the problems 
facing those who would wish to make appropriate generalisations 
on the basis of cultural and personality analysis, and, by the 
same token, seme of the traps into which the unwary could fall.
[58]
[ii]
Effective cross-cultural analysis can be impeded by all manner
of distortions, erroneous inferences, prejudices, confusions,
and inappropriate strategies. There are, for example, the
approaches that see difference and similarity as mutually
exclusive rather than two sides of the same coin. The
consequence is that individuals ’belonging1 to different
cultures are seen either as 'birds of a different feather' or as
(133)'brothers under the skin', but never as both. Much more
realistic is the notion that cross-cultural studies may
contribute substantively to our understanding "both of what is
distinctive in single nations and of what is relatively
universal in human society." One of the most interesting
examples of an investigation which picked up similarities when
dealing with differences, and vice-versa, was that carried out
(13*5)
by Milton Mayer [1955]. Then there is the frequently
ignored fact that the images drawn of one culture and its 
members by the members of another are often related to the 
presence or absence of divisive social, political, or economic 
issues and are, in the former case, most sharply defined in 
brushstroke in periods of tension and conflict. It does not 
make for confidence when distinctions can be seen to rest on 
special pleading, self-interest, or exigencies of various kinds. 
No less threatening to effective analysis is the tendency in
[59]
many sources to exaggerate both the permanence and wide
diffusion of particular forms of social behaviour or particular
personality characteristics in a society - threatening
because an unjustifiable sense of uniformity, a quite spurious
sense of homogeneity is promoted. So far as sharing in common
culture is concerned, individuals do it differentially, and when
it comes to the combined forces of heredity and culture shaping
personality, "the same fire that melts the butter, hardens the 
(137)egg." Then there is the danger that behaviour and
personality patterns may be viewed as products solely of a
national culture whose bounds are narrowly defined by political
borders. Such a view neglects the sense in which ’national
cultures* are sub-systems, interacting with other sub-systems,
of wider cultures. Margaret Mead touched on this point when she
suggested that a West European’s behaviour could be referred,
culturally speaking [and in ascending order from local to
international levels] to his individual life history, his
membership of a particular class, presence in a geographical
locality, a nation, a Greco-Rcman tradition, and a technological
(138)’universe* stretching back to prehistoric tool-making. And
then, of course, there is the matter of appropriate strategies. 
To what extent are conclusions based on the use of test 
instruments or other analytic procedures? What -types of 
instrument and procedure - and hew many - were used? To what 
extent was the issue of validity considered? So far as
[60]
cross-cultural analysis is concerned such questions never 'go
away'. Ginsberg, reviewing in 1941 the literature which
offered distinctions between one culture and another concluded
that "the greater part... are livres de circanstonce, written
under the influence of particular political situations and with
(139)a view to future policy." The images one group has of
other complex national or ethnic groups are suspect - even when 
apparently favourable - if their origins can be traced to the 
personal motives of their proponents. For example,
Klineberg [1944] referred to the image of the negro as a loyal 
and devoted friend to his 'white-folks', and as endcwed-vocally 
and rhythmically - with musical talent, and suggested that such 
a stereotype, apparently favourable, had to be judged in terms 
of the function it was designed to perform.
" 'Loyalty and devotion to white-folks' may represent a 
favourable judgement, but it helps to keep alive the 
notion that the Negro's 'place' is that of a servant. 
'Superiority in singing and dancing* strengthens the 
stereotype of the Negro as a performer and to that extent 
discounts his potential ability as professor or judge. 
Similarly, in the case of national stereotypes, our 
constant query must be: to what extent can they be
explained by their function? To what extent, for example, 
do they justify... inmigration policies? To what extent
[61]
do they give a basis for our alliances and our enmities?
To what extent do they fit in with our economic and 
industrial interests."
When Plato assigned the traits of passion and spirit to the 
Ihraceans and Scythians, love of money to the Phoenicians and 
Egyptians, but reserved love of knowledge to the Greeks, what 
functions were such stereotypes designed to perform? Was he 
attempting to demonstrate the superiority of the Greeks? 
Similarly, propagandist and ethnocentric motivations nay be 
detected in Aristotle's comparative characterology, based on 
climatic conditions, of those who inhabited Northern Europe, 
Asia, and the Mediterranean lands. The Northerners, subject to 
cold climate, were "full of spirit" and therefore held on to 
their freedom, but had no political organisation, and so were 
"incapable of ruling over others." Those of the East were 
"intelligent and inventive", but lacked spirit and so were 
"always in a state of subjection and slavery." In the case of 
the Hellenic race, situated between the extremes, intelligence 
and spirit were common, and if the people of the area "could be 
formed into one state, would be able to rule the world."
All this may be taken as little more than a vehicle for assuming 
the superiority of one group over others. Schrieke [1936] noted 
that the trait names assigned to Chinese immigrants by white 
Californians in the pre 1870 period, when labour was scarce and
[62]
incomers no real economic threat to indigenous workers, were of
the order of 'thrifty*, 'sober', and 'law-abiding'. The
inmigrants were held to demonstrate an adaptability beyond
praise. Later, when labour carpeted in a buyers market and
incomers from China were regarded as an economic threat, the
typical trait names included 'filthy', 'clannish', and
'dangerous.' The inmigrants were then seen as being loathsome
in habits and morally and mentally inferior. in December
1935 Max Meenes presented 160 students of Howard University with
a list of 84 stereotype words and asked them to select
appropriate adjectives descriptive of 1 0 different
national/racial groups. Having done that, they were required to
go back over their descriptions and select the five words which
seemed most aptly to characterise each group. In February 1942
[i.e. shortly after Pearl Harbour] the same procedures were
carried out with 137 students at the same university. The
results for 1935 and 1942 in respect of Germans and Japanese -
listed in rank order - are given below. Trait names which were
(144)listed in 1942 but not listed in 1935 are asterisked. [see
Figure [7 ]]
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Meenes noted that there were similarities as well as differences 
between 1935 and 1942 stereotypes. About half the trait names 
were cannon to both years in each case, not particularly 
surprising in Meenes* view since the Howard students of 1942 
were "quite like those of 1935." He thought it "plausible to
attribute the differences found to changes in world events and
. . . . (145)to changes in public attitudes in the intervening years."
of -the Meenes study, Klineberg carmen ted:
"... the new situation had altered the stereotypes... and 
the inconsistencies challenge the truth of either the 
first or the second list, and possibly of both."^^
A review [1962] of the images of Germany prevalent in the United 
States throughout the nineteenth, and into the early years of 
the twentieth century, suggests that the American view of 
Germany served, in turn, self-justificatory, econanic, and
political ends. In the first half of the nineteenth century the 
list of trait names given to Germans included calm, moderate,
staid, economical and hardworking. These matched the
self-assigned traits of the early republicans and the pioneers 
of the Jacksonian period. There was but one snag? the
autocratic nature of the states in the German Confederation. 
The Revolution of 1848, in which the German states appeared to 
be steering a middle course between royalty and radicalism made 
the political
[65]
image altogether more congenial, and "America was carried away 
by a wave of Germanophile emotions unparallelled ever before or 
since." The failure of 1848 to live up to its premise gave 
rise to disillusionment, perhaps related to an American desire 
to see their virtues reflected in others - a disillusionment 
echoed in an 1866 comment in The Nation magazine which described 
Germans as
"The most learned, patient, industrious, civilised people 
on the face of the Globe, which has attained the highest 
distinction in arts, in science, in arms, in literature, 
in everything, in short, but in politics."
In the second half of the nineteenth century, in spite of her 
autocratic system, Germany stood high in American esteem: it
was the land of Luther when the Establishment1 in America 
identified with Protestantism; it was pioneering free 
elementary education; in caimon with the United States it was 
engaged in dynamic economic development in challenge to Great 
Britain. However, the Germany of Wilhelm II came to assume a 
quite different image in the minds of Americans [with the prime 
exception, of course, of German-American ccmnunities]. The 
'good Germans' became the 'bad Germans', ideologically out of 
tune, as ever, in their pursuit of power rather than freedom, 
but now also militaristic, and a disturber of the status quo 
through
[66]
its naval and imperial policies. There was little opportunity 
now for self-justificatory praise of Germany; if anything, 
self-justification could be gained by condemnation of Germany. 
And on top of that there were sound political and economic 
reasons for revising the image.
Disillusionment as a force capable of recasting an image may be
noted in the interesting case of Owen Wister. The author
of The Virginian, and the creator of Trampas, was a Germanqphile
before the outbreak of war in 1914. He rhapsodised on those
features of the German lifestyle that he took to contrast very
favourably with like aspects of his own society. In June 1915,
he wrote, "This day, last year, I was in the heart of Germany.
The beautiful, peaceful scene is plain yet. It seems as if I
never could forget it or cease to love it... And, for the mere
curiosity of it I looked in my German diary to find if I had
(149)recorded anything." He had recorded a great deal - that
each experience of life in Germany made him more and more 
impressed, that the enlightened attitudes of the people 
conspired to make the German landscape a constant pleasure to 
the eye, and constant repose to body and mind. Wherever he 
looked there was beauty in seme form to be seen, "given its 
chance by the intelligence of man."
All this was in stark contrast to the habitat of the United
[67]
States, "littered with rubbish and careless fences... hideous 
with glaring advertisements... rusty junk lying about... America 
was ugly and shabby - made so by Americans. Germany was swept 
and garnished - made so by G e r m a n s . " A l l  around him in 
Germany Wister saw evidence of social conscience, of social 
investment in the future, of efficiency in the service of the 
people, and he thought of America,
"where so many things look beautiful on paper and so few 
things vrork, because nobody keeps to the rules. 11 ^ 2)
A recurring theme in his pro-German treatise was the contentment 
of the people. He was "struck with the contentment in the German 
face. Contentment I Among the old and young... this was the 
dominating note, the great essential possession."
Anticipating criticism from those who might question the 
relative value of contentment in the context of an autocratic 
regime, he put a case against moral imperialism:
"Until mankind grows uniform, will any form of government 
be likely to fit the whole world like a glove? So long as 
mankind continues as various as man's digestion, better to 
look at government as if it were a sort of diet or 
treatment. Hew is the government agreeing with its 
people? This is the question to ask in each country. And
[68]
what is the surest sign? Could any sign be surer than the 
general expression, the composite face of the people 
themselves?"
Having arrived in Germany from the United States, where the 
people "looked driven, unpeaceful, dissatisfied", it was restful 
to be in a place "where the spirit of man was in stable 
equilibrium." All in all, "the fair aspect and order of
the country and the cities, the well-being of the people, their 
contented faces, their grave adequacies, their kindliness", set 
Germany ahead of France and Britain, both in their own ways 
"distressing and unenviable." In Germany there was order and 
stability; in France confusion and in England disturbance. ^ 6) 
And so, he thought,
"Suppose a soul, arrived on earth from another world... 
were given its choice after a survey of the nations, which 
it should be bom in and belong to? In May, June and July 
1914, my choice would have been, not France, not England, 
not America, but Germany.
Against this background, Wister1 s conversion to an anti-German 
viewpoint was traumatic. Having embraced Germany to the extent 
that he harboured doubt on the merits of his own society and its 
democratic form of government, he appeared to suffer the shock of
[69]
disillusionment with the outbreak of war and subsequent events. 
He now referred to Germany as "a hospital case, a case for the 
alienist", in the grip of a mania "analogous to those mental 
epidemics of the Middle Ages, \hen fanaticism... sent entire 
communities into various forms of m a d n e s s . " C r i t i c i s m  was 
given an edge by disappointment. One can detect a sense of 
betrayal, the resentment of a man deceived, in the realisation 
that his pre-war image of Germany had been "... innocent 
altogether, deeply innocent."
There is nothing untoward about the notion that national 
cultures are usually 'held together' and to varying degrees 
sustained as cohesive entities by a combination of elements, 
interrelationships, patterns, and forces, which include the 
relative incidence of apathetic and conscientious compliance on 
the part of the members, the pervasiveness of regularities in 
behaviour patterns, and the extent to which seme form of cannon 
purpose informs the interaction between sub-systems and 
sub-cultures. However, the extent to which cohesion exists or 
is sustained, the level of conscientious compliance, and the 
informing force of ccnrnon purpose can easily be exaggerated. 
Regional, religious, economic, and all manner of sub-cultural 
variations - contributing to what Ginsberg called "the great 
complexity of national groups" - can be evened out, made to 
disappear, if it is in the observer's interest to suggest a high
[70]
degree of homogeneity. When Bocker [1937] warned that it
was "very venturesome to speak of a community of national 
customs and morals" it was not to deny that one national culture 
could be said to differ from another in terms of norm and value 
patterns and the distribution of personality traits, but to 
direct attention to the differences which existed within 
national cultures. Although norms are recognised in their
observance, individual behaviour shows a wide variation around 
norms; regularities in behaviour are not all of the same
order, and the motivations underlying the regularities are sure 
to differ. The probability of the distribution of personality 
traits in any modem, complex society being unimodal, that is, 
taking the form of "a single prevailing personality pattern" is 
so remote as to be discounted.
The generalisations found in the sources quoted in chapters 2 to 
8 will be re-examined, in the light of the present discussion, 
in chapter 10. There are other interesting examples of the 
inner cohesion of national cultures being exaggerated, and the 
two now cited could be regarded as representative of the 
mystical and mechanistic approaches, respectively. Canetti 
[1962] argued that an investigation of customs, traditions, 
politics and literature "could be thorough and still not touch 
the distinctive character of a nation, that which... becomes its 
f a i t h . " i n  essence, he regarded nations as analogous to
[71]
religions, each with its own particular symbols, such as sea, 
forest, and com - subsuming among other things the notion of 
cohesion and cannon rhythm. I3ie German and the Englishman were 
dissimilar in that
"The Englishman likes to imagine himself at sea, the 
German in a forest. It is impossible to express the 
difference of their national feeling more concisely
The most potent symbol for the Englishman was the sea, and there 
was a precise connection between his relationship with it and 
his "famous individualism." He saw himself "as a captain on 
board a ship with a small group of people, the sea around and 
beneath him. He is almost alone; as captain he is in many ways 
isolated even from his crew."^^ On the other hand, the 
symbol most revealing of the character of the Germans was the 
marching forest:
"The parallel rigidity of the upright trees and their 
density and number fill the heart of the German with a 
deep and nysterious delight... he feels at one with the 
trees."
Unlike trees in tropical forests which grew in all directions 
and suggested a certain indiscipline, chaos, and an 
"unarticulated mass of growth which effectively precludes any
[72]
sensation of order or even of repetition", the trees of the 
German forest [either in imagination or personified in the shape 
of the Anry] were notable for their "orderly separation", the 
"stress on the vertical", and "a conspicuous rhythm." In "the 
rigidity and straightness of trees" lay the clue to the German 
character.
It could be argued that in the period under study there were 
areas of German experience which exuded rather than precluded 
the "sensation of order or even of repetition", and that at a 
particular point in time, in response to a particular 
concatenation of historical events, there was a still wider 
appreciation of the virtues of "conspicuous rhythm", and perhaps 
even a romantic identification of the routine securities and 
certainties of everyday life with "the rigidity and straightness 
of trees;" it is as well, however, that explanations of 
differences between national cultures have not been confined to 
mysticism of this kind.
At the heated meetings of the German Historical Association in 
1964 when the significance of Fritz Fischer's Griff nach der 
Weltxnacht was discussed, Fritz Stem attacked the prevailing 
tenor of German historiography - described by Dahrendorf as "a 
tranquillising instrument of self-interpretation" - which denied 
that nation's responsibility for upheaval in Europe. Stem 
pointed to the sequence of 'catastrophes' in recent German 
history [in
[73]
principal, the First World War, the Rise of the Nazis, the 
Second World War], compared them to a sequence of accidents in 
an industrial concern and asked "whether such a series could 
happen anywhere without somebody suspecting that something must 
be wrong somewhere in the enterprise. Analogies are
useful tools but are usually in seme degree suspect for they are 
seldom limited in connotation by the will of their creators. As 
a device for encouraging German historians to confront rather 
than retreat from the German contribution to major crises in 
Europe, Stem's analogy was a useful tool; the problem, 
however, is that to compare the German nation to an industrial 
concern is to allow, by analogy, that the degree of inner 
cohesion of the former was similar to that of the latter. In an 
industrial concern process and product are defined in terms of 
objective market criteria, are more often than not related to 
critical path structures, and are subject to inspection, 
control, and remediation. None of this would be possible at the 
required level of performance without a very high degree of 
inner mechanistic cohesion - an inner cohesion which is in no 
way a function of what is happening outside the industrial 
concern. The interior cohesion of, say, process phases and 
critical path stages can exist in the face of exterior 
disruption. Further, an industrial concern, a plant, for 
example, which is experiencing process or product difficulties 
can be shut dewn, brought to a dead stop, and faults identified.
[74]
In none of these descriptions can a nation be said to resemble 
an industrial concern.
In 1943, Jacques Barzun asserted that "a people is too numerous, 
too various, too much an epitome of mankind, to be cited for 
judgement in a formula." The detail of his assertion had
been adumbrated by Sarolea 31 years earlier. Any thoughtful 
student of international politics, wrote Sarolea, recognised not 
only the delicacy but also the difficulty of expressing a
competent opinion on any great collection of human beings. He 
considered that the dictum, "all generalisations on national 
character must be subject to considerable limitations", was
especially true with regard to Germany and the Germans.
"In the case of Germany, any sweeping generalisations are 
manifestly futile and unreal. We have continually to 
qualify and modify our judgements; we have continually to 
distinguish between the North and the South, between 
Catholics and Protestants, between the Government and the 
people; we must constantly keep in mind, in judging the 
German people as a whole, that although they have been 
welded into an empire, they have not really achieved
national unity: which is hardly surprising when we
consider that the German Hnpire is ccmposed of many 
elements heterogeneous in race and religion - and that it
[75]
is only forty years since those heterogeneous elements 
have been politically combined... they continue to 
present to us at the beginning of the twentieth century a 
bewildering mixture of spiritual paradoxes and political 
contradictions
Karl Dietrich Bracher's analysis of the relationship between
electoral support for the N.S.D.A.P. and the "regional,
sociological, and confessional differences" in Germany echo
Sarolea's reference to "the cleavages between the German
catholic South and the protestant North, between the industrial
and socialist West and South West and the reactionary and
agrarian East and North East."^^ It is against this
background that Rainer Baum's literary content analysis of
popular fiction published in Die Gartenlaube assumes very real
significance. Far from the Germans demonstrating, through
sharing in cannon culture, a high order of cohesion in terms of
attitudes, values, and dispositions, Baum found that they were
"ethical strangers to each other", and that German society was
"... characterised by deep value cleavages, dividing the people
into different value communities by region, social class, and
(172)urban and rural ways of life."
Hie informing force of canton purpose within a national culture 
may be exaggerated by a too easy identification of the
[76]
'character' of the literature and philosophy which is
temporarily dominant and the 'character' of the people at large.
Ginsberg disliked "rough generalisations" that exaggerated the
diffusion of particular characteristics. He noted that
literature and philosophy were often taken "as a basis for the
psychology of people", accepted that in the case of dominant
groups within a society such a connection might be reasonable,
but entered serious reservations to the notion that prevailing
orthodoxies in literature and philosophy represented an
expression of the character of the general population. He took
much the same view with regard to major social and political
institutions, arguing that they "may not reflect the character
of all the members [of the culture] but perhaps only of powerful
sections... It follows that at any one moment of time we cannot
safely infer the character of a people from its institutions or
(173)public policy."' Sheehan [1981] argued along similar
lines:
"... in the political realm, we should be wary of false 
assumptions about institutional symmetry and cohesion. 
There almost always is, for instance, a big difference 
between the order given at the centre and the way it is 
carried out on the periphery, a difference which does not 
usually become apparent if we confine our attention to the 
records of the central administration."
[77]
An instruction to the citizens of Monster by General Baron von 
Bis sung, Cormander of the 7th A m y  Corps, in December 1914, 
could be read as a concrete example of Ginsberg*s distinction 
between public policy and the extent to which such policy finds 
expression in the behaviour of ordinary people:
"In an order of the day, I recently appealed to the public 
not to display false and misplaced sentiments of sympathy 
towards the prisoners of war. You should show more of a 
German conscience.
... According to the reports which have been submitted to 
me, all kinds of dainties... have been offered to the 
prisoners in spite of the prohibitions which have been 
issued... recourse will be had to exemplary punishment in 
order to put a stop to this anti-German conduct."
Sheehan, reflecting on the question, ’What is German History?1, 
concluded that the * single mould1 perception of cohesion, which 
was dissipated with the recognition of multiplicity, was "an 
often illusory cohesion", and that a richer view of the past 
emerged with its demise. Taking as a 'text' De Maistre1 s dictum 
that it was not difficult to unify a nation on the map, but 
quite another thing to do it in reality, Sheehan argued:
"We should not... allow the appearance of cartographical
[78]
cohesion... to conceal the fact that every state is filled 
with... structures which, resisting being drawn into the 
institutional symmetry which states try to inpose, form 
pockets of internal separation..."
Sheehan, interested in "the centrifugal force of regionalism", 
noted that Tipton [1976] had suggested that German Unification 
may have "increased the importance of regional differences by 
accentuating the contrast between industrial and agrarian areas 
within the Reich.
It has so far been the intention of this brief discussion of the 
problems inherent in "rough generalisations", which exaggerate 
the degree of behavioural homogeneity in national cultures, to 
highlight the inportance of the concept of 'differential 
sharing' - a concept descriptive of the many ways in which 
different people in the same broad cultural setting may share 
differentially in what that setting has to offer. Rough 
generalisations are just as problematical when personality - 
that vAiich lies behind behaviour - is at issue; and they are 
just as cannon. Sarolea noted hew difficult it was to 
"formulate a deliberate opinion on the character of a friend... 
knewn for a lifetime"; awareness of the ccmplexity of human 
nature and of the "infirmity of... judgement", made one pause, 
hesitate, and ponder. Given the opportunity, however, to pass
[79]
judgement on nations, the reticence which guided and reserved 
assessment in the case of individuals disappeared:
"... when we are asked to pass judgement, not on one
individual, but on millions of whan we have no direct 
knowledge, and about wham we have very little direct 
information, we do not seem to feel the slightest 
hesitation in expressing a strong and unqualified opinion; 
and generally, the less we do knew, the stranger that
(177)
opinion is likely to be."
The sources quoted in chapters 2 to 8 stand as evidence 
that it was not unusual in the period under study to attribute 
cannon personality characteristics to Germans en masse. To use 
a concept that would have been unfamiliar in this context at the 
time, but which precisely defines the approach, the distribution 
of personality variants was often seen as unimodal. In 
mathematics, the mode of a set of numbers or quantities is that 
1 value' which occurs with the greatest frequency. It follows 
that in a particular context a mode may not exist, or, if it 
does exist, may not be unique. For example, there is no mode in
the set 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 11, 19, 27; there is one mode [4] in the
unimodal set 2, 3, 4, 4, 5, 9, 11, 19; there are two modes [4 
and 9] in the bimodal set 2, 3, 4, 4, 5, 9, 9, 11. This simple 
illustration provides the basis
[80]
FIGURE [ 8 ] POSSIBLE SHAPE OF A PERSONALITY PROFILE.
Notes Although personality 'type1 5, 10, and 14 do not 
occur with the same frequency, they occur at 
mathematical maxima and so may be accepted as 
modes.
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for yet another case, that of a multimodal distribution.
Following Linton [1945] Inkeles and Levinson argued that in the
case of a complex, modem nation, "a multimodal conception of
[personality] would seem to be theoretically the most meaningful
as well as empirically the most realistic", since it "can
accommodate the sub-cultural variations of socioeconomic class,
geosocial region, ethnic group, and the like, which appear to
exist in all modem nations, and tends somewhat to counteract
the inclination toward stereotyping and spurious homogenising in
(178)our descriptions of national populations."
Consideration of what a multimodal personality profile might 
look like should suggest the procedural requirements for its 
construction and the limitations on the uses to which it could 
be put. [See Figure 8 ].
Before we can even refer to the existence of different 
personality modes we have to determine the frequency with 
which the different types appear. This, in turn, depends 
upon a definition of personality variants which establishes 
clear 'type boundaries'. The fictional multimodal personality 
profile shewn in Figure [ 8 ] indicates the frequency with
which particular personality types occur in a 'population' [ 
e.g. the adults of a national culture]. As such it would be 
the end product of a major exercise in the gathering, collation, 
classification and analysis of raw data. To arrive at a profile
[82]
of modes of distribution of personality variants wculd require
"the psychological investigation of adequately large and
(179)representative samples of persons studied individually."'
This highlights the need for careful and extensive testing.
As a modal personality profile of, say, the adults of national 
culture ’x*, there is an extremely high probability that the
example in Figure [ 8 ] would differ fran a similarly
constructed profile of the adults of national culture !y ’. The
height of the peaks, the depth of the troughs, the general shape 
or configuration of one profile would be different from those of 
another. When constructed on a cross-cultural basis, such 
profiles would serve - for some time at least - as indicators of 
hew one culture differed frcm another. In themselves, however, 
modal personality profiles may do no more than this. In itself, 
a personality profile of a national culture - even if the end 
product of careful and extensive investigation of a large mass 
of raw data - may establish little beyond its distinctiveness in 
relation to others of its kind. The example above indicates 
that personality types 5, 10 and 14 occur most frequently, and 
that if horizontal lines are drawn through the distribution they 
will highlight those types which occur with equal frequency 
[e.g. 3, 6 , 8 , 12 and 16], It is likely that another level of 
analysis will be required to resolve a range of vital 
qualitative issues - issues regarding the influence within the
[83]
'population1 of a particular type, or types, the relative 
weighting that should be assigned to a type, or types, in 
respect of, say, the decision making process in domestic and 
international politics - or apathetic/conscientious compliance 
in the outcome of that process - the electoral success or 
otherwise of individual political parties, and so on. Crucial, 
also, are the relative weights, in determination of behaviour, 
that should be assigned to personality variants [once defined] 
and situational factors.
First, then, rigorous procedures are necessary for the 
definition of the personality profile of the members of 
a national culture; beyond this, a range of qualitative issues 
have to be addressed. Failure to address such issues may well 
lead to the erroneous belief that the definition of a modal 
personality profile accounts, of itself, for the intra and inter 
- national policies and behaviours of a national culture.
Situational factors, as determinants of behaviour, are not 
confined within the boundaries of national cultures. Without, 
of course, losing sight of the caveat on differential sharing, 
account has to be taken of wider cultural contexts, of the 
extent to which particular behaviour patterns are related to the 
norms and values of a common international culture. To take an 
example apposite in the present context, the ccnmon international
[84]
culture of Europe in the pre-1914 period was a competitive one. 
Its dominant norms and values were competitive. Even allowing 
for important instances of co-operative and conciliatory 
relations between states, the general unwillingness of powerful 
or aspirant nations to sacrifice their existing status or abort 
their pretentions, in the interests of the international 
carmunity, suggests an acceptance of ccnpetitive norms. And at 
the beginning of the twentieth century these norms were infused 
with a powerful new force - "a perfect principle of causality" - 
Social Darwinism.
Both German and British sources indicate that the application of
biological theories to the sociopolitical field "served as a
motive pcwer as well as justification for expansionist
policies." Walter Bagehot had argued that nations endowed
with characteristics which made them "most fit to win in war"
were, so far as Nature was concerned, "really the best 
(182)characters." Lord Milner's Credo legislated:
"... this is the law of human progress, that the 
competition between nations each seeking its maximum 
development, is the Divine Order of the world, the Law of 
Life and progress."
Charles Pearson, in National Life from the Standpoint of
[85]
Science, noted that "the path of progress" was "strewn with the
wrecks of nations... of inferior races, and of victims who found
not the narrcw way to p e r f e c t i o n . " M a x s e ' s  "illusion
mongers", guilty of "fatuous sentimentalism", were those who
could not see that inexorable forces were at work. in
response to those who argued respect for the status quo, Usher
declared that existing conditions were not "... the end and
object of the process of e v o l u t i o n . " C r a m b ’s "inexorable
nexus of things" was little more than the struggle for survival
(187)played out between powerful states. '
It appeared that every nation was "subject to the natural laws
(188)of life and death, growth and decay." Friedrich von
Bemhardi asserted that war was never to be seen as accidental;
it was a law of nature. The options facing nations in the
(189)struggle for supremacy were 'Weltmacht Oder Niedergang'. 
the elder Moltke saw war as "an element of the order of the world 
established by God, without which the world would stagnate and 
lose itself in materialism." Conrad Hotzendorf, the
Austrian Chief of General Staff, reflecting on the relative 
influence of national and artificial forces on the course of 
human history concluded that
"Philanthropic religions, moral teachings and philosophic 
doctrines may certainly sometimes serve to weaken
[86]
mankind's struggle for existence in its crudest form, but 
they will never succeed in removing it as a driving motive 
in the world... It is in accordance with this great 
principle that the catastrophe of the war came about 
inevitably and irresistibly as the result of the motive 
forces in the lives of states and peoples, like a 
thunderstorm which must by its nature discharge 
itself."(191)
Kurt Riezler, Bethmann-Hollweg's aide believed that eternal and 
absolute enmity was "fundamentally inherent in relations between 
peoples... not the result of a perversion of human nature but of 
the essence of the world and the source of life itself. It is 
not accidental, temporary and removable, but a 
necessity..."
The major sub-systems of this international culture - sovereign 
states and their leaders - had similar goals [terminal values] 
such as security, prestige, improvement of position either 
diplomatically, economically, or militarily. They addressed 
such norm referenced considerations as 'how do we gain a better 
place in the order of things?' - 'how do we prevent others 
getting ahead of us?' - 'where do we stand in the rank order of 
pcwar?' Galtung [1964] suggested that nations can be ranked for 
their comparative status - either 'T* [tcp-dog] or 'U'
[87]
[under-dog] - along a number of scales such as extent of
industrialisation, income per capita, military power, level of
educational provision, past glory, imperial /colonial
possessions, etc. In his terms, the international culture in
Europe at the beginning of the twentieth century was a
multi-dimensional system of stratification, where those who
'had1 and those who 'had not', those who 'had more' and those
who 'had less * found, were given, or were forced into their 
. . (193)positions. In the pre-1914 period there were high levels
of rank-disequilibrium and status discrepancy, that is to say,
too many states were not rank-concordant, but were high on seme
(194)scales and lew on others. Using Galtung's Top-dog -
Under-dog measure of comparative status, a rank-ordering of 
Britain and Germany on a number of scales in the pre-1914 period 
produces the following picture:
[88]
SCALE BRITAIN GERMANY
Colonial
territory
T U
Economic 
development 
[subsuming 
rate of growth]
T
[but in relative 
decline]
T
[but in relative 
ascendancy]
Military Power 
[land-based]
U T
Naval Power T U
The comparative status of the two nations so far as possession 
of colonial territory was concerned may be highlighted:-
Colonial area in 
sq .miles (M)
No. of Colonial 
Territories
Ratio of Home 
Colonial Area
Britain 1 2- 55 1/96
France 4- 29 1 /2 0
Germany 1- 10 1/5
Belgium 1/82
Netherlands
t 3 21 1/23Italy j 1/63
7l95T
In terms of colonial area, Germany had one-sixteenth of that 
controlled by Britain and France? she had less than one-eighth 
of the number of territories owned by those countries. With 
regard to the ratio of home to colonial area, Germany came right 
at the bottom of the league, in company with Italy.
[89]
Pettman has noted that
"A rank-discordant state will be continually exposed to 
differential treatment and therefore constantly reminded 
of its disequilibrium position. It will use the resources 
of its top-ranking dimensions in a self-righteous way to 
raise its standing on those dimensions where it has a *U* 
score. «<196>
Why did states concern themselves about their rank-discordance 
in the pre-1914 period? Was it a matter, purely and simply, of 
personality profiles and intranational cultural patterns? To 
answer in the affirmative would be to beg the question of why 
two nations moving, without dedicated resistance on either side, 
towards conflict might have had two quite different personality 
profiles, and to assign to the international culture less 
significance than it deserves.
Were ordinary, everyday observers consistently sound in their 
assessments; were the ’subjects* of their observations uniformly 
’obvious* in that actual behaviour was never ambiguous, and 
always matched motivation; were there no hidden depths to 
individuals - then Sarolea *s cautions on the complexity of human 
nature and the "infirmity of judgement" could be dismissed. 
None of these situations obtain, however, and so assertions on
[90]
cross-cultural distinctions - 'whether narrow or wide in focus - 
should, if they are to justify any claim to objective authority, 
consider similarities as well as differences, resist any charge 
of special pleading or self-interest, deal cautiously with the 
issue of intracultural homogeneity, avoid exaggeration of the 
longevity and diffusion of characteristics, locate the 'systems’ 
being compared in a wider cultural context, and be the product 
of an investigatory process which has employed a range of sound 
analytic procedures.
If observation of human behaviour is uninformed by theoretical
considerations the chances of making superficial and/or
erroneous judgements are greatly increased. Without due
attention to the complex of roles occupied by an individual in
modem society it would be easier to overlook the fact that in
everyday life it is often "necessary to mask the true self, to
(197)present to the world an appearance..." And appearances
can be deceptive. Fronm [1978] cited the case of the 
red-faced, shouting man who could be described by an observer, 
accurately enough on a superficial level, as angry. A deeper 
probe into the man's system [through, say, a test instrument or 
an indepth interview] might lead to the conclusion that he was 
frightened, and a still more rigorous form of analysis might 
lead to the view that the man was helpless. "All three 
statements are correct", wrote Fromm. "However, we have a 
varying degree of relevance, because only the statement 'this
[91]
man feels powerless1 canes close... As long as I see him as an
(198)angry man, I see only a surface phenomenon.n '
Cock [1984] gives the example of 'Mr Savage*, an individual with
an aggressive disposition who, in the course of one day,
experiences strong urges to punch a neighbour, set the dog on
the postman, swear at a fellow driver, run down an employee, and
snarl at colleagues - yet he does not implement any of them.
Superficial observation of Mr Savage's behaviour might well miss
the fact that his socially unacceptable urges were contained not
by the internalisation of general social values but by the size
of his neighbour [taller and heavier], the fear that an injured
postman might refuse to deliver mail to the Savage heme, the
police uniform worn by the fel lew driver, absenteeism on the
part of the employee, and in-house customs on interpersonal
(199)relations between colleagues.
The dangers of taking an individual' s attitudes, values, and 
beliefs at face-value, as opposed to sizing them up over a 
period of time and in a variety of situations, have been noted by 
Rokeach [I960]. The individual may be engaged in a deliberate 
act of deception or he may be rationalising. Inferences about 
what an individual really believes should be based on all the 
things he says and does. Only through such comprehensive 
observation and analysis can an individual's "total
[92]
belief-disbelief system... an organisation of verbal and 
non-verbal, implicit and explicit beliefs, sets, or 
expectancies" be determined. ^ 00) Bern pointed to the errors of 
inference which could arise when necessary connections were 
assumed between evaluative beliefs and/or positive attitudes on 
the one hand, and values on the other. For example, the 
evaluative belief - ’power would enable my country to be great 
again* - and the positive attitude - *1 like uniforms* - could, 
but need not have a necessary connection with the value, 'it is 
desirable that inferiors obey superiors.' "To know whether a 
positive attitude or an evaluative belief is also a value for a 
particular individual, one must knew the functional role it plays 
in his total belief system." (2 0 1) ^  individual's total belief
system is not normally sane thing which is open to superficial 
observation.
Tajfel [1963] drew attention to the important distinction to be 
made between the different motives underpinning similar forms of 
behaviour. For example, two white South Africans could support 
Apartheid policies - one because he believed that black South 
Africans were inferior to white South Africans, the other 
because he saw them as manipulative devices to retain pcwer; 
two German shopkeepers could have acted to the detriment of 
Jewish neighbours, one because he considered Jews to be inferior 
and genuinely subscribed to racist doctrines, the other because
[933
he saw anti-Semitic legislation as a means of getting rid of
(202)serious competition. There is nothing admirable in either
position, but the motivation is certainly different. In the 
case of the German shopkeeper preoccupied with economic motives 
there is a clear lack of human sympathy and self-interest is 
dominant. In this sense his behaviour could be said to be 
supportive of Nazi values? but it could not be said to be based 
on Nazi values. Motivational distinctions of this kind are 
safely made only after "a sustained study of a particular 
individual.n(203>
The form of assessment which places an emphasis on 
norm-referenced behaviour can reveal a great deal about 1 overt1 
consensus on means, but may otherwise be very unreliable. The 
possibility of there being a distinction between the norm as 'the 
desired' and the norm as 'the actual' should not be overlooked. 
In this context, Baum's dictum is relevant:
"Never forget, you could survive in Treblinka only by 
becoming a tool of destruction."
Bruno Bettelheim's Remarks on the Psychological Appeal of 
Totalitarianism examined the Hitler salute as an example of a 
behavioural norm in Nazi Germany. It was given "wherever people 
encountered each other - at public or private meeting places
[94]
such as in restaurants, railroadcars, offices, or factories, and 
on the street." Why was there such a high degree of 
conformance? Was it because it was an "expression of 
self-assertion" eagerly adopted by people who supported the Nazi 
regime? For sane this was no doubt the case. But the salute 
was also given, when expected, by those who were actively or 
passively opposed to the regime, for those "who saw that one did 
not give the Hitler salute might report this, and often enough 
did," and people hesitated to "make a big fuss - which refusing 
to give the Hitler salute created - in often repeated everyday 
situations." Furthermore, there was the effect which deviant 
behaviour might have on some person met by chance:
"Refusing to salute was made more troublesome because one 
not only placed one's cwn life in danger, but also that of 
the other person, since he was required to report any 
failure to give the salute to the authorities... Many 
times a day the anti-Nazi either had to became a martyr 
and simultaneously test the courage and convictions of the 
other person, or lose his self-respect."
Bettelheim was conscious of the pressures which a totalitarian 
regime could lay on its subjects. Such a regime, he argued, 
creates a complex of everyday tasks and functions - norms and 
role expectations - which the individual can ignore only at the
[95]
risk of his own destruction.
Conment on personality traits should be as rigorously founded as
that on attitudes, values, and general behavioural regularities.
Allport considered that any approach which fell short of this
would swamp the observer in "considerations of reputation,
rumour, gossip, erroneous evaluations..."^20^  Apart frcm the
problem of identifying them, so many distinctions have to be
made between traits that sustained study is essential. The
investigator has to guard against identifying as a relatively
enduring personality trait a single-instance disposition
"divorced from the usual pattern of circumstances", and "not at
(207)all typical of... ordinary behaviour." Then there are the
distinctions to be made between real and pseudo traits, 
stylistic and motivational traits, dominant, central, and 
secondary traits, between enduring dispositions related to 
personality and temporary [though not single-instance] 
dispositions related to a temporary state of affairs 
psychological or physical or both. Pseudo traits are often 
purposeful affectations, making of the individual something he 
is not. To identify them as real traits is to make the "errors 
of inference... that come frcm fixing attention solely upon 
appearances." Errors of real magnitude can be made when 
stylistic traits - those "more closely related to external 
conduct than to root motives" - are confused with motivational
[96]
(208)traits. And it is clear that an individual's
personality structure could be dramatically misconstrued by an 
investigator v?ho assigned dominant rather than central or 
secondary status to a particular trait, or who identified as a 
relatively enduring facet of personality a disposition which 
owed its existence less to life-history than to more iirmediate 
circumstances.
Of the two broad approaches to the rigorous study of 
cross-cultural differences which they identified - the close 
analysis of cultural products and the close study of individuals 
- Inkeles and Levinson were in no doubt as to where the 
methodological priorities should lie:
"... the analysis of collective policies and products...
Psychological analysis of these phenomena can contribute
significantly to the overall psychological
characterisation of a society... however, this should be a
supplementary rather than a primary method, the primary
(209)one being the large scale study of individuals."
Yet the problems inherent in cross-cultural study are not 
entirely removed even when assertions are the product of an 
investigatory process informed by methodological priorities and 
involving a range of sound analytical procedures. At the end of
[97]
an analytical process which may be, to sane extent, freely 
reproducible, and so a corporate possession, there remains the 
individual and in part imaginative act of interpretation. This 
problem may be highlighted through brief consideration of one of 
the most effective strategies for examining cultural products 
[e.g. public and private documents, literary fiction, film, 
etc.] - content analysis. Duverger [1964] defined content 
analysis as
"... a special simplified form of quantitative 
semantics... the basic idea of context analysis is to 
place the parts of a text [words, phrases, paragraphs, 
etc., depending on the units chosen] in a number of 
predetermined categories. Content analysis is, frcm one 
point of view, the ranging of all these parts in a series 
of pigeon holes, and describing the text by the number of 
elements in each pigeon hole."
The technique has been widely used. Lemer [1942] analysed the 
content of articles in German psychological journals. Kracauer 
[1947] examined the structure, text, and images of German films 
of the Weimar period. McGranahan and Wayne [1948] employed the 
principles of content analysis in their study of the 45 most 
popular stage plays in Germany and the United States in 1927, in 
order to make a cross-cultural comparison of personality traits. 
Baum [1981] reached interesting conclusions on the incidence of
[98]
particular value clusters at regional level in Germany between 
1871 and 1914 by conducting a highly structured content analysis 
of 31 novels. As an analytical technique for highlighting
intracultural configurations and for describing cross-cultural 
differences, content analysis has much to reccmnend it. But it 
does not of itself point to the conclusions which should be 
drawn and it does not free the student from the need to 
adjudicate between conflicting interpretations.
The problem of interpretation may be demonstrated by 
consideration of the election poster produced by the Nazi party 
for the second Presidential Election of 1932, and published in 
the Bavarian edition of Volkischer Beobachter 3 March of that 
year. It is a relatively simple matter to apply the principles 
of content analysis to this document. It could be argued that 
its structure and content threw up such obvious points and 
categories that one man's analysis would be fairly close to that 
of another; but the interpretations built from ccrrmon 
analytical descriptions could be dramatically different.
HITLER is the password of all who believe in Germany's 
resurrection.
HITLER is the last hope of those who were deprived of
everything: of farm and hone, of savings, employment,
[99]
HITLER
HITLER
HITLER
HITLER
survival; and 'who have but one possession left: their
faith in a just Germany which will once again grant to 
its citizens honor, freedom, and bread.
is the word of deliverance for millions, for they are 
in despair, and see only in this name a path to new 
life and creativity.
was bequeathed the legacy of the two million dead 
comrades of the World War, who died not for the 
present system of the gradual destruction of our 
nation, but for Germany's future.
is the man of the people hated by the enemy because he 
understands the people and fights for the people.
is the furious will of Germany's youth, which, in the 
midst of a tired generation, is fighting for new 
forms, and neither can nor will abandon its faith in a 
better German future. Hence Hitler is the password 
and the flaming signal of all who wish for a German 
future.
[100]
The document is so structured that the eye is iirmediately drawn 
to the word 'Hitler'; there is a strength in the word, derived 
frcm its dimensions in relation to other words, from its 
repetitive appearance, and frcm the 'distance* established 
between it and the rest of the text. A dynamic immediacy is 
created through the recurring 'is'. Absolute identity is 
established, and appears to extend to a corporate identity that 
'swallows' up the individual self: he is; we are. The message
is addressed to all who feel that hope is exhausted, to all who 
feel they are going over the edge, to all in despair, to all who 
feel that they cannot help themselves. They are offered a 
lifeline at the beginning and end of the document in the form of 
a 'password', cementing them, through possession of something 
precious, in corporate security, and leaving those without 'the 
knowledge' under threat. There is a 'reckoning' in store for 
those outside the pale and for those identified as responsible 
for the suffering of the many - 'Now you are to know us!' 
Religious images suggest miraculous works and powers, but also 
death, decay and decomposition. An act of resurrection 
presupposes miraculous powers, but that act is predicated upon 
death; deliverance is effected by a prophet but it is from 
evil; To enter into new-life and creativity is to be 'bom 
again', to enter into a new and sustaining faith, but it also 
presupposes the shedding of the old, decaying skin.
[101]
It is possible to build a number of interpretations on this 
analysis. Two examples in opposition should be enough to 
demonstrate that content analysis can take us so far and no 
further. The first interpretation, which for convenience may be 
termed the 'psychoanalytic' interpretation, proposes that the 
essential characteristics of the dominant German personality 
type are reflected in the document. Hitler is recognised as a 
strong father figure from whom all others take their identity 
and to whom they willingly submit. The secular father takes the 
shape of a spiritual father; there is a strong suggestion of 
'come to me, all ye who are heavy laden'; in the notion of 
'password' there are echoes of the select body of saints defined 
in John 3, 16. The masochistic longings peculiar to the Germans 
attract them towards a complete surrender of independent will. 
In the catalogue of deprivation there is an appeal to the 
neurotic anxiety of those who, losing everything else, fear 
castration. Masochistic pleasure is derived from the images of 
decay, decomposition and death, and premise of release for 
sadistic energies is found in contemplation of the misery of 
those left outside the bond, and of the revenge to be carried 
out on the enerry. A profound concern about inferiority informs 
their desire for regeneration.
The second interpretation, which does not exclude psychological 
considerations, which takes account of anxiety - but the
[102]
rational form as well as the neurotic form - and which places 
more emphasis than the other on situational factors, proposes 
that the document could have had relatively wide appeal to 
people who had suffered the cumulative distress of disappointed 
expectations, of starvation during the blockade, of the physical 
and psychological scars of inflation, of loss of personal 
status, and who, at the same time, did not experience the 
psychological security of belonging to a highly structured and 
well disciplined political group. For such people the choice 
might well have been 'Nationalsozialist - Oder umsonst waren die 
Opfer'. - .
As might be expected, the issue of discrepant interpretations 
arises in many other areas of cultural and cross-cultural 
studies. Reference has been made to the emphasis placed by 
Bateson, Gorer, and Potter on parent-child relationships as
indicators of cross-cultural differences in adult personality 
patterns. That different perspectives on human psychology can 
lead to different interpretations is evident when we consider 
Klineberg's challenge to Gorer's thesis that Japanese aggression 
toward 'weak' peoples was predicated upon the aggression shown 
by young males toward 'weak' females in the Japanese family. If
it were true that such aggression was sanctioned within the
family, "might this not," wrote Klineberg, "make it less
necessary for him to find other occasions on which to give full
[103]
(213)expression to his anger?" Margaret Mead's And Keep Your
Powder Dry, focused on the importance of success rather than 
status in the culture of the United States. She saw the general 
pattern of parent-child relationships in that culture as one in 
which the child was stimulated to excel, "prepared very early on 
for participation in a highly competitive society, in which 
failure, even though cushioned by a good standard of living 
[seemed] more terrible than poverty itself would seem in a 
status country." The individual worth of an American was 
assessed not by status [position occupied] as such but by the 
distance which lay between the position occupied and the 
original point of departure. "Projecting this success drive to 
his children," the American expected them to "have a different 
future and an achievement greater than his own." The culture 
was success oriented; this defined a trend in parent-child 
relationships, and in their turn those relationships had a
/ OT A \
product which reinforced the orientation of the culture.
Apart frcm questions relating to the distribution of such 
characteristics, to the applicability of Mead's conclusions to 
the population of the United States as a whole, as opposed to, 
say, a particular social group - questions bearing on 
intracultural interpretations - there are those which bear on 
cross-cultural interpretation:
"Miss Mead mentions, as an American characteristic, the
[104]
need to bypass your father by choosing another skill than 
his. Alfred Adler thought this was a pretty widespread 
phenomenon, particularly if the father was at all 
successful."
Marked differences in interpretation can arise when behaviour 
appears to be motivated by anxiety. Is the anxiety rational or 
is it neurotic? Does the 'anxious* behaviour point to 
underlying personality traits or is it associated with a 
temporary and circumstantial state? Further opportunities
for the expression of discrepant interpretations are opened up 
when self-analysis, empathy, and imagination, are regarded as 
necessary conditions for the effective analysis of others. 
Bales considered that "to understand a personality or a group is 
to be able to reproduce in one's own mind relevant parts of what 
goes on in the minds of others." This is the process of 
enpathetic identification - a process not without pitfalls, for 
it is "about as likely to lead one to infuse his own 
characteristics unknowingly into the object, as to internalise 
the object correctly." If the understanding of another 
personality, or a group, "implies an understanding of the self," 
then it is reasonable to suppose that interpretations may differ 
according to the extent to which the prescription is followed 
and, since self-understanding is an interpretive, imaginative 
process in itself and subject to limitations, interpretations
may even differ when the prescription is followed with dedicated
Wherever human judgement - differentiated in terms of
experience, imaginative capacity, gifts of perception,
(218)objectivity, etc., - is brought to bear on matters of
human behaviour - always, and in all forms, susceptible to
explanations which may be difficult or impossible to verify -
interpretations are likely to be many and different. It has
been said that whereas chemists knew exactly what they mean by
'copper sulphate', and physicists exactly what they mean by
'light', every psychologist knows exactly what personality
means, except that to each psychologist it 'means' something
different. This general principle on judgement was sustained
(219)experimentally by Estes [1937]. A number of 2 minute
films were made, each depicting the behaviour of a subject whose 
personality structure had been intensively studied by a group of 
20 psychologists over a twelve month period. The short films 
were then studied by 37 'judges', all formally trained 
psychiatric social workers with no less than two years practical 
work experience. In terms of congruence with the general tenor 
of the original assessments made by the panel of 2 0  
psychologists, the ten best judges frcm the group of 37 had a 
success rate 33% higher than the 10 poorest judges, and the best 
single judge was 62% ahead of the poorest judge in terms of 
cross-analyses congruence. Allport
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found the conclusion inescapable that "even in a hanogeneous and
highly trained profession such as psychiatric social work the
difference in ability to ' size-up' individuals... is very
striking." It was clear to him that "... a gifted judge,
applying his skill to certain overt and readily accessible
traits in a subject who is himself not deceptive or enigmatic,"
(220)were preconditions for trustworthy judgement.'
The problems identified above are not eased by the fact that a
number of projective tests and self-report inventories, designed
to reveal aspects of personality, do not lend themselves to
objective - freely reproducible - interpretation, or have to
contend with all the quirks associated with the test situation
in the social sciences - the fact that the subjects are not
inanimate, that unlike one molecule of hydrogen which is more or
less the same as another molecule of hydrogen, people differ one
fran another; that they have independent wills, and know that
their responses are being noted and measured. It was Duverger's
view that assessment of performance on projective instruments
such as the Rohrschach Test, the Thematic Apperception Test
[TAT], and the Rosenzweig [frustration] Test, was "highly 
(221)controversial." So far as attitude scales are concerned
[for example, the Bogardus, Thurstone, and Lickert scales]
(222)•response-set1 is a common problem. Seme subjects
consistently take the same option when answers are required in a
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yes/no form, or always record the extreme response [strongly
agree/strongly disagree] or the middle-way [don't know] in a
Lickert test. Strategies for dealing with the 'response-set'
problem - for example, Criterion-groups Procedure, The Lie
Scale, the Forced-Choice Method - have had a mixed reception,
with experimental results suggesting that the remedial
procedures can introduce "other difficulties of a very serious
(223)nature." Knowing what is happening to them, many subjects
appear to select or provide the response which they feel would
be most acceptable to the tester. This can involve a fair
measure of faking. E. J. Webb et al [1966] saw that one way out 
of this difficulty lay in the use of unobtrusive measures, but 
these would demand, by definition, that subjects bear witness
against themselves without even being aware that they were in a 
test process. Use of such strategies would raise all manner of 
ethical issues.
Test instruments are indispensable aids in the study of intra 
and cross-cultural differences, but they are unlikely ever to 
escape criticism or debate on their effectiveness and accuracy. 
This is simply in the nature of things, in the nature of the 
limitations of those who compile and interpret them, and in the 
nature of the subjects being assessed. It would be unfortunate 
if the cautions on the need to recognise similarities as well as 
differences, on the dangers of special pleading and
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self-interest, on the exaggeration of homogeneity and diffusion, 
on the identification of a wider cultural context, were all met, 
but immodest claims were made on behalf of investigatory 
procedures.
[iii]
Geoffrey Gorer [1953] defined national character as that which
"isolates and analyses the principal motives or predispositions
which can be deduced from the behaviour of the personnel of a
(224)society at a given time and place." The term national, as
he and other anthropologists used it, referred to a society
[i.e., a group "within which the members share the basic
(225)elements and conditions of a canmon life." ] possessing a 
culture in an identified space at an identified time, and not 
necessarily to a nation-state. It remains true, however, that 
the greatest impetus to the theoretical refinement of the 
concept of national character came in the political context of 
the Second World War and immediately subsequent events when 
researchers, first acting independently then under the auspices 
of Columbia University Research in Contemporary Cultures and a 
series of successor projects, attempted to identify cultural 
regularities in the behaviour of members of nation-states.
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In the context of the present chapter, with its emphasis on 
differential sharing and multi-modal distributions, the word 
national is ambiguous, carrying adequate significance as a 
discriminator vis-a-vis other nations but inadequate 
significance as a discriminator at the intracultural level. It 
is a word which can be taken to suggest that the character it 
qualifies is a corporate possession; it is a word which tends 
to have an 'embracing', non-discriminatory effect when applied 
to menbers as opposed to non-members. There is, of course, a 
sense in which the members of a national culture are embraced in 
or by experiences common to them and not to other people. This 
does not mean that they are untouched by influences that touch 
other people, but it does mean that to grcw-up and live in one 
national culture will embrace the individual in a form and 
content of experience which is not identical to that which 
embraces the individual in another national culture. There is 
also a sense in vbich national identity or national image may, 
at certain times, cane close to being a corporate possession. 
Dawson and West [1984] argued that the unity of a nation, 
internally among its cwn menbers as well as externally against 
others, "is... constructed ideologically around a specific 
'national identity' which gives substance to 'nationality' and 
meaning to 'belonging'." For example, British national identity 
would be "a constructed version of Britain that says this is 
what Britain stands for, this is what it means to be British,
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(227)these are our characteristics." Gorer had earlier referred
to this ’unity' as an ideal image, "in the light of which
individuals assess and pass judgement upon themselves and their 
(228)neighbours." Even in this area, however, it has been
shown that individuals tended to share differentially in
awareness and application of the ideological component of the
British self-image, varying in the extent to which they were
consistent and to which they experienced cognitive dissonance.
Mead recognised the airbiguities and imprecision of the term
national character. The research activity of the 1940s and
1950s was, of necessity, interested in nationally originating
behaviour, that is, behaviour which was national in the sense
that it was being expressed by people acting in the name of, or
recognised as acting in the name of the nation as a whole. The
national emphasis in the studies was "the exigent one that they
were... designed to help national governments to deal with the
members of nations who were also behaving nationally, as members
(229)of armies, negotiating commissions, and so on." 1 With those 
issues in mind, and in the context of the present chapter, the 
writer's preference would be for the replacement of the term 
national character by the terms 'cultural profile of the nation' 
and 'personality profile of the nation', so that when, for 
exanple, German national character was being discussed reference 
would be made to the German cultural profile, circa., and the 
German personality profile, circa. This terminology is, of
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course, clumsy; it does not have the neatness or economy of 
national character. But the selection of the word profile is 
quite deliberate. In cannon usage the connotations of the word 
include ups, downs, peaks, troughs, in short the caning together 
of a number of different features to produce an overall image. 
In specialised assessment usage the concept allows for 
irregularities, for imbalance, for the recording of peaks and 
troughs; what then emerges is an overall pattern of 
performance.
On this basis it may be said of the members of any national 
culture that they have, as individuals, dynamic personality 
structures involving needs, motivations, traits, attitudes, 
etc.; that they all share, to varying degrees, in a catrnon 
culture; additionally, in respect of their membership - 
normally multimembership - in different groups and 
socio-economic classifications, they share differentially in 
separate sub-cultures; that in this multi-layered sharing they 
conform - at least in terms of observable behaviour, and again 
differentially - to various sets of norms, and that this 
conformity makes them appear, whether apathetically or 
conscientiously, to accept the values that lie behind the norms; 
that they each occupy and play out a range of roles, and that 
the style or styles with which they play out their roles will be 
expressed in traits. It should be possible, as a result of
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analysis and investigation, to construct two profiles broadly 
descriptive of the ways in which the national culture is 
distinct from others, a personality profile and a cultural 
profile. Each would take account of situational factors, [e.g., 
historical circumstances, immediate as well as long term] and 
of issues relevant to its own field - for example, individual 
differences as well as similarities in dynamic personality 
structures as revealed in multimodal distributions? 
differential sharing in the cannon culture as well as in 
separate sub-cultures; the distribution of traits across 
society as a whole, subsuming the incidence of particular traits 
in particular groups; the range and relative significance of 
social roles? norms and the means by which norms and actual 
behaviour are made to match; the extent to which values are 
accepted conscientiously, prudentially, or with mere 
acquiescence. Each profile would have a distinctive overall 
pattern vis-a-vis profiles constructed along similar lines for 
other national cultures.
Insofar as its essence as a concept is to direct attention to 
overall patterns of individual and social experience which make 
one society in some respects and to seme extent distinct from 
another, national character - to use the historical term - may 
be defined as the composite picture which emerges when the two 
profiles are constructed. It is important to emphasise that it
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is the overall patterns of its personality and cultural profiles 
which makes one society distinct from another, for in respect of 
seme, perhaps even many of the various facets which coalesce 
into unique overall patterns - perhaps even in respect of 
sub-patterns within the unique overall patterns - one society 
may be more similar to than distinct frcm another society.
David Potter, writing in 1954, noted that "theories of the
distinctiveness of... various peoples have gained singularly
ready and widespread acceptance at the hands of writers in every
country and in every age," with the identification of national
traits being one means of demonstrating national superiority.
In view of the long history of a concept whose origins could be
traced as far back as the 5th century B.C., Potter thought that
"it might be supposed that... far reaching attention would have
been given to the rationale of the subject and that the idea
would have been defined and elaborated with rigour and
precision." On the contrary, however, he found that outside the
field of social psychology those who had "trafficked" in the
concept - particularly historians - had produced little more
(230)than "striking evidence of the lack of adequate analysis."
Many of the sources quoted in chapters 2 to 8 of this thesis 
made statements about German national character. To what extent 
do they confirm Potter's complaint? To what extent do they take 
account of the range of issues discussed in the present chapter?
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For exairple, to what extent was 'symbolic material' in cultural 
products analysed? When traits were discussed were distinctions 
made between different types? Was attention given to the 
distribution, variation, and relative salience of attitudes and 
values? Was serious consideration given to the concept 
'authority' and hew different people might have regarded it? To 
what extent was social systems analysis employed? Was the issue 
of differential sharing in culture considered? Was personality 
structure regarded as unimodal or multimodal? To what extent 
was reference made to similarities as well as to differences? 
Was self-interest and special pleading involved? What 
significance was assigned to situational factors?
Chapter 10 will address such questions. What must be said at 
this point is that individual and social psychologists appear to 
date the emergence of rigour and precision in national character 
analysis to the pioneer work of the 1940s and 1950s. Mead and 
Metraux's Study of Culture at a Distance [1953] was, in part, a 
reccmmendation to scholars in the social sciences to make use of 
methods for analysing cultural regularities that had been 
developed during and immediately following the Second World War. 
Their bibliography cited 447 titles, 337 of which were dated 
between 1939 and 1953. Klineberg, writing toward the end of the 
Second World War, was eager to draw attention to "certain 
techniques that psychologists might use in giving to national
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character a more respectable face in the universe of scientific
(231) .research." If specialists in the fields of individual and
social psychology had not begun to develop a rigorous and
coherent body of theory on national character until given an
impetus by the outbreak of the Second World War it is hardly
appropriate that non-specialists should be criticised for not
producing such a body of theory before that date. What could
have been expected, however, from sources claiming objectivity,
was carment informed by a common sense regard for their own
everyday experience. This would have brought seme light to
their sorties into cross-cultural analysis. Furthermore,
although the body of theory on national character awaited
developnent, refinement and articulation, the field was not
empty, and there was no lack of useful theory on more general
aspects of individual/social psychology and sociology.
That this was so is evident from the fact that many of the 
sources which provide 'images of Germany' structured their 
arguments around concepts such as personality, culture, 
behaviour, and national character. This placed upon them an 
obligation. Short of an extreme position which would invoke the 
law of trespass against all non-specialists, the validity of 
argument so structured rests less on a writer's claim to 
academic qualification in the disciplines of, say, psychology or 
social psychology, than on the discipline which he imposes on
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himself. A writer who steps into the territory of the 
psychologist [individual or social] or the sociologist can make 
his way, however tentatively, only through an effort to 
familiarise himself not simply with the words on signposts but 
also with the terrain to which the words refer. If he cannot 
offer specialist credentials the very least he must do is act in 
a disciplined manner and, as rigorously as possible, locate 
concepts in a theoretical framework and then determine, with 
caution, hew appropriate the theory might be as a means of 
understanding particular historical circumstances. Caution 
allows space for scepticism. The need to determine how 
appropriate theory is as a means of understanding particular 
historical circumstances is of crucial importance. If a 
theoretical edifice appears impressive it may be worshipped. 
The impression conveyed by same of the sources in, for example, 
the use of a concept such as 'neurotic personality1, is that 
they had discovered through the services of a respected magician 
the key to a problem which had previously appeared insoluble. 
The problem with magic is that it requires no justification; in 
fact, it denies it. It is enough that the magician knows.
Judged on these tests, many of the sources which deal with the 
personality, culture, behaviour, and national character of 'the 
Germans' lack authority.
APPENDIX
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(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
Some examples of paper and pencil test instruments
Abridged version of a Values Survey Module for 
Cross-Cultural Survey Studies. Geert Hofstede [1984]
An interpersonal Rating Procedure.
Robert Freed Bales [1970]
'F1 Scale Clusters.
Adorno et al [1950]
Sample items from:
Taylor's Manifest Anxiety Scale;
The Affect Adjective Check List?
Freeman Manifest Anxiety Test;
The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory.
E. E. Levitt [1968]
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(i) Abridged version of a Values Survey Module far
Cro6s-Cultural Survey Studies. Gert Hofstede, Culture’s 
Consequences, pp. 283-285.
VALDES SURVEY MQDQLE 
FOR
CRQSS-CDLTORAL SOEVEf STODIES
Please think of an ideal job - disregarding your present job; in 
choosing an ideal job, how important would it be to you to:
1. Have sufficient time left for your personal or family life?
2. Have challenging tasks to do, from which you can get a
personal sense of accomplishment?
3. Have little tension and stress on the job?
4. Have good physical working conditions (good ventilation and
lighting, adequate work space, etc.)
5. Have a good working relationship with your direct superior?
6 . Have security of employment?
7. Have considerable freedom to adopt your own approach to the
job?
8 . Work with people who cooperate well with one another.
9. Be consulted by your direct superior in his/her decisions?
10. Make a real contribution to the success of your company or 
organisation?
11. Have an opportunity for high earnings?
12. Serve your country?
13. Live in an area desirable to you and your family?
14. Have an opportunity for advancement to higher level jobs?
15. Have an element of variety and adventure in the job?
16. Work in a prestigious, successful canpany or organisation?
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17. Have an opportunity for helping other people?
18. Work in a well-defined job situation where the requirements 
are clear?
In response to each item, subjects are asked to indicate its 
importance on a 5 point scale [of utmost importance, very 
important, of moderate importance, of little importance, of very 
little or no importance].
The descriptions below apply to four different types of
managers. First, please read through these descriptions.
Manager 1. Usually makes his/her decisions promptly and
communicates them to his/her subordinates clearly 
and firmly. Expects them to carry out the
decisions loyally and without raising 
difficulties.
Manager 2. Usually makes his/her decisions promptly, but,
before going ahead, tries to explain them fully 
to his/her subordinates. Gives them the reasons 
for the decisions and answers whatever questions 
they may have.
Manager 3. Usually consults with his/her subordinates before
he/she reaches his/her decisions. Listens to
their advice, considers it, and then announces 
his/her decision. He/she then expects all to
work loyally to implement it whether or not it is 
in accordance with the advice they gave.
Manager 4. Usually calls a meeting of his/her subordinates
when there is an important decision to be made. 
Puts the problem before the group and invites 
discussion. Accepts the majority viewpoint as 
the decision.
19. New, for the above types of manager, please mark the one 
which you wculd prefer to work under (circle one answer 
number only)
1. Manager 1
2. Manager 2
3. Manager 3
4. Manager 4
5. He/she does not correspond closely to any of them.
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21. How often do you feel nervous or tense at work?
1. I always feel this way.
2. Usually.
3. Sometimes.
4. Seldom.
5. I never feel this way.
22. A company or organisation’s rules should not be broken - 
even when the employee thinks it is in the organisation’s 
best interests.
23. Most people can be trusted.
24. Quite a few employees have an inherent dislike of work and 
will avoid it if they can.
25. A large corporation is generally a more desirable place to 
work than a small company.
In respect of items 22-25 subjects are asked to respond on 
a five point-scale [strongly agree, agree, undecided, 
disagree, strongly disagree].
26. How frequently, in your work environment, are subordinates 
afraid to express disagreement with their superiors?
1. Very frequently.
2 . Frequently.
3. Sometimes.
4. Seldom.
5. Very seldom.
27. How long do you think you will continue working for this 
company or organisation?
1. Two years at the most.
2. Fran two to five years.
3. More than five years (but I probably will leave before 
I retire).
4. Until I retire.
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[ii] Abridged version of an interpersonal Sating Procedure.
Robert Freed Bales, Personality and Interpersonal
Behaviour, pp 6-9, and chapters 9 to 35.
Concentrate your attention on the person you are 
rating. Try to recall how he has behaved, what he has 
said, what his attitudes seem to be, and how you feel 
about him. When you have these memories activated, 
read the questions on the form above entitled 
Interpersonal ratings, Form A. Try to answer each 
question "yes" or "no". If you are unable to give a 
clear answer, either because of a lack of information, 
or because of seme conflict or ambiguity, put down a 
question mark, emit that question, and go on to the 
next question. Record your answers on a separate 
sheet of paper, a yes, no, or a question mark for each 
of the twenty-six questions.
Scoring Procedure far Interpersonal Ratings
Immediately following the questions on the 
Interpersonal Rating Form you will find a key. After 
either a "yes" or a "no" answer on each question you 
will find a code of one, two, or three letters that 
tell how you are to score the answer. The scoring is 
done on a form like that shewn in Figure 1.1.
After you learn the procedure you will not need the 
full form. All you really need is a vertical list 
containing the code letters U, D, P, N, F, B. The 
procedure new follows in steps:
1. Go through your answers to all twenty-six 
questions and enter tallies according to the code 
shown on the key, making one tally mark for each 
letter in the code. For example, suppose a "yes" 
answer is followed by the code UPF, enter one 
tally mark after U, one after P, and one after F, 
on the form: three tally marks in all. Some
codes call for only one tally, as in the case of 
question 1, coded yes = U. Others call for two, 
as in question 2, coded yes = UP. Still others 
call for three, as in question 3, coded yes = UPF. 
The separate letters stand for the names of 
"directions" in the system (explained in step 3), 
and a complete set of one, two, or three such 
component letters is called a "directional 
indicator."
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2. After you have entered all tallies, count the 
lumber of tally marks after each code letter and 
enter the totals in the boxes marked Find Totals.
3. Next, oonfare the number entered for the
direction U with the number entered for D. The 
letter U stands for the direction called "upward" 
in the spatial model of this system, and D stands 
for the one called "downward." It is understood 
that, as in ordinary three-dimensional physical 
space, movement upward is the opposite of 
movement downward. They are opposite directions; 
movement in either direction cancels movement in 
the other. The object of the comparison is to 
find which direction is indicated most 
frequently, and by hew much. To record this
result, note the larger total, subtract the 
smaller from the larger of the pair, and put down 
the number standing for the difference, followed 
by the name of the larger (U or D) in the first 
box titled Subtract and Name. Go through the 
same steps for P (positive) compared to N
(negative) on the assumption that, as in
algebraic addition, the directions positive and 
negative cancel each other. Then do the same for 
F (forward) compared to B (backward), with the 
rule that forward and backward cancel each other 
(see Figure 1.1).
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INTERPERSONAL RATINGS, FORM B
1. Is his Cor her) rate of participation generally high?
2. Does he seem to assume he will be successful and 
popular?
3. Does he seem to see himself as a good and kind parent?
4. Is his rate of giving suggestions on group tasks high?
5. Is his rate of receiving disagreement generally high?
6 . Does he seem to make others feel he diKiikpg them?
7. Does he receive a lot of laughter?
8 . Does he seem very extroverted?
9. Does he seem able to give a lot of affection?
10. Does he seem friendly in his behaviour?
11. Is his rate of giving agreement generally high?
12. Does he tend mostly to give opinion or analysis when he 
participates?
13. Does he seem to emphasize moderation, value-determined 
restraint?
14. Does he seem unfriendly in his behaviour?.
15. Does he seem pessimistic about group ideals?
16. Does he seem preoccupied with wishful fantasies?
17. Does he seem to make others feel they are
entertaining, warm?
18. Does he seem calm, understanding?
19. Does he seem to be submissively good?
20. Does he seem often to ask for suggestion or for
task-leadership?
21. Does he seem to feel anxious, fearful of not 
conforming?
22. Does he seem only to participate when others ask him 
for his opinion?
23. Does he seem preoccupied with feelings of dislike for 
others?
24. Does he show many signs of tension and passive 
resistance?
25. Does he seem unlikely to arouse dislikes?
26. Does he seem to confine his participation mostly to
only giving information when asked?
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KEY TO BttERPERSGNaL KftTINS FOPMS
(This key is used for Forms A, B, C).
1 . No = D Yes = U
2 . No = m Yes = UP
3. No = DNB Yes = UPF
4. No = DB Yes = UF
5. No = DFB Yes = UNF
6 . No = DP Yes = UN
7. No = DPF Yes = UNB
8 . No = DF Yes = UB
9. No = DNF Yes = UPB
1 0 . No = N Yes = P
1 1 . No = NB Yes = PF
1 2 . No s= B Yes = F
13. No = PB Yes = NF
14. No = P Yes = N
15. No PF Yes = NB
16. No = F Yes = B
17. No ss NF Yes = PB
18. No = UN Yes = DP
19. No = UNB Yes = DPF
2 0 . No = UB Yes = DF
2 1 . No = UPB Yes = CNF
2 2 . No = UP Yes = DN
23. No = UPF Yes = DNB
24. No = UF Yes = DB
25. No = UNF Yes = DPB
26. No = U Yes = D
Enter Find Subtract Drop A n y  Smaller S u m m a r y  Assessment
Tallies Totals an d  N a m e  T h a n  3  Directional N a m e
u ININ 10
D (HI II 8
P (HI IKi il 13
N (HI 5
F (HI (HI llll 14
B llll 4
Figure 1.1 Scoring procedure for interpersonal ratings.
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Sane exanples of personality types [Bales, Part 2, pp. 189-377]
Type D: Toward Material 
Success and Power
The member located in the upward pert of the group 
space by his fellow neuters seems active, talkative, 
and powerful, but not clearly either friendly or 
unfriendly. He is neither clearly value- or
task-oriented, nor is he expressively oriented 
against the task. In the realization of his own 
values he seems to be trying to move toward material 
success and power. "Our modern industrial and 
scientific developments are signs of a greater 
degree of success than that attained by any previous 
society." "There are no limits to what science may 
eventually discover." "Let no one say that money is 
of secondary value - it is the measuring stick of 
scientific, artistic, moral, and all other values in 
a society."
Type OP: Toward 
Social Suooess
The menber located in the upward-positive part of 
the group space by his fellow members seems to be 
socially and sexually extroverted, ascendant but at 
the same time open and friendly. He encourages 
others to interact to express themselves and give 
their opinions, but he is neither clearly for the 
group task nor against it. In the realization of 
his own values he seems to be trying to move toward 
social success and popularity. "The most important 
thing in any group is to maintain a happy, friendly 
atmosphere, and let efficiency take care of itself." 
"Cooperation is far more enjoyable and more 
desirable than competition." "There are always 
plenty of people who are eager to extend a helping 
hand."
Type N: Toward 
Trv^ i v-idiia'l igf-ir; isolationism
The menber located in the negative part of the group 
space by his fellow members seems unfriendly and 
disagreeable, but neither ascendant nor submissive, 
neither value- and task-oriented, nor against 
authority as such. He is rather self-concerned and 
isolated, detached, unsocial, defensively secluded 
and negativistic. In the realization of his own 
values he seems to be trying to move toward 
individualistic isolation. "In life an individual 
should for the most part ’go it alone,' assuring 
himself of privacy, having much time to himself, 
attempting to control his « n  life."
Type B: Toward Rejection 
of Conservative Group Belief
The menber located in the backward part of the group 
space by his fellow members seems heretical and 
disbelieving. He refuses to admit the validity of 
nearly all conservative group beliefs and values. 
He wishes to install another form of society, or 
perhaps a different mode of existence, a fantasy 
mode, in another place and time. He is neither 
clearly unfriendly nor friendly, but ambivalent. He 
is neither ascendant and expressive, nor submissive 
and completely inhibited, but tends to be poised, 
lost in the fantasy of wildly improbable ambitions, 
unable to decide anything or to actually strive for 
anything far in the future. In the realization of 
his own values he seems to be trying to move toward 
the rejection of all conservative group belief. 
"Man can solve all his important problems without 
help from a Supreme Being." "Heaven and Hell are 
products of man's imagination, and do not actually 
exist." "The whole structure of society must be 
radically changed."
TYPE CNF:
Toward Autocratic Authority
The member located in the upward-negative-forward 
part of the group space by his fellow members seems 
dominating and unfriendly and takes the initiative 
in the value-or task-oriented direction. He assumes 
moral superiority over the others in the group and 
regards himself as the authority and the guardian of 
the moral and legal order. In the realization of 
his own values he seems to be trying to move toward 
autocratic authority. "In most groups it's better 
to choose somebody to take charge and run things and 
then hold him responsible, even if he does seme 
things the members don't like." "Obedience and 
respect for authority are the most important virtues 
children should learn."
Type P:
Toward P/pi'Hi't-aT-i anion
The menber located in the positive part of the group 
space by his fellow members seems friendly, 
sociable, and informal. He approaches others as 
equals, neither ascendant nor submissive. He seems 
interested in them as individual persons with needs 
and motives of their own, as important as his own. 
He is not concerned about either their 
conventionality or their deviance, nor with either 
their task-relevance nor their status. In the 
realization of his own values he seems to move 
toward equalitarianism. "There should be quality 
for everyone - because we are all h/rran beings."
Type PB: Toward 
Permissive T.iheral-tm
The menber located in the positive-backward part oi 
the group space by his fellow members is friendly 
and receptive to jokes and stories, neither 
ascendant nor submissive, but equalitarian. He is 
not task-oriented, but responsive to others as 
individual persons, appreciative and likable, read} 
to share and enjoy sociability. He wants everybody 
to have what he needs, without a lot of 
complications. He is concerned about persons anc 
their growth. In the realization of his own values 
he seems to be trying to move toward permissive 
liberalism. "Divorce should be subject to fewer 
old-fashioned restrictions and become more a matter 
of mutual consent."
Type DP: Toward Trust 
in the Goodness of Others
The menber located in the downward-positive part o: 
the group space by his fellow members seems friend! 
and nonassertive, calm and ready to admire others 
He is neither primarily task-oriented no: 
expression-oriented, but responsive to others a 
individual persons. He tends to trust and identif 
with others. He feels people cure good; he like! 
them in his calm and sanewhat submissive way. H< 
tends to emulate and imitate those he likes. In tbx 
realization of his own values he seems to be tryirx 
to move toward trust in the goodness of others! 
"People are basically and innately good." "The vasl 
majority of men are truthful and dependable."
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(iii) *F' Scale dusters
T. W. Adorno, E. FrenkelHBrunswik, D. J.
Levinson, R. N. Sanford
The Authoritarian Personality, pp.255-257.
F-Scale Clusters: Forms 45 and 40
a. Conventionalisms: Rigid adherence to conventional,
middle-class values.
1. Obedience and respect for authority are the most
important virtues children should learn.
12. A person who has bad manners, habits, and breeding can 
hardly expect to get along with decent people.
37. If people would talk less and work more, everybody
would be better off.
41. The business man and the manufacturer are much more
important to society than the artist and the
professor.
b. Authoritarian Submission: Submissive, uncritical attitude
toward idealized moral authorities of the ingroup.
1. Obedience and respect for authority are the most 
important virtues children should learn.
4. Science has its place, but there are many important 
things that can never possibly be understood by the 
human mind.
8 . Every person should have complete faith in seme 
supernatural power whose decisions he obeys without 
question.
21. Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas, but as 
they grow up they ought to get over them and settle 
down.
23. What this country needs most, more than laws and 
political programs, is a few courageous, tireless, 
devoted leaders in whom the people can put their 
faith.
42. No sane, normal, decent person could ever think of 
hurting a close friend or relative.
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44. Nobody ever learning anything really important except 
through suffering.
c. Authoritarian Aggression: Tendency to be on the lookout
for, and to condemn, reject, and punish people who violate
conventional values.
12. A person who has bad manners, habits, and breeding can 
hardly expect to get along with decent people.
13. What the youth needs most is strict discipline, rugged 
determination, and the will to work and fight for 
family and country.
19. An insult to our honor should always be punished.
25. Sex crimes, such as rape and attacks on children,
deserve more than mere imprisonment; such criminals 
ought to be publicly whipped, or worse.
27 There is hardly anything lower than a person who does
not feel a great love, gratitude, and respect for his 
-parents.
34. Most of our social problems would be solved if we
could somehow get rid of the immoral, crooked, and 
feebleminded people.
37. If people would talk less and work more, everybody
would be better off.
39. Homosexuals are hardly better than criminals and ought
to be severely punished.
d. Anti-intraoeption: Opposition to the subjective, the
imaginative, the tender-minded.
9. When a person has a problem or worry/ it is best for
him not to think about it, but to keep busy with more 
cheerful things.
31. Nowadays more and more people are prying into matters
that should remain personal and private.
37. If people would talk less and work more, everybody
would be better off.
41. The businessman and the manufacturer are much more
important to society than the artist and the 
professor.
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e. Superstition and Stereotypy: The belief in mystical 
determinants of the individual's fate; the disposition to 
think in rigid categories.
4. Science has its place, but there are many important 
things that can never possibly be understood by the 
human mind.
8 . Every person should have complete faith in sane 
supernatural power whose decisions he obeys without 
question.
16. Seme people are bom with an urge to jump from high 
places.
26. People can be divided into two distinct classes; the 
weak and the strong.
29. Some day it will probably be shewn that astrology can 
explain a lot of things.
33. Wars and social troubles may someday be ended by an 
earthquake or flood that will destroy the whole world.
f. Power and "Toughness": Preoccupation with the 
dcminance-submission, strong-weak, leader-follcwer 
dimension; identification with power figures; overemphasis 
upon the conventionalized attributes of the ego; 
exaggerated assertion of strength and toughness.
2. No weakness or difficulty can hold us back if we have 
enough will power.
13. What the youth needs most is strict discipline, rugged 
determination, and the will to work and fight for 
family and country.
19. An insult to our honor should always be punished.
21. It is best to use some prewar authorities in Germany to 
keep order and prevent chaos.
23. What this country needs most, more than laws and 
political programs, is a few courageous tireless, 
devoted leaders in whan the people can put their 
faith.
26. People can be divided into two distinct classes; the 
weak and the strong.
38. Most people don't realize how much our lives are
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controlled by plots hatched in secret places.
Destructiveness and Cynicism; Generalized hostility, 
vilification of the human.
6 . Human nature being what it is, there will always be 
war and conflict.
43. Familiarity breeds contempt.
h. Productivity: The disposition to believe that wild and
dangerous things go on in the world; the projection
outwards of unconscious emotional impulses.
18. Nowadays when so many. different kinds of people move 
around and mix together so much, a person has to 
protect himself especially carefully against catching 
an infection or disease from them.
31. Nowadays more and more people are prying into matters 
that should remain personal and private.
33. Wars and social troubles may someday be ended by an 
earthquake or flood that will destroy the whole world.
35. The wild sex life of the old Greeks and Romans was
tame compared to some of the goings-on in this
country, even in places where people might least 
expect it.
38. Most people don't realize hew much our lives are
controlled by plots hatched in secret places.
i Sex: Exaggerated concern with sexual "goings-on".
25. Sex crimes, such as rape and attacks on children,
deserve more than mere imprisonment; such criminals 
ought to be publicly whipped, or worse.
35. The wild sex life of the old Greeks and Romans was 
tame compared to some of the goings-on in this 
country, even in places where people might least 
expect it.
39. Homosexuals are hardly better than criminals and ought 
to be severely punished.
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(iv) Sample items: Eugene E. Levitt, The Psychology of Anxiety
(a) Sample Items frcm Taylor's Manifest Anxiety Scale.
I frequently find myself worrying
about something. True False
I always have enough energy when
faced with difficulty. True False
I am usually calm and not easily upset. True False
I have diarrhoea once a month or more. True False
p.84.
(b) The Affect Adjective Check List
Anxiety-plus Anxiety-minus
Calm 
Cheerful 
Contented 
Happy 
Joyful 
Loving 
Pleasant 
Secure 
Steady 
Thoughtful
p. 42
(c) Sample Items frcm Freeman Manifest Anxiety Text.
If someone is easily irritated, the reason is he 
cannot help himself. Yes No
The successful person:
(1) Takes things as they come.
(2) Worries before each task.
The average person:
(1) Fears another war talcing place.
(2) Fears doing the wrong thing.
p.95
Afraid
Desperate
Fearful
Frightened
Nervous
Panicky
Shaky
Tense
Terrified
Upset
Worrying
[1313
(d) Sample Items frcm the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory
I am calm. 1 2 3 4 5
I feel regretful. 1 2 3 4 5
I am a steady person. 1 2 3 4 5
I am overexcited and battled'. 1 2 3 4 5
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of the most important psychological 
characteristics of the national 
population." p. 458
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CHAPTER 10 
NATIONAL CHARACTER: APPLICATIONS
[157]
[i]
It may be said of the bulk of contemporary sources quoted in 
chapters 2 to 8 that they do not constitute a challenge to David 
Potter's assertion that theories of the distinctiveness of 
national groups often find singularly ready and widespread 
acceptance. And, to the extent that many writers who ccnmented 
on the traits and values of 'the Germans' were retailing, and 
offering for public consumption, ideas which could contaminate 
critical capacities if taken without due care, the sources also 
support his contention that there was a 'traffic' in the concept 
of national character. Before outlining a theoretical framework 
for the study of contributions on the characteristics of the 
Germans, two particular conceptual approaches have to be 
discussed briefly, then dismissed - the approach which took 
nations to have "great personalities of their own..."^  , and 
the approach which invoked the idea of an average personality 
structure and/or an average behaviour pattern.
Writing in 1915, Geoffrey Faber was cautious in his appraisal of 
the concept 'individual personality', and well aware that it was 
not a mere surface phenomenon. The concept still lacked 
theoretical substance; no satisfactory definition had been 
framed. In consequence, its nature was "imperfectly, if at all 
understood." On some issues, however, there was agreement. It
[158]
was known that personality was complex and variable, that it was
the product of ages of slew development, that it could be
"broken up", and that there was "more behind than appears on the
surface - immense reservoirs of energy and emotion seldom
(2)dreamed of even by their possessor."' When he came to apply 
the concept to the life experiences of individual men and to the 
characteristics of nations, Faber was much less cautious. The 
complexities and hidden depths of personality and the variations 
possible within an individuals personality profile, were 
collapsed into three clearly defined stages. Each stage was 
occupied by a particular 'typo1, identified by a clearly defined 
cluster of traits, and each stage was an unfaltering step on the 
way to maturity.
"In the life of the... man of spirit we see three
stages... First comes the boy... savage, vindictive,
quarrelsome, cruel, pugnacious; then the young man...
sensitive to honour, generous, quick to draw upon an enemy
or to embrace a friend, ardent both in hatred and
affection; last, the full grown man, growing each year
more tolerant, more sympathetic, less angry, less
(3)impulsive. So runs the gamut from cruelty to charity."
This model of personality development was then laid like a 
template on national and international experience with the
[159]
suggestion that it was possible to trace "an exactly similar
course of development in the personality of nations," the one
difference - of degree rather than kind - being that the
characteristics reappeared in more or less exaggerated form at
(4)national level. The truth of this proposition was to be seen
(5)
in virtually "every event in international history." Faber 
did not elaborate on this point, but what he seems likely to 
have had in mind was that, depending on the stage reached in the 
development of the national personality, action on the part of 
any one nation would be expressed savagely, vindictively, 
cruelly, or with an unpredictability which could embrace 
generosity, touchiness, fraternity and hatred, or with 
sympathetic understanding. In this way the action of the nation 
would resemble that of the boy, or the young man, or the mature 
man.
The notion that as personality develops the psychological 'skin' 
appropriate to each superseded stage is shed, that, in fact, the 
process of development is unilinear, cannot be sustained; nor, 
as will be noted be lew, can the notion that nations have 
personalities. This is not to deny the explanatory value of 
metaphorical connections between the psychological condition of 
individuals and the public actions and reactions of nation 
states. It was not uncommon before the First World War for 
writers to depict the public actions and reactions of Germany as
[160]
expressive of adolescent behaviour. This was metaphorical, and 
illustrative of hew Germany appeared to perceive herself in 
relation to other states. At its least sympathetic it was 
concerned with symptoms and had conservative undertones; 
Germany was being difficult and disruptive; she had the vigour 
and clumsiness of youth, but had not yet developed sound 
judgement; the socialisation process was incomplete. At its most 
sympathetic it was descriptive of an identity crisis, of a party 
to a set of relationships attempting to terminate the "social 
moratorium" between youth and adulthood and achieve parity of 
status.^
Faber asserted that "the personality of a nation is just as 
truly organic as that of a single individual." In an attempt - 
not entirely without merit - to establish the connections, he 
succeeded in demonstrating the absurdity of his case. "An 
organism", he wrote [clearly dealing with the human 
individual], "is something more than the sum of its parts. The 
character of... an organism is more affected by a few dominant 
than by a number of indifferent units." This much is 
acceptable; one only has to consider the relative significance 
of brain/central nervous system and limbs for the 'health* of 
the individual. When he came to consider the personality of 
nations he noted that official Germany, representative of the 
nation in international affairs, was "essentially warlike and
[161]
aggressive," whereas the majority of Germans were "personally
disposed for peace and a quiet life, neither interfering nor
interfered with." How was this to be explained? Since the
personality of a nation was no less organic than that of an
individual, the relative significance of components would again
be the determining factor; in other words, it would be "the
dominant and strongest personalities which contribute most to
(7)the personality of the nation as a whole." Faber's attempt 
to explain official German conduct by making distinctions 
between Germans on the grounds of relative significance was an 
advance on the explanatory devices employed by many of his 
contemporaries, but the foundations of his particular argument 
were weak. Nations are not organisms; nor do they have 
personalities, as opposed to the theoretical possibility that at 
any given point in time they can provide territorial parameters 
for the construction of a complex personality profile. It is 
true that an individual organism is more affected by dominant 
than by indifferent units, and that the official conduct of a 
nation state is more likely to be affected by dominant rather 
than by indifferent forces. But Faber's parallels break down in 
face of a simple test; destroy the individual's brain/central 
nervous system and the individual organism dies; destroy the 
dominant forces responsible for the official conduct of the 
nation state and others take their places.
[162]
The concepts of ’average1 personality structure or ’average*
behaviour pattern are used in a number of sources. Geoffrey
Faber [1915] commented on "the life of the average man. . . ; * 1
Thomas F. A. Smith [1916] asserted that ”... the average German
will sell his soul for an empty title...;" Paul Barr [1923]
referred to "the average German, when you get to the root of
him...;" L. B. Namier [1941] considered that "A nation can
crystallise above or below the average moral level of the
(8)individuals who compose it."
An average is arrived at through a process of redistribution. 
There are situations in which invoking the concept makes 
operational sense and others in which it does not. By 
’operational' in this context is meant the capacity to actually 
implement the process of redistribution. If 5 men sitting round 
a table took all the money out of their pockets, pooled and 
summed it and then divided the total into 5 equal parts, with 
one share going to each individual, it could be said that each 
came to hold an average amount by an act of redistribution. 
There is operational sense to the exercise. On the other hand 
there may well be purpose [actuarial, carmercial, welfare] but 
there is no operational sense in calculating the average height 
or average weight of a population. The calculation is possible, 
since numerical quantities are involved, but there is no 
possibility of actual redistribution. In these two examples,
[163]
calculation was possible in both cases, but redistribution [and, 
therefore, operational sense] in only one. Where personalities 
are concerned, neither calculation nor redistribution is possible.
Take Smith’s assertion that "national character is a rough
average of all the individual characters which make up the
(9)nation... Setting aside the objection that, even if such a 
calculation, were possible, it would produce one standard 
national character which would probably fit very few 
individuals, rather than a national profile with internal 
variations, there are practical difficulties. How would a gross 
'personality' quantity be arrived at? How would redistribution 
take place? oddly enough, Smith did not have to invoke the 
concept of average. Had he dropped the first six words from the 
following passage on German characteristics and substituted a 
phrase such as, 'in order to form a picture of the culturally 
determined behaviour of a national group', he would have 
retained its essential meaning and at the same time expressed 
more clearly his obvious interest in behavioural norms and 
social sanctions and values. In itself the passage points to 
the iirportance of studying norm-referenced behaviour in a 
systematic way. The intrusion of a piece of verbal trickery in 
the form of 'average' was unnecessary.
"... in order to strike this average, their daily acts in
[164]
the counting house, street, and hone must be observed. 
Attention must be paid to those deeds which receive 
condemnation or praise from the largest number of 
citizens. In the process of time an image is formed in the 
observer's mind representing the standard of right and 
wrong which regulates the doings between these men."
Namier's use of the concept has already been mentioned in chapter
6 . One or two comments may be added here. All the reservations
made above on calculation and redistribution apply to his notion
of an "average moral level." But he used "average moral level"
for other purposes - namely to demonstrate the superiority of
that level in one nation as against another. This led to
logical inconsistency in his argument. Once formed, Namier's
national character acted on individuals: "the English national
pattern raises individuals above their own average moral level,
. (11)the German suppresses their human sides." In plain English
this must mean that the prevailing norms and values in Britain 
made many people behave in a way which appeared to enhance their 
moral potential, whereas the prevailing norms and values in 
Germany made many people behave in a way which appeared to erode 
their moral potential. This means that positive, conscientious 
conformance was not universal in either nation, and that all 
sorts of motives were at play behind the overt acceptance of 
norms and values. In short, it presupposes differential
[165]
sharing. However, it will be noted below that Namier did not 
allow the notion of differential sharing - a logical consequence 
of his particular use of the concept of average - to intrude on 
his judgement of Germans en masse.
[ii]
Figure [ 9 ] represents an attempt to define an analytic 
framework within which the sources may be studied. With the 
discussion in chapter 9 in mind, an approach to national 
character would be considered unimodal, bimodal, or multimodal 
depending on hew the contributor perceived characteristics - 
personality or behavioural - to be distributed. It is proposed 
that variance in the type of approach would be accompanied by 
variance in the nature of related arguments. For example, a 
unimodal approach would be more likely to exaggerate the degree 
of cultural or personality trait homogeneity, more likely to 
regard characteristics as innate, and more likely to recommend 
cataclysmic remediation than would a multimodal approach. 
Conversely, a multimodal approach would be more likely to assign 
some degree of causal autonomy to situational factors, more 
likely to demonstrate concern for appropriate methods of 
investigation, and more likely to give objective consideration 
to the wider cultural context than would a unimodal approach.
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Application of such an analytic framework is relatively 
straightforward when dealing with sources which are explicitly 
unimodal, bimodal, or multimodal in approach to national 
characteristics. There are, however, one or two slightly odd 
cases which lie outside its scope, and a larger number of cases 
where the approach to characteristics is implicit and has to be 
inferred. In this latter case it is important that the reader 
is made aware of the interpretive processes used to assign 
particular modal structures to such sources.
J. A. Cramb [1914], L. J. Maxse [1915] and Paul Barr [1923] fall
(12)into the category of odd cases. Maxse and Cramb were less
concerned with national character as it has so far been defined
than with the great historical currents and fates which in a
sense 'selected' powers for greatness and then brought them into
confrontation with each other. "The forces which determine the
actions of empires and great nations," wrote Cranib, "are deep
hidden... They lie beyond the wishes and intentions of the
individuals composing those nations. They may even be contrary
. . (13)to those wishes and intentions." In this there is a very
definite sense of great events and developments being beyond the 
control of 'national characteristics' - "La politique, c'est la 
fatalite" Of course, one may argue that the capacity to
recognise and seize upon historical destiny or fate is probably 
a function of a particular 'type' of people. A lazy,
[168]
unimaginative, unambitious people, lacking in initiative, would 
be unlikely to take up the opportunities or use to the full that 
potential stored up by "laws more akin to Nature... than to the
(15)
motives of human action."' This paradox is implicit in the
work of Maxse and Crairb. On the one hand, individuals cannot be
regarded as mere byestanders? Napoleon's belief that "Politics
is Destiny" has to be taken in conjunction with his adage,
"Everything is in the execution." On the other hand, there were
"those darker, obscurer forces shaping the destiny of
nations." This paradox may be resolved by reading between
the lines of a passage fran Cramb*s lectures which refers to
Germany's spiritual resources, to "the hidden foundations of its
strengths," and to the fact that "with nations, as with
individuals, it is character that counts; he that wills
(17)greatly, conquers greatly." Here Cramb appears to use
'character' in the same way that the concept 'having character'
was treated by R. S. Peters - to describe individuals who could
exercise self-control, who would not easily give way to
self-indulgent desires, who would not take their colour from
their company, who would do what their inner voices told them
(18)that they should, "even though the heavens fall." Men of
this calibre would be able, indeed essential servants in the 
cause of Destiny. It does not appear far-fetched to consider 
that Maxse and Cramb would have regarded as being without 
character the 'peace-cranks', the parliamentarians preoccupied
[169]
with ’trivial issues’, the public men fascinated and hypnotised 
by German blandishments, and all others whose words and deeds 
appeared to deflect the energies of Britain frcxn the inevitable 
conflict.
But character in this sense is descriptive of "the style and not 
the content of a man's rule-following,” and as such may say
little or nothing about an individual's substantive or 
motivational traits. Maxse and Cramb were more important to the 
discussion on the appropriateness of the Idealist-Realist 
dichotomy than they are to the discussion on national 
characteristics.
Paul Barr's contribution [1923] may be described as 'odd' for a 
quite different reason. His argument was markedly multimodal. 
He highlighted what he termed natural lines of division and drew 
the outline of a very richly patterned cultural profile:
"The south is Catholic and monarchist? the Rhineland is 
Catholic but republican; the centre is Protestant and 
moderately republican ? Saxony is almost Ccmnunist? the 
north-east is Protestant but monarchist... There is a 
chasm between what one might call the cultural atom of,
say, the Pommeranian and the Bavarian, or the Suabian and
. (2 1) the Westphalian, or the Prussian and the Saxon."
[170]
He was aware that in posing the question, 'Is Germany a 
Nation?', he was running the risk of being labelled as an 
amiable lunatic or as sane blissfully ignorant backwoodsman 
since,
"For the last two generations we have had dinned into our 
ears stories of German thoroughness and craft, intense 
national ambition, admirable organisation and efficiency. 
Even before the war... we had grown accustomed to look 
upon Germany as a homogeneous whole, working with 
well-oiled bearings..."
But he was convinced that the process of unifying Germany, of 
"forging it into the single, flawless blade of steel it proved
to be in 1914", did not correspond to the genuine instinct in
(23) .the mind of the German people. The German Bnpire was not
the product of natural, healthy grcwth. It was an artificial
creation, likely in the near future, and as a result of the
recent defeat, to revert to "a heterogeneous collection of
(24) .states, each with its own problems..." The Franco-Belgian
seizure of the Ruhr had appeared to rouse national feeling, but
resentment had been related to day-to-day economic deprivation -
to "absurd prices for bread, butter, meat and the like" - rather
than to any emotional ccnmitment to the "sacredness of Germanic 
(25)soil." The same sort of response, with variation, had
[171]
characterised attitudes to the Silesian issue:
"German politicians and journalists went into hysteria 
about Silesia; it was, they said, like tearing the very 
heart out of the living body of Germany..."
But then it was discovered by the ordinary German that
"German industry was not dead... and that to its continued 
welfare it mattered not one rcw of pins whether Silesia 
was under the German or the Polish flag. The minute he 
realised that, he ceased to care about Silesia. It was 
dead meat to him."^^
The problem, so far as the analytic framework is concerned, is 
that Barr did not so much comment on the characteristics profile 
of a permanent cultural entity known as Germany, as on the 
characteristics profile of a temporary, artificially created and 
soon to disappear cultural entity to be found in the
geographical area known as Germany.
By way of contrast with contributions which were implicit in 
their approach to national characteristics, and call for
inferential interpretation, [see below], Dillon [1914], Harrison
[1918], and De Sales [1942] may be taken as examples of
[172]
contributions which were quite explicit on German
(27)characteristics. In Dillon*s view, Germany had parted
company with morality. Warlike tendencies, evil purposes, and 
savage instincts characterised the people and gave the whole 
nation the image of the Anti-Christ. He conceded influence to 
culture, but in the case of Germany this influence was uniform. 
He did refer specifically to the "virus of the fell Prussian 
disease," but it would be a mistake to suppose that this was a 
serious act of discrimination, for Prussia and Germany were 
interchangeable terms as far as he was concerned, with 
’Prussianism' being the creed which animated the nation as a 
whole. The remedy was to smash German culture. Justice should 
be retributive. The Devil should be destroyed. Harrison's 
position was that particularly nasty characteristics were very 
widely distributed across the German population. Each German 
had within himself something of "the wild beast." Just as the 
beast of the forest forever carried its markings, so with the 
German people; no amount of goodwill or consideration, no 
amount of time, no normal human circumstance or experience - and 
here we vrould have to include historical events, cultural 
modifications, etc., - could promote a change of character. It 
is clear that he took the characteristics to be not only 
homogeneous in distribution but also innate, that he denied any 
degree of causal autonomy to situational factors, that the wider 
cultural context was relegated to insignificance, and that
[173]
cultural considerations were seen as simple and uniform rather 
than complex and variable. Further, remediation had to be of 
the cataclysmic variety. There was a faint chance of re-birth 
to something less vile, but to be brought to it the German 
people would have to be broken, brought low, degraded and 
ruined. For Raol de Roussy De Sales, all Germans were 
characterised by commitment to a particular form of romanticism. 
The layer-by-layer development of his argument provided 
opportunities to limit the distribution of such a characteristic 
to, say, literary, intellectual, and artistic elites, but the 
opportunities vere ignored. Whereas in other parts of Western 
Europe romanticism had, in sum, a fairly innocuous effect on 
political affairs because it remained within the framework of 
laws and conventions, the situation was different in Germany:
"... across the Rhine romanticism took a very different
form... under its Germanic aspect, this exploitation of
sentimental emotionalism, of inflated egotism.
translated itself into something forceful, aggressive,
(28)bloody, racial and barbaric."
Worship of the individual ego within areas of experience not 
controlled by the State, and in opposition to the rest of the 
western world, carried with it a threat to all codes of 
morality, a threat heightened by the fact that "the whole German
[174]
people now visualise themselves as the incarnation of the great
romantic age." And, of course, it was the "fundamental theme of
(29)romanticism that the ego is the extreme law unto itself..."
The Germans saw it as their mission to "overthrow the western
world, to rid themselves of its moral discipline, of its
rationalism, of its concept that there is a law above man."
Hitler was indissolubly linked with this aspect of the German
character. His Mein Kampf and J. J. Rousseau*s Confessions had
the same "unregulated intellectual exhibitionism." From a
position of exaggerated self-importance both took pleasure in
describing how they had suffered, and how harsh and unjust the
world had been. In this, Hitler was "the perfect example of the 
(31)romantic hero." He was the mirror of every German's
unconscious, the loudspeaker which magnified the inaudible 
whispers of the German soul; he was the first man to tell every 
German what he had been thinking and feeling all along. So 
that,
"Through Hitler, the Germanic tendency to identify
brutality with strength, cruelty with manliness, hardness
(32)with determination, has been brought to perfection. " V 7
In all this there was no regard for the possibility of 
differential sharing in cultural norms and values. A wider 
cultural context was alluded to, but the following passage
[175]
suggests that it was brought into play to support his general 
thesis and to point up paranoid and sado-masochistic tendencies 
rather than to consider, objectively, if international norms had 
any bearing on German policy.
"No other nation has tried to justify its 
quasi-pa thological manifestations of brutality, 
lawlessness, and ferocity on the basis that the whole 
world was leagued against it in seme sort of fabulous 
plot. No other nation has ccmplained so much of being 
treated unjustly not only by fate but by every other 
single nation... No other nation has practised with such 
consummate skill and persistence the double blackmail of 
trying to inspire pity as a victim and terror as a 
bully. "(33)
In contrast to Dillon, Harrison, and De Sales, Dent [1928],
Gooch [1928, 1935 and 1939] and Eaton [1937] may be regarded as
sources whose positions on the modality of German
(34)characteristics were implicit and had to be inferred. In a
short contribution of 11 pages to the Gardiner and Rocholl 
Symposium, Edward Dent never quite made it clear where he stood 
on the modal distribution of the characteristics which he 
assigned to Germans. The reader is two-thirds of the way through 
the article before he learns that Dent's purposes are limited
[176]
ones. Germany, he argued, was in need of leaders,
"... I do not mean political leaders, for this article is 
not concerned with politics, but intellectual and artistic 
leaders."
In Germany there appeared to be a "blind devotion" to what was 
vorschriftmassig - in accordance with instructions or
prescriptions. The effect of this had been to make "all German
(361 «life curiously devoid of artistic unity." Vorsdhriftmassige
principles covered such concepts as Bildung, which was one of
the most cherished conventional ideas in Germany. Bildung -
form, structure, organisation - explained their "love to have
everything arranged in categories." The Englishman, on the
other hand, did not think in categories; he was synthetic in
his approach to issues and ideas - so that, for example, he
instinctively applied aesthetic principles to ethics "because he
does not know the difference between the two - he has no idea of
Bildung." The German could not possibly apply aesthetic
principles to ethics because he knew that they were "two entirely
(37)separate things." The act of bringing them together would
entail the crossing of category boundaries, and cause confusion. 
It was a general insensitivity on the part of the British to 
this caimitment to Bildung which caused misunderstandings and 
recriminations between them and the Germans. Germans, for
[177]
example, were frequently accused of being tactless, yet anyone
who really knew them understood that they were fundamentally
kind. The resolution of this apparent paradox was to be found in
the feet that "tact is simply the application of intellect to
kindness - and that, of course, is a confusion of
(38)categories." Additionally, there was a tendency in Germany 
to take up " a definite attitude" toward anything and everything 
- "Mann muss dazu Stellung ndTmen." This was a trait quite 
distinct fran the Englishman's preference to "act on reason", to 
hesitate rather than simply go ahead without the necessary 
forethought.
To what extent were such characteristics distributed across the 
German population as a Whole? A close sentence by sentence 
analysis of Dent's contribution suggests that his approach to 
Germany, nationally, was bimodal to multimodal, but that his 
approach to the elite groups which were responsible for the 
definition and codification of 'Good Form' was unimodal. It was 
in these elite groups that a high degree of homogeneity was 
present. His references - 6 times in 3 pages - to the average 
German and the average Englishman appear in his case to be less 
an erroneous attempt to gross and redistribute personality 
traits than an ill-choice of synonym for the unimodal - i.e., 
overwhelmingly predominant - attitudes and behaviours of the 
socially dominant groups. When assessing German
[178]
characteristics the counterpoints in Britain were "large numbers
of people among the educated classes..." When he strenuously
asserted that his contribution had nothing to do with politics,
and at the same time regretted that "all German life" was
"seriously devoid of artistic unity," the reader may be
entitled to assume that "all German life" meant all the German
life that he was specifically interested in - artistic and
intellectual circles. It is instructive to consider the status
of the native German sources whan he quoted in support of his
case. They were by no stretch of the imagination statistically
representative of the population as a whole. One was "a
cultivated and much travelled German..."; yet another had means
enough to arrange his European tours according to particular
fancies - Italy for beauty, France for the pleasures of the
body, Germany for the pleasures of the mind, and England for
Geselligkeit; then there were "two students... both sons of
professors and brought up in really cultured hemes..."; and
again, "one friend of mine - a man with an amazing knowledge of
(41)art." The 'German' penchant for getting involved in things 
immediately and instinctively rather than after a lengthy 
period of consideration and preparation, was illustrated by 
references to industrialists and businessmen. The way in which 
Dent fixed his attention on and devoted his remarks to elite 
groups within German society, highlighting what he took to be 
their distinctive and uniform traits and attitudes, suggests
[179]
that his approach to the nation as a whole was implicitly 
bi-multimodal.
Three of G. P. Gooch's pre-1940 contributions to the debate on
the German Problem [1928, 1935, 1939] make no explicit reference
to national characteristics. In spite of this there are strong
grounds for inferring that his approach was decidedly
multimodal. All three are marked by an appreciation of the
complexities and variability of cultural factors; all assign a
measure of causal autonomy to situational factors; all give
objective consideration to the wider cultural context involving
international norms, values, and patterns of behaviour; two
[1935, 1939] implicitly avoid exaggeration of homogeneity. In
1964, Gooch wrote postscripts to his 1935 and 1939 contributions
which, unlike the originals, explicitly dealt with national
characteristics. These postscripts support the inference of
(42)multimodality in the earlier work. His afterthought on the
Conway Memorial Lecture [1935] referred to the opportunity which 
the overthrow of the Nazi regime had given for "the re-emergence 
of the better elements in the German people"; that on the 
university of London Extra-mural Lecture [1939] raised the 
question of the extent to which the Nazis represented "the 
community whan they led into the valley of the shadow of death." 
He accepted that certain distinctive traits had variable 
distribution within Germany. It was possible to detect a
[180]
"traditional docility", and in part at least, the Germans were 
"a romantically minded and inflamable people..." That he did 
not perceive these characteristics as being uniformly 
distributed is evident from the fact that he used this analysis 
as the basis for a three-way division on political participation 
- positive supporters of the Nazi regime, positive opponents, 
and passive supporters. He believed it was "a delusion to 
regard Germany as more temperamentally bellicose than other 
nations." His post-war attitude to Germany was far from being 
one which favoured cataclysmic remediation; rather was it in 
line with that expressed by Beveridge. Germany should be 
treated not as a criminal but as a hospital case; "no offender 
can be reformed by outlawry."
Gooch's pre-war ccnments on the Nazi regime are particularly 
interesting in the context of this analysis since they may be 
read as descriptive of totalitarian efforts to establish, where 
it had not previously existed, the unimodal distribution of 
certain characteristics, traits, values, attitudes and behaviour 
patterns. The Nazi aim was to fashion a Volksgemeinschaft. 
Totalitarian uniformity would be expressed through "one party, 
one pattern, one rhythm, one creed." As the individual lost 
himself in the life of the whole, an "authorised type" would be 
produced. To distinguish between a typical pluralist - and so 
multimodal - democratic system, and the "single pattern of mind
[181]
and character" - unimodality - aimed at by the totalitarian
system, Gooch used a botanical analogy: "It is the difference
(43)between the flower garden and a field of turnips." His
multimodal image of Germany before Hitler came to power may also
be inferred frcm his comments that the Nazis were running a
steam-roller over the "political and cultural regionalism... of
(44)the old Germany," and attempting by force to reduce to
(45)"mechanical unity" an "infinite variety of human types." 
Situational factors, cultural complexities, and the wider 
international context were enlisted in explanation of the rise 
of Hitler and the collapse of the Weimar Republic. Material 
destruction, humiliation, economic misery, had all played their 
part, and at the end it was "the American blizzard that filled 
his sails and floated him over the b a r . " M i l l i o n s  of 
distracted people were searching for solutions to meet their own 
particular needs, and Gooch’s appreciation of the sociological, 
regional, sub-cultural, confessional and age differences that 
gave rise to those particular needs confirmed that his 
perception of Germany was of a society in which characteristics 
were distributed multimodally rather than unimodally.
J. W. Eaton's contribution [1937] is less susceptible to 
confident inference, largely because in his case there are 
occasions when 'reading between the lines' - normally 
facilitated by evidence internal to the source - can be carried
[182]
out only if external collaboration or clarification is enlisted. 
And to do this is to run the risk of attributing to the original 
source very much more than it said, either explicitly or 
implicitly. To take account of this risk, two possible 
interpretations of Eaton's contribution will be provided, and 
the reader invited to make a choice. This particular case draws 
attention to the fine type of judgement that would sometimes be 
required to locate a source in the analytic framework.
So far as thought for methods of arriving at conclusions,
ascription of sane degree of causal autonomy to situational
factors, and notice of a wider cultural context are concerned,
Eaton's approach has the mark of multimodality. He thought it
important to take a balanced view, to set aside any prejudice
associated with the past. He believed that injustices had been
incorporated in the Peace Settlement. Those could not be
ignored as factors contributing to the rise of Hitler; nor
could the serious post-war difficulties, internal and external -
the prolongation of the blockade, the chronic inflation, the
jealous and vindictive policies of France. A perception of
sub-cultural differences, and so of differential sharing, can
be detected in his view that the Arbeitsdienst could bridge
(47)gulfs in society. And yet, he reflected,
"Are all the reasons for present-day Germany to be found
[183]
in the events since 1914? Are there not, as with other 
nations, still more important reasons to be found in her 
history and in certain traits in the national 
character..."
He was obviously troubled by the historical record. The Germans 
had never, to his time of writing, shown any capacity to achieve 
or bear the costs of a democratic system. They appeared to 
lack confidence and trust in each other. Reform never seemed to 
ccme frcm "Their cwn persistent efforts and sacrifice", but from 
"regulations and instructions from above." They could not bind 
themselves together by their cwn efforts; for this they seemed 
to require "a strong and confident leader."
One way of reading Eaton's contribution would be that his 
willingness to retreat from a unimodal approach, through 
consideration of a range of explanatory issues, was ultimately 
overpowered by his feeling that crucially distinctive and very 
widely distributed characteristics had a profound influence on 
German history. This reading would have him fall into the 
unimodal canp. There is another way of reading his contribution, 
a reading which throws up a support rather than a counter to his 
initial willingness to retreat from unimodality. It is a 
reading which hinges on the view that German culture, 
nationally, was characterised by value-dissensus; that is to
[184]
say, that the Germans were characterised by multimodality so far
(49)as evaluative beliefs were concerned. Such a view is not
out of line with Eaton’s claim that Germans, in their group 
relationships, did not trust each other, did not have confidence 
in each other, could not come together of their own volition, 
and even in crisis situations had to be forced into common 
purpose. Value-dis sensus could account for their apparent 
submissiveness as expressed in certain kinds of norm-referenced 
behaviour; they were so different that in the interests of 
necessary social cohesion and the delivery of instrumental 
values a high prudential dividend was seen to accrue from 
obedience to secular authority. Such an explanation assigns to 
the Germans a rather distinctive fabric of characteristics - a 
more or less unimodal distribution of prudential attitudes toward 
what might be termed effective authority, that is, authority 
able to deliver an instrumental values, and a more or less 
multimodal distribution of evaluative beliefs. It is an 
explanation which does not dodge the dangers that lurk within it 
for a society so described. Would it, however, have recommended 
itself to J. W. Eaton?
Having dealt with preliminaries on forms of interpretation, the 
remainder of this section is given to consideration of sources 
assigned to categories:-
[185]
Multimodal Rimndal ftiimdal
E. C. Bentley [1915] Havelock Ellis [1915] A. Brome-Weigall [1915]
T. S. Knowlson [1918] A. G. Gardiner [1915] Sidney Brooks [1915]
Mona Caird [1918] G. Barraclough [1946]
Philip Gibbs [1921] Frances E. Warwick [1915]
S. Miles Bouton [1922] Thcmas F. A Smith [1916]
C. Hamilton [1931]
1
Harold Nicolson [1936/39]
Vernon Bartlett [1933] A. L. Rowse [1937-41]
Peace Pamphlet 19 [1943] L. B. Namier [1941]
C. H. Herford [1927] R. Vansittart [1941]
i i
Arthur Brcxne-Weigal 1 took a very 'singular* view of German 
culture. In the community of nations, Germany stood out as a 
clearly defined, single and unique case. In one particular 
respect German civilisation and that of the rest of the world 
had "marched along separate lines." This distinctiveness was 
not difficult to explain. It had been brought about by one 
cardinal cause - the unimodal distribution of a single dominant 
Charakterzug which expressed itself behaviourally in an 
unfailing predilection for applying the principles of logic to 
human experience. Germans looked the world straight in the 
face, warts and all. They took it for what it was, with no 
thought to what it could be. They would have considered
[186]
themselves guilty of self-deception had they credited it with 
any hidden depth or meaning. They confronted the "raw facts of 
life" with thought processes which denied "the existence of a 
heart" and were untempered by a "nicer sense" or "the spiritual 
element."
Brane-Weigal 1 referred on a number of occasions to German 
disregard of "that paradoxical delicacy which makes life 
tolerable", to their rejection of values and conduct that could 
not be "justified in logic." What he called the "cancer of 
logic" touched all aspects of their behaviour. It was in their 
habits, their morals, their arts. Slaughter was a daily 
occurrence in the animal world, and it was clear from experience 
that Nature was neutral in its regard for life. Man was an 
animal, and nations were simply rapacious packs of animals 
preying on each other. To allcw sensitivity or squeamishness to 
influence decision making in such a context was to be a victim 
of logic. Better to recognise it and observe its rules. To 
make war - that is, to engage in a brutal enterprise - according 
to the tenets of an abstract idea such as ' fairplay', derived 
fran an idealised view of mankind, was to be trapped in a 
non-sequitur. This frank recognition of, and accomodation to 
the crude and bestial elements in human experience was not 
limited to international relations; it also influenced their 
behaviour in the municipal area. In a country where an act of
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self-control in constraint of human passions would be regarded 
as illogical, was it any wonder that there had been 140 
murderous assaults in Germany "to every one in England in recent 
years." The artistic life of Germany was also corrupted by an 
"abandonment of all spirituality", to the extent that "the 
subjects chosen for representation are largely those which we 
abject to display." The world was in need of salvation from 
this "Teutonic disease", behaviour founded on an utter disregard 
for anything that did not meet the demands of logic. Nothing 
short of the complete destruction of German ethics would do.
Brcme-Weigall's contribution is of particular interest because 
it raised in an unusual form the cannon charge that the Germans 
were unsuitable material for democracy because they could not 
deal with the uncertainties, doubts, and imponderables that were 
part of democratic procedures and institutions. The application 
of logic brought simplicity and certainty into decision making. 
But the democratic process involved acceptance that individual 
points of view had worth because they were what they were, 
rather than because of their status in a two value system; in 
fact, the democratic process involved acceptance that value 
positions were many and varied and that no one had easy answers 
to the difficult questions sometimes faced in the course of 
human experience.
[188]
The argument that the Germans could not deal with the 
ambiguities inherent in such a process was usually put in terms 
of psychological disturbance and usually suggested that profound 
anxiety - normally of the neurotic type - was suffered when they 
were confronted by uncertainty. To use a term invented by 
Hofstede, this argument would propose that the Germans would 
score high on an Uncertainty Avoidance Index. The interesting 
thing about Brame-Weigall' s variation on this theme is that he 
appears to see the alleged rejection of paradox and ambiguity as 
a calculated, rational behaviour pattern, designed to provide a 
justification for self-regarding policies and activities.
Sydney Brooks considered that the Germans were all of a piece. 
The ordinary Englishman might make distinctions between the 
Prussians and the rest, between the rank and file of the nation 
and the military leaders, but he was scmewhat innocent to do so. 
That Brooks saw in "the spluttering insensate hatred of England" 
which was "the cannon passion of seventy-million Germans", 
something beyond a temporary response to a wartime eneny appears 
clear from his claim that the Germans, as a rule, demonstrated a 
pathological facility to luxuriate in and derive strength from 
grudges and antagonisms. As a people they had a number of 
common traits and dispositions, some so resilient over time and 
so unamenable to change as to be considered innate; they were 
gregarious and hard working; they had an instinct for
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surrendering their independence? sadistic tendencies - revealed 
in a streak of brutality and in a lust to daninate and humiliate 
those who were weaker than they - had their roots "far down in 
the Teutonic temperament?" they were immature, susceptible to 
ideas, nervous, and unsound in a crisis.
The German approach to life issues defined by Brcme-Weigall as 
"the cancer of logic", also figured in Brooks* analysis. For 
example, the application of *fairplay* and the * rules of the 
game* to the practice of warfare were seen as frivolous. In 
artistic matters, the Germans were not put out by reality, 
however bizarre or brutal, unlike the British who tended to 
"squint at facts" and threw "the glamour of a romantic decorum" 
around anything unpleasant or disagreeable. Although such an 
approach led to coarseness in behaviour, manners, and morals 
Brooks viewed it with some sympathy, tracing its origins to 
historical factors which, had they borne upon Britain, might 
well have produced the same results. The territory known as 
'Germany' had been invaded, partitioned and exploited time and 
again. The only way to arrest this process was to give 
precedence to arrangements which would guarantee a united front. 
And so the Germans ''willingly, consciously, intelligently, as a 
matter of common sense and prudence [sacrificed] a large measure 
of personal and political liberty."
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As was the case with Brcme-Weigall, Brooks suggests that it was 
rational rather than neurotic anxiety which attracted Germans to 
discipline and order, prudence and calculated self-interest 
which made regimentation the favoured option.
Whether by subtle design or simply because of confused thinking, 
Frances Evelyn Warwick swithered between a unimodal and a 
bimodal interpretation of German characteristics. She made a 
clear distinction between two types, the Prussian who was cruel 
and harsh at heart and the "simple German of the South" who did 
not have these particular innate features and was best described 
as "a dreamer and a sentimentalist, with strong love for 
domestic pleasures." This was an explicitly bimodal analysis. 
The distinction was then largely erased by a statement which at 
first sight seemed set to reinforce it:
"There are countless Germans who could only be cruel in 
obedience to orders and, of course, every German will do 
what he is told..."
The introduction of a unimodal ly distributed trait of 
sufctnissiveness reduced the difference between Prussians and the 
rest to the difference between those who, when ordered to be 
cruel and harsh, would take pleasure in obeying, and those who, 
when ordered to be cruel and harsh, would obey - either with
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emotional neutrality or distress. There may be substance to the 
distinction insofar as sado-masochists are likely to inflict 
pain and suffering without the necessity of contend whereas 
masochists would act only on contend, but it could be argued, 
along the lines taken by Vansittart, that a victim would not 
make much of it. An element of bimodality was introduced when 
she considered the role of wanen in German family life. There 
were tens of thousands of hones in which wives and daughters 
were loved and respected but, particularly in Prussian hones 
where sadism would find expression in male danination and 
cruelty, and more particularly still in Prussian hones 
associated with military and bureaucratic circles, wanen were 
not honoured and were assigned roles that limited their 
horizons.
For its time, Thomas F. A. Smith's The Soul of Germany was a 
remarkable contribution to the debate on German national 
character. Although his approach was explicitly unimodal and 
built on the assumption of widely distributed and innate 
characteristics, he engaged in quite thorough sub-system 
analysis, with particular emphasis on the relationships that 
were to interest James Joll - those between educational 
experiences and political outlook. His stated principles on 
methodology, as distinct from ways in which, with or without 
intent, he may have subverted those principles in practice were,
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for their time, irreproachable. He indicated that he was aware 
that behaviour was not always a sure clue to inner motive, and 
that behavioural patterns could be sustained through 
reinforcement. The relationship between national 
characteristics and cultural products was explored. He was not 
the first to allege that there was a link between 
value-dissensus within German society and German attitudes to 
authority, with authority both controlling [in the public 
sphere] and permitting scope [in the private sphere] to 
individual predilections - but he was an early entry to the 
field.
The Spectator, reviewing Smith's book, considered it a scathing
indictment against the whole German nation. The Morning Post
suggested that the picture drawn might have passed for
caricature "if recent events had not attested its fidelity to
fact", and in consequence doubted "whether any more searching
and scathing indictment of the German people has ever been 
(531written." 7 It is certainly true that Smith's description of 
German characteristics assumed both cross-generational longevity 
• and a very high level of cultural homogeneity. Traits such as 
quarrelsomeness, unbounded vanity, marked sensitiveness, envy, 
lack of consideration for others, brutal self-assertion, were of 
long standing rather than recent vintage, and one German was 
more or less like any other: "Germans are inherently brutal...
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German character is the same, whether it is concealed beneath 
the drab coat of a German Methodist or the gay uniform of a 
German Officer."
"Beneath the intellectual veneer and imitated manners lies 
Germany's heart - a heart which has not been changed 
either by culture or Christianity... Character, both 
national and individual, has always been of the brutal 
type in the Fatherland; the success of Treitschke and his 
school is due to the fact that their teachings were 
acceptable to the nation - in short, the seed fell upon 
good ground... it is a ridiculous theory to imagine that 
the seed 'transformed' the soil."^^
There was a strong and socially diffuse tendency toward
sado-masochism. They acted like invertebrates when dealing with
superiors - "es wird gebuckt und geduckt", but all alike 
possessed the "lust of bullying - die Freude jemand zu
emiedringen." From top to bottom they submitted to tyranny
throughout their lives, "sustaining themselves with the hope of
/ c g \
becoming tyrants too."
Smith was very careful to establish his credentials and outline 
the methodological principles on which, he claimed, his study 
was based. The student of national character should always
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recognise that no great nation, including his own, was free fron
moral obliquity. This would help him to control inherent
national prejudices and to avoid the all too easy identification
of the "worst elements" with the whole. An Englishman would
expect the foreign student to work to such general principles;
no less could be asked of the Englishman in the course of his 
(57)studies.' But even when so on guard, the observer's focus 
could be of the narrow, specialised kind, and this would lead - 
if for different reasons - to similar untenable generalisations. 
The 'texture' of modem society was so rich and complex that all 
the pieces making up its distinctive pattern had to be studied 
and related:
"Each of the Great European States may be compared to an
infinite piece of patchwork. There is some sort of
junbled design about it, yet to draw conclusions from one
of the small insets and apply them to the whole piece
leads only to error. This point refers to authorities who
have studied a city or province and ventured to write on
(58)seventy million people."
Confronted with students of their culture, Germans often put the 
question, "Nun, haben Sie sich gut eingelebt?" It was of 
crucial importance that a sincerely affirmative answer were 
given. It was categorically imperative that observers should be
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fluent in the language and be able to 'feel German1. Staiith had
spent 12 years working in Germany - mainly in the capacity of
lecturer in the University of Erlangen. He had lived himself
into his surroundings, had been incessantly alert "in looking at
things from the other man's point of view", and had been
equipped "with unlimited patience and inexhaustible sympathy."
Because of this, Germans were not conscious that they were in
the presence of a foreign element, and so remained "truly
(59)natural and themselves." He had mixed with every class of
German, had "never missed an opportunity to talk with the 
workman in field or factory", and had been "in close touch with 
the intellectuals and official circles." His soundings had been 
representative. For example, his comments on German schools
were based upon
"... personal visits to cities and schools too numerous to 
mention. Between September 10th, 1913, and March 20th, 
1914, alone, he lectured in over one hundred German and 
twenty-five Austrian Secondary State schools... and... 
spent his vacation... in this way since 1909."^^
Mention has already been made of Smith's recommendation that 
behavioural norms, and the rewards and sanctions distinctive to 
a particular society, were best studied through close 
observation of day-to-day activities. In itself this was an
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incisive methodological insight. To round off, he made two 
telling concessions which appear to enhance rather than diminish 
the soundness of his theoretical position: first, "no single
writer is able to write with absolute finality upon so canplex a 
mechanism as modem Germany"; second, whatever conclusions 
emerge from such an exercise, they will be no more than "the
observer's opinion of... national character... and ... may be
_  , _ (62) entirely wrong."
Without prejudice to the recommendations themselves, and without 
denying the importance of his insights or indeed the relevance 
of some of his conclusions, it is difficult to avoid the 
suspicion that Smith's prescriptions were, in part at least, 
self-justificatory. It was perhaps with an eye to convincing 
his audience and disarming potential critics that he said all 
the right things about methodology. When standards are set so 
high and yet are reached what room is there for argument? When 
we are told that no single writer is able to pronounce with 
absolute finality, and that with all his precautions a careful 
observer could still be wrong, there is a hint of, 'but I can 
cane very close to a certain and accurate judgement. * There 
was a measure of overkill in the cumulative effect of his claims 
- familiarity with subject, quality of involvement, closeness of 
observation, inexhaustible sympathy, limitless patience, and an 
ability to see things fran the German point of view. When set
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against this the caveats on absolute finality and the
possibility of human error ring a little hollow. If his
methodological principles had wholeheartedly informed rather
than at times decorated his analysis, it is unlikely that he
would have failed to remark upon the fact that the duration of
his domicile and his caimand of the language would not have
disguised frcm the native inhabitants with whom he mixed and was
in close touch - intellectuals and officials - that "a foreign
element was in their midst." Complimentary Bavarian
citizenship was not something conferred upon those assumed to be
local. If Germans did indeed look upon England "as their
(63)inveterate enemy, and hate her"; if it was indeed a case of 
"gebuckt und geduckt" when they encountered superiors, and if 
they observed "slavish forms of politeness" as a means of 
deception, what, objectively, was the likelihood that they 
would invariably be "truly natural and themselves" in the 
company of the English lecturer from the University of Erlangen? 
There is a certain arrogant confidence as opposed to a 
commitment to methodological vigour in the claim that "in the 
whole range of German literature there is no writer who stands 
out as a supreme lover of humanity," and in the admission that 
the publication of Norman Angell's Prussianism and its 
Destruction - a title which implies bimodality, at the very 
least - was of little interest to him:
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"The author has not read Mr NOrman Angell's book and has 
no intention of doing so."^^
And insights lose same of their potency when they are applied 
solely in the interests of a particular case. Observation of 
certain behaviour patterns in German social relations confirmed 
what Smith must surely have known, in general terms, from 
personal experience - that outward forms did not always match 
inner motive. However, not everyone would have identified the 
norm and been able to make tenable inferences on the culture 
specific purposes it served. On many occasions he had observed
"The German girl curtsy, the schoolboy obsequiously lower 
his cap almost to the ground, and the soldier ... salute 
with wooden rigidity - only to make a grimace in the next 
instant, or for the expression of profound respect to 
become a sarcastic snigger when discovery seemed 
impossible... In the streets of German villages and towns 
it is possible to observe every few minutes two 
acquaintances who have stopped to chat, raising and deeply 
swinging their hats at meeting and leave-taking, several 
times in as many moments. Neither means anything, 
possibly they are bitter rivals or even hate each other, 
yet both will observe these slavish forms of politeness."
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Having identified other areas of German social experience where 
an exaggerated - almost neurotic - emphasis was placed at the 
concept Ehrgefuhl, Shiith deduced that this Ehrenzeichen accorded 
by one individual to another was yet one more example of 
ritualistic norm-referenced behaviour - not meant in any real 
sense, but engaged in for its tactical, prudential and deceptive 
powers or dividends:
"... the sign of respect... is the result of the 
inevitable 'must1, and not a tribute... Ehrenzeichen is a 
word written in bold characters on the life-path of the 
German... it is the foundation of that outward 
punctiliousness which characterises German life, 
irrespective of the inward motive or sincerity... [the 
German] uses this weapon to threw dust in the eyes... to 
curry favour,... to deceive."
The prcblem with this analysis is not that it is a complete 
mismatch with reality, or that it fails to say something 
significant about aspects of German culture at that particular 
point in time; the problem is that it uses the 1 grapeshot1 
approach. There is no need to consider the difficult question 
of the incidence of norm conformance because there are no 
deviants; all engage in this behaviour, and all engage in it for 
one or perhaps all of a range of self-regarding motives.
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Further, the possibility that prudential rather than 
conscientious motives - given so much importance in this case - 
could explain other examples of norm referenced behaviour, is 
conveniently ignored when it would be to the disadvantage of his 
unimodal approach to consider it.
Smith made an interesting contribution to one of the recurring 
themes of the period - the 'German1 attitude to, and regard for 
authority. In part, the articulation of his argument has to be 
inferred, but the clues are not particularly obscure. It was 
based on what he appeared to see as two interrelating features 
in German culture: a tendency toward self-assertion on
evaluative issues, - what may be termed value-dissensus - and a 
tendency toward sado-masochism. Value dissensus in German 
society was noted by Sarolea [1912] when he reflected on why it 
was that the Germans,
"who a moment ago claimed his absolute liberty of 
thought... new submits to the most petty regulations... 
who a moment ago demanded that the last barriers of the 
moral law shall be taken down... is confronted at every 
step with the fateful words: Es ist Verboten!"
He came to the conclusion that Germans sought in the sphere of 
thought and ideas a freedom that was denied to them in the
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sphere of politics. Each thinker tried to outbid the others,
feeling the need to avenge himself "against the abuses of
authority in practical life by glorifying anarchy in philosophy 
(67)and art." Brooks [1915] had described Germany as "a land
of... splenetic envy and back-biting" in which the citizen would
obey the State "so long as his private life is as spacious and
(68)unfettered as he cares to make it." Price Collier’s
classic explanation [1913] of why the German countryside was
littered with instructions that such and such was verboten or
nicht gestattet was essentially a comment on an underlying
value-dissensus which could only be controlled fcy statutory or
municipal caimand. Similar references and conclusions
appear in Smith's text. The reader is told that the German
State was aware of the intolerance and quarrelsome
vindictiveness which characterised its constituent units. The
average [!] German respected the rights and susceptibilities of
others "just so far as the law, plus the policeman's sword and
revolver [compelled] him to do so." He was forever on the qui
vive to assert himself, and more often than not collided with
another who was out on the same mission. There is explicit
enough reference in this to the existence of a potentially
injurious competition of ideas and preferences - what Smith
referred to as "morbid egoism... diseased vanity" - which had to
(71)be kept under strict control.
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Smith was not explicit in his explanation of why a people with
such dispositions came to be so thoroughly regimented. The
arguments based on geopolitics - insecurity and recurring
exploitation requiring the establishment of a strong central
authority - and on instrumental values - a strong central
authority required to ensure basic economic canforts and
(72)standards - were touched on but not developed. However,
analysis of the various strands in his thinking lead to the 
inference that Smith brought value dissensus, instrumental 
issues, and innate characteristics into conjunction. The 
striking lack of consideration for the rights of others, the 
self-assertion and morbid egoism which gave rise to value 
dissensus and made Germany the classic heme of "das befreite 
Ich, das Losgerissene Ich", matched up with the sadistic element 
in the German character; only a strong power could exercise the 
control necessary to guarantee instrumental needs; when this 
power emerged in the region and was in a position to take 
control, the masochistic element in the German character 
facilitated submission. Submissive instincts were then nurtured 
by and through the institutions and procedures which required 
blind obedience and which encouraged behaviour of the 'gebuckt 
und geduckt1 variety. However, there were compensations [Smith 
used the words Solace* and 1 indulgence1 ], providing 
opportunities for the expression of sadistic instincts. In 
those areas of activity untouched by the writ of the State, the
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individual was "permitted extra-ordinary latitude", was left 
with "extensive freedom with regard to ethical responsibility
towards his fellow men and the entirety of humanity," and could
, (73)
exercise licence "in regard to his moral obligations."'
This 'personal' area within which the passions - specifically
those for brutality and bullying - still had free rein was
jealously guarded by an emphasis on Ehrgefiihl - the feeling or
sense of honour. In that special space where the individual ego
was permitted freedom there was a morbid response to anything
which could be construed as a wound [Verletzung seines
Ehrengefuhls]. Distinctions, medals, and titles eagerly sought
after - "the average German will sell his soul for an empty
title" - not only nourished the individual's Ehrgefuhl, but
facilitated release of sado-masochistic instincts in that titles
and distinctions, in locating the individual, defined those to
whan he must defer and those over wham he could wield power.
The philosophies of Treitschke and Nietzsche were natural
developments frcm such a culture and became in turn reinforcing
agents. Nietzsche's egoism and "inconsiderate
(74)self-assertion" tie in with innate sadism, value dissensus, 
and the private, personal space; Treitschke's doctrine of 
submission to the State tied in with innate masochism, took 
notice of instrumental issues, and defined the public zone. 
There was a sense, however, in which both came together - for
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Treitschke1 s State with its self-assertive notion of mission
was, "in reality, merely a magnified ego." In effect, "both...
vere apostles of aggression in one of two forms, [Nietzsche]
(7 5)
individual, and [Treitschke] collective aggression." And
so, the expression of sadistic instinct was not confined to the 
private zone; through submission to the State there was the 
opportunity to express sadistic instincts in the public zone, 
either as an official protected by the laws relating to 
Beamtenbeleidigung, as a soldier, or simply as a citizen 
participant in the triumphs of the State.
Although there was no place in Smith's image of German culture 
for variation in carmitment to norm referenced behaviour, no 
place for differential sharing or for heterogeneity in the 
public sphere, his analysis of sub-systems was a useful one. It 
must always be remembered, hcwever, that his case was stated in 
such a way as to demonstrate the reinforcement of innate 
characteristics.
In a culture nourishing and nourished by sado-masochistic 
characteristics it was not to be expected that the humanity and 
sympathy normally associated with the concept, 'family life', 
would intrude on the domestic relationships of Germans. Wives 
were docile and submissive. Their sons treated them like 
housekeepers. As a result, young men were not made sensitive to
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ideas such as "reverence for womanhood." The docile and
unassertive role of the German wife was exemplified in the
practice whereby no German lady was addressed by her surname,
"but always by her husband's title or position... Mrs Doctor,
(76)
Professor, Architect,... and joy of joys... Mrs Lieutenant."
For tenement dwellers there was a daily training in submission, 
a daily reminder of the sacredness of formal procedures:
"Usually the landlord occupies one of the flats, generally 
that on the ground floor. On entering... one of the first 
things which strikes the eye is a placard containing sane 
twenty numbered paragraphs, comprising the Hausordnung - 
what you most or must not do. A tenant is informed in the 
house rules when he may play the piano and how he may 
water the flowers on the window-sills, etc. The landlord 
is the house policeman, so that even the German 
better-class hemes are not free from barrack-yard 
discipline
In German schools, students were drilled in the individual's
duty to the State. The aim was to "make machines of human
(78)beings." Anything remotely like an independent mind or
spirit in relation to public affairs was fiercely discouraged - 
"Jede Selbsthilfe ist verboten." The Government, whose servants 
the teachers were, did not wish any of its schools "to teach
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self-reliance or independence... In this way educated automata
(79) .were created."' University lecturers were civil servants,
"paid, obedient servants of the State", and so their political
activities and influence could only be exercised "in one
direction." The schools and universities of Germany
provided the soil on which the poison of Germanism had
flourished. Those institutions had served "not only as seed
beds, but also as channels through which the baneful ideas of
(81)aggression by brute force had been disseminated." The men
who occupied high places, "in diplomacy, in the army and navy,
in short, in every branch of public life" - men who ruled
Germany's destinies - had been trained in brutality at German
universities. Those institutions, through the medium of student
Corps, turned young men into swaggering bullies. In the lecture
theatres they came under the influence of professors who were no
more than State propagandists, and entered an academic world
which was saturated with the teachings of Treitschke. Writing
in 1916, Smith reckoned that the ideas disseminated by
Treitschke forty years previously had percolated "to nearly
(82)every educated man in the country."
So far as the testing of probabilities in the analytic framework 
is concerned, Smith's work is of real interest because of its 
nuances. There is no doubt that from his unimodal stance he 
assured a high degree of homogeneity and a low level of
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differential sharing - at least - in the public zone. Cross 
cultural similarities were touched on, but marginally? the 
dominant characteristics of the Germans were, in the main 
innate. As has been seen, however, he demonstrated - 
untypical ly for a unimodal approach - a very high level of 
concern for methodology. The case made here is that the 
concern, though possibly sincerely held in principle, was more 
decorative than real when it came to ccnment on German 
characteristics. There is also the question of the complexity 
and variability of cultural considerations, when cited. Smith 
was typical of the unimodal approach on the second, but much 
less so on the first of these two descriptors. Finally, Smith 
devoted the last one and one half of 343 pages to Britain's 
punitive function in the war that had been brought about by low 
cunning, brute force, and hate on the part of Germany. The 
eneny represented Kultur, a complex system that was antithetical 
to all that Britain stood for. There was nothing to be gained 
by efforts to conciliate a sullen, envious, uncompromising 
enemy, a nation of "highly trained, drilled, human tigers", who 
could emit fiendish laughter "at the drowning struggles of 
non-combatant victims." Smith did not specify the fate that 
should be inflicted upon Germany, but he did claim that hanging 
in the balance were all the humane ideals that had evolved with 
Christianity over 2000 years. The catastrophe had to be 
averted. It may be inferred that a cataclysm for Germany would 
be required to avoid a cataclysm for the world.
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Although he made one or two concessions that would not have been
out of place in a multimodal approach, Harold Nicolson's
'German' [1936, 1939] was an easily recognised representative of
a long-standing neurotic condition which had reached "a sort of
(83)paranoiac stage." He assigned sane degree of causal
autonomy to situational factors in the development of what he 
termed "the distinctly German type of mind." It is clear, 
however, that he made a distinction between distant and more 
immediate factors, giving independent force to the former - in 
that they helped to fashion - and secondary, reinforcing 
significance to the latter - in that they acted upon, innate 
characteristics. To demonstrate this feature of Nicolson's 
thinking it is necessary to take his 1939 contribution before 
that of 1936.
Traditionally, the Germans had lacked sharp geographical, 
racial, and historical definition or outline. 'Spiritually 
homeless' they were forever in search of a sense of belonging, 
and this bred, behind their solid and magnificent virtues, "a 
layer of nervous uncertainty." They were desperate for focus 
and eventually found it in a mystic view of the State and in the 
power which collective submission conferred upon them. Having 
found a focus for their energies, innate nervousness made them 
willing to sacrifice anything and everything to retain it, to the 
point where it could be said that "in every German there is an
[209]
element of suicidal mania. it was with allusion to these
particular characteristics - innate nervousness and instability 
- that Nicolson opened his 1936 contribution. He conceded that 
situational factors in the twentieth century, for example, The 
First World War, the blockade, the inflation, had placed on the 
Germans "a strain such as human history has never known," but 
this strain was acting on "a heredity already unstable." And 
so, when the person and techniques of Hitler entered the 
equation their effect was dramatic, not primarily because they 
offered release fran immediate difficulty but because they were 
responsible for an "extraordinary evocation and excitation of 
all that is most neurotic in the German soul." The neurotic 
condition, stoked up by immediate events, had been fanned into a 
"strong strain of insanity" by Hitler's revivalism. Germany had 
become what she had always been in danger of becoming - "a 
mental case."^^
By any strict standard, the contributions of Rcwse [1937, 1939, 
1941], Namier [1940, 1941, 1942], and Vansittart [1941] are 
bimodal in their approach to German characteristics. This
is because they refer in their work to deviation from, as well 
as conformance to the dominant pattern as they perceived it. 
Rowse depicted much of modem German history bimodally, in terms 
of episodic confrontations between progressive and reactionary 
forces: for example
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the ideas of Eramus - versus - the ideas of Luther,
the ideas of Kant - versus — the ideas of Frederick The
Great,
the ideas of Goethe - versus - the ideas of Hegel,
the ideas of Marx - versus - the ideas of Bismarck,
the ideas of Weimar - versus - the ideas of Hitler.
The problem was that the resolution always favoured the
reactionary forces. "It is hard", wrote Rcwse, "to forgive the
total ineffectiveness, the spinelessness... of the liberal
(87)elements in Germany." Namier accepted that there were
humane elements in Germany, but considered that the "decent,
kindly Germans" had failed to impress their pattern on the 
(88)nation." Vansittart’s conviction that 80% of the German
nation constituted the moral and political scum of the earth 
still left hope for seme 20% Notwithstanding these references 
to plurality, the contributions are shown on page [185] to 
straddle the bimodal and unimodal categories. This is because 
their references to deviance were patently designed to dramatise 
the quantitative significance of the dominant pattern. "It is 
noticeable", wrote Rcwse, "how many Germans are happier since 
1933." Namier found that he could not dissociate any
substantial part of the nation from the Nazis; and
Vansittart limited his condemnation to "the bloody minded 
bulk.n(91)
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There was sane confusion in Rcwse's work about hew distinctions
should be made between the 'good' and the 'bad' elements in the
German nation. On the one hand the distinction was made on
geographical grounds: the Germans of the Rhine, the northern
seaboard, the Catholic south, were more civilised than the 
(92)rest. On the other hand the distinction was more often a
matter internal to the dynamics of individual personality. He
defined his concern as being "the problem of the dominant German 
(93)mind..." At the heart of the German people there was "a
real neurosis." They had within themselves at one and the same
time an uncertainty and unsureness, and the capacity for
aggressive exhibitionism; a sentimental, but also a brutal
disposition. Here was evidence of "a pathological disease", all
(94)the symptoms of "a dominant neurosis." It was in this
context that Rcwse flirted with a completely unimodal approach.
Interestingly, every time he retreated fran such an approach he
succeeded in confirming his affection for it. to highlight
(95)this, sane examples are tabulated:-
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Stem tfeumodal Retreat to bimodal
1. "...the nature of the German mind.
2. "...Hitler is the
very mirror of the German soul,
3. "...the brutal 
errphasis upon 
macht that appeals 
to every German,
4. "... clever to lie, 
to go back on your 
word. They like that
sort of thing.
or at any rate the 
dominant German 
mind."
or the dominant 
elements of it."
or at least the 
dominant German 
type."
or at any rate a 
certain side of them 
does, the dominant 
side.
German characteristics were innate. Hitler was in direct line
of succession from Luther; his views "answered to something deep
down in the German nature... Before they lapped up the
pernicious Nazi rubbish, they lapped up the Hohenzollem 
(961claptrap." A search for the deep buried reasons for this, 
for an explanation of why the Germans were "so unsatisfactory, 
such bad Europeans", would have to begin with geopolitics. 
Territorially they had lacked precision? their borders had been 
ill-defined; they were, in fact, "a frontier less people." This 
had made them stress their unity "as a volk" and given a 
'boundlessness' to their aims and ideas. That they should have
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(97)success, they were willing to obey and prepared to be led.
Rcwse appeared to show concern for methodology, but in this
particular context he was in fact unimpressive. He agreed that
there was a difficult problem of diagnosis to be faced when
dealing with the question ’What is wrong with the Germans?1 In
review of A. J. P. Taylor's The Course of German History, he
seemed to give sane causal autonomy to situational factors in the
thought that "Perhaps Mr Taylor does not allow sufficiently for
the extreme difficulty and complexity of the German political 
(98)situation..." He reccnmended - partly by way of criticism
of his opponents - that writers on Germany should have more than
a superficial acquaintance with the country; that they should
have lived there and become familiar with its language and
literature. However, when it came to consideration in his own
work of those elements to which Taylor had apparently given
insufficient weight - "the extreme difficulty and complexity of
the German political situation..." Rowse more or less dismissed
them with the assertion "... this is no place to traverse the
(99) .whole of German history." Yet, in the interests of his own
case, Rowse had already traversed the whole of German history. 
In his search for the origins of the "dominant German mind" he 
delved back to the barbarian tribes to identify the fuhrer 
principle, the attraction of Volksgemeinschaft, "the... herd 
spirit, the primitive love of fighting for its own sake."
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He had taken time and space to consider the episodic 
confrontations between progressive and reactionary forces from 
the 15th century onwards. When he considered the failure of the 
Weimar Republic and the rise of Hitler, he wrote,
"I knew there were external factors aiding the process..."
And that was precisely as far as he went with regard to such 
factors.<101>
Any solution to the German problem had to take account of the 
fact that the nation was in the grip of "a dominant neurosis, 
verging upon madness." One did not cajole, or cctnpram.se with 
a homicidal maniac. If strong action was not taken to "root it 
out", the German madness would lead to a European war every 
twenty-five years "to prove that the last one was wrongly 
decided against them." There was a premise of retribution
in his conviction that the pernicious consequences of the "roots 
and ganglia of the German outlook" should be "brought home to 
them properly next time."^^
Namier made seme telling points on methodology. He had clearly 
addressed the question of how cross-cultural differentiation 
could be assessed. The respective forms of communal life - 
norms, institutions - should be carefully examined; then the
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extent to which these forms functionally attained, preserved, or 
negated the practical application of concepts such as individual 
freedom should be measured. He argued that "sane nations
develop one or two forms into dominant patterns which express 
the national character of their cctrmunal life," and there is 
much to be said for his view that the dominant forms in Germany 
were State, army, subordination of the individual, iron 
discipline and organisation, and those in Britain Parliament, 
the team, the rules of the game, and flexibility. An
appreciation of cross-cultural differences did not lead him to 
ignore cross-cultural similarities. "Most types of social 
groups," he wrote, "can be found, in one form or other, in all 
nations," and "as members of a group... most people enjoy 
greater freedom frcm scruples and inhibitions, and readily do 
things which they would hesitate to do for their own 
benefit." He had some valid things to say about the
relationship of Hitler to the German people. He could not 
accept that it was a matter of Hitler and a few cronies on one 
side and the entire German people on the other. Press and film 
reports which captioned events with "Hitler sees..., Hitler 
wants..., Hitler thinks..." were vastly exaggerating the 
distance between him and the people: "the achievements and the
guilt of Germany [were] not to be ascribed to one individual, 
nor even to a party... He had sane interesting comments
to make on how the bonds of a submissive relationship to
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authority might cane to break. Interesting, because one of the 
consequences of defining the Germans as unreservedly docile and 
submissive in face of authority is the need to find an 
explanation for the fact that a fair number of them did not 
demonstrate such characteristics during the life of the Weimar 
Republic. Namier's answer was that submission and deference were 
accorded to effective authority [largely defined, one supposes, 
by strength and ability to impose order], and that loss of 
effectiveness raised in the German mind "doubts concerning the 
gerents of The German State..."
In Namier's view the Germans had within themselves the "closely
interconnected, indeed inseparable elements" associated with
sado-masochism; they were willing slaves and also ruthless
bullies; they were submissive and deferential to the State
because through this they were able to participate in the
"ruthless tyranny" exercised by that State at heme and 
(109)
abroad. They lacked moral courage, self-assurance, and
independence, and this made them seek "safety, self-assertion, 
and superlative power" in and through the State and nation. 
Hedged round by organisation, uniformity, and hierarchy, the 
German was able to find protection from his "moral doubts and 
fears." His sense of duty - his Pflichtgefuhl - was 
"obsessionist and coloured with anxiety." it was to these
deep instincts that Hitler appealed with unparallelled success.
[217]
Here, as in other contributions, there is the notion that 
masochism led to submission; and through submission there was a 
dividend for sadism.
If Namier was quite impressive in the statement of 
methodological principles, he was less so in their application. 
This discrepancy may be inferred frcm a number of 
inconsistencies and verbal 'tricks'. For example, he
seemed to be unaware that his unimodal approach did for the 
Germans en masse what he argued the Germans did for the Jews - 
obliterate all relevant distinctions.
"... there is a vague belief in the Gentile mind that all 
Jews are marvellously knit together: therefore in seme
way responsible for every single one among them. If 
Smith operates in the 'black market1, Smith does it; if 
Cohen, it is the Jew. Whenever seme specially unpleasant 
or provoking incident occurs, Jews, who by no stretch of 
imagination could be connected with it, murmur: 'I hope to 
God the fellow is not a Jew.1 When Hitler imposed a 
fantastic fine on an already ruined German Jewry because 
one young Jew, driven mad by the sufferings inflicted on 
his parents, had killed a German diplomat, he merely 
condensed and exhibited in hideous, grotesque 
exaggeration... an idea deeply ingrained and widely 
diffused among the Gentiles."
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He referred to action derived from group membership, but did not 
raise the issue of differential sharing? the inference is that 
the action - in terms of scruples and inhibitions - of a fully 
integrated member, sharing maximally in the group norms and 
values, would be the standard action. Then, employing a 
unimodal approach he nevertheless invited the Germans to 
disprove his hypothesis by demonstrating multimodality at a time 
- war emergency - when multimodality would be least likely to 
characterise any group. The reader is informed that "there is 
no possibility of effective opposition under dictatorship", and 
yet it is expected of the German nation under such conditions 
that it give evidence, in proportion to the ten righteous men 
asked of Sodom and Gomorrah, of 100,000 men overtly public in 
their outrage. At one point it is asserted - with
suggestions of parity of knowledge, participation, and 
commitment - that the Germans take "a full-share" in Nazi 
transactions; at another, the claim is that "hundreds of 
thousands of men have participated in them, and tens of millions 
have watched them with approval, or at lease connivance."
The inconsistency is obvious enough? the question of syntax and 
the use of particular words remains. Was it merely use and wont 
that made him lead with 'approval1 and follow with the 
qualification? Did he intend that the reader should infer a 
conspiracy of like minds from his use of 'connivance'? In 
fairness, hcwever, it has to be said that his contention that
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the Germans were sado-masochists ties in logically with his 
thesis that respect for, and deference to State authority, 
diminished in proportion to the State's inability to inpose 
order.
As with Namier, Vansittart challenged those whose image of the 
war was of a contest between Britain and the Nazi party. There 
was too much made of the possible distinctions between party and 
people. It was not helpful to refer to 'Hitlerite Germany' if 
that term was intended to reduce the burden of 
responsibility. These were useful correctives to
extravagant views. No less valuable as a corrective was his 
dismissal of the myths that the Germans en masse had latent 
democratic virtues, and were "blood-brother s" to the 
British. Objectively, those challenges were valid because
on the one hand they insisted that seme sort of sharing took 
place, and on the other they insisted that sharing was 
differential. However, it is questionable if Vansittart would 
have wanted his complaints justified in this way; his general 
thesis on Germany indicated that he had every interest in 
non-differential sharing. This may be tested by considering his 
tendency to criticise the most extravagant and untenable cases in 
favour of differential sharing, [e.g. - Germany is made up of 
same 'bad' Nazis and a mass of 'good' Germans - 'Blood 
Brothers'], in order to dismiss, or perhaps even conceal neglect
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of more moderate cases in favour of it. The reader was 
encouraged to reject - and probably rightly so - the view that 
"Germany is full of good Germans awaiting us to become good 
E u r o p e a n s . H o w e v e r ,  there was no mention that
differential sharing could have been more modest than this, or 
that, as a phenomenon, it did not stand or fall according to 
acceptance or rejection of the statement. Similarly, rejection 
of the myth of the Germans as "blood-brothers" was not, of 
itself, justification for the rejection of the notion of "the 
other Germany."(118)
Vansittart's stance on the innate nature of German
characteristics "thinking with the blood... lust for
domination", had been piling up through the ages, and one had to
delve into the mists of history to find the genesis of German
brutality - allowed him to deny any causal autonomy to
situational factors. The Weimar Republic failed because Hitler
found the savages ready made to play on. Any difficulties
Germany experienced were spiritual, not social or economic. ^ 0 )
And so, no matter what the Allies had done in 1919, no matter
hew generous they might have been to Germany, the Weimar
(121)Republic "would have failed no less surely and completely."
To seme extent the thinking of Ellis [1915] was similar to that
(122)of Rcwse. Although he was in no doubt that German
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characteristics were distributed bimodally, and markedly so, 
Ellis - like Rcwse - had geographical as well as psychological 
explanations. Further, both considered that dichotcmous 
cognitive and emotional elements were at work within the German 
psyche. However, for Ellis - unlike Rowse - the inner struggle 
did not take the clearly defined form of sado-masochistic 
strivings? and it may be inferred that for Ellis - unlike Rowse 
- the outcome of the inner struggle could be socially productive 
where the circumstances ware favourable.
The two distinct faces of Germany were revealed in the contrast
between the spirit which animated the Rhineland [west and south]
and that which animated Prussia [north and east]. It was the
contrast between the spirit of cosmopolitanism and the spirit of
the drill sergeant. Between them they accounted for "the
strikingly duplex character of the German spirit", and had
produced, in Goethe and Bismarck, "the two supremely
(123)representative German men of modem times." This was a
classic statement of the ’two Germanies1 theme: es gibt zwei 
Arten Deutsche... Die einen reden immer von Bismarck... Die 
anderen inner von Goethe.
There was, however, another sense in which two Germanies 
existed, and that was within the individual psyche. Unlike 
Rcwse, Namier, and Vansittart - for whcm the inner struggle was
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represented by the play of interconnected sadistic and 
masochistic instincts, and productive of a particular
psychological condition, the sado-masochistic personality -
Ellis took account of a number of dichotomies between which, he 
argued, the German 1 spent1 oscillated:-
intemationalism - nationalism
individualism - authoritarianism
cosmopolitanism - particularism
abject servility - brutal arrogance.
By including in his list the commonly attributed dispositions of 
"brutal arrogance combined with abject servility", he introduced 
an element of confusion. Oscillation entails movement from
one position or condition to another. It is reasonable to talk 
of oscillation between caimitment to internationalism and 
nationalism, cosmopolitarism and particularism, individualism 
and authoritarianism, and between the conditions of abject 
servility and brutal arrogance. However, where the dispositions 
of arrogance and servility are combined, there may well be 
oscillation in behavioural terms - as, for example, between 
behaviour in face of a superior and behaviour in face of an 
inferior - but not in psychic terms, since the sado-masochistic 
personality is a psychological whole. This aside, it is clear 
that in Ellis' opinion productive as wall as unproductive 
consequences could flow from the struggle for dominion between
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the cosmopolitan and the drill sergeant. That the process of 
oscillation had, by 1915, skewed the scales in favour of the 
socially unproductive consequences was due to an earlier 
recognition on the part of non-Prussian Germans that the 
qualities invested in Prussia - strength, organisation, etc., - 
were essential to make Germany as a whole "an effective force in 
the world." And so, since 1870, "the spirit of Germany [had] 
been the spirit of Prussia. However, it was central to
Ellis' thinking that such a situation was temporary. Potential 
regard for internationalism, cosmopolitanism, and individualism 
still existed. A Germany free of Prussianism would allow scope 
to such regard. Sympathetic treatment of the non-Prussian 
elements in German society was implicit in this vision of the 
future.
Namier had demanded - in a form of sophistry - that Germans 
challenge his perception of their unimodal characteristics by 
demonstrating multimodality in circumstances highly unfavourable 
to such a demonstration. Ellis, markedly bimodal in his 
interpretation, was not put out by the apparently united - 
unimodal - front presented by Germans during the First World 
War. Although many Germans were peaceloving, they obviously 
felt carpel led, as patriotic citizens, to act in accordance with 
the norms of the crisis situation.
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Bimodality was also obvious in the work of A. G. Gardiner
[1915]. He made very clear distinctions between Government
and people, public policy and private feeling, 'system* and
people. He had a concern for appropriate methodology in
cross-cultural studies. Political exigencies should not be
allowed to colour judgements; the prejudices of wartime had to
be set aside. Unpleasant characteristics attributed to Germans
could be found in British society. His parable of the family
heme in flames and the corporate effort needed to save it was a
valuable corrective to the not unccrrmon view that damned
sections of the German population [e.g., workers, churchmen] for
not rising up against the political and military leaders in
1914. He had a sense of the potency of situational factors. A
non-punitive resolution to the German problem was inplicit in
(127)his comment, "we shall not answer infamy with infamy."
Yet, however much his rejection of unimodality was, in 
principle, more satisfactory - theoretically and empirically - 
than the views of Bowse, Namier, Vansittart, and many others, 
Gardiner's thesis was unsoundly based. In a sense he argued the 
right case for the wrong reasons.
Gardiner made two important statements about Germany. First, 
the crimes of Germany were the crimes of a 'system' and not of a 
people; second, airy weaknesses in German character were to be 
explained not by reference to innate dispositions but to the
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force of circumstances. The first statement, though very
important in itself as an expression of an attitude - all the
more remarkable, as has been noted earlier, by the fact that it
was made during the public hysteria of 1915 - appeared to ignore
the theoretical ramifications of the second. He argued, for
example, with more generosity than many others, that "after all,
(128)we are what our circumstances make us."
Britain
.. had the good fortune to inherit an island, with the
inviolate seas for a defence and the free ocean as a
pathway to all the world. Liberalism had a chance on such
a soil. The Germans had the bad fortune to be cast in the
midst of Europe... They lived with fear and survived by
fighting... the doctrine of Force by which they had
'hacked their way through' became their gospel... It
ceased to be a means of defence and became the expression
of the national spirit... The German people accepted the
gospel as a necessity of their existence... Perhaps they
might have broken the enchantment if they had not been
(129)surrounded by fear."
By defining the respective circumstances that led to differences 
in the cultural development of Britain and Germany, Gardiner
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opened up the issue of national character. But he did not face 
it squarely. It is valid to argue that in Britain and Germany 
it was, in part, circumstances beyond the control of peoples 
which produced particular cultural trends - liberalism in the 
one case and the doctrine of Force in the other. The problem is 
that once under way, those cultural trends beccme the 
recognisable constants into which new generations are inducted, 
within which they grew up, and to which they find ways of 
accommodating themselves. Integral to those cultural trends are 
values, and the norms which tend to make behaviour consistent 
with the values. This much Gardiner appeared to accept, for he 
referred to ways in which the "necessity of their existence" - 
geopolitical ly - influenced the nature of German institutions 
and human relationships within them. But he did not grapple 
with the consequences of this position. He simply ignored them. 
In this way he was spared the impossible requirement of 
providing theoretical foundation for his claim that 
notwithstanding the constants and the induction process, 
government/establishment and the public at large in Germany were 
things totally apart. Differential sharing, in Gardiner's 
thesis, was a case of all or none. The reader is left with the 
impression that it was only members of the Establishment who 
were touched in any positive sense by the values in German 
society which he regarded as reprehensible. The internal 
contradictions of an argument which at one turn recognised the
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relationship between culture and behaviour and at another 
appeared to ignore it are evident in his parable of the family 
house in flames. In this he drew attention to the force of 
cultural norms. Yet that force was wished out of existence in 
order to draw a hard and fast line between Government and 
people.
Gardiner, given his appraisal of the British self-image, could 
hardly argue that adherence to the ideal which distinguished 
that country fran Germany was differentially shared in such a 
way as to produce an absolutely bimodal distribution of British 
Government and Establishment on the one hand and British public 
at large on the other - but he was prepared to infer such an 
absolute distribution in the case of Germany. The fact that 
Britain had a democratic and Germany an absolutist form of 
government was in itself an inadequate foundation for such an 
inference. Same section of 'the public at large1 is likely to 
internalise national 'ideals' in the process of socialisation, 
even though they may have had no say in the political and 
institutional formulation of those ideals.
Barrac lough [1946] pointed to the contribution made by
situational factors, and by the norms of the wider international 
culture, to the shaping of German history after the First Wbrld 
War. The leaders of the Weimar Republic failed to take the
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opportunity to "remodel German society and German political life 
in a new international framework." The action of the
victorious powers was not the least of the many reasons that 
could be adduced in explanation of this 'revolution without a 
transformation'.
"... the German people was not left free to reshape German 
society on democratic lines; instead it was subjected to 
Allied pressure and, at many important points, to Allied 
veto, and the creation of an efficient government capable 
of expressing the will of the German people was 
subordinated to the national interests of the victorious 
Entente."(131)
Fran his bimodal interpretation of German characteristics there 
emerged the conflicting Images of the authentic and 
non-authentic voices of the German people. In the interests of 
world peace, the Allies were advised to nourish the authentic 
voice by establishing a European community in which there was 
"equality for the German people in its dealings with other 
nations. " ^ 2)
It was in search of the authentic voice of the German people 
that Barrac lough first avoided and then repeated the error that 
has been detected in Gardiner's analysis. The internal
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variability of Barraclough's contribution may be represented:-
Government
People People
Government
People People Government People
Bimodality in the Bimodality in the Bimodality in the 
Imperial Regime Hitler regime: Hitler regime:
1933-1938 1939-1945.
In his analysis of the Imperial regime he avoided the dramatic 
dichotomy of an 'all or none1 distinction between government and 
people in terms of differential sharing - that is to say, 
differential sharing was not restricted to members of government 
in respect of government values and to members of the public at 
large in terms of non-government values. There were elements of
the public at large which supported the authoritarian
(133) .regime. His analysis of the Hitler regime between 1933 and
1938 produced similar nuances; that for the 1933-1945
period was less profound. In this latter period the assumed
dichotomy between government and people was highlighted by the
claims that the regime was "hostile to all that the German
people had striven after...," and that Hitler himself
recognised that there was a "deep cleft between his own
objectives and the aspirations of the German people."
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Short of the argument that in relation to Hitler's activities 
after 1938 Barraclough had come to use "the German people" not 
as an embracing term but as a synonym for its "authentic voice" 
- an argument which in itself would suggest a certain 
carelessness - his description of differential sharing in the 
period 1939-1945 was crude.
Herford [1927] appears to straddle the multi-and-bimodal
categories. Although he did not have much to say on
methodology, he did point to the dangers of preconceived ideas,
recognised the "extreme hazardousness" of attempting to "chart
the prevailing currents in the intellectual life of a complex
contemporary civilisation", and recommended a balanced approach
which took account of all facets of German experience,
progressive or otherwise. Situational factors were
underlined, particularly those which had affected social
cohesion — the blockade, revolution, the Treaty of Versailles.
In response to the experiences of 1914-19, extreme solutions
were being promoted - informed on the one hand by hope and
idealism, on the other by disillusionment and pessimism. At
least half of the nation regarded the military defeat as a
release, and many saw the humiliation of the army as a triumph
for civilisation. This has the appearance of a bimodal approach
but, in fact, Herford's Germany was more pluralistic than
(137)that. First, it may be inferred that the definition of
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extreme positions leaves space for something in between - a
third position at the very least. When discussing the ccmnunist
and right-wing risings in Berlin and Munich in the early years
of the Weimar Republic, Herford commented that "all were
frustrated by the resisting and resilient power of the solid
(138)mass between." Further, although hope and idealism as
informing elements stand in direct opposition to disillusionment
and pessimism, these generic types may express themselves in a
variety of forms. For example, Herford noted that for seme the
particular form of their hope and idealism was "shaped by
(139)memory"; for others, the form was "shaped by imagination."
On one level, E. C. Bentley's approach [1915] could be mistaken 
for an example of unimodality. He identified the state of mind 
prevalent in Germany as one associated with traits such as want 
of understanding, monstrous vanity, and feverish inconsistency. 
This condition was not confined to government and 
establishment, nor was it peculiar to Prussia. Prussia's 
geographical position had forced her to be militaristic. With 
the creation of the German Enpire, the process of 
Prussianisation had brought the rest to believe that armed 
violence was a healthy and desirable thing. The "arrogance and 
folly which made the war" were not exclusively Prussian; "... 
the Enpire was more verpreusselt [in 1914] than it had ever 
been."(^0) He raised the issue of innate characteristics: the
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methods employed by Germany in the Great War were "only one 
result of a general leaning towards violence which has always 
been present in the soul of the people. He made the sort
of odd misinterpretation usually found in unimodal approaches, 
and usually designed to bolster a weak case. For example, he 
saw in newspaper reports which "volubly [declared] their 
unbroken conviction that their country cannot possibly be 
anything but victorious", and in the "pathetic perseverance" 
with which journals assured their readers "that this, that, or 
the other eminent person is completely at ease about the result 
of the war", confirmation of the trait of feverish exaggeration 
and of "the curious one-sidedness and ... national egoism of the 
German mind."
Despite this, Bentley has been located in the multimodal 
category. He referred, explicitly and implicitly, to 
differential sharing. He conceded that there was a difference 
between Prussians - whose characteristics appeared to be 
distributed unimodal ly - and the other groups within the Enpire:
"I readily admit that the Prussian still holds a marked 
pre-eminence over other types of German nationality... 
Ruthless employment of superior strength of any kind to 
one’s cwn advantage, and a taste for the exercise of force 
in general, are so much a matter of course to that strange 
people..."(143)
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When he insisted that the commission of atrocities was not
unique to the Prussians and that Bavarians were also capable of
such activities, there was just a suggestion that where Prussian
behaviour in this respect was highly predictable, Bavarian
behaviour was less so. His contention that the Enpire was more
verpreusselt in 1914 than ever before could be taken to mean
that a single value system had been established; but it is
likely that he was referring to overt conformance to norms at a
time of heightened crisis. Further, Prussianisation was a
process of accarmodation to particular norms and values, and
implicit in this is the matter of degree. Different people
would accommodate to more than others, and at different rates -
in other words, they would share differentially in the process.
When Bentley argued that "millions of Germans never desired the
peace to be broken", and that "the overwhelming majority of
those vho now want Germany to rule the earth would rather it
were done by a much more intelligently and liberally governed
Germany than exists today", he made means and values
distinctions between the government and the majority of its
supporters, and between the government and its supporters on one
(144)side and large numbers of Germans on the other. There was
an element of confusion in his presentation when he referred to 
innate characteristics. A careful reading indicates that the 
innate characteristics belonged to Prussians. When elaborating 
on the thesis that a leaning towards violence "had always been
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present in the soul of the people", the examples were selected
(145)fran the streets of Berlin.
There was no suggestion of innate German, as opposed, say, to 
Prussian characteristics, in T. S. Knowlson's contribution 
[1918]. His Germany of 1870-1918 occupied what might be 
described as a cultural parenthesis. In that period the nation 
had been Prussianised to the extent that a belief in a "quite 
unapproachable superiority", once a monopoly of those fran the 
north and east, had developed in the people. They considered 
that their State could do no wrong, that they themselves were 
custodians of the world's knowledge, and that they had a duty to 
convert all others. If this latter mission were not well 
received by those to whom it was directed, "then the world must 
be taught better manners by war and frightfulness." This 
Prussianisation had been effected by "two generations of 
persistent schoolmastering, policing, drilling and 
s u p e r v i s i n g . " Before 1870, German genius had flourished, 
located mainly in the west and south. The essential difference 
between the pre and post 1870 periods was to be found in the 
"contrast between the old culture of the German States and the 
new Kultur of modem G e r m a n y . After 1918, if Germany 
could be purged of Prussianism, there would be "a larger scope 
for personal initiative... and more opportunity for the natural 
self." Germany had a deep intellectual life "that could be
[235]
potent if properly developed." ^
Knowlson's view of Germany may be interpreted as follows: were
an imaginary 'line of development' to be drawn fran pre 1870 to 
post 1918 there would be a consistent latent tendency toward 
cultural richness and variety [inclusive of Prussian values and 
goals] as opposed to uniformity. This latent tendency could, of 
course, be stimulated and encouraged or kept firmly below the 
social surface, depending on the political and institutional 
circumstances. This explains why Knowlson is located in the 
multimodal category. He is there because of the interesting 
temporal dimension he brought to his contribution, but also 
because his prognosis on post 1918 possibilities indicated that 
latent tendencies had not been rooted out. And so it is valid 
to infer that Germans shared differentially in Prussian values 
and goals; that only seme Germans informed their lives with 
these values and goals because they were congruent with their 
cwn value systems [internalisation]; that other Germans, where 
they 'accepted' these values and goals did so fran motives 
associated with prudential and pragmatic processes such as 
identification and compliance. Additionally, the phrase "two 
generations of persistent schoolmastering, policing, drilling 
and supervising" presupposes a strenuous, ever vigilant, ever 
checking process which in itself suggests a need in the face of 
differential sharing.
[236]
Mona Caird's contribution [1918] was brief, but not without
substance. Garmon sense and everyday experience had
demonstrated to her that similarities as well as differences
could emerge from the study of different national groups. She
was profoundly conscious of the dangers inherent in judgements
based on non-verifiable assertions. She refused, in the absence
of proof, to associate the whole German people with the policies
of their rulers. Her predisposition, therefore, was to argue
(149)that the degree of homogeneity should not be exaggerated.
Philip Gibbs [1921] set the 'German problem' in the wider 
context of an international culture with conventions of rivalry 
and competitive ethics. Before the war the statesmen of Europe, 
operating within those conventions and in accordance with those 
ethics had met the errors and miscalculations of Germany with 
others of their own. After the war, and acting as victors, they 
had missed opportunities to make a clean break from the old 
standards; and so they made further mistakes and 
miscalculations. The leitmotiv of Philip Gibbs', The Hope of 
Europe, was a plea that the conventions of rivalry and the 
ethics of competition be replaced by the values and norms of 
cooperation, enshrined in what has been described earlier as his 
'Ten Affirmations'. But although highly critical in principle 
of the 'Leaders of The Old Tradition', and the 'Men of the Old 
Gang1, he appreciated that he was discussing an international
[237]
culture. He conceded that cultural change was more often a 
question of "gradual taming" than of sudden conversion.
Although bitterly opposed to the behavioural consequences of the 
international culture he considered that it was futile to 
criticise those consequences if criticism was "conducted on the 
basis of the old philosophy of international relations in 
Europe. "^^1) And he noted, with sane understanding of the 
pressures laid on statesmen as participants in the international 
culture, that "they were all in the jungle together.
Although he made no formal theoretical statement, it is possible 
to detect a theoretical stance in his grasp of the significance 
which a wider international culture had for the nations that 
participated in it. This point will be elaborated in section 
[iv] of the present chapter, but it may be said here, to
underline the sympathetic understanding Gibbs brought to his 
analysis, that there was a sense in which states involved in
pcwer politics could not ignore the norms, conventions, and
values of the international culture. For example, if being in 
receipt of 'respect1, or being accorded 'standing1 was a valued 
condition, and if this value was sustained by norms of behaviour 
which called for particular types of responses in certain 
situations [say, to strike back, inflict injury, or in sane 
other tangible and observable way retaliate if humiliated, etc.] 
then these states were confronted with potent hypothetical
[238]
imperatives. In this sense it was unlikely that there would be 
deviance from the norms of the international culture, like them 
or not. Differential sharing would, theoretically, be limited 
to one of two forms: [1] full conformance to norms, accompanied 
by disclaimers that this was not the preferred or 'civilised* 
course of action - a position always open to charges of
hypocrisy; ^ 3 )  [2 ] various levels of deviance from the norms,
depending upon how unthreatening to, or unthreatened by other 
states the potential deviant was.
Gibbs also had concern for methodology, and for the significance 
of situational factors as behavioural influences. Cross-cultural 
studies were often blighted by the silly things one group said 
of the other. Reason, rather than passion, should inform the 
process of study. Perhaps the most obvious applications of this 
principle are seen in his reactions to the allegations of
atrocities contained in the report of H h e  Bryce Conmission, and
in his criticism, to be repeated by Robert Thouless during the 
Second World War, of all embracing, dangerous, and ultimately 
meaningless phrases such as 'England does this, or that; England 
thinks this, or that.' He saw a connection between the 
traumatic experiences of German families during the blockade and 
their justification - where it occurred - of the U-Boat war. It 
was a connection which was sufficient in itself; there was no 
need to go beyond it and seek out innate characteristics of
[239]
brutality.
Holding this range of views Gibbs was, of course, multimodal in 
his approach to German characteristics. If there was an element 
of bimodal cversiirplification in his recommendations that the 
German military caste should be found guilty and the 'ordinary 
German' exonerated, that a distinction should be made between 
rulers and ruled, it was more apparent than real, and was in the 
nature of a preliminary to the suggestion that support for, or 
lack of opposition to the actions of one's own government did not 
necessarily entail non-differential sharing in the values 
underlying those actions. He pointed to the distinction between 
what may be called consummatory and instrumental values when he 
posed the question: to what extent were German housewives, 
clerks, shopkeepers, peasants, and manufacturing fellows busy 
with the problems of their own 'little lives', as 'ordinary' 
people the world over might be - that is, preoccupied with
(154)
instrumental as opposed to consurrmatory values?
Thomas F. A. Smith would probably have regarded the views of S. 
Miles Bouton [1922] and Cicely Hamilton [1931] as anecdotal 
rather than serious contributions to the debate on German 
characteristics. But both contributions are interesting because 
their approach to the modality of German characteristics and 
attitudes was, in various respects, corroborated by sources such
[240]
as Karl Dietrich Bracher [1964] , Ralf Dahrendorf [1967], Rainer 
C. Baum [1981], and Robert Weldon Whalen [1984].
In an effort to find an answer to the question 'will Germany 
revert to monarchy?' Miles Bouton travelled through "all parts 
of Germany for marry weeks, much of the time afoot, with knapsack 
and tourist's stick, the rest of the time in fourth class 
railway c a r r i a g e s . " H i s  conclusions suggest that there were 
many different attitudes in Germany, often determined by 
regional, confessional, and sociological differences, and that 
sane times similar attitudes were held for quite different
reasons. In the towns of Wurttemberg and Baden, Bouton found 
that "the people are mild monarchists in principle, but they 
have nevertheless accepted the new order of affairs without 
visible repugnance." On the other hand, "Among the peasants of 
both states... I found many outspoken monarchists." in the 
north, socialists had made many gains, but "the natural
conservatism of the farmer is gradually resuming its sway... in 
the territory between Frankfurt-on-oder and Breslau, a district 
of small peasants' holdings, I encountered again that hostility
to Socialism and Republicanism which I had found among the same
/ICO)
class everywhere in Germany." Regional and sociological
differences were also behind attitudinal differences in 
Thuringia:
[241]
"In village after village in Thuringia... I directed the 
conversation into political channels... If one avoids 
cities possessing industrial plants, one can wander for 
days without hearing a Republican sentiment 
uttered..."(159)
In Bad Blankenburg, Bouton met up with three individuals, each 
of them dissatisfied with the existing state of affairs, but for 
different reasons. Leinhoss, a Gasthaus proprietor, had been 
shot through both lungs in the war and had spent a year in 
various hospitals. He had rejoiced when the revolution came. In 
1922 he carmented:
"I was disgusted with my treatment at the hands of sane of 
our officers and with the whole war... and my health had 
been affected seriously by my wound. But I have had 
enough Republic. I don’t think much of the last Kaiser, 
but any Kaiser would be better than what we have now."
Meinhard, a wealthy peasant, declaimed:
"You knew our old Germany... What do you think of the 
Schweinewirtschaft we have now? Things can’t go on in 
this way. Hie day will come when Germany will have a 
monarchy again, and then we’ll take up the work where we
[242]
left off. Look at what we have to-day! No order, no 
discipline. Republic! Bah!"^^
An old peasant remarked:
"Of course, everything wasn’t perfect... but new we’ve got 
so many rights that we don’t knew what to do with them. 
There’s no use emptying the baby out with the bath water.
I'd like to trade sane of what you call rights for seme of 
the order we used to have."
The views of the two peasants may be said to conflict on a 
number of crucial issues, although, of course, there are 
similarities. The wealthy peasant's opinion of the Republic was 
entirely pejorative. He looked with nostalgia and reverence to 
the past. The old peasant had reservations about the past; he
clearly welcomed sane of the individual rights guaranteed by the 
Republic; his worry was that the balance was wrong. More order 
was needed, and if this meant that sane rights had to be
sacrificed, then so be it. Without suggesting that Leinhoss, 
the Gasthaus proprietor, was necessarily expressing the
jaundiced view of the Republic held by millions of his fellow 
war-victims, his opinions match the war-victim syndrane and
should at least be set in the context of war-victim
[243]
disillusionment.
The significance of the war-victim issue in war-time and 
post-war Germany may be measured by the number of organisations 
which were established to promote the interests and meet the 
needs of wounded survivors and the next-of-kin of the dead.
In 1918, Evelyn Blucher, who later set down her reminiscences in 
An English Wife in Berlin [1920] noted that "the country is 
overrun with invalids with g r i e v a n c e s . i n  search of 
solutions to these grievances, "bizarre parades took place 
throughout the country." Leonard Frank*s Per Mensch ist Gut 
[1918] ended "with a terrifying march through Berlin. Train 
load after train load of the maimed arrive in the city and 
hobble through the streets." in 1919, Chancellor
Scheidemann was informed by a delegate from the Reichsbund der 
Kriegsbeschadigten und ehemaligen Kriegsteilnehmer that
"Everywhere in the circles of war invalids and survivors 
there is such bitterness... and when we make inquiries we 
are always told 'we*re working on it'."
In April of the same year the Saxon War Minister was drowned 
after being thrown into the Elbe by irate war-invalids.
The National Pension Law of 1920 was designed to solve the 
problems and quieten the agitation, but it failed because of the
[244]
administrative load it had to carry - for example, the mounting 
backlog of cases in the pension appeal courts - and the 
political and economic disturbances of the post-war years. And 
so it was that "five years after the war's end, millions of war 
victims still did not know what their pensions would be. " ^ ^
This was the broad context within which the Gasthaus 
proprietor's comments were made. It could suggest that the 
reasons for his dissatisfaction were different from those of 
Bouton's other Bad Blankenburg respondents.
Cicely Hamilton who travelled around Germany in the late 1920s 
and published her reflections in 1931 believed that anyone who 
went about that country with their eyes and ears open could 
hardly help noticing that there were constant appeals for unity. 
The appeals were certainly more frequently made in Germany than 
anywhere else. She concluded that the appeals for unity were 
made because unity did not exist. This early commentary on
the Nazi interest in Volksgemeinschaft redirects attention to 
the argument that Germany was a nation characterised by 
value-dissensus. The title of Hamilton's book was significant: 
Many Germanies.
It is a relatively straightforward matter to locate Bartlett 
[1933] in the multimodal category. Although he offered
[245]
political reasons for not depicting Germany under the Nazis as a 
strong-bonded, homogeneous community in terms of traits and 
values - to do so would have the effect of creating a siege 
mentality and of bringing regime and people closer together - 
the real reason for avoiding such a depiction was its basic 
inaccuracy. Most Germans were 'right-minded1, unaware of the 
atrocities perpetrated by the regime, and not supportive of 
those reprehensible elements of the Nazi movement which were 
public knowledge. Within the Nazi movement itself important 
social and attitudinal distinctions had to be made. 
Industrialists were there from pragmatic self-interest rather 
than ideological commitment. There was profit to be made. Most 
of the young people in the party were there because they were 
attracted by the vision of a new society - revolutionary rather 
than reactionary. Then there were the bullies. Bartlett was 
careful to identify the potential for sadism in all human 
groups. When he suggested that it ran "deeper in the German 
character than in that of most other people", this has to be 
taken to mean, either that it was a personality trait widely 
distributed across the population - in contradiction of his 
other comments - or that sadism did not occur in the form of an 
innate characteristic but appeared with variable cross-cultural 
incidence in populations as a consequence of dynamic forces 
within the personality structure of particular individuals. In 
view of his other comments this latter position has to be
[246]
inferred.
He made brief references to appropriate methodology and to the 
influence of both internal situational factors and the wider 
international culture on behaviour patterns, attitudes, and 
psychic 1 states'. Under the encouragement of real or imaginary 
emergencies, any nation might commit atrocities; it was 
shamefully easy to write lurid accounts of the deficiencies of 
other people. Post-war Germany was neurasthenic, because it had 
been unable to recover 'mental balance' after the Great War. 
She perceived her position in the world to be one of inequality 
and insecurity. Her neighbours appeared to be better equipped 
and armed than she was; some of her neighbours appeared 
threatening. Additionally, she had been beset by harrowing 
economic problems. It was not to be wondered at that this set 
of circumstances gave rise to an inferiority complex.
The main question addressed by the contributors to Peace Aims 
Pamphlet No. 19 [1943] could serve as a text for the present 
discussion:
"To what extent are we to hold the German people as a
whole responsible for the sins of Nazism?"
In their different ways, T. H. Minshall, Patrick Gordon Walker,
[247]
and H. N. Brails ford rejected the argument fran innate 
characteristics, held that homogeneity should not be 
exaggerated, pointed to the importance of 
intra-and-intemational cultural factors and suggested remedies 
based on rational, social, political, and economic engineering 
rather than on vengeance. In all this they located themselves 
in the multimodal category.
Brails ford was disinclined to "assume a German tendency to
aggression." Internal and international pressures had made for 
"a very perverted environment" in the post 1918 period; the 
success of the Nazi movement "sprang above all out of want and 
fear." Hope for the future lay in breaking the hold which 
conservative forces had on the German economy. German heavy 
industry should be incorporated with that of Britain and 
America. Junker estates should be expropriated. An 
international society should be built up in which Germany could 
"exercise her rights as an equal." Minshall and Walker 
detected certain behavioural regularities in German culture
(171)
which set it apart from other countries. Minshall 
considered that the centralising tendencies of the post 1871 
period had been built upon centuries of severe discipline in 
Prussia and a tradition of paternalism in other states. The 
overall effect was that the political capacity of the people had 
been retarded. In the public, as opposed to the private area
[248]
where the free play of individualism could extend to 
exaggeration of self-significance, "compulsion and obedience 
[were] widely considered better instruments... than consultation 
and agreement." Helping to sustain authority in the public 
area were the teachings of the Lutheran Church and the normal 
deference and sutmissiveness of the Catholics to their clergy. 
These two facets of German life, obedience in the public area 
and individual freedom in the private, encouraged a tendency to 
go to extremes since neither familiarised the people with the 
procedures involved in compromise and negotiation. In all this 
Minshall was identifying tendencies and so taking account of 
variation. He wanted to avoid "dangerous generalisations." He 
knew that opinions differed "as to the proportion of the German 
masses that are today militarist and aggressive and those that 
are peace loving, and as to hew far they are only criminally 
docile and subservient to evil leaders." Although unwilling to 
come down on one side or the other there were suggestions in his 
own analysis, in the hearsay evidence that he quoted, and in the 
solution he offered that there were distinctions to be made. 
His solution envisaged a German confederation released from "the 
deadly influence of the Prussian system." Responsible 
parliaments would be established in each state, with control 
over finance, education, justice, and the appointment of civil 
servants. Further, there would be "complete decentralisation of 
control of all military and police pcwer frcm Prussia." In
[249]
(172) . .Walker1 s view, Prussian!sm had generalised itself in all
geographical areas of Germany, but not in all classes or groups. 
He addressed the question of the 'good' and ’bad* German by 
focusing on reactions to situational factors. Over a period of 
time, depending on the. situational stimuli, the self-same people 
could be swept one way and then swept the other. "Socially 
backward militarist forces were strongly overdeveloped in 
Germany" because of historical logistics and geopolitical 
imperatives. An "unfixed and mobile eastern frontier" had led, 
naturally, to the emergence of "a militant frontier type." The 
significance of these 'tough elements' had been sustained in 
Germany by the nation's late arrival as a world power, forcing
it "to create its nationalism... when the world was already
imperialistic." The late arrival also had an impact on the 
econary, denying to German industry a laisser-faire period at 
all canparable to that which had been enjoyed by Britain. It 
was not surprising that Walker's solution to the German problem 
included the destruction of the frontier mentality as expressed 
in the militarist tradition, a liberalisation of the German 
economy, and the encouragement of democratic institutions. But 
all this would be futile if the Allies did not create a world
"in which there will be room for Germany."
[250]
[iii]
Of all the critical caiments made in the literature of British 
attitudes toward Germany, two in particular stand out: first,
the Germans, or large numbers of them, had sado-masochistic 
personality structures; second, the Germans, or large numbers 
of them, had a deep-rooted respect for authority. These two 
themes were, of course, often seen as part and parcel of the one 
syndrcme. In many sources the deep-rooted respect for authority 
was a necessary concomitant of a sado-masochistic personality 
structure. The purpose of the following discussion is to make a 
tentative test of the validity of the ccmnents on personality 
structure and respect for authority by examining the extent to 
which they may be sustained by more theoretically based 
presentations - primarily those of Erich Frcmm and Milton 
Rokeach.
The theoretical position constructed by Frcmm [1942] to account 
- with Germany in mind - for "those dynamic factors in the 
character structure of modem man which make him want to give up 
freedom", may be summarised as follows: clinical
psychoanalytic observation of certain individuals had revealed a 
dynamic personality structure or condition known as 
sado-masochism, with symptoms such as feelings of anxiety, 
aloneness, powerlessness and insecurity, and with behavioural
[251]
compensations which took the form of a dualistic search for real
or vicarious pcwer and security - either by aligning with and
being swallowed up by a greater power [masochism], and/or by
exercising mastery over a weaker object, exploiting it and
making it suffer; ^ 174  ^ it was feasible to draw conclusions on
the group psychology of 1 normal' individuals from clinical study
of neurotic individuals since there was no qualitative
difference between the psychological problems experienced by
neurotic and normal individuals; further, an individual's
location on the normal-neurotic continuum was culturally
defined, so that in social, as opposed to psychological terms,
sado-masochists could be normal [i.e., socially adaptive] in one
society and neurotic [i.e., socially non-adaptive] in another
society; the lower-middle class in Germany, normal in that
they were socially adaptive, had such sado-masochistic
strivings, characteristics typical of them since the Lutheran
Reformation; it was power as such, power because it was
power and able to command obedience, that sado-masochists
(177)admired and submitted to; and so they found the authority
of the Imperial regime [1871-1918] congenial and the 'authority* 
of the Weimar Republic [1919-1933] unacceptable; ideas lack 
influence unless they meet deep psychic needs, and so the fusion 
of the lower-middle class and Hitler was brought about by the 
fact that the personality characteristics of the leader were 
replicated in the followers.
[252]
Frarm insisted that "the answer to the question why the Nazi
ideology was so appealing to the lower-middle class [had] to be
(178)sought in the social character of the lower-middle class."
How had this social character been formed? Where, in German
history, did its foundations lie? As a preliminary he
established a general principle, namely that there are
circumstances in which freedom can be "... an intolerable
burden... identical with doubt, with a kind of life which lacks
meaning and direction." In such circumstances, "powerful
tendencies arise to escape from this kind of freedom into 
(179)submission." He then applied this general principle to
events in German history.
In the medieval period, people were "... rooted in a
structuralised whole... which left no place, and no need, for 
doubt." Unlike modem society, the concept of individual
freedom had no real meaning in the Middle Ages, when "everybody 
was chained to his role in the social order." This created a 
strong "sense of solidarity" sustained by "the directness and 
concreteness of human relations." There was no question of the 
individual being deprived of freedom, since the 'individual* did 
not yet exist:
"Man was still related to the world by primary ties. He 
did not conceive of himself as an individual except
[253]
through the medium of his social ... role."
But then the structure of society changed, and with it the
personality of man. A new moneyed-class emerged, and with it
new economic initiatives Which encouraged individualism and
competition. Giving the lead to such changes was a relatively
small and dynamic group which wanted to break from the
traditional way of life and, iirportantly, had the social and
economic resources to survive the break. However, for the
masses and the urban lowsr-middle class - those who did not
share the wealth and power - the break with traditional ways was
traumatic; they lost "... the security of their former status"
without having the capacity to compensate for the loss.
Instead of having a fixed and to some extent protected place in
the social and economic order, "the individual was left alone?
everything depended on his own effort, not on the security of
his traditional status." For the masses and the urban
lowsr-middle class "... the increasing role of capital, of the
market, and of competition, changed their personal situation
(182)into one of insecurity, isolation, and anxiety." Now man
was free, but he was threatened on all sides and from all 
angles, oppressed ly a sense of individual worthlessness and 
helplessness. Such feelings had to be alleviated if the 
individual was to function in society. They were alleviated by 
Protestantism which "showed the individual how to cope with his
[254]
anxiety... Protestantism was the answer to the human needs of
the frightened, uprooted, and isolated individual who had
(183)to...relate himself to a new world." Fratm claimed a
direct connection between the doctrines of Luther and the 
psychological condition of all but the rich and powerful. To 
save himself, man had to sufcmit entirely to God. This involved 
man's acceptance of his insignificance; it involved 
denunciation and renunciation of individuality; it involved 
humiliation. However, for that price he could find certainty 
and security. Strength was to be gained by "becoming an 
instrument in the hands of an overwhelmingly strong power 
outside the i n d i v i d u a l . " T h i s  'contract', Frcmn argued, 
had secular connotations:
"In making the individual feel worthless and insignificant 
as far as his own merits were concerned, in making him 
feel like a powerless tool in the hands of God, he 
deprived men of the self-confidence and of the feeling of 
human dignity which is the premise for any firm stand 
against oppressing secular authorities... Once man was 
ready to become nothing but the means for the glory of a 
God who represented neither justice nor love, he was 
sufficiently prepared to accept the role of a servant to 
the economic machine - and eventually a 'Fuhrer'."
(2553
It was not only masochistic tendencies which were encouraged by 
Luther's teachings. The sadistic tendency was also cultivated. 
In De servo arbitrio, Luther declared that man had no free will 
"in respect of those who are above him, but in respect only of 
those beings who are below him. "
And so the personality structure of the lower-middle class 
German was forged. In the Imperial regime this type of
individual had derived security and power from identification 
with the monarchy. He had occupied a particular rung of the 
social ladder and had a clear perception of those who were above 
him and those who were below him. For the lower-middle class, 
the experience of the Weimar Republic "intensified the very
traits to which the Nazi ideology had its strong appeal: its
craving for submission and its lust for power." Having 
identified himself "in his subaltern manner" with the
institutions of the Imperial period, the lower-middle class 
German lost his sense of pc^r. His feeling of security 
disappeared with the monarchy. His stable position in relation 
to those above and below him was shaken then destroyed by 
inflation and depression. The ideas of Hitler appealed to him 
because he was a kindred spirit - a fellow sado-masochist. Mein 
Kampf was littered - on the sadistic side - with references to 
the author's contempt for the powerless, to his convictions that 
orators should break the will of an audience, that there is
[256]
satisfaction to be gained fran domination and - on the
masochistic side - with references to the worthlessness of the
individual in any situation short of one in which the individual
(187)dissolved himself in the whole.' ' Since the "influence of
any doctrine or idea depends on the extent to which it appeals
to psychic needs in the character structure of those to whcm it
is addressed", the ardent reception given to Hitler's ideas by
the lower strata of the middle class was proof of their
(188)sado-masochistic tendencies. It was clear that Hitler's
ideology "was addressed to people who, on account of their 
similar character structure, felt attracted to and excited by 
these teachings." Through alliance with Hitler, the 
lower-middle class German gained access to a hierarchy
"... in which everyone [had] somebody above him to submit
(189)to and somebody beneath him to feel power over."
There is a generous sweep to Fromm's ideas that invites 
admiration. His generalisations seem to unpack the constituents 
of problems and make everything much more intelligible. 
Sado-masochistic attitudes to power, when set in the historical 
context of Germany [1871-1945], appear to offer a very plausible 
explanation for the temporary nature of the Weimar 
'parenthesis':
[257]
Imperial
Regime
Weimar
Republic
Nazi
Regime
Functional
Characteristics
Powerful in 
capacity to 
maintain order 
and command 
obedience.
Powerless 
to impose 
order and 
command 
obedience.
Powerful in 
capacity to 
maintain 
order and 
command 
obedience.
How regarded 
by Sado- 
masochists.
Admired Despised Admired
Setting aside for the moment the crucial issues of incidence and 
distribution, it would be foolhardy to exclude sado-masochistic 
strivings from the nexus of causal factors in modem German 
history. Fromm's reference to dynamic forces in man is to be 
commended. And one does not have to be a psychologist or a 
psychoanalyst to appreciate that freedom, in the shape of 
individual responsibility and opportunity for autonomous 
decision making, can be burdensome and give rise to doubt, 
uncertainty, and anxiety. Ordinary everyday experience provides 
its own verification. This said, there is a sense in which 
Fromm's whole theoretical construction is a pack of cards.
He started from the sado-masochist as identified by careful 
clinical observation and then assigned similar dynamic 
personality structures to the lower strata of the middle class 
in Germany. The 'gap' between findings derived from the
[258]
in-depth study of individuals undergoing psychoanalysis and the 
characteristics assigned to a large social group was bridged not 
by appropriate methodological techniques but by intuition and 
the introduction of three theoretical propositions, each of 
which, in unqualified form is flawed and of dubious value for 
the interpretation of modem German history. First, there was 
the proposition that
"The phenomena which we observe in the neurotic person
are in principle not different from those we find in the
normal. They are only more accentuated, clear cut, and
frequently more accessible to the awareness of the
neurotic person then they are in the normal who is not
(191)aware of any problem which warrants study."
second, there was the proposition that
"The influence of any doctrine or idea depends on the
extent to which it appeals to psychic needs in the
character of those to whan it is addressed. Only if the
idea answars powerful psychological needs... will it
(192)become a potent force in history."
Third, there was the proposition that Hitler’s ideas were 
attractive because they reached out fran one sado-masochist to 
many other sado-masochists.
[2593
Inkeles and Levinson took the view that national character
referred to "inodes of a distribution of individual personality
variants", and argued that its study required "the psychological
investigation of adequately large and representative samples of
persons studied individually." Further, national character
could not be equated with societal regularities of behaviour,
for "a given behavioural regularity may or may not reflect
personality characteristics that are enduring in each individual
(193)and cannon to all individuals who shew it." Frcmm’s
methodological approach failed to meet either requirement. 
There was no examination of adequately large and representative 
sairples studied individually, and so he was forced to deduce 
characteristics frcm a behavioural regularity - and frcm one 
which was confined to a short space of time - the incidence of 
electoral support for the Nazi party frcm lower-middle class 
voters. It may have been his awareness of this methodological 
problem that led to the introduction of the three theoretical 
propositions.
The flaw in the first proposition is that as it stands, without 
qualification, it is patently unsatisfactory when applied to the 
interpretation of historical events. Frcmm defined the 'normal* 
or 'healthy* in two ways. In social, as opposed to 
psychological terms, a person was normal or healthy if he was 
socially adaptive, that is if he was able to fulfil role
[260]
expectations; in psychological terms, a person was normal or
healthy if he achieved "the optimum of growth and happiness" as
an individual. Both definitions would merge if the adaptive
person lived in a society that offered individuals the
possibility of achieving optimum psychological health, but in
most societies there was "a discrepancy between the aims of
smooth functioning... and of the full development of the
individual." It followed that the person "who is normal in
terms of being well-adapted is often less healthy than the
neurotic person in terms of human values. Often he is well
adapted only at the expense of having given up his self in order
to beccne more or less the person he believes he is expected to
be." Such a person, even though socially adaptive would be
(194)crippled in the growth of his personality. In The Crisis
of Psychoanalysis [1973], Fronm noted that a person could 
function well in a sick society precisely because he was sick in 
human terms. He posed the question: "Was not a sadist quite 
effective in the Nazi system and a loving person quite 
unadapted?" New, bear in mind that unadapted individuals
in such a context - that is, those who by definition could not 
function socially and would be noticed as culturally abnormal - 
would have gone into exile or been prime candidates for camps 
and/or liquidation. By implication, adaptive individuals in 
this context were so because they were crippled in the growth of 
their personality. But what about the possibility that
[261 ]
sensitive and caring individuals obeyed rules and functioned 
according to the norms - and so adapted to, and appeared normal 
in Nazi society - through fear rather than inclination? 
Further, the sadist who found norm-based opportunities to 
exercise his inclinations may well have experienced pleasure 
and, to the extent that personal happiness may be related to 
culture specific considerations such as the approbation of 
peers, may well have been happy. For the sensitive, caring 
person, laden with guilt because of his overt acceptance of 
norms and feeling that he was in some way diminished, happiness 
may have been a remote prospect. So far as adapted Germans were 
concerned, the real suffering and the real unhappiness, the real 
psychological sickness may have been endured by the sensitive 
and the caring rather than the sadistic. Adaptation in the Nazi 
regime and under the Nazi writ did not of necessity presuppose 
sadistic tendencies, even if the population sample is limited to 
the lower-middle class. The inmates who serviced the crematoria 
of Treblinka were adapted in functional terms to their 
environment. Were they sadists, or were they guilt laden 
victims of fear?
It has been noted that Fronm did not see the terms normal and 
abnormal as dichotcmous. Father he considered that they lay on 
a continuum so that the difference between the "pathology of 
neuroses and psychoses" and the "pathology of normalcy" was one
[262]
of degree, not of kind. it has to be conceded that there
is a sense in which the 1 normal* individual struggles with the
same complexes as the 'abnormal', the difference lying mainly in
the manner in which the complexes are handled. In all
individuals there is conflict when impulses come in contact with
social reality. In non-neurotics those impulses are
"transformed into relatively stable and socially adapted traits
through reaction formation or sublimation"; in the neurotic
there has been a "damning up [repression] of... energy and its
pathological transformation in seme symptomatic manifestation",
(197)such as withdrawing into a phantasy life. The normal or
adaptive individual is not free from inner conflict for the 
meeting place of inner drives and social reality is a 
battleground. This quantitative distinction between normal and 
abnormal, non-neurotic and neurotic - convincing on one level - 
is unsatisfactory when applied to the interpretation of history. 
Suppose a continuum between the extremes of normal and neurotic. 
Between those extremes will lie any amount of individuals in 
different states of psychological disequilibrium. Insofar as we 
are interested in the roles such people play in historical 
events, w e  have to step beyond quantitative analysis, beyond the 
identification of differences of degree, and engage in 
qualitative analysis. As historical agents, the individuals are 
more than theoretical constructs; they are participants, making 
inputs, influencing others, reacting, being influenced by
[263]
others. Clearly there is a possibility, and perhaps no more 
than that, that individuals close to each other on the continuum 
may input, influence, react, and be influenced in much the same 
way. But one would expect the inputs, reactions, and influence 
of individuals at the extremes of the continuum to differ 
qualitatively, and it appears reasonable to allow the 
possibility that this would also apply to individuals or groups 
of individuals located at points relatively distant from each 
other on the continuum. Once allow the possibility - buttressed 
by knowledge that the behaviour of historical agents does differ 
- that individuals who may differ quantitatively in their 
ability to deal with the common problem of inner conflict may 
differ qualitatively in form of action, that is, in the making 
of history, and the claim that it is legitimate to proceed 
directly to an understanding of history frcm the study of 
neurotic individuals becomes dubious, to say the least.
It is no doubt true that ideas lack influence if they do not 
meet psychic needs, and Hitler's ideas may well have met the 
particular sado-masochistic psychic needs of some Germans - and 
not only lower-middle class Germans. But psychic needs are not 
synonymous with sado-masochistic needs, and can be expressed in 
the form of non-neurotic anxiety over issues of material 
self-interest - getting a job, regaining status, etc. While it 
is true that in-depth analysis of large numbers of individuals
[264]
would be necessary to determine what specific psychic needs were 
being met for specific individuals by particular ideas, everyday 
experience suggests that non-neurotic anxiety, or temporary 
neurotic - that is, state rather than trait - anxiety is very 
cannon. Frarm claimed that
"... the psychology of the leader and that of his
followers, are, of course, closely linked with each other.
If the same ideas appeal to them their character structure
(198)must be similar in important respects."'
Had he qualified this statement so that it included the phrase 
'may be closely linked with each other', and had he dropped the 
categorical 'must', it would stand as a valuable if contingent 
analytic aid and no exception could be taken to it. But Fronm 
was unable to so qualify the statement because to have done so 
would have further reduced its usefulness as a bridge plank 
between limited clinical observation and the definition of group 
characteristics. The statement is simply not true as it stands. 
Perceptions can be vastly different. The relationship between 
the ideas of a leader as the leader understands them and the 
ideas of a leader as followers understand them is often 
convincing proof that the two sides can see things differently, 
not only in cognitive but in certain important psychological 
respects. Consider Lenin and Luxemburg in relation to Marx;
[265]
consider the Girondins and the Jacobins in relation to J. J. 
Rousseau. Michael Waltzer [1964] suggested that
"Ideas are spectacles which men use to bring the world
into focus. They then walk this way and not that because
(199)of the particular focus they have chosen."
This is an apposite metaphor. Frcrnn appears to have overlooked 
the possibility that spectacle lenses are not identical.
The interesting, if scsnetimes contradictory things Frcircn had to 
say about the typical sado-masochist's attitude to power might 
explain why seme Germans, acting irrationally, cast their votes 
for Hitler. The problem is that this attitude, as he defined 
it, is so irrational that it is difficult to assign it to large 
groups of Germans who, struggling to keep their heads above 
water, and probably possessed of seme image - modest or 
otherwise - of the good life, were more likely than not to be 
concerned with instrumental and consummatory values. The love 
and admiration, and readiness for submission of Fromm's 
sado-masochist were "automatically aroused by power - whether of 
a person or of an institution... not for any value for which 
[it] might stand but just because it [was] power." The 
sado-masochist also had a clearly defined attitude to fate. He 
loved to be subjected to it; "crisis and prosperity [were] not
[266]
social phenomena which might be changed by human activity, but 
the expression of a higher power to which one [had] to 
subnit." (200) This intrinsic as opposed to functional view of 
power, and submissive accommodation to whatever economic 
conditions obtained - based on an essentially pessimistic view 
of the capacity of governments to protect, maintain, and enhance 
the living conditions of their citizens - might well be 
uncovered in seme individuals in the process of clinical 
observation, but it is not what one would expect from the great 
bulk of people, accepting or rejecting power sources in terms of 
their capacity to carry them toward some tangible material goal 
and, perhaps more importantly on a day to day basis, to meet 
their basic economic needs. Even without the benefit of a 
specially constructed test instrument it might reasonably be 
argued that few are neutral about the capacity of governments to 
deliver in terms of short and long term goals. Indeed, Frcrrm 
slipped into contradictions on this point when he wrote that a 
sado-masochist might fight against one set of authorities if 
disappointed by lack of power, but later on submit to another 
set of authorities which "through greater power or promises" 
seemed to fulfil his longings.(201) The notion that acceptance 
or rejection of power may be without regard to values is 
difficult to sustain outside the psychopathology of 
sado-masochism. Even the closed-mind thinker - Milton Rokeach's 
synonym for the authoritarian personality [see below] - related
[267]
to 'authorities' vhich were associated with values, and stood in 
opposition to 'enemies' identified by the unattractive values of 
a disbelief system.
That the Weimar Republic was likely to have had the effect of 
intensifying the anxieties of a sado-masochistic personality is 
not in question. The problem is that the desire to escape from 
the "unbearable feeling of aloneness", from the "terror of 
aloneness" - a desire so characteristic of the psychopathology 
of sado-masochism - appears to be in direct contradiction to the 
commonly held view that Germans tended to make an operational 
distinction between 'public' and 'private' areas. With regard 
to the latter it is suggested that through a process of 
withdrawal and detachment they had marked out private mental and 
emotional 'space' for themselves. This process was eventually to 
facilitate inner emigration. In this private space, loneliness 
was not the angst-laden condition experienced by the 
sado-masochist. Dahrendorf noted that in Peter Hofstatter's 
investigation of American and German concepts of loneliness the 
Americans attached sub-concepts such as unloved, insecure, 
small, weak, sick, empty, sad, bad, and ugly, whereas the 
Germans attached sub-concepts such as tragic, big, strong, deep, 
courageous, and healthy. To the extent that the retreat into 
private space was a widespread phenomena in Germany, and to the 
extent that the mental and emotional aloneness experienced in
[268]
that space was less angst creating than uplifting, then to much 
the same extent would sado-masochism be limited as a dominant 
drive motivating behaviour.
"Where public virtues prevail loneliness is necessarily a
sign of failure... and therefore experienced with anxiety.
Among the private values... loneliness occupies an eminent
place. Not everyone can bear it... but whoever can is a
(202)hero? he is strong and healthy."
There is a hint of contrivance about Fromm's Thesis. It was too 
exact and surefooted in its treatment of the distant past and it 
fitted too snugly with all the stereotypes of more recent 
history. In the interests of smooth transition from one idea to 
another the reader is informed that there was no place for doubt 
in medieval society because everyone was sure of his place. It 
is true that knowing one's place may remove doubts about the 
location of one's place, but not necessarily doubts, 
uncertainties, frustrations, discontent, and insecurities in 
relation to a wide range of other life issues. In his thesis 
are found 'definitive' reasons for the aggressiveness and the 
sufcmissiveness; theoretical confirmation of the abstract of 
traits on page [45] above? the source of the sense of mission 
and superiority. It is difficult to avoid the impression that 
"a great number of apparently insoluble problems" are made to
[269]
(203) . . . .disappear. This impression is reinforced by the nature of
the 1 straw-men1 [miserable specimens, even allowing for the time
of writing] set up in opposition to the thesis: the notion that
the rise of Hitler was due to the madness of a few individuals,
that he gained power through nothing but cunning and trickery,
that Germans as a whole were willingless objects of betrayal and
terror.<204>
Figure [ 10] is a simplified version of Milton Rokeach's 
diagrammatic representation of open and closed belief 
systems. The basic assumption is that amongst every
individual's beliefs there are seme which are perceived to 
"emanate from authority." The heavy lines in the closed system 
- the dogmatic or authoritarian system - suggest that the 
separate beliefs of such a thinker are isolated from each other, 
and indeed isolated as a whole from different belief systems 
held by others. In closed systems the separate beliefs are only 
in indirect communication with each other, through ccranon 
contact with "the authority region." In closed systems a 
change in a belief will take place only by sanction of the 
individual's authorities, and unless the authorities so ordained 
it, would have no effect on other beliefs, nor any effect on 
"beliefs regarding the credence" of the authorities. The 
closed belief system belongs to the authorities rather than to 
those who 'hold' the beliefs. By way of example, Rokeach noted

[271]
that
"... Some Ccmmnists were observed to change their beliefs 
about ccmmunist collaboration with the Nazis imnediately 
following the announcement of the Hitler-Stalin pact in 
1939... However, other beliefs relevant to carmunism did 
not change. The change was an isolated one, a party-line 
change restricted to one belief, without altering the 
total belief system."
It should be noticed that in the open system the lines which 
separate one belief from another, and the system as a whole from 
other systems, are light. In open systems, because beliefs are 
"intrinsically related to each other as well as to beliefs about 
authority", they are "... in high ccmnunication with each other 
as well as with the authority region. A change anywhere will 
spread in all directions and will be seen to have implications 
for changing the remaining beliefs, including beliefs about the 
credence of authority."
Rokeach placed two groups of volunteers, selected on the basis 
of their responses to an assessment instrument designed to 
identify open and closed thinking (The Dogmatism Scale), in an 
experimental situation where they were faced with a problem 
which could only be solved if they came to terms with three new
[272]
'beliefs' which, in relation to an ordinary activity, 
contradicted three everyday beliefs. In the experimental 
situation no assistance (clues, guidance, etc.,) was given to 
the volunteers - that is, they were let loose on the problem 
without access to an authority who knew how to solve it. Each 
individual, whether 'open' or 'closed' had to "... do his own 
synthesising of... beliefs without benefit of external 
authority."(206)
The outcome of this experimental/laboratory exercise led 
Rokeach to conclude that closed system thinkers experienced 
greater difficulty than open system thinkers when, "without 
authority to lean on", they were confronted with a 'world' which 
could be understood only in terms of beliefs which contradicted 
those they already held. This difficulty retarded the 
synthesising process, prevented the break-down of the closed 
system as a system, and hindered the formation of new 
systems. ^ Q7)
It was part of Rokeach's case that when an authority 'speaks', 
that is, when a source of authority either actually or 
metaphorically makes a declaration or statement, gives advice, 
expresses a cemmand, etc., two types of information are 
available for evaluation: information about the world on the
one hand, and on the other information about the authority and
[273]
what it wants the adherent to do or feel about the world. As an
example he referred to the statement by a member of the U.S.
administration to the effect that the Russians were as stubborn
(208)as ever on the issue of disarmament. This statement
provided information about the world (in this case Russian 
attitudes) and the recipient had to decide if it were correct. 
But information was also provided about the member of the U.S. 
administration - his beliefs, what he wanted the recipient to 
believe, what he wanted the recipient to do about it. Rokeach 
considered that an cpen-system thinker would evaluate both types 
of information by looking at them separately and asking 
questions about their validity. This appears to be a reasonable 
assertion. It is in fact the sort of procedure adopted by the 
historian who asks questions both about the sources 
(authorities) themselves and what those sources actually say. 
But the open-minded person differs in this respect from the 
closed minded person (and for closed minded person we can read 
'authoritarian personality1):
"... The more open the belief system, the more will the 
dual character of the ccrrmunication... be appreciated and 
responded to with discernment, each piece of information 
being weighed on its own merits;... the more closed the 
system, the less cognitive discrimination we will expect 
between the two sets of information...
[274]
There are two aspects to the cairnunication, and in
different people the dual aspects will be differentiated
or fused together, according to the degree to which their
systems are open or closed... Reliance on authority,
yielding conformance and resistance... all may have a
ccnmon cognitive basis, namely, the ability (or inability)
to discriminate substantive information from information
(209)about the source, and to assess the two separately." '
Each individual has a belief-disbelief system. In his 
discussion on the organisation of these systems Rokeach was 
eager to demonstrate that an individual's disbelief system was 
not merely the mirror image of his belief system, and so 
unnecessary as a theoretical construct. He insisted that every 
belief - disbelief system was asymmetrical, including "on the 
one hand a system of beliefs that one accepts, and, on the 
other, a series of systems that one rejects. For example... the 
Soviet Marxist accepts one particular system of beliefs and 
rejects Trotskyism, several varieties of socialism, Fascism, and 
so forth... Thus, our conception of the disbelief system is that 
it is far more than the mere opposite of the belief 
system. "^10) Different individuals, depending on whether they 
had open or closed minds would seek information about their 
respective disbelief systems in different ways. For example, if 
a person's system was completely open "... he would seek
[275]
information about a particular disbelief subsystem directly from 
the adherents or authorities of such a system." An open-minded 
Stalinist, wishing to learn about Trotskyism would know that the 
best place to go would be to Trotsky himself. An open minded 
Baptist, wanting to learn about Catholicism would know that the 
best place to go would be to Catholic sources. But the more 
closed a person's system, the more sensitive he would be "to 
communications, reinforcements, warnings, prohibitions, and 
premises issuing., form his own... authorities;" and the more 
he would be dependent on such authorities for the information he 
accumulated about a particular disbelief system. Information 
about disbelief systems, if it was received at all, would "ccme 
second hand, spoon-fed by the person's authority. For example, 
the more closed a particular Stalinist is, the more likely it is 
that he will cone in contact with Trotsky's views only through 
Stalinist sources."
It is important to note that Rokeach' s diagrams represent ideal 
types. When writers in the 1890-1940 period, picking up bits 
and pieces from the developing literature of Psychology, 
referred to the Germans as extravagantly submissive to 
authority they were, more or less, seeing Germans as 
representative of the ideal type of closed-minded thinkers. It 
is clear that short of the ideal types, any one individual's 
belief-system can be to a greater or lesser extent open or
[276]
closed. In other words, the lines in the respective diagrams 
can be less heavy than in the ideal type of closed system and 
less light than in the ideal type of open system. With this in 
mind we can apply the theory to the historical context of the 
Weimar Republic. Large numbers of those who opposed the
Republic, so the argument runs, did so because they had what
would now be called authoritarian personalities or
closed-belief-systems. Conversely, there is a tendency to 
assume that open-system thinkers could not have gone towards 
Hitler as a solution to the social, political and economic
problems besetting the Weimar Republic. This argument is, to 
seme extent, of the post hoc ergo propter hoc variety, in that 
an awareness of the character of the Nazi regime leads back to 
the assumption that there must have been 'something wrong' with 
those who positively contributed to its emergence. In an 
attenpt to clarify what lies behind this argument, use is made 
here of a statement of socio-political theory and of a technique 
for measuring the extent to which minds are open or closed - both 
post-dating the Second World War. This may be justified on the 
grounds that the statement and the measuring technique may lead 
us toward a clearer expression of what some writers in the 1930's 
and 1940's were trying to articulate.
Ralf Dahrendorf described "... the constitution of liberty" as 
"a basic political attitude... characterised by three premises":
[277]
first - and notwithstanding firm conviction to the contrary and
consistent efforts in persuasion - all men were imperfect in the
sense that no one person knew for certain what was good for
himself and everyone else; nobody could "establish the binding
validity of his convictions except by force:" second, and as a
result, there was always a menu of ideas, a "plurality of
proposals for short term and, especially, long term solutions to
social, and political problems;" in the absence of forcible
suppression, all these proposals were competitors: third,
political institutions existed to make sure that no single idea
would "prevail at the expense of all others;" political
institutions were in the business of maintaining the
(212)"competition of designs." As a means of reaching a more
theoretically based impression of the views expressed by those
writers of the 1930’s and 1940's who saw support for Hitler
residing in the authoritarian, closed-minded national
characteristics of the Germans suppose, for the sake of argument
that those writers had before them Dahrendorf's statement on the
"constitution of liberty" and the measuring instrument devised
by Rokeach [see Figure [ 11 ] which gives the instructions
related to the administration, and sample statements taken from,
(213)the Dogmatism Scale]. Uiey might well have hypothesised
along the following lines: anyone in broad sympathy with the 
socio-political philosophy expressed by Dahrendorf would (i) 
have achieved a negative score on the Dogmatism Scale
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(indicating an aggregated disagreement with the statements) and 
(ii) not have supported the Nazi movement in its climb to power. 
Hypothesis (i) is not in dispute but it may be worthwhile to 
consider hypothesis (ii) with the actual circumstances of the 
Weimar Republic in mind.
Faced with a social, political and economic environment 
dislocated by the aftermath of war, the inflation, the weakness 
of successive governments, the depression, the apparent failure 
of a range of short term political options - support for the 
Nazi party (provided it was not extended in the expectation of 
the terror, the Enabling Act or something similar, and all that 
followed on from that) was not of itself inconsistent with 
belief in pluralism, a conviction that in a world populated by 
carpeting designs there are no certain solutions. The Nazi 
alternative was one of the carpeting designs; support for it in 
advance of the manipulations consequent on power was not 
necessarily a denial of the kind of premises listed by 
Dahrendorf. A pluralist ethic must, by definition, take 
account of a range of possible options, and in politics those 
options usually run from left to right. On a theoretical basis 
no pluralist could object to the Nazi movement simply because it 
was a movement of the right. At a concrete level it has been 
argued that the programme of the Nazi party "... was wide 
ranging and confused enough to let the party appear as less than
[280]
a major threat to the existing order." And pluralism was
part of the existing order. Analysis of the 25 points of the 
Nazi prograrrme suggests that Dahrendorf's premises would not 
have been violated by the demand for self-determination [1 ] , the 
desire for an equal place in the community of nations and 
revision of Versailles and Saint Germain [2], access to colonies 
[3], the emphasis on "character and ability" rather than corrupt 
practices in selection for positions [6], state concern for 
employment prospects [7], equal rights and obligations for 
citizens [9], the assertion that individual activity should not 
violate the general interest [1 0], the Socialist provisions* [1 1  
to 15 and 17], concern for education [20], health and welfare 
[21]. Additionally, there was no obvious threat, prior to the 
spring of 1933, to the independence of the judiciary. Voters, 
with the marginally possible exception of those who were 
authoritarian personalities and were motivated by ' sociopathic ’ 
tendencies, were hardly likely to have had the vision that under 
Hitler Germany would experience a time when "... Themis, Goddess 
of Justice, had the blindfold ripped frcm her eyes in order that 
she might determine the precise ethnic origin and political 
opinion of every party in the dispute over which she presided; 
... when a German minister of Justice found it ’lawful1 that the 
Chancellor of Germany should have his political opponents 
slaughtered... without the slightest semblance of a 
trial..." To the reader not caught up in the Weimar
[281]
predicament, and armed with the benefits of hindsight, [4 ], 
[18], and [24], represent the thin end of a very dangerous 
wedge. If citizenship was to be removed fron German Jews, if 
all criminals, irrespective of race - on the face of it, a 
reasonable and equitable provision - were to be severely 
punished for acts against the State then it was simply a matter 
of time as far as the Holocaust was concerned. And although 
religious freedom was to be extended to all denominations there 
was the saving clause [24] excluding anyone who endangered the 
state or violated moral and ethical feelings. The door was 
open. And [23] allowed scope, in unscrupulous hands, for the 
destruction of a free press. But the hands would have to be 
seen as unscrupulous! If, notwithstanding an appreciation of 
the benefits vftiich hindsight confers, it were claimed that no 
one subscribing to the kind of premises outlined by Dahrendorf 
should have, or indeed could have voted for the Nazi party, the 
caution expressed by Robert H Lewie should be considered. 
Writing of the "... man in the street longing for delivery from 
present evils", he concluded that "He was neither a sceptical 
analyst nor a prophet." It has to be conceded, however,
that anyone subscribing to the principles enshrined in the 
'Dahrendorf premises', and who read the Nazi programme in a 
careful way, exploring through content analysis the 
possibilities inherent in the language of seme of the clauses, 
and/or who had a similar sound familiarity with Mein Kampf,
[282]
vrould have left himself open to serious cognitive dissonance by 
voting for Hitler. And yet, in the special conditions of the 
Weimar Republic such an individual might have resolved the 
inconsistency to his satisfaction.
Reference was made above to the experiment in which open and 
closed-system thinkers were let loose, "without benefit of
external authority", on a problem involving new beliefs that
. . (2171contradicted certain everyday beliefs." ' "Without authority
to lean on", and confronted with a 'world' which could be
understood only in terms of new beliefs inconsistent with those
already held, the closed-system thinkers experienced real
difficulty in forming the new systems required to 'solve the
problem' - a step which, by analogy, could be regarded as the
equivalent of dropping traditional and accepting new social
conventions as situations changed. This experimental data may
provide a clue to certain varieties of actual behaviour in the
Vfeimar Republic, but as an empirical prop on which to rest the
general claim that opponents of the Republic were closed-minded
authoritarians it appears to have two major and interrelated
weaknesses. First; there is a distinction to be made between
laboratory situations and the real wcrld. In this experiment
those with closed and contextually inappropriate belief systems
were isolated frcm the contextually appropriate information
because they were denied access to the authority that possessed
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the information. But this isolation was an experimental device. 
Bound by the 'old' conventions they were denied, by external 
design, access to the 'new1 conventions. This is not what 
happens in the real world. When, in the real world, social and 
political change brings new conventions into being there will be 
those for whan the change is congenial. There will also be 
those who are more in tune with the old conventions, and, as 
always in such circumstances, there will be dissatisfaction and 
a certain lack of congruence between how they think the world 
should be and hew it actually is. But in the real world there 
is no experimental device or external design vhich denies them 
access to the new conventions, and this is where it differs from 
the laboratory. Second; one can appreciate why the 
closed-system thinker in the experiment is, like his open-system 
counterpart, deliberately shut off from the new conventions which 
provide the solution to the problem. For control purposes both 
groups must labour under identical conditions so that if the 
open-minded thinkers 'get there first' it will be the nature of 
their belief systems rather than something else in the 
environment that is responsible. But what if access to 
authority with knowledge of the new conventions had not been 
proscribed? It seems reasonable to suppose that closed-minded 
persons would have been driven to consult the authority - 
earlier and more eagerly than the open-minded thinkers - for 
their ability to deal independently with the strange new world
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was obviously more limited. They might have resented the fact 
that they were forced to reveal their limitations, and the 
authority with knowledge of the new conventions might not have 
been respected. Yet it may be supposed that they would have 
consulted it. This scenario, when related to the Weimar 
Republic, proposes a situation in which closed-minded thinkers, 
finding themselves in an alien environment, might have undergone 
a belief system change. That is, wishing to function 
effectively in a society with new conventions and choosing to 
avoid isolation they might have recognised that the authorities 
on which their belief system rested were inadequate and turned 
towards other and different authorities. In short, there is 
theoretical justification for the hypothesis that not all who 
met the Weimar Republic as anti-democratic closed-minded 
thinkers necessarily kept their old belief-disbelief systems 
intact.
It has to be conceded, however, that the experimental data may
provide a clue to certain varieties of actual behaviour in the
Weimar Republic. One example is behaviour of the type described
(218)by Thomas Mann and Ernst Glaeser. It should be clear from
the argument already developed in this section that individuals 
in the Weimar Republic would not be 'isolated' or distanced from 
information about the new conventions unless they chose to be. 
Such a choice involves some sort of retreat - perhaps more
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mental than physical - from vAiat most would regard as the real 
world into what the individual concerned would regard as a more 
real world. In Mann’s Unordnung und Fruhes Leid, set in the 
period of chronic inflation (1923), Professor Cornelius effected 
a retreat of this kind into the more congenial and for him more 
real world of 16th century Spain. In Glaeser's Frieden, 
published in 1930, the hero had cone of army age just as the 
Armistice was agreed in 1918. The chaos and disintegration 
which surrounded him led to questions which his mother could not 
and did not want to deal with. When the father returned from 
the Front he too avoided discussion of the social and political 
issues which disturbed his son. He was aided in this avoidance 
by the fact that his wife had arranged his study exactly as it 
had been four years previously. The parents were retreating 
into a world in which the war was forgotten and the 
environmental upheavals ignored. K. L. Roper wrote:
"In these two figures, Glaeser portrayed a parent 
generation who wished to escape from any awareness that 
the world had changed."
It might v^ll be argued that Mann and Glaeser draw attention to 
individuals who experienced so much difficulty in caning to 
terms with no* conventions that they encapsulated themselves in 
the old. This sort of behaviour could be said to have
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contributed negatively to the collapse of the Weimar Republic. 
But two troublesome questions remain: how can this type of
behaviour be quantified and were such individuals necessarily 
closed-minded thinkers? The first question is hardly 
susceptible to answer, except that in very general terms the
incidence of this specific behaviour must have been fairly
(219) .lew. Any attempt to answer the second question must, while
recognising the irrational element in the behaviour, leave open
the possibility that for a number of people - irrespective of
belief system - the experiences of war and its immediate
aftermath ware just too much to bear.
And what of those who distanced themselves from the new 
conventions and yet participated in the real world. Two groups
may be identified. One appeared to hold on overtly to the old
belief system and brought it into fierce collision with the new; 
the other appeared to acquiesce, overtly accepting the new 
conventions - even using them for their own ends - whilst 
covertly subscribing to the old. So far as closed-belief system 
theory is concerned there is a significant distinction to be 
made between those two types of behaviour. The emotional 
context in the criminal behaviour of seme Freikorps men and 
members of the derivative Fehme organisations points to
individuals acting on the basis of authority which was
contextually inappropriate. The way they have been described -
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fighters who could not become debrutalised, and men who could
never demobilise psychologically - is suggestive of people tied
to ways of thinking and acting no longer conventionally
(220)appropriate. In this case, however, the retreat from the
new was spectacularly violent and defiant, rather than passive.
It could be that in this case we are in touch with the neurotic
element, with those for whom the need ”... to ward off threat
(221)and anxiety [was] predominant."
Developing the argument further, we have to allow for the 
possibility that among the Freikorps and Fehme members - and 
indeed among those engaging in the type of behaviour described 
by Mann and Glaeser - there were those for whom the Weimar 
Republic and its authority, based on democratic principles, was 
the concrete historical realisation of an invulnerable disbelief 
system. In such cases, where individuals chose, through one 
form of isolation or another, not to function effectively in 
adaptive terms, categorical information about the social and 
political deficiencies of democracy would have come from their 
own authorities, and that information would have labelled 
democracy as undesirable. Although their own authorities were 
new contextually inappropriate in the sense that they could not 
be said to reflect the constitutional structure of Germany, or 
contribute to an understanding of it, these authorities were 
retained as absolute guides to action. There was therefore no
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need, and in theoretical terms no ability, to evaluate the 
time-specific activities of the Weimar authorities and what 
these authorities said about the world. For, within the 
disbelief systems undesirable source and what was said by 
undesirable source were lumped together. Further, since the 
Weimar authorities were associated with invulnerable 
disbelief-systems, these authorities were, by definition, 
illegitimate. But this still leaves the problem of those who 
covertly opposed Weimar authority yet overtly played to the 
1 rules of the game1. Out of tune with the new conventions, 
participating in the real world but not engaging in criminal 
activity, the solution lay in temporary and feigned 
acquiescence. The law was obeyed, the procedures of the State 
followed and used; but always there was the aim of destroying 
the new conventions. Such individuals, though opponents of the 
Republic, do not fit into closed-belief-system theory as defined 
by Rokeach. We are told that the closed system "... is the 
authority's system rather than the adherents'," but there is a 
degree of adherent autonomy in behaviour which overtly 
conformed to nav belief systems - as a matter of pretence - when 
old belief system authorities, literally predating the 
introduction of the new systems, could not provide the 
information needed to do this.
For clarification suppose, first, that the individual lives in a
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society which, through the governing bodies, institutionally 
reflects his belief system (say - autocracy) and in which that 
part of his disbelief-system which he 'knows* as democracy can 
be treated as something relatively abstract because, although a 
conpeting philosophy, it is non-institutionalised. His belief 
system is supported by concrete reality and reliance on his 
authorities is facilitated by the abstract nature of its 
opposition. There is, in other words, no institutionalised 
democratic reality to offer a concrete challenge. Suppose, 
then, that the tables are turned, the competing philosophy is 
institutionalised, and his belief system is no longer reflected 
in the laws and civil/political practices of the new social 
arrangements. Although his own authorities can still spoon-feed 
him in terms of general anti-democratic principles they cannot 
give him much help with the time-specific activities of the new 
governing bodies in response to time-specific circumstances. If 
he is to overtly support and covertly oppose the democratic 
regime in anything other than a generalised and abstract manner 
he has to evaluate its time-specific activities for himself. 
This involves a degree of personal autonomy inconsistent with 
the closed-belief system in its ideal form. The application of 
the theory to a particular historical context opens up the 
possibility that anti-republicans were not necessarily typical 
authoritarian personalities.
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There is, on the other hand, a measure of agreement from
historians that important groups within German society
demonstrated what Rokeach termed 1 party-line thinking* - a
characteristic of authoritarianism. Hie Weimar Republic had
three major political groupings [excluding the Nazis] which
might be said to have demonstrated, to varying degrees,
(222)party-line thinking - KPD, SPD, and Zentrum. Since at the
level of philosophy, if nothing else, the approach of those 
groups was relatively humane, it is interesting to contemplate 
that apart from the obvious example of hard-core Nazi supporters 
they might represent the authoritarian personalities of the 
Weimar Republic. Erich Frorm certainly considered that the 
Weimar socialists displayed significant traits of the 
authoritarian character structure. He wrote
"Ideas often are consciously accepted by certain groups, 
which, on account of the peculiarities of their social 
character, are not really touched by them; such ideas 
remain a stock of conscious convictions, but people fail 
to act according to them in a critical hour. An example 
of this is shewn in the German Labour movement at the time 
of the victory of Nazism. Hie vast majority of German 
workers before Hitler's coming to power voted for 
Socialist or Communist parties and believed in the ideas 
of those parties; that is, the range of these ideas among
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the working class was extremely wide. the weight of
these ideas, however, was in no proportion to their
range... A close analysis of the character structure of
German workers can show one reason - certainly not the only
one - for this phenomenon. A great number of them were of
a personality -type that has many of the traits of what we
have described as the authoritarian character. They had a
deep seated respect and longing for established authority.
...Socialism was not what many of these workers rally
(223)wanted on the basis of their personality structure."
Before this line of argument is tested against the historical
circumstances a few methodological issues have to be addressed.
Fromm suggested that the psychological analysis of doctrines can
show "... the subjective motivations which make a person aware
of certain problems and make him seek for answers in certain
directions. Any kind of thought, true or false, if it is more
than a superficial conformance with conventional ideas, is
motivated by the subjective needs and interests of the person
who is t h i n k i n g . " T h e  assumption is that "... ideas have
(225)
an emotional matrix," and on this basis it is reasonable to
assume that Socialism gained ground in the nineteenth century in 
much the same way that "... the new religious doctrines were an 
answer to psychic needs" in the sixteenth century. ^ 26) But 
Frcmm did not concede the similarity. Although he deferred the
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explicit introduction of the concepts 1 range* and 'weight' until 
the appendix to The Fear of Freedan, they are implicit in the 
body of his thesis. It appears that the range or incidence of 
adherence to ideas is related to the number of individuals who 
profess belief in them as a potential answer to certain 
subjective needs and interests, whereas the weight or influence 
of ideas is related to the strength of these needs and interests 
and the capacity of the 'answer' to satisfy them. In Fromm's 
words:
"The influence of any doctrine or idea depends on the
extent to which it appeals to psychic needs in the
character of those to whom it is addressed. Only if the
idea answers powerful psychological needs... will it
(227)become a potent force in history."
In arguing that Socialist doctrine was not what many of the
professed believers really wanted, on the basis of their
personality structures, Fromm was asserting that the doctrine
was no answer to their powerful psychological needs. But, if
only those doctrines which do answer the powerful psychic needs
of their adherents become potent forces in history, we are led
inevitably to the conclusion that socialism was not a potent
force in modem German history - and this conclusion is
(228)untenable. The internal logic of Fromm's thesis appears to
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have forced him toward a conclusion at odds with the historical 
record: Socialism could not be recognised as a potent force in
modem Germany because he had defined many of its adherents as 
individuals with the type of psychic needs and interests which 
it could not satisfy. To concede potency to Socialism would 
have negated his premise on hew ideas in general come to have 
weight and influence, and made nonsense of his claim that 
Socialists were not "really touched" by the ideas they professed 
to believe in.
Two further methodological points deserved attention. First, 
the distinction between what people appear to want and what they 
actually want is a very convenient one to make, because away 
from the experimental conditions of the clinical environment, 
and in relation to large groups, it does not have to stand the 
test of verification. It cannot be used with impunity, however, 
for it has two cutting edges. Once the claim is made that many 
Socialists subconsciously desired something other than what was 
offered by their conscious beliefs, the same sort of argument 
can be used in relation to the lower middle class in the 
sixteenth century - and this, without having to stand the test 
of verification, would subvert Fromm's main thesis on German 
history. Second, for the sake of argument suppose that 
'Socialists' were authoritarian closed-system thinkers - e.g. 
their relationship with authority was not one of "rational,
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tentative reliance..." but one of "arbitrary, absolute
(229)reliance..." Because of their personalities and psychic
needs they would slavishly derive their views from their 
’authorities'. In this context it is hardly legitimate to argue 
that they did not really hold Socialist views.
Methodological issues aside, it remains true that the unions did
not exert their considerable extra-parliamentary potential
against the Nazis in 1932/33. They "... still spoke the
fighting words, but from mouths that had lost their bite." ^ 0)
Historians have attempted to explain this 'failure' in ways that
lead, albeit with more respect for the conventions of
verification, to much the same conclusion as that provided by
Erich From. Snell, [1967] reflecting on (a) the importance in
Socialist and Nationalsocialist thought of concepts such as
in/out groups, discipline, conflict, exploitation and
dictatorship, and (b) their caimon military vocabulary, drew
attention to similarities between "... the characteristic
features of the Nazi personality (and) the personality features
(231)which German Marxism had helped develop." Friedrich
Meinecke pointed to "inherent tendencies" which in strategic
(ultimate objective) terms gave Socialism an authoritarian
(232)image. Did such similarities between organised Labour and
the Nazi movement - a shared conceptual language, a cannon 
tactical vocabulary and parallel inherent tendencies bring the 
Socialist movement "close to paralysis" in 1932/33? Hew else is
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the withdrawal of participation (that is, failure to stop the
(233)Nazis) in an "hour of political crisis" to be explained?
The problem with this type of question, referring as it does to 
alleged indecisiveness and ineffectiveness in face of impending 
catastrophe, is that post-facto knowledge of the magnitude of 
the consequences is so shocking that they can hardly be 
accounted for in terms of rational decision making across a 
range of options. After-knowledge excludes one of the options 
(in this case the success of the Nazi movement) and this 
after-knowledge can so easily be transposed as * fore-kncwledge1 
to the minds of the historical agents. The effect is to deny to 
those agents the normal time-specific human activity of checking 
out the options as they saw them. And with this denial the way 
is open for a charge of collusion. Respect for the past demands 
that the options as perceived by the participants be given due 
consideration.
In July 1932, Chancellor Franz von Papen, on the stated grounds 
that the Prussian Government was unable to deal with street 
fighting between Nazis and Communists, dismissed the coalition 
headed by Otto Braun and Karl Severing. In the same month the 
Nazis increased their Reichstag representation from 107 to 220. 
January/February 1933 saw Hitler*s accession to power and in 
March the S.A. launched attacks on union property. Why, in the
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face of such warnings and challenges, did union executives and 
the hierarchy of the SPD not provide the dynamic, militant 
leadership that might have roused their supporters to violent 
response? And why, in the absence of such leadership did the 
rank and file not make violent response on their own behalf? 
Theories of authoritarian personality provide a deceptively 
comprehensive answer: in the final analysis what they actually 
wanted did not coincide with what they publicly believed, and 
the leaders were in that mode of relationship to their followers 
in which instructions from above were accepted without question 
by party-line thinkers. In this scenario no account is taken 
of the possibility that the behaviour of Socialists in the 
crisis was, in sane respects, closely related to what they 
publicly believed rather than to what theorists consider they 
actually wanted. Furthermore, there is a sense in vhich this 
form of explanation, although taking account of human 
experiences in the Weimar Republic assigns to them a mere 
reinforcing and exacerbating influence on personality structures 
long entrenched. The experiences have no dramatic and novel 
conditioning force in their own right; they simply help to 
reveal the one true established personality. 
Additionally, in its party-line aspect, it does not allow for 
the possibility that recommendations from authority were 
accepted on the grounds that they matched with independent 
evaluation of the range of available options. Without denying
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that the theories of From and Rokeach would cover the 
experience of sane Socialists, and so add a dimension to 
explanation, it is contended in opposition to a general 
application of those theories that the traumatic events of the 
Weimar Republic had a novel conditioning effect which was likely 
to make many men, earlier prepared to take forceful and risky 
action (as in response to the Kapp putsch), wary and 
circumspect; that this in turn probably facilitated careful and 
critical appraisal of the options open to them; and that their 
decisions were not necessarily made at the sacrifice of what 
they publicly believed as defenders of democracy.
Katherine Larson Roper's examination of Weimar novels suggests 
that primary social ties, disturbed and weakened by the war of 
1914-18 were in many cases broken in the aftermath, leaving many 
young people dissatisfied with existing political groups which 
appeared unable to remediate present difficulties. Then, with 
little breathing space large numbers of those embarking on 
courses with the expectation of professional careers were first 
victims of the inflation and then carpeting candidates for 
employment in a rapidly declining market. Those traumatic 
experiences were to some extent responsible for their rejection 
of Socialism, for in its party political form (SPD) it was 
associated with institutional failure to solve serious social 
aix3 economic problems. With this rejection, recruitment dried
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up and the socialist movement became "... lacking in youth and
vigour, defensive in mentality." It was in this condition
that it experienced the Depression in the years from 1928 to
Hitler’s accession to power, and that experience "...
demoralised the labour movement both physically and 
(236)psychologically." A contemporary description of the
composition and morale of the Socialist paramilitary force, The 
Iron Front, testifies to the dramatic inpact events can have on 
men:
"In this vast army, the battalions of strong young men, 
the daring youngsters with muscles of steel and determined 
spirit, were only a minority. So many... bore the marks 
of the long privation of the economic crisis; hunger and 
cold, the unending search for work, the misery of
homelessness... had robbed them of vitality and
,,(237)courage."
Are wa dealing here with circumstances that merely reinforce and 
exacerbate long established personality structures, or 
circumstances that have a dynamic, personality adjusting 
capacity in their own right? To comment as one historian has 
done that "... the movement had lost its elan" - its impetuosity 
and dash - is to suggest that character was being modified 
rather than reinforced.^38)
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What options we re open to workers in the Socialist federations
at this time? In response to the von Papen coup in Prussia they
could have taken strike action, demonstrated in the streets,
resorted ultimately to violence. But rumours were rife that
agent provocateurs had infiltrated with the aim of pushing them
into that kind of action - and if this were so then sinister
forces, in opposition to the movement, could be drawing them
(239)into open and bloody confrontation with the Reichswehr. 
Additionally, there was understandable self-interest in their 
calculations. There was no shortage of volunteers to take their 
jobs if they went on strike and were subsequently locked-out. 
Then there was the matter of the Constitution. They had 
supported it, had attempted to make it work, had been associated 
with the political party most constant in the cause of the 
Republic. And this presented them with a dilemna. While the 
Supreme Court was adjudicating on the legality of von Papen's 
actions of July 1932, violent extra-parliamentary action would, 
unlike their response in 1920, be inconsistent with loyalty to 
due process. And unless we wish to infer fore-kncwledge from 
after knowledge, respect for due process cannot be excluded from 
the response to Nazi electoral success or to Hitler's 
appointment as Chancellor.
Reduced in spirit and confronted by dilemmas, sane of them may, 
as Meinecke suggested, have seen in Hitler's proposed
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Volksgemeinschaft a way of "bringing the bourgeoisie and the 
working class into harmony in regard to the great basic
questions of public life." in the end, without
fore-knowledge of hew socialism would be "denatured and robbed 
of its best content," synthesis and survival may have been
preferred to negation.
The theories of Freud, Fromm, and Rokeach cane together on the 
issue of neurotic anxiety - a condition often said to have 
characterised those Germans who opposed the Vfeimar
Republic. Each made a distinction between rational [or
realistic] and irrational [or neurotic] anxiety. Freud regarded 
realistic anxiety as "something very rational and intelligible." 
He suggested that the occasions on which anxiety would appear, 
i.e., "in face of what objects and what situations," would
depend to a large extent "on the state of a person's knowledge
\ (242)and on his sense of pcwer vis-a-vis the external world."
[The theoretical support which this statement gives to Fromm's
recognition of anxiety as a central feature of the
sado-masochistic personality should be obvious] Irrational or
neurotic anxiety was a condition in which objective as opposed
to the psychic perception of danger played little part, so that
"the connection between anxiety and a threatening danger [was]
completely lost to view." Rational or realistic anxiety
was a condition which was invariably a reaction to objective
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danger. So far as Fromm was concerned, the manifestations of
neurotic anxiety resembled "irrational behaviour in a panic."
He gave as an example the case of the man trapped in a blazing
house; instead of taking the chance to escape downstairs before
the building collapsed, he is caught up in panic and
irrationally stands at a window calling for help. The
distinction between neurotic and rational anxieties corresponded
with "an important difference between neurotic and rational
activity. In the latter the result corresponds to the
motivation of an activity - one acts in order to attain a
certain result. In neurotic strivings one acts from a
compulsion... to escape an unbearable situation." Unfortunately,
"the result is contradictory to what the person wants to obtain;
the compulsion to get rid of an unbearable feeling is so strong
that the person is unable to choose a line of action that could
(244)be a solution in any other but a fictitious sense." For
Rokeach, the closed-mind person - the authoritarian personality 
- was one for whom the need "to ward off threat and anxiety..." 
is predominant, and this need, although partly brought about by 
external pressures is also associated with "... irrational 
internal drives..." Rokeach argued that "... in the extreme, 
the closed system is nothing more than the total network of 
psychoanalytic defence mechanisms organised together to form a 
cognitive system and designed to shield a vulnerable mind." 
Some of the headings in Rokeach's 'Dogmatism Scale', designed to
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measure open and closed systems, are reminiscent of Freud's 
broad states of neurotic anxiety - e.g.,
"Beliefs regarding the aloneness, isolation and
helplessness of man; Beliefs regarding the uncertainty of
(245)the future; Paranoid outlook on life."
There is no doubt that the irrational does have a part to play 
in human behaviour and experience, and that the psychological 
wells of the irrational should be explored by historians. It is 
also true that many who opposed the Weimar Republic gave every 
appearance of suffering anxiety and every indication that they 
perceived themselves as threatened, and although it would be a 
near impossible task to assess their number it would not be 
unreasonable to suppose that seme of them experienced neurotic 
anxiety. But it can be argued, from the historical record and 
the capacity of those examining that record to empathise with 
those who were part of it, that for many the anxiety was 
realistic and that the perception of threat was rational. In 
other words, it can be argued with seme justification that the 
anxiety and perception of threat experienced by many in the 
Weimar Republic were such as could have been experienced by most 
normal persons in like circumstances; that their anxiety and 
perception of threat were not divorced from environmental 
determinants and were not incomprehensible; that the connection
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between anxiety and threatening danger was not "... completely 
lost to view"; that what the historical record shows is 
certainly people feeling the need to ward off threat and 
anxiety, but as likely to be doing so in a realistic and 
rational sense as in thrall to profound psychic neuroses.
The identification of 'anxiety' as a significant feature was not 
confined to sources vhich took an essentially unimodal view of 
German characteristics; but there was an important difference 
between unimodal and multimodal approaches in this context. 
Where multimodal approaches made an implicit distinction between 
'trait' and 'state' anxiety - between a lasting and to all 
intents and purposes constant condition and a condition 
contingent upon situational factors - and allowed for the 
existence of both in modem German history, unimodal approaches 
did not make the distinction and focused attention exclusively 
on what amounted to a 'trait' version of anxiety. In this, as 
in other areas, consideration of theory-based approaches to 
human behaviour can provide what E. H. Carr referred to as a 
scaffolding for thought. it may illuminate what might
otherwise be neglected. It may add substance to more 
generalised lay approaches. But it may also demonstrate the 
dangers of generalisation and underscore the philosophical and 
enpirical attraction of a multimodal approach to the definition 
of group characteristics.
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[iv]
Sources which purported to reveal the behavioural and dynamic 
personality characteristics typical of Germans in the period 
under study have been criticised on a number of grounds. For 
exanple: for inferring personality fran behavioural
regularities in normal cultural setting and so treating as 
similar in personality structure a mass of people who would 
certainly have revealed personality variations if subjected 
individually to methodologically rigorous investigation; for 
adopting unimodal/bimodal approaches when multimodality was 
theoretically and empirically more appropriate; for exaggerating 
homogeneity, undervaluing, the significance of differential 
sharing, and so representing behavioural regularities as 
evidence of widespread positive support for underlying values. 
This criticism was not in the form of a denial that the sources 
said anything meaningful about German society in the fifty or so 
years leading into the Second World War. It was the 
all-embracing, undifferentiated nature of certain approaches 
that gave rise to criticism. In both of the senses discussed in 
Chapter 9 there was unquestionably a German national character; 
only in one, however, can a German national character actually 
be approached. That there was, in theory, a German personality 
profile for the period is not in doubt; and given the
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knowledge, will, and opportunity it could have been outlined if 
not fully defined. An actual German personality profile does 
not exist; where it is claimed it is no more than a construct 
of the imagination. However, there were some features of German 
society which, particularly in their interconnections, could be 
said to give partial and provisional shape to a distinctive 
German cultural profile. It is the purpose of this section to 
lock at some of those features, endorse the claim for
distinctiveness, and then argue their partial and provisional 
status on theoretical and practical grounds.
Without losing sight of the above reservations it may be argued 
that there is an interesting coherence and a distinctive pattern 
to the following set of cultural interconnections.
1. Historically, the people of 'Germany' occupied a
geographical area with 'soft' frontiers, open to invasion, 
constantly under threat. Faced with these geopolitical 
imperatives one state within the geographical area 
[Prussia] modelling its political, economic, and social life 
on the analogy of a "city under siege" [see Milton Mayer], 
encouraged certain values, institutionalised certain norms 
and practices, and so survived. The pressure-pot tensions 
involved in what was essentially a recurring act of 
survival gave rise, at least in governing elites, to a
[306]
'paranoid style in politics' [recognised in many sources, 
and given sane theoretical substance in the work of Richard 
Hofstadter].
2. The Germans, as a people, ware characterised by value 
dissensus in respect of perceptions of 'the good 
society'; that is to say, in value terms they were in a 
condition of disunity to the extent that the most 
characteristic feature of human relations in Germany was 
that they were carried out between 'ethical strangers'. 
[Charles Sarolea, Rainer C. Baum]. Value discensus was 
exacerbated by the fact that the 'market model' of the good 
society - said to nourish a respect for differing opinions, 
compromise, ambiguity and negotiation - was a superordinate 
value in only one of the four main regions of Germany, that 
is, Prussia, the Rhineland, the South, and the Southwest 
[T. B. Bottcmore, Ralf Dahrendorf, David E. Apter].
3. In the second half of the nineteenth century Prussia joined 
with the other German states to form the German Empire. 
The geopolitical imperatives still held. But now, within 
the one consolidated state they ware rendered profoundly 
more dangerous by value dissensus. For this reason it was 
instrumentally advantageous to the other states to pass 
responsibility for security to Prussia [Sarolea's 'Parable
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of Prussia and Germany'], and for the same reason the 
'paranoid style in politics' was a feature of governing 
elites in the Imperial Regime as it had been in Prussia 
before 1871.
4. To safeguard the new state from external [geopolitical] and 
internal [value dissensus] threats to its stability it was 
necessary to 'Prussianise', that is, to generalise the 
public norms and practices which had been successful in 
Prussia as a "city under siege." This had an inpact on 
the political, educational, economic, belief, judicial, and 
kinship sub-systems of the German Empire [various sources, 
but primarily Ralf Dahrendorf]. Value dissensus remained, 
but was inactive at public level. For the sound operation 
of the State all other value systems were, overtly 
subordinated to the value system of the State. This meant 
that no non-official value system was able to claim 
precedence over another. Active value dissensus was 
confined to the private sphere. However, it still had an 
influence on public life for it led to "a propensity for 
amorality in role behaviour" among elites [Baum, Mayer, 
Dahrendorf].
Reference to the precarious geopolitical position of 'Germany'
and its influence on cultural development was a relatively
[308]
cannon feature of the sources consulted. Milton Mayer's analogy 
of a 'city under siege' and Charles Sarolea's 'Parable of 
Prussia and Germany' are amongst the most imaginative versions 
of this interrelationship. With 'soft' frontiers always
open to invasion, self-interest led Prussia to turn in upon 
herself, in a corporatist sense, and becane like a city "cut off 
from the outside world." Under siege, martial law took 
precedence; with the public interest superseding the individual 
interest, with the camnunity - figuratively - becoming "an 
organism, a single body and a single soul, consuming its 
members...", people surrendered their individuality. Duty 
became "the central fact of life", and civic pride became the 
highest pride: "for the end purpose of all one's enormous
efforts [was] the preservation of the city." Rather than the 
city existing for the citizens, the citizens existed for the 
city. The emergencies - real or imagined - related to 
geopolitical considerations persisted "for generations and for 
centuries" and could not fail to inform cultural patterns. There 
was an emphasis on military standards and virtues, on the merits 
of service, on corporate consciousness, on obedience and on 
loyalty.(248)
Before 1871, the distinction between Prussia and the other German 
states which were to figure in Bismarck1 s Kleindeutsch resolution 
of tensions within the German Confederation was markedly
[309]
cultural as well as political. It was for this reason that 
Sarolea set out to explain the "startling paradox" that although 
there was absolute opposition between the Prussian and 'German' 
temperaments, Prussian control was accepted. His 'Parable of 
Prussia and Germany' was an early recognition of the 'value 
dissensus* which many sources saw as characteristic of German 
culture. To provide a theoretical framework for the comments of 
Sarolea, Collier, Brocks, Ginsberg, and Dahrendorf - among 
others - it is useful to start with Rainer Baum's study of 
regional cleavages in models of the 'good' and the 'bad' society 
in Germany.
Using a specially designed 15 item questionnaire, the 'value
orientations' of central characters in 31 examples of
ethnographic realist German fiction were established by means
(249)of content analysis. The central characters in the
fiction served "as models of identification and distantiation, 
telling the reader who he or she is and ought to be, what one 
ought not to be like, and who some clearly identified others are 
and how one ought to be like or unlike them." Baum
identified four models of 'the good society.' The Market Model 
placed emphasis on individualism. Institutions existed to serve 
the needs of individuals. A just society was one "in which the 
individual pursuit of happiness is given maximum scope." The 
traditional dilenma of individual needs versus group needs was,
[310]
in this model, resolved in favour of the individual. There was 
a presupposition that people had things to exchange and that 
conpetition in ideas was not only useful but healthy. To 
proponents of the Corporatist Model emphasis on individuality 
was evidence of selfishness. The good society was one in which 
there was a "... buckling under to the demands of organisation... 
rather than individualism." Individual desires had to be 
sublimated for the sake of the collective whole. The 
traditional dilemma was therefore resolved by the "clear-cut 
subordination of the individual." The Geroeinschaft model 
emphasised interdependence, social harmony, and the satisfaction 
to be derived fran awareness of 'belonging1, and so threw a 
bridge across the divide between individual and group ethics.
To those three models, markedly distinct from each other in 
their cwn ways, the Canmunion Model was utopian because its 
emphasis was on ultimate concerns. In the Ccmntunion Model 
social organisation existed "to transform human and social 
nature...'1, and in this enterprise, individuals and groups were 
"nothing but the instruments of sane larger transcendental
/OC 1\
purpose, secular or sacred."
Baum's findings led him to the conclusion that Germany was a 'nation' 
"in name only." The value profile as revealed by the 
ethnographic realistic fiction was that of a country "deeply 
split into regional subcultures with quite different value
[311]
(252)
hierarchies." Figures [12] and [13 ] show, respectively,
national and regional adherence to the various models of the 
good society.
On the basis of those results Baum concluded that "... the
German people as a whole shared few if any common values."
Ccnparative analysis shewed that Prussia and the Rhineland had
quite different value hierarchies. The values that came first
and last in the Rhineland occupied different points on the
Prussian rank order. Then again, the two regions south of the
River Main were distinct from both Prussians and Rhinelanders in
that both South and Southwest gave precedence to the
Gemeinschaft model; in their turn however they differed on the
identification of subordinate values. And so there were "three
deep cleavages separating the Prussians from the Rhinelanders
and both of them from the people in the Southern part of 
(254)
Germany." Vitally significant though this value dissensus
was, and however deeply they were divided in adherence to
different beliefs about the nature of the good society, Germans
"shared some beliefs on the nature of the bad one. With the
exception of the Rhineland, it was German to disdain the Market 
(255)Model." It is in this context that Bottcmore1 s reference
to "the competition model of democracy" and Apter's claim that 
what he called the "secular-libertarian" model of political 
relations was analogous to the marketplace - a view shared by
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Dahrendorf - is of interest.
T. B. Bottcmore [1964] pointed to the similarities between 
economic behaviour in a free-enterprise system and the 
democratic process in politics, to the "conception of democracy 
as... competition..." In David Apter's demonstration of
similarities between liberal democratic practices and the 
marketplace, concepts common to economics are conspicuous. 
There was an acceptance in the secular-libertarian model of 
divergence in points of view because this led to debate and 
"competition in ideas." Ideas had to be "tested competitively 
with other ideas in order to establish truth." In this the 
libertarian model was
".. .essentially an extension of the rationalism of the 
market place, with the atomistic, competitive, and free 
play of ideas controlled only by a legal constitutional 
mechanism that prevents any group from obtaining a 
monopoly of power... The polity is like a vast 
marketplace. Government represents the sellers, with 
incumbents and candidates for political office actively 
engaged in producing policy or in discussing anticipated 
policy. Citizens are the buyers... Power and loyalty are 
exchanged for benefits and privileges... This concept of 
the polity parallels the pure theory of economic
[315]
competition and accepts the same values... Where as money 
is the measure and expression of wealth in the market, 
votes are the measures and expressions of power in the 
polity... There are other similarities between the 
econony and the political forms of the secular-libertarian 
model. Information is freely available to voters and 
officials just as it is to buyers and sellers. On the 
basis of information, rationality is possible. Hence, 
political freedom is first a condition of frankness. 
Knowledge of the product and knowledge of the policy
/pco\
assume an informed public.” In Dahrendorf’s thesis
liberal democratic procedures enabled citizens to "act
rationally... to explore the market of life chances..."
He defined citizenship rights as "so many chances of
participation" through which the individual could "carry
his interests to the market of politics as he does his
goods to the market of the economy, and his idiosyncrasies
(259)to the market of society."
Value dissensus, as such, and the geographical limitation to 
support for the market model, increased the probability that the 
inevitable conflicts would not be handled by the give-and-take 
process of ccnprcmise. In such a situation, Baum argued, "you 
cannot ask the classic question of all bargaining, How much?... 
you do not bargain about identity.
[316]
Where genuine ideal interests clash, it is not a question of 
'how much1 which structures conflict relations but rather 
questions of what and who will carry the d ay."^^ In other 
words, the issue resolves itself to one of power. In Sarolea1s 
parable the non-Prussian Germans were the heirs of a rich and 
beautiful estate. They were clever and gifted but they could 
not deal effectively with the problems of management, 
protection, and development - serious in their own right - 
because "they could not get on together." With the estate on 
the verge of bankruptcy they took on a Factor. He was bullying, 
unrefined, and overbearing, but he consolidated, kept out 
poachers, protected the property against strong neighbours and 
exploited weak neighbours. It was to the Factor that 'Germany1 
owed "the prosperity of the national estate. "^61)
Value dissensus and its ramifications in terms of power relations 
within German society was a recurring theme in the period. 
Sarolea' s Factor had welded the estate into a great and powerful 
unit after 1871, but on the eve of the First World War there had 
been no diminution in value dissensus. The Germans had political 
unity but had not come close to each other in more profound 
ways, still presenting "a bewildering mixture of spiritual 
paradoxes." Because of this conflict of ideas the unity of the 
Empire had to be maintained "artificially by autocracy and 
bureaucracy." ^ 62) collier [1 9 1 3], in a dramatic
[317]
passage listing all the things that Germans did not knew what, 
how, or when to do - expectorate, smoke, walk, stare, laugh, 
eat, drink, dress, etc., - was highlighting the lack of value 
consensus. Conrnon standards had to be imposed, and so 
instructions on behaviour littered the German landscape. 
Collier effected a nice synthesis of the argument when he wrote:
"The people living upon this ethnographical chess-board 
have been for centuries rather tribal than national, and 
are still rather philosophical than political, rather 
idealistic than practical... To organise this population 
for self-support and self-defence, to ignore 
differences... required severe measures.(263)
Ginsberg [1942] quoting R. Muller-Freienfels1 view that 
Prussian ism was accepted because without it individualism would 
have led to anarchy, reflected that lacking same sort of 
"balance to the forces of individualism, the Germans have only 
been able to achieve such unity as they have by authoritarian 
discipline."
McGranahan and Wayne [1948], examining the basic themes in the 
45 most popular plays produced for the German stage in 1927, 
noted that where conflict was a central issue "their level of 
action is primarily ideological; the basic conflict is between
[318]
forces that represent divergent social, political... interests 
or divergent philosophies of life.n Against this
background, and without complete subscription to his view, it is 
clear what Baum meant when he wrote:
"... obedience to state authority was always primarily a
matter of esqpediency."
The potency of value dissensus was in this way controlled but not 
eliminated. It was redirected into another channel. Many 
sources refer to the division effected in the life experience of 
Germans through the creation of two quite distinct areas, "a 
private zone of freedom and independence and a public zone of 
deliberate acceptance of restraint." If public space was 
regimented and characterised by overt submission to authority, 
private space was "spacious and unfettered" and characterised by 
individualism.
Leaving aside the question of the extent to which behavioural 
norms were adhered to because their underlying values had been 
internalised, there were patterned conditions of life, general 
modes of conduct, and structured regularities in German society 
which owed their 1 shape1 to the developments outlined above. 
The web of interrelationships between the structural elements of 
the German social system described a cultural 'map*
[319]
on which harmonisation of procedures and practices was the most
prominent feature. So far as State interest in the public area
was concerned, "the settlement of contest was sought everywhere
(268)
in its abolition..." In this society the relationship of
inferior to superior had to pervade all public spaces. In this
1 norm-referenced1 culture respect for and deference to military
needs and virtues occupied first place in the rank order, for,
ohne Armee kein Deutschland. Then, not much further down the
list came the bureaucracy which, as an institution, reinforced
subordinate-superordinate relationships by defining its members
vis-a-vis all others and by programing superiority and
inferiority at each of its own levels. Sustaining the members
of the bureaucracy, frcm highest to lowest, and reifying the
distinctions between persons in respect of the authority they
carmanded, were the decorations - satirised in Oberlander' s
1894 cartoon, "Per Herr Conroercienrath vor und nach seiner
Decorierung"; they were devices which, to use Frarm's words,
were intended to "insure the adaptation of the individual's
character to what is considered 'normal' and 'healthy' within a
(269)given social structure." Additionally, there was the
protection of Beamtenbeleidigung. There was an "exaggerated 
faith in the rule of law", supported by the knowledge that the
commitment was "on behalf of the victory of the ideal of
. . . (270)organisation over the ideal of chaotic individualism." The
importance of subordinate-superordinate relationships in society
[320]
at large was mirrored to sane extent in domestic relationships. 
If the family is considered - cross-culturally - as a system of 
conflict regulation and if, as Potter argued, authoritarianism 
is to be expected in the heme when it is "diagnostic in 
society", there were signs, even allowing for differential 
experience, that Germany over time was more of a ’Father Land' 
than other modem states. The affirmative responses, in 
percentages, of 1847 Germans faced at the end of the Second 
World War by the statement, "The word of the father has to be an 
inflexible law in the family", were:
U.S. Zone and
American Sector, Berlin 73%
[1,470]
American Sector, Berlin 80%
[182]
Youth, 17-27 80%
Wurttemberg - Baden 
[295]
(271)
Schaffner’s study [1948] convinced him that there was a
"remarkable parallel" between the rules that governed the
typical German family and "the credos of national, political 
life." He found to his satisfaction that the German father was 
"cmnipotent, anniscient, and omnipresent", and concerned less 
with the welfare of his family than with the "inviolability of 
his position as head." Of the 96 subjects whom Schaffner
[321]
studied at the Screening Centre of the Information Control 
Division of the U.S. Military Government, 70% completed the test 
sentence "A mother who interferes when a father is punishing his 
son..." to the mother’s disadvantage, and all answers to the 
test question "When a man expresses his political opinion, his 
wife should..." reflected "the subordination of the German woman 
to her husband in the hcme."^^
It has been suggested that value dissensus and its counterweight
- an exaggerated respect for procedural exactitude - contributed
in their different ways to degrees of moral indifference in the
ranks of German elites. "One can observe certain things in
German society of the day before yesterday, yesterday, and even
today", wrote Dahrendorf, "which raise the suspicion that they
are somehow connected with a mentality that turned doctors and
(273)judges and officers into murderers." As early as 1913,
Price Collier referred to the special status, legal as well as 
social, occupied by 'the official' vis-a-vis all others in 
Germany, and considered it "a fatal incentive to the aggravating 
exaggeration of his importance, and to the indifference of his 
behaviour to the private citizen. "^74) in 1916, John
Dewey, noting that Kant's Categorical Imperative had, under 
influences which exalted secular authority, led to an 
identification of the essence of morality with obedience to the 
ccnmands of the State, saw in that identification a tendency "to
[322]
an implicit acquiescence in whatever laws happen to impinge upon 
the individual." In such a relationship there was little
roan for civic courage, for challenge to secular authority in 
the name of seme higher principle. There was, however, 
considerable scope for indifference to what secular authority 
did. Baum considered that this long-standing feature of 
'German' culture had been raised "to a general principle of 
conduct..." in Nazi Germany. To demand legitimisation for State 
action which involved disadvantage to others, to ask on what 
moral grounds that action was predicated and that disadvantage 
justified, was not the norm in a culture characterised by value 
dissensus on the one hand and its counterweight - exaggerated 
respect for procedures - on the other.
"Given your knowledge that your peers are peers in position 
only but not peers in convictions, you know that your 
chances for earning derision or even contempt as a
sentimental fool are far larger than the chances of
gaining respect for such an endeavour... Value dissensus 
pushed you towards an abrogation of morally evaluating 
your role performance. In his official capacity a
reasonable man would not try to be also a moral man. His 
chances for finding a consensual echo for his caring
concern about moral values among critical others were too 
bU».-<27«
[323]
The paranoid style in politics, as defined by Richard Hofstadter
[1966] was "a way of seeing the world and of esqpressing
oneself", one marked by heated exaggeration, suspiciousness, and
conspiratorial fantasy. The paranoid spokesman in politics was
not to be confused with the clinical paranoiac, although both
would appear "overheated, oversuspicious, overaggress ive,
grandiose and apocalyptic." The difference between the
clinical paranoiac and the spokesman of the paranoid style lay
in the fact that the former saw a hostile and conspiratorial
world directed specifically against himself, whereas the latter
saw it directed against his nation, his culture, and its way of
life. In this latter case danger threatened "not himself alone,
but millions of others." It was futile to oppose this danger
by the "usual methods of political give-and-take" - by "a
willingness to compromise" - for the conflict was "between
absolute good and absolute evil." What was required was "an
all-out crusade... the will to fight things out to a
(277)finish." German politics in the period under study -
particularly in relation to the outside world - provides what 
appear to be examples of the paranoid style. A precarious 
geopolitical position, the natural touchiness and tension 
inherent in a Kriegstaat, the perpetual fear of Eirikreisung, 
wide ranging ambitions and a sense of greatness offset by a 
sense of frustration, suggests that here was a State in a 
permanent condition of emergency. The thesis advanced by
[324]
Dollard et al [1939] that frustration causes aggression and that
all aggression is the result of frustration is no longer
accepted as reliable in a predictive sense. But this is not to
argue that aggressive behaviour is never related to frustration,
particularly if the person, power, rival, etc., which is
responsible for goal-denial already has what the aspiring other
wants, was in part responsible for inspiring these wants through
its own success, and yet resists that other's pursuit of
equality of status. What may be said with sane conviction is
that contemplation of Britain's colonial and naval power did not
(278)of itself discharge or cathart German aggression.
The paranoid style may be detected in the notions that choice
was at times limited to Weltmacht oder Niedergang, that great
expectations if unrealised must have been denied by seme form of 
(279)conspiracy. It may also be detected as a emotional product
of the conjunction between the Kaiser's claim: "Wir sind das
Salz der Erde", and Maximilian Harden's cry from the heart: "Uns
(280)lebt kein Freund auf der weiten Erde." Reviewing
exairples of 'literature' couched in the paranoid style, 
Hofstadter claimed that it usually "starts from certain moral 
carmitments that can be justified to many non-paranoids but also 
carefully and all but obsessively accumulates evidence." Nazi
attitudes to Britain in the late 1930s appear to fit this
. . (281) description.
[325]
The elements and interconnections discussed above help to
sketch in seme features of a 'draft' cultural profile which, in
its configurations - its shape - was in all probability
distinctive. Once established, institutions, practices, and
procedures had their own reinforcing effect and an important
bearing on German history. A trait of 'suhmissiveness' -
however various the forms in which it expresses itself - cannot
fail to influence political attitudes and behaviours if fairly
widely distributed in a population. From his examination of
about 1000 German Ps.O.W. Dicks [1950] found "... the trait of
submission... to be so widely distributed in the culture that it
(282)would fail in its purpose as a discriminating factor."
Subordinate-superordinate relationships within the family - a
political system in its own right in which one can learn "habits
of response ... which can carry over to the larger political 
(283)system" - were to some extent shaped by the wider culture
and in turn made a contribution to its maintenance. Of the 96
Ps.O.W. subjected to intensive examination by Schaffner and his
colleagues, the responses of 74 to the test sentence "If a
father does not inspire Ehrfurcht..." embodied "the predominant
cultural patterns..." k . Larson Roper noted that one of
the most frequent family patterns described in Weimar novels was
that which portrayed "a subservient mother and a father who
(285)cloaks his basic weakness in a strident authoritarianism."
It is possible to reserve one's position on the theory that
[326]
schoolteachers, policemen, public officials and military
personnel were obeyed because, psychologically, they were
perceived as surrogate fathers, and yet accept that attitudes
to authority within the home wsre not unrelated to attitudes to
authority in the individual's outside world. On the reasonable
premise that the exercise of political liberty "forces the
individual into the public at the expense of the apolitical
dimensions" whereas the individual who puts weight on private
values stands apart, and "reserves the choice of retreat" from
the social and political process, the forms of withdrawal -
described by Mary Fulbrook as "retreat from politics and the
public sphere into private spaces in personal life" - were
neither creative nor supportive of "The Constitution of
(286)
Liberty." G. W. Allport el al suggested that these forms
of withdrawal ensured that people did not have to "admit
disturbing reality" to their "temporary islands of 
(287)security." In Glaeser's Frieden the mother took refuge in
total political withdrawal, explaining that 'Everything the
State asks of us entraps us and brings us misery. I want
nothing more to do with it'? the father, as was noted above,
"retreated into a world in which the war was forgotten and the
(288)revolution ignored." It is not to deny significance to
other causal factors to suggest that the relative unpopularity 
of the market model of the 'good society' was likely to limit 
the attraction of a secular-libertarian system. Schaffner' s
[327]
study convinced him that "the idea of uniting all Germans in one
family-like group had a powerful appeal"; Dahrendorf's review
of modem German history led him to the conclusion that "the
community of the whole people" had, for some time, been "one of
the preferred German ideologies"; and Jeremy Noakes considered
that Mittelstand adherents to Corporatist and Gemeinschaft
values resented the development of "a modem... capitalist
(289)economy, and a more open and mobile society." Hie serious
and very important value cleavages at regional and national 
levels appeared to be replicated in the regional distributions 
by social class. For example, abstracting 'best* (a) and 'next 
best’ (b) in each case, the regional cleavages in Mittelstand 
perceptions of the good society were;
Prussia: Corporatist (a); Gemeinschaft (b).
Rhineland: Market (a); Corporatist (b).
Southwest: Gemeinschaft (a); Ccnrnunion (b).
(290)South: Gemeinschaft (a); Gomnunion (b) .
There was a three way division in terms of 'best', and a three 
way division in terms of 'next best', but it should not escape 
notice that out of 8 value positions the Corporatist and 
Gemeinschaft models - models which one way or another constrain 
the individual - aggregate 5 appearances. The elements and 
interconnections of the 'draft' profile also appear to increase
[328]
the probability that here was a culture in which, comparatively
speaking, there was a sharper than usual definition to the
necessary conditions for the public expression of
sado-masochistic tendencies and the practice of indifference; a
culture in which value dissensus contributed to the abrogation
of personal moral involvement; a culture in which an emphasis
on subordinate-superordinate relationships was to be detected in
all sub-systems and institutions; a culture in which there was
an emphasis on procedural exactitude, on the credo 'Ordnung
muss sein1, to such an extent that there was always a danger
(291)that Qrdnung would become an end in itself. There is, of
course, the problem of quantification. For example: How many
sado-masochists? Main themes in this and the previous chapter 
have pointed to the spurious nature of arguments which adopt 
unimodel or bimodal approaches to such questions. On the other 
hand, multimodal approaches, however much supported so far as 
variety in distribution is concerned by theory, everyday 
experience and the historical record, do not of themselves 
resolve the problem of measurement. In the discussion which 
follows it is argued that the 'draft* profile - though providing 
useful clues to what was peculiar, in terms of mixture and 
measure of features, to German culture - is partial and 
provisional. This argument requires that, among other things, 
the temptation to exaggerate the incidence of sado-masochistic 
personalities be resisted. It should not and does not require
[329]
that the phenomena be regarded as insignificant. Significance 
in this context does not require that sado-masochistic 
characteristics were widely distributed in Germany. It should 
be noted that Hofstede, through an intriguing example, has shown 
how comparison of marginal phenomena can reveal dramatic
cross-cultural differences in the statistical probability that
. (292)particular forms of behaviour will occur.
The ’draft' discussed above must not be taken as a sharply
defined composite picture of all the configurations and features
in the German cultural profile circa 1871-1945. It takes little
account of multidimensional approaches to legitimacy. It tends to
ignore the very real probability that conformity can "conceal a
(293)wide variety of inward states and conflicting motives. It
can encourage a conveniently loose approach to quantification. 
Consider the following - multimodal - comment on the responses 
of Germans to National-Socialism:
"Among the million or so who ran, or tried to run, away
from National-Socialism, there were many who opposed it on
principle. Maybe a million more fought it, or tried to
fight it, from within. A few million more didn't like it.
But so many Germans liked it [and not just seme of it, but
all of it] that it may justly be said to have represented
(294)the predominant national character of the time."
[330]
The most noticeable feature here is the 'declension' in 
quantitative precision. VJhere ccxrmitment to the regime and its 
principles is taken to be non-conscientious there is an attempt 
to define limits - 'million or so', 'a million more', 'a few 
million more'. Where cccrmitment is taken to be conscientious, 
definition becomes fuzzy.
Put too much faith in such a 'draft' and it may come to act as a 
measure by which any and every type of action by Germans can be 
defined and explained, to the exclusion of other and perhaps even 
more reasonable interpretations. Examples of this may be 
detected in the work of Schaffner. Responses to item 28 on the 
questionnaire demonstrated a quite marked disinclination to take 
an active, responsible role in politics in 1945/46. The 
majority of respondents wanted occupational control to remain 
indefinitely:
item 28: Germany should be occupied for many years, until
the German people are able to form a democratic 
government.
American Sector, Youths, 17-27
Berlin WUrtteniberg -
Baden
U.S. Zone and American 
Sector, Berlin
Yes 69% 79% 69%
[331]
Schaffner took this as confirming proof that Germans lacked "the 
capacity to handle their own political problems or to reach
/OQC]
solutions without guidance. " 1 The responses were made to
fit the theory. Although Baum’s version of why people were not 
eager to participate in politics at that time should not be 
considered as an alternative all-embracing explanation, common 
sense demands that it should not be ignored.
"In 1945, if you stood in Berlin or Hamburg, Dresden or 
Munich, you found yourself amid rubble stretching for 
miles... Such moments in history are not moments of 
reflection. Your worries are biological, where to find 
something to eat, and a place to sleep. If you have 
social vorries, these are utterly personal: how to find
out about the fate of parent, spouse, or child.
It was reported at the time that vast numbers of Germans "wehren
sich auffallig vor jeder Politik", and that young people, in
particular, "furchtet zunachst Politik wie das gebrannte Kind 
(297)Feur." Fulbrook thought that "the prevailing mood of the
time appears - apart from a caimitted minority - to have been
one of political apathy, or even fear of politics, combined with
(298)a predominant concern for survival."
[332]
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It has been noted that more than 70% of the respondents in each
of the three groups cited gave affirmative answers to item 3 on
Schaffner1 s questionnaire - "The word of the father has to be an
inflexible law in the family." This contributed to his view
that there was a "remarkable parallel" between the ethos of the
family and the ethos of society at large, yet in Figure [ 14 ]
the responses, in percentages, of the same three groups to
questionnaire items 2, 18, 26, 56, 83, 87, 98, and 101, suggest
- in sane cases quite dramatically - that Schaf fner1 s view is
suspect. Were the * draft* taken to represent a finished
portrait rather than a preliminary, perhaps even shadowy sketch,
it would comfortably subsume - without critical consideration of
alternatives - J. P. Steam*s analysis of the significance and
purpose of the ja oder nein? formula in Hitler's rhetorical
(299)exchanges with his audiences, whether immediate or wide. 
Consideration of why use of this formula was such a potent 
tactic at the time led Stem to conclude that it was aimed at 
authoritarian personalities who wanted to reduce "complex 
problems to single black and white issues" as a way of wishing 
anbiguity, nuance, and subtlety out of existence. That the ja 
oder nein? formula would probably appeal to authoritarian 
personalities has theoretical and empirical support, but at the 
time its appeal was not necessarily limited to this personality 
type. What if the situational pressures were so great and 
anxiety so sharp that people, though short of being neurotic,
[334]
ware more susceptible to simple solutions? Although such 
susceptibility is clearly a psychological condition, it is not 
necessarily the case that the condition was of long standing or 
had characterised people before the particular circumstances 
obtained. Stem himself conceded that the "temper of the age" 
was "of most complex and hazardous and exacting speculation..."
TO say 'no' at such a time might well have been equivalent to 
"back to the drawing board" - i.e. do nothing as yet to alter 
the circumstances.
More texture and substance may be given to the German cultural 
profile circa 1871-1945 by taking a closer look at the various 
attitudes which may be held of authority, by considering the 
relative importance of instrumental and consunmatory values in 
different situations, by assessing the predictive reliability of 
theories which link particular traits with particular forms of 
behaviour, and by giving due weight to what may be termed the 
generalised, non-culture specific, non-heroic nature of the 
human condition in modem societies.
There is evidence to suggest that attitudes which are conveniently 
labelled 'authoritarian' do not reliably predict authoritarian 
behaviour. ^ 0 )  Confirmation of this is found in the work of 
Schaf fner, Dicks, and McGranahan and Wayne. It has been noted 
above that Dicks was unable to use the trait ' sutmissiveness' as
[335]
a means of discriminating between Nazis and Anti-Nazis, because 
in his findings the trait was present in both categories. It 
has also been noted that authoritarian attitudes on father-son 
relationships and on the role of the mother in family life were 
not reliable predictors of authoritarian attitudes on other 
issues. Of the 96 individuals in Schaffeer's intensively 
examined sample, 83 were licensed by the Screening Centre as 
suitable to work in various branches of the media. Yet on the 
sentence completion item relating to ' son-father-Ehrfurcht', 74 
of the 96 responses embodied the predominant cultural pattern 
"regardless of the particular political affiliation of the 
individual. 11 Schaf fner concluded that his results demonstrated 
"the prevalence of traditional German premises even in those 
individuals who did not succumb to Nazi ideology. "^01) 
problem of predictive reliability is highlighted by the early 
family history of one of the Ps.O.W. He was the son of a 
regular army officer. His father had been particularly strict. 
Reflecting on his relationship with his father he contented:
"I had only Ehrfurcht for him... I always wanted to say
Sie to him... He made me an Einzelganger... I lived under
(302)pressure and fear of his strictures."
The respondent was an Anti-Nazi! During the war 15 American 
films on various themes were shown to 200-300 Ps.O.W. who were
[336]
"selected anti-Nazis." Their responses supported the 
conclusions of McGranahan and Wayne on traits that were widely 
distributed in German culture. The anti-Nazi prisoners 
ccmplained about lack of depth, artificial happy endings, 
"superficial trash", about the general failure of the American 
films to penetrate "profound and meaningful sources of human 
action", about the emphasis on materialistic values, about the 
exaggeration - in seme films - of the importance of the female 
role and the consequent subordination of the male role. ^ 03) 0f 
all the Germans with authoritarian attitudes in some areas of 
their life-experience, and with seme of the traits normally 
associated with authoritarianism, it is clear that sane became 
Nazis and some did not. Being 'German' involved conformance to 
a range of norms which were underpinned by authoritarian values, 
but conformance did not reliably predict political behaviour.
Baum's review of voting behaviour in Germany between 1871 and 
1933 satisfied him that "from a motivational perspective, a 
vote, like love, is a many splendoured thing. Fulbrook's
suggestion that conformity can subsume a wide range of 
psychological dispositions and conflicting motives is a 
variation on the same theme. The question, Why do people act as 
they do, politically? - for example, give or refuse support - 
was frequently posed by the contemporary sources examined in 
this thesis. But the problem was that when Germans as a
[337]
national group came under the scrutiny of the question, the 
answers were seldom based on an analysis of the concept 
'authority' and hew people might view it both conceptually and 
in practice. On the rare occasions when they were so based the 
theoretical framework was insubstantial.
Leaving aside the case in which political authority is accepted 
for no other reason than that it has the power to coerce, the 
properties required of political authority if it is to minimise 
the damaging effects of opposition and dissent have been defined 
by Apter as the capacity to give expression to, and meet the 
needs of instrumental and consunrnatory values, and by Lipset 
[1965] as the capacity to demonstrate effectiveness and confirm 
legitimacy. ^ 05) When a political authority acted in 
recognition of instrumental values it was encouraging individuals 
to maximise benefits by giving support; when it acted in 
recognition of the needs people had for "emotional warmth, the 
sense of creativity and other 'feelings* and states of mind", it 
was attempting to hold support by meeting consunrnatory values.
(306) Lipset's position was similar. Effectiveness 
represented "the capacity of a political system to satisfy... 
the expectations of most members of a society..." and was 
"primarily instrumental in character." Legitimacy represented 
"the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the 
belief that existing political institutions are the best that
[338]
could possibly be devised", and was "affective and evaluative."
A system would be regarded as legitimate or illegitimate by its
menbers "according to the way in which its values fit in with
(307)their Weltanschauung." Explicitly or implicitly, these
views on the properties required of authority are 
operationalised with regard to Germany in the Allensbach opinion 
Polls [1956,1965], and in the work of Verba [1965], Steinert 
[1977], Baum, Kershaw [1983, 1985], and Stephenson [1986].^^
It is accepted here that modem German history would be 'closed* 
to anything but grossly oversimplified explanation if 
consummatory values were left out of the discussion. That 
history was what it was partly because of dissensus in 
consummatory values, and the three discrete regimes of the 
period, Imperial authoritarianism, Weimar democracy, and Nazi 
dictatorship derived support, in part, from the fact that their 
policies and practices matched the perception of the good life 
held by seme of those who thought of such things. However, since 
consummatory values had a much better innings than instrumental 
values in the contemporary sources, and since the significance 
of instrumental values as factors influencing the "scale of 
orientations" to authority was often denied or ignored in these 
sources, it is on these instrumental values that attention is 
now focused.
[339]
It is hardly surprising that Prussia, "more of an authoritarian
society than other regions", should forge "ahead of others in
withdrawing support from Weimar democracy." It would be
convenient to explain this fact in terms of a mismatch between
the consummatory values of Prussian society and Weimar
democracy. This in turn would lead to the expectation that
Prussian votes "should have been the most supportive of the
(309)Wilhelmian polity." That this was not the case is
demonstrated by Baum's analysis of pro and anti-system political 
sentiment as reflected in the voting figures for the 13 
Reichstag elections from 1871 to 1912. This analysis
showed that pro-system votes for the nation as a whole started 
at 71% and fell to 42%, whereas anti-system votes started at 19% 
and rose to 47%. Within these national figures, the anti-system 
vote was consistently greater in Prussia than elsewhere. 
Although consummatory values were involved - for example,
Prussian agrarians perceived legislation which favoured 
industrialists as promoting that which was anathema to them, 
'modem society' - there were strong instrumental forces at 
work. The building of a costly fleet in order, among other 
things, to guarantee inexpensive food supplies from abroad was 
seen to favour the special interests of the industrial classes 
to the detriment of the conservative landowners. Additionally, 
the fleet posed a challenge to the traditional supremacy of the 
army. For such reasons, "The Prussians were the spearhead in
[340]
withdrawing support from the imperial polity...” Throughout 
the period 1871-1933 there was to be seen in Prussian voting 
figures a "propensity to withdraw support from any form of 
government that failed to earn its right to rule" - i.e., failed 
to satisfy the material interests of the Prussian 
conservatives.^311*
Between 1919 and 1933, instrumental values - defining what the 
regime was expected to deliver in terms of material benefits - 
were of particular importance to those for whom the Weimar 
Republic did not represent a political expression of their 
consummatory values. Had it been able to satisfy the 
instrumental needs of the Protestant Mittelstand it is likely 
that dissent and withdrawal would have been much less 
significant, and that reflection on the 1 consummatory gap', 
where it existed, would have been greatly reduced and, given 
time, minimised.
No discussion on the disappointment of instrumental expectations 
and aspirations in the Weimar Republic can exclude the Inflation 
which peaked in 1923 and the Depression which began in 1928. 
The psychological impact on the individual of raging inflation 
was explored by Elias Canetti [1962].
"The millions one always wanted are suddenly there in
one's hand, but they are no longer millions in fact, but
[341]
only in name... What used to be one mark is first called
10,000, then 100,000, then a million. [It] is no longer
fixed and stable, but changes from one moment to the 
next...it has no continuity and less and less value. A 
man who has been accustomed to rely on it cannot help
feeling its degradation as his own. He had identified
himself with it... and his confidence in it has been like 
his confidence in himself... Whatever he is or was, like 
the million he always wanted he becomes nothing... The 
individual feels depreciated because the unit on which he 
relied, and with which he equated himself, starts
sliding... an inflation cancels out distinctions between
„ (312) men..."
Significantly for the status consciousness of the middle 
classes, the inflation did cancel out distinctions between men. 
For many middle class folk in Germany the Inflation left a scar 
which never healed. For generations they had seen the world in 
terms of 'those above us and those below us', and were conscious 
of holding a precarious middle position in society. Of course 
they wanted to rise up the social scale, but more importantly, 
they did not want to drop down the scale. In Mann's Unordnung 
und Fruhes he id the professor and his family were described as 
members of the 'villa proletariat'. Jarausch [1985] noted that 
the Deutscher Richter-Zeitung complained about "the
[342]
deterioration of the legal profession through 
proletarianization..." A survey conducted in Hanover in the 
early 1920s revealed that 64% of teachers could not support 
their families on their pay alone. Later, in the Depression 
period, the term Anwaltsproletariat was coined. Under the so 
called Notverordnungen legal fees and the salaries of teachers 
were cut by between 30 and 50%. Additionally, 10% of the 
teaching profession was compulsorily retired. By 1932, 
approximately 60 thousand professionals were unemployed.
"The social effects of the crisis varied with age and
rank: for the established professionals, secure in their
job, pay cuts were a relative deprivation. For the
unemployed adults, the Depression was a threat to their
very existence. For the recent graduates who were unable
to find a job, the 'academic professional plight' was a
(313)betrayal of their expectations."
The reference to recently qualified individuals is of particular 
importance. Fran surviving records in Hamburg, Halle, East 
Prussia, and Lcwer Saxony, Jeremy Noakes [1971] noted that the 
ranks of the Nazi Party were being filled with young people. At 
a time when one third of the total electorate voted for the Nazi 
Party, two thirds of the total student population belonged to 
Nazi student organisations. why did the NSDAP
[343]
have such an appeal for the young? Erikson [1958] made the 
interesting carment that young people, standing "between the 
past and the future both in individual life and in society", 
have not quite 'found themselves* and so naturally search for 
identity. In doing this they are especially open to ideological 
appeals. k . Larson Roper, in her analysis of Weimar
fiction, suggested that young people were alienated in their 
search for identity and meaning because their parents were 
unwilling to help, could not help, or offered solutions 
unacceptable to their sons. Some young people, according to the 
Weimar novels, drifted aimlessly because of lack of guidance in 
their lives, became apathetic, and withdrew from political life. 
But others, considering the existing order to be bankrupt, 
challenged it and looked for seme thing else. Here we have
some justification for thinking that Consumnatory issues had a 
bearing on many of the three million Germans who reached voting 
age in the last years of the Republic.
But instrumental issues were also of crucial significance. The 
student population rose sharply to 90,000 in 1919, and by 1921
1 2 0 ,0 0 0, double the last pre-war figure entered universities. 
Professional enployment opportunities first remained static [a 
fall in real terms] and then declined sharply. The struggle to 
complete courses had been bad enough at a time when inflation 
had wiped out family savings. Then the survivors came out into
[344]
a society that could not offer them appropriate employment. 
That they should lose faith in their environment as then 
structured is hardly surprising and not without precedent. 
Reflecting an similar problems of post-qualification employment 
prospects, Lord Chancellor Ellesmere remarked in 1611 that 
"Learning without living doth but breed traitors." For many of 
the young men desperate to make their way in the last years of 
the Weimar Republic, the Nazi Party offered a vision of a future 
society, but it also offered employment in an alternative 
bureaucracy, and status in the form of titles and uniforms - in 
short, some satisfaction of their material needs. It is the 
latter offer, recognising the significance of instrumental 
values that is often missing from the contemporary sources.
Karl Wilhelm Dahm's discussion of the political behaviour of the
Protestant clergy during the Weimar Republic takes account of
both consummatory and instrumental motivation. On the one hand,
"all the calamitous phenomena that they connected with the word
'revolution' rained upon Germany one after the other..." The
collapse of the monarchy had robbed the Church of its
"institutional representation"; the "conception of authority
that had become customary through the centuries seemed to have
(317)lost its meaning." On the other hand, very concrete
instrumental values were at stake. In the State of Braunschweig 
in 1922, an unskilled worker earned 12 times as much as a
[345]
parson. In 1926 the Deutsches Pfarrerblatt recorded
"Bitterness in the parsonages is enormous. The church 
cannot perform its tasks with a clergy economically ruined 
and embittered."
After 1933, and particularly during the war, instrumental values
were important in the formation or adjustment of attitudes.
Dissatisfaction in respect of the political failure to 'deliver’
on instrumental values was probably less significant in the case
of those individuals who had a strong consurrmatory bond with the
regime than in the case of those for whom the bond was partial,
weak, or non-existent. Kershaw [1983, 1985] has shown that the
Nazi claim to have created a Volksgemeinschaft was "propaganda 
(319)varnish." Disaffection in consequence of policies and
practices which were not in line with pre-regime expectations
was kept within manageable limits because of the popularity of
Hitler himself - not because of "rational belief in a
(320)coherent... set of ideas or political ideology." But this
popularity was partly dependent - in the years leading up to the 
war - an his assumption of an ' antic-disposition", appearing to 
believe in negotiation and peace, and in the early stages of the 
war by the success of German arms. When conditions worsened, the 
'Hitler Myth' was a poor substitute for the satisfaction of the 
instrumental values of those who were not ideologically
[346]
ccmnitted. As daily life became tiring, frustrating, insecure,
and uncertain, obedience became "a matter of sullen resignation
(321)rather than... enthusiasm." It appears that under pressure
in a material and physical sense, many Germans did engage or
re-engage consummatory values, but those of the pre-Nazi period
(322)- for example, belief in orthodox religion.
The potency of instrumental values as such may be noted in the
immediate post-war experience of Germans and in the way they
came to accomodate themselves to the Federal Republic. Kramer
[1986] considered that "the post-war state of anonie - the
disintegration of social norms [revealed] significant things
about the nature of German society. The stereotype of the
Germans as inimitably law abiding [was] disproved: the
disappearance of nation-state authority combined with material
need sufficed for most Germans to ignore social norms and
(323)existing laws." When asked in the Autumn of 1951 - having
experienced without sign of early relief a period of acute 
material disadvantage - to identify the best and worst times for 
Germany in the twentieth century, 40% of the respondents
selected 1933-38 as the best time [2% said it was the worst time] 
and 8 8% said that the post-1945 period was the worst. When the 
same format was repeated in 1963, in more prosperous times, 63%
said that the ’present condition * was the best they had
experienced, with the vote for 1933-38 falling to 10%. The
[347]
Allensbach Opinion Polls point to judgements made on 
instrumental grounds.(324)
Mary Fiilhrook has offered a "scale of orientations" to authority 
that "range through a variety of positions between assent and 
rejection."
1. SUPPORT/ in the form of positive assent.
2. PASSIVITY/ an orientation carrying little interest in 
politics.
3. WITHDRAWAL, amounting to "an active retreat."
4. DISSENT, an orientation at variance with official 
values and practices but not aimed at overthrowing 
authority.
5. OPPOSITION/ dissent aimed at overthrowing authority.
There is a striking degree of multimodality to this approach. 
In order to consider it in greater detail it is compared in 
Figure [15] with the findings of Dicks. Although alignment is 
imperfect, the similarities are obvious. Both tabulations have
5 categories. Both form a Sandwich1, with non-active 
categories enclosed between positive and negative perceptions of 
the authority system. In each tabulation categories 1 to 4, 
although each one is different fran the others, may be subsumed 
under the heading of 'conformity' [i.e. either positive active
[348]
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[349]
acceptance of, or non-active/reluctant compliance with the 
authority system]. In this they demonstrate the variety of 
motives that can be subsumed under that heading. Ctonrnitment to 
consurmatory values is a feature of both tabulations, but it 
should be noted that Dicks also assigned importance to 
instrumental motives. Those in his ’unpolitical1 category were 
"essentially concerned with private motives such as subsistence 
and security." His ’passive anti-Nazis *, though doubtful about 
the Movement on consunmatory grounds, had originally given 
support on instrumental grounds. As it became clear that their 
instrumental values were not being operationalised by the system 
there was nothing left in that area to compensate for 
consummatory doubts. Those whom Dicks located in Category 2 - 
’Near Nazis, believers with reservations* - are particularly 
interesting. He claimed that they could be critical of the 
Nazis, but usually on instrumental rather than on consurrmatory 
grounds. This could suggest that they genuinely subscribed to 
the ideology. But there is another way of looking at them, 
supported by the fact that they constituted the one unstable 
grouping in Dicks' analysis. They may have been people who had 
no great interest in consummatory issues. The ’good life* for 
them might simply have been one in which their instrumental 
needs were met. As the war drew to a close and the outcome 
became more certain, the attitudes of those in categories 1, 3, 
and 5 remained more-or-less constant, but those who occupied
[350]
/opc\
category 2 began to shift towards category 4.
Fulbrook1 s analytical framework allows for the existence of an
important sub-group in the 'Support' category - that which gives
positive support in terms of explicit values and attitudes for
reasons which are almost entirely prudential. For such
conforming Germans but non-ccrmitted Nazis overt adaptation
could have a high price. The surrender to prudential motives
could be accompanied "by feelings of depression and a bitter
(3261consciousness of defeat." One of the most sensitive
descriptions of the experiences of such individuals 
anticipating comments on the generalised, non-heroic nature of 
the human condition in modern society - was provided by 
Bettelheim [1979]. He argued that for such individuals "the 
system created unmanageable conflicts", and
"In the battle between moral conviction and 
self-preservation the side... that wanted to live would 
eventually win out over principle... for safety's
Seme victims of this inner conflict killed themselves, or gave 
themselves away, but
[351]
"the vast majority.. .gave up the fight and made their 
peace with the system. Without joining the party, without 
accepting all of its values... they became convinced that 
they had to live with and in it... in totalitarian 
societies opponents live in the continuous anxiety that 
they may make a slip, that they may reveal their inner 
feelings and risk total destruction, of themselves and 
maybe their families. Therefore, opponents have to become 
perfect actors. But in order to be a perfect actor one 
not only has to act, but to feel, to live the role... Only 
by becoming the obedient servant of the totalitarian state 
can one feel sure that one will be observed obeying all 
its orders."(328)
Those defined as active Nazis and placed by Dicks in category 1
were described by him as sado-masochistic, paranoid and anxious.
Consideration of their personality profile records suggested
"maniac denial and regression to magical restitution and
(329)vengeance phantasies." This is no doubt an accurate
description of some who gave positive support to the Nazi 
regime. It cannot describe all who were in that category.
In 1934, reflecting on what has been described as "the 
courageous resistance... confined almost entirely to the
[3523
religious sphere" of Niemoller's Confessional Church, Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer wrote:
"What is at stake has long ceased to be what appears to be 
at stake in the ecclesiastical struggle; the lines are 
drawn in quite another place... I see quite clearly that 
this opposition is only a very temporary transitional 
stage to a quite different opposition, and that only very 
few of those who are involved in the preliminary skirmish 
will be found in the second battle." (330)
It is the difficulty most ordinary people have in getting ready 
for and then actually fighting the 'second battle' that defines 
the generalised, non-culture specific and non-heroic nature of 
the human condition in modern society. Milton Mayer quoted the 
exanple of the schoolteacher who, having been dismissed from 
post in 1933 because there were references to 'liberal' 
behaviour on his record, subsequently joined the Nazi Party:
"If the good had been twice as good and the bad only half
as bad, I still ought to have seen it... But I didn't want
to see it, because I would then have had to think about
the consequences of seeing it, what followed from seeing
it, what I must do to be decent. I wanted my heme and
(331)family, my job, ny career, a place in the community."
[353]
By posing a number of awkward questions based on hypothetical 
and actual scenarios, Mayer demonstrated the non-culture 
specific nature of the human condition:
"The mortal choice which every German had to make - 
whether or not he knew he was making it - is a choice 
which we Americans have never had to confront. But 
personal and professional life confronts us with the same 
kind of choice, less mortally, to be sure, every day. And 
the fact that it is a platitude does not keep it from 
being true that we find it easier, on the whole, to admire
Socrates than to envy him; to adore the Cross... then to
• 4. ,,(332) carry it."
In Th. Th. Heine's cartoon 'Michel am Scheidewege', the
(333)paths lead . zur Demdkratie and zur Reaktion. 
According to seme interpretations of modem German history 
Michel's route was pre-determined. He turned away frcm 
democracy because he could not think for himself, was used 
to following instructions, was blindly obedient and wanted 
to be led. large numbers of Germans had so internalised 
the behavioural requirements of their culture that, in 
Franm's terms, they had acquired the kind of character 
which made them want to act in the way they had to act. 
They had come to desire what objectively was necessary for
[354]
them to do. It has been the purpose of this chapter
to argue that images of Germany fran this frame of 
reference are unreliable.
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PART 5 
CONCLUSIONS
CONCLUSIONS
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British attitudes to Germany as reflected in the sources fell 
into four broad categories. There were those who made no 
distinctions between Germans, covering all with blanket 
condemnation. In national character terms theirs was the 
Schwarzweissmalerei unimodal approach. Diametrically opposed 
to this was the approach which made meaningful distinctions 
between different groups of Germans and was genuinely 
multimodal. Lying between the unimodal and multimodal 
approaches were two versions of bimodality, simplistic in their 
attitudes to Germany and the Germans and to German national 
character. Sane sources in this category made distinctions 
between the government and the people or between the 'military 
caste1 and the people, along sympathetic 'most Germans are like 
us' lines; others made distinctions between 'the bloody minded 
bulk' and an ineffective residue, along unsympathetic 'most 
Germans are not likens' lines. The commonly validated standard 
by which Germans were assessed was the ideological component of 
the British self-image. The self-image as a whole was 
dualistic. There was a pragmatic canponent in the form of a 
perception of what Britain had and held in a competitive world - 
benefits of trade, security, wealth, possessions, relative 
status. In these terms any gain by a significant competitor was 
counted as relative loss to Britain. Then there was an 
ideological component in the form of a perception of the kind of 
people the British were. This perception was multifaceted,
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representing the British as emphathetic - open to the points of 
view of others, willing to consider things from all angles - as 
fair - unwilling to make rash or harsh judgements, keen to 'play 
the game', self-critical and aware of their own failings - as 
tolerant - always prepared to make allowances - and as decent - 
having a commitment to justice. Although the Germans were so 
often judged in terms of the ideological self image that it took 
the form of a commonly validated instrument of assessment, it 
was the dualistic nature of the image as a whole and the 
relative eights accorded to each component that gave rise to 
and fuelled the debate on Germany and the Germans in the fifty 
or so years from 1890 - particularly during periods of
threatened or actual crisis when Britain and Germany were in 
confrontation. At such times the pragmatic and ideological 
elements inevitably came into conflict. Whenever there was 
serious and sharp debate about the Germans the tensions inherent 
in the self-image as a whole came to the surface. There is a 
strain towards consistency between expressed attitudes derived 
from declared values and the values themselves, particularly 
when the values are central to the perception of self. Where 
cognitions are not in 'molecular isolation1 from each other 
there is a natural desire to reduce the psychological discomfort 
of dissonance. Sources which used the ideological self-image as 
an instrument of assessment tended to experience cognitive 
dissonance if the assessment was not sympathetically informed by
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fairness, justice, tolerance, and empathy. The use of
mechanisms for the reduction of bothersome inconsistency was 
detected in a number of sources - particularly mechanisms such 
as paying ritualistic lip service to the claims of the dissonant 
cognition [in this context the ideological self-image],
derogation of those who held views in opposition to their own, 
self-justification in the form of the 'suffering servant* 
syndrome, transcendence of the inconsistency by a superordinate 
cognition such as the need to combat the Antichrist, and even 
reinterpretation of the ideological self-image itself.
Tenable cross-cultural distinctions can be made through 
comparative analysis of symbolic material and collective 
products, consideration of the behavioural regularities
embodied in the respective norms, and study of the functional 
relationships between the various sub-systems of each culture to 
determine, for example, the extent to which their procedures, 
practices and values are harmonised. One culture may be 
considered distinct from another in terms of the range and/or 
distribution of the dynamic personality structures of its 
membership. The range and distribution of personality 
characteristics have to be inferred since, unlike the behaviour 
which is said to follow from them, they cannot be directly 
observed. The extent to which such distinctions - behavioural 
and personality -deserve to be regarded as objectively valid is
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in direct proportion to the observational and inferential rigour 
employed. The British sources analysed in this thesis, 
including those which were genuinely multimodal in their 
approach to the definition of German national characteristics, 
were deficient when measured against such criteria. What can be 
said of the genuinely multimodal approaches is that they tended 
to identify cross-cultural similarities, avoid exaggeration of 
homogeneity, recognise differential sharing, assign seme causal 
autonomy to situational factors, and consider the wider context 
of international culture, lhe analytical framework devised for 
the comparative study of views on German national character 
demonstrates that variance in the approaches to modal structure 
tends to produce variance in the approaches to a range of 
related issues. Bor example, unimodal approaches tended to 
exaggerate the degree of homogeneity, underestimate the 
significance of differential sharing, ignore cross cultural 
similarities, neglect the potential influence of a wider 
cultural context, regard characteristics as innate, pay no more 
than lip service to methodological rigour, and favour 
cataclysmic solutions to *the German problem*. Unimodal 
approaches, which made no distinctions between Germans, and 
simplistic bimodal approaches of the kind presented by Rowse and 
Vansittart shared in the general lack of observational and 
inferential rigour, were missing the intuitive balance of the 
multimodal approaches and, typically, failed to address a number
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of crucial issues including multidimensional attitudes to 
legitimacy, the wide range of psychological dispositions and 
conflicting motivations which may be subsumed under the head of 
conforming behaviour, the distinction between instrumental and 
oonsummatory values and what such a distinction could entail in 
particular circumstances. Unimodal and simplistic bimodal 
approaches to German national character were particularly 
unsafe.
Conclusions on the classification of British attitudes towards 
Germany have been deferred until new because there is a sense in 
which the competition - cooperation alternative to the 
idealist-realist dichotomy brings together all the main themes 
of the thesis. The idealist-realist dichotomy with respective 
pro and anti-German sub-sets is unreliable. Idealists could be 
anti-German, Realists could be ideologically neutral, and a 
whole range of others equivocal in their attitudes. The area of 
congruence in the parallel continuums model allows for the 
recognition and identification of ambiguous positions. The 
competition - cooperation model is a more reliable means of 
locating one perception in relation to another [see example 
below]. It is a more realistic reflection of normal functional 
relationships between states in the modem world. Unequivocal 
positions - but more usually that of extreme competition - may 
be adopted under particular circumstances, but it is an
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airbiguous 'mixture' of competition and cooperation vtfiich tends 
to inform dealings between states. There is also a sense in 
which the competition-copperation model brings the main themes 
of the thesis into coherent relationship. Competition and 
cooperation though not synonymous with the two main components 
of the British self-image are concepts readily derived from 
them. Multimodality in versions of national character, if 
genuine and not a matter of one overvdielmingly dominant mode 
dwarfing a number of equally insignificant minor modes, is 
likely to go with a predilection for cooperation, even if it is 
in 'future tense'. Gollancz, dedicated to the defeat of the 
Nazi regime was committed to cooperative goals on conclusion of 
the peace. And through these relationships the model is linked 
with consistency theory. Multimodal versions of German national 
character were less likely to give rise to cognitive dissonance. 
Unimodal approaches were likely to go with a predilection for 
competition, and tended to be more productive of bothersome 
inconsistency.
SELECT BIOGRAPHICAL APPENDIX
[388]
G. Barracloogh (1908-1984). Educated Bootham and Oriel College, 
Oxford. Medieval historian who turned to promoting the study of 
'Contemporary History'.
J. A. Cramb (1862-1913). Educated at Glasgow and Bonn 
Universities. Journalist and lecturer. Latterly Professor of 
Modem History at Queen's College, London.
E. J. Pi nan (1854-1933). Educated in Paris and several German 
and Russian universities. Specialist in oriental languages and 
philology but then turned to journalism. Daily Telegraph 
correspondent.
A. G. Gardiner (1865-1946). Journalist, biographer and author. 
Editor Daily News 1907-19.
Philip Gibte (1877-1962). Privately educated, he began as a 
literary journalist but then made his name as a war 
correspondent during the Great War. As well as journalism, he 
produced a steady stream of novels and historical studies.
Victor Go! lanes (1893-1967). Educated at St. Paul's and New 
College, Oxford, he was first a schoolmaster before turning to 
publishing. After working for Benn he set up his own publishing 
house in 1928. Active on the Left, he took a wide interest in 
various political and humanitarian 'causes'.
L. J. Maxse (1864-1932). Educated at Harrow and King's College, 
Cambridge. Editor and proprietor National Review frcm 1893.
L. B. Namier (1888-1960). Came to England frcm Polish Russia in 
1908 and studied at Balliol College, Oxford and the London 
School of Economics. Made his name for his approach to the 
study of eighteenth-century English history, but wrote and 
reviared widely on contemporary European political developments.
H. Nioolson (1886-1^6$ ). Diplomat, biographer, historian, 
essayist and diarist who was also a back-bench M.P.
A. L. Reuse (1903- ) Educated St. Austell and Christ Church,
Oxford. Historian, literary scholar and poet who entertained, 
for a time, left-wing views and political aspirations.
R. Vhnsittart (1881-1957). Educated at Eton. Entered 
Diplomatic Service. His career was largely spent in London. 
Permanent Under-Secretary 1930, but later his influence was 
by-passed. Subsequently his literary skills were put to use in 
various polemical books. The view they advanced about Germany 
earned the title 'Vansittartism'.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[389]
Abel, Theodora M. 'The Rorschach Test in the Study of Culture, 1 
Rorschach Research Exchange and Journal of 
Projective Techniques, XII, No.2, 1948.
Aberle, D. F., and Naegele, K.D. 'Middle class fathers'
occupational roles and attitudes towards 
children.' American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 
22, 1952.
Adcock, C. J. Fundamentals of Psychology. London: Pelican, 1964.
Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D. J., Sanford,
Nevitt, R. The Authoritarian Personality. New 
York: Harper and Row, 1950.
Aldcroft, Derek H., and Richardson, Harry W., The British 
Economy, 1870-1939. London: Macmillan, 1969.
Allen, Vernon L. Role Theory and Consistency Theory, in Robert
P. Abelson, et.al., (eds.), Theories of Cognitive 
Dissonance. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968.
Allen, William Sheridan, The Nazi Seizure of Power. Chicago: 
Quadrangle, 1965.
Allport, Gordon W. Personality, A Psychological Interpretation. 
London: Constable, 1949.
Allport, Gordon W., Bruner, J. S. and Jandorf, E. M.
'Personality under social catastrophe: ninety
life histories of the Nazi revolution. '
Character and Personality, 10, 1961.
Almond, G. A., and Verba, S. Civic culture: political attitudes 
and democracy in five nations. Boston: Little, 
Brcwn, 1963.
Andler, C. Frightfulness in theory and practice. London: 
Fisher Unwin, 1916.
Angell, Norman Prussianism and its destruction. London: 
Heinemann, 1914.
" " The Great Illusion, 1933. London: William
Heinemann, 1933.
Apter, David E.The Politics of Modernisation. Chicago 
Uhiversity Press, 1965.
[390]
Arblaster, Anthony, and Lukes, Stephen, (eds.), The Good 
Society. London: Methuen, 1971.
Aronson, Elliot. Dissonance Theory: Progress and Problems, in 
Robert P Abelson, et.al. (eds.), Theories of 
Cognitive Dissonance. Chicago: Rand McNally,
1968.
Ballard, F. Plain truths versus German lies. London: Kelly, 
1915.
Baleson, G. A. 'Seme systematic approaches to the study of
culture and personality.' Character and 
Personality, No.ll, 1942.
Bandura, A., Walters, R. H. Adolescent Aggression. New York: 
Ronald Press, 1959.
Barker, J. Ellis. The Foundations of Germany. London: Smith, 
Elder, 1916.
" 1 " (ed/trans). Germany’s Annexationist Aims. London:
John Muray, 1917.
Barr, Paul. 'Is Germany a Nation?1 Fortnightly Review,
Vol.114, 1923.
Barraclough, G. Factors in German History. Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1946.
Bartlett, Vernon. Nazi Germany Explained. London: Gollancz,
1933.
Bateson, Gregory. Morale and national character. In G. Watson
(ed.), Civilian morale. Boston: Society for the 
Psychological Study of Social Issues. 1942.
Bateson, Gregory. 'Cultural and thematic analysis of fictional
films.1 Transactions of the New York Academy of 
Science, 5 (Series 11), 1943.
Bateson, Gregory. 'The Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis,' 
Psychological Review, XLVIII, No.4, 1941.
Bateson, Gregory. 'Formulation of End-Linkage'. In Mead,
Margaret, and Metraux, Rhoda, (eds.)., The Study 
of Culture at a Distance. Chicago University 
Press, 1953.
[391]
Baughman, E. E. Personality; The psychological study of the
individual. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey;
Prentice-Hall, 1972.
Baum, Rainer, C. The Holocaust and The German Elite. London: 
Croon Helm, 1981.
Becker, C. L. Everyman his own historian. New York: Crofts,
1935.
Begbie, Harold. The Trend of Things. In Rolf Gardiner and
Heinz Rocholl (eds.)., Britain and Germany. 
London: Williams and Norgate, 1928.
Beloff, Max. ‘Press and Politics.1 Government and Opposition. 
Vol, 8(3), 1973.
Bern, Daryl, J. Beliefs, Attitudes, and Human Affairs.
Belmont, California: Brooks/Cole, 1970.
Benedict, Ruth F. The study of cultural patterns in European
nations. Transactions of New York Academy of
Sciences, No.8, [series 11], 1946.
" " The chrysanthemum and the sword. Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1946.
Bentley, E. C. 'The German State of Mind.' Fortnightly Review, 
Vol. 97, 1915.
Berger, Peter L. Invitation to Sociology: A Humanistic 
Perspective. London: Penguin, 1963.
Berger, Morroe. 'Understanding National Character and War.'
Ccnmentary, XI, No.4, 1951.
Berghahn, Volker R. & Kitchen, Martin, (eds.) Germany in the Age 
of Total War. London: Croon Helm, 1981.
Berkowitz, Leonard. The Motivational Status of Cognitive
Consistency Theorising, in Robert P. Abel son, 
et al, (eds.) , Theories of Cognitive Dissonance. 
Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968.
Bemhardi, Friedrich, von. Deutschland und der Nachste Krieg, 
Stuttgart: Cotta'sche Buchhandlung,1912.
Bettelheim, Bruno. Surviving and other Essays. London: Thames & 
Hudson, 1979.
[392]
Ben-Israel, Hedua, 'Cross Purposes: British Reactions to the
German Anti-Nazi Opposition,' Journal of 
Contemporary History, Vol.20, 1985.
Black, Kurt W. 'Equilibrium as Motivation: Between Pleasure and 
Enjoyment,' in Robert P. Abelson, et al, (eds.). 
theories of Cognitive Dissonance. Chicago: Rand 
McNally, 1968.
Bland, J. 0. P. Germany's violations of the laws of war,
1914-15. London: Heinemann, 1915.
Boas, F. Anthropology. In E. R. A. Seligman (ed.).,
Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. New York: 
Macmillan, 1930.
Bogdan, Denitch. Legitimation of Regimes. London: Sage, 1979.
Bohne, Friedrich, Per Deutsche in Seiner Karikatur: Hundert
Jahre Selbstkritik. Stuttgart: Bassermann' sche,
1971.
Bottanore, T. B. Elites and Society. London: C.A. Watts, 1964.
Bout on, S. Miles. "Which way goes Germany?" Atlantic Monthly, 
January 1922.
Booth, J. B. The gentle cultured German, the road-hog of Europe. 
London: Grant Richards, 1915.
Bourdon, Georges. The German Enigma. London: J. M. Dent, 1914.
Bracher, Karl Dietrich. Deutschland zwischen Demokratic und 
Diktatur. Munich, Bm, 1964.
1 " The German Dictatorship. Harmondsworth, Penguin,
1980.
Brailsford, H. N., Gordon-Walker, Patrick, Minshall, T. H.,
Wood, Herbert, G., Carter, Henry, (et al). The 
Future of Germany. London: The National Peace
Council, 1943.
Bramel, D. Dissonance, Expectation and the Self, in Robert P.
Abelson et., al. (eds.), Theories of Cognitive 
Dissonance. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968.
[393]
Braunthal, Gerhard. 'The German Free Trade Unions during the
Rise of Nazism*. Journal of Central European 
Affairs, XV, January 1956.
Brehm, J. W. 1 Post-decision changes in the Desirability of
Alternatives.1 Journal of Abnormal and Social 
Psychology, 52, 1956.
Brickner, Richard 'The German Cultural Paranoid Trend'.
American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, No.3, 
and No.4, 1942.
" " is Germany incurable? Philadelphia:
Lippmcott, 1943.
Bronfenbrenner, U. Two worlds of childhood: U.S. and U.S.S.R.
New York: Russell Sage, 1970.
Brooks, Sidney. 'A War of Contrasts.' Fortnightly Review,
Vol.98, 1915.
Buchanan, W., and Cantril, H. How nations see each other.
Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1953.
Cadogan, Mary, and Craig, Patricia. Women and Children First. 
London: Victor Gollancz, 1978.
Caird, Mona. 'The Greater Comnunity', Fortnightly Review,
Vol.104, 1918.
Canetti, Elias. Crowds and Power. London: Gollancz, 1962.
Carr, E. H. The Twenty Years' Crisis: 1919-1939. London: 1939.
" " " What is history? New York: Random House, 1961.
Carron, Albert, V. Social Psychology of Sport. New York: 
Mouvement, 1981.
Carsten, F. L. War against War: British and German Radical
Movements in the First World War. London: 
Batsford, 1982.
Carter, W. Hors fall. 'Let Us Understand Germany.' Contemporary 
Review, Vol. 134, 1933.
Cattell, R. B. Personality. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950.
Cattell, R. B. The sixteen personality factor questionnaire.
Handbook and tabular supplement, Champaign, 
111.: Institute for Personality and Ability
Testing, 1950.
Chaplin, J. P. Dictionary of psychology. New York: Dell, 1968.
Chesterton, G. K. The barbarism of Berlin. London: Cassell,
1914.
Chesterton, C. E. The Prussian hath said in his heart. London: 
Chapman & Hall, 1914.
Childs, David. 'The British Communist Party and the War:
1939-41 Old Slogans Revised.' Journal of 
Contemporary History, Vol. 12, 1977.
Child, Irvin L., Doob, Leonard W. 'Factors Determining National 
Stereotypes.' The Journal of Social Psychology, 
Vol.17, 1943.
Cohn, Norman, The Pursuit of Tie Millenium. London, 1957.
Collier, Price. Germany and the Germans. London: Duckworth,
1913.
Cock, Mark. Levels of Personality. London: Holt, Rinehart, 
Winston, 1984.
Cock, Sir T. A. Kultur and catastrophe. London: Murray, 1915.
Cotgrove, Stephen. The Science of Society. London: George Allen 
and Unwin, 1967.
Cranb, J. A. Germany and England. London: John Murray, 1914.
Curtis, Mark, C. 'The Alienated Intellectuals of Early Stuart 
England.' Past and Present, 23, 1962.
Dahm, K. W. 'German Protestantism and Politics 1918-39.' Journal 
of Contemporary History, Vol.3, 1969.
Dahrendorf, Ralf. Society and Democracy in Germany. London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968.
Dawson, Graham and West, Bob. "Our Finest Hour? Hie Popular
Memory of World War II and The Struggle over 
National Identity": in Geoff Hurd (ed.).
'National Fictions: World War II in British Filins
and Television'. London: B.F.I., 1984.
[395]
de Beufort, J. M. Behind Hie German Veil. London: Hutchinson,
1917.
de Sales, Raoul, Roussy. 'What Makes a German? A Study in
National Temperament.' Atlantic Monthly, March,
1942.
Demos, John. 'Developmental Perspectives on the History of
Childhood.' Journal of Interdisciplinary 
History, Vol. 11, No.2, Autumn, 1971.
Dent, Edward J. What can the two nations learn from each other?
in R. Gardiner and H. Rocholl, (eds.), Britain 
and Germany. London: Williams & Norgate, 1928.
Dewey, John. 'On Understanding the Mind of Germany.'
Atlantic Monthly, Vol.117, 1916.
Dicks, Henry V. 'Personality Traits and National Socialist 
Ideology.' Human Relations, 5, 1950.
Dillon, E. J. A Scrap of Paper. London: Hodder and Stoughton,
1914.
Dollard, J., Docb, L. W., Miller, N.E., Mowrer, O. H., and
Sears, R. R. Frustration and Aggression. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1939.
Diplcmaticus, 'Romanticism in Germany From an English
Viewpoint,' in Gardiner Rolf and Rocholl, Heinz, 
(eds.). Britain and Germany. London: Williams 
and Norgate, 1928.
Duverger, Maurice. Introduction to the Social Sciences, London: 
George Allen and Unwin, 1964.
Eaton, J. W. 'The Unchanging Germany.' Queen's Quarterly,
Summer, 1937.
Eksteins, Modris. 'All Quiet on Hie Western Front and Hie Fate 
of a War.' Journal of Contemporary History, 
Vol.15, 1980.
Ellis, Havelock, 'Hie German Spirit.' Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 115,
1915.
Erikson, E. H. 'Hitler's imagery and German youth.' Psychiatry, 
5, 1942.
[396]
Erikson, E. H. Childhood and Society. New York; Norton, 1950.
" " " Young Man Luther: A study in Psychoanalysis and
History. London: Faber & Faber, 1958.
Estes, S. G. The Judgement of Personality On The Basis of Brief 
Records of Behaviour. Canbridge, Mass., 1937.
Eyck, Erich. A History of The Weimar Republic, Vol.2, Harvard 
U.P. 1964.
Eysenck, H. J. The dynamics of anxiety and hysteria. London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957.
Faber, Geoffrey. ’The War and personality in Nations', 
Fortnightly Review Vol. 97, 1915.
Farber, I. E. Anxiety as a drive state. In M. R. Jones,
(ed.)., Nebraska Symposium on Motivation.
Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press,
1954.
Farber, M. L. 'The problem of national character: a
methodological analysis.' Journal of Psychology. 
30, 1950.
Festinger, L. A. A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 1957.
11 " " Conflict, Decision and Dissonance.
Stanford University Press, 1964.
Fischer, Fritz, Germany's War Aims. New York: Norton, 1967.
" " War of Illusions. London: 1975.
Frankel, Joseph. National Interest. London: Macmillan, 1970.
Franke, Kuno. 'The True Germany.* Atlantic Monthly, Vol.CXVI,
1915.
Freedman, Jonathan, L. Hew Important is Cognitive Consistency?
in Robert P. Abelson et al., (eds.), Theories of 
Cognitive Dissonance. Chicago: Rand McNally,
1968.
Freud, S. The Ego and the Id. London: Hogarth Press, 1927.
" " The problem of anxiety. New York: Norton, 1936.
[397]
Freud, Anna. The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense. Trans.
Baines, Cecil, New York: Internal Universities 
Press, 1946.
Freud, S. Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis. Trans. J. 
Strachey, London: Pelican, 1974.
Friedrich, Otto. Before The Deluge. London: Michael Joseph,
1974.
Frann, E. The Fear of Freedom. London: Routledqe and Reqan Paul,
1955.
" " The Crisis of Psychoanalysis: Essays on Freud, Marx,
and Social Psychology. London, Pelican, 1978,
Fyfe, Hamilton. The Illusion of National Character. London:
Watts & Co., 1940.
Galtung, Johan. *A Structural Theory of Aggression.' Journal of 
Peace Research, Vol.l, 1964.
Gardiner, Rolf, and Rocholl, Heinz, (eds.)., Britain and
Germany. London: Williams and Norgate, 1928.
1 " Meditations On The Future Of Northern Europe,
in Gardiner and Rocholl, et.al., (eds.). Britain 
and Germany, London: Williams & Norgate, 1928.
Gardiner, A. G. The War Lords. London: J. M. Dent, 1915.
Gay, Peter. Weimar Culture. New York: Harper & Row, 1968.
Geary, Dick. 'The German Labour Movement.1 European Studies 
Review, 3, 1976.
" " Radicalism and The German Worker, in Richard J.
Evans, (ed.), Politics and Society in Wilhelmine 
Germany. London, 1978.
Geiger, Theodor. Die Soziale Schichtung des deutschen Volkes. 
Stuttgart, 1932.
Gerard, James W. Face to Face with Kaiserism. London: Hodder & 
Stoughton, 1918.
Gerard, James W. My Four Years in Germany. London: Hodder & 
Stoughton, 1917.
[398]
'Germany After the War: Roundtable - 1945.* American Journal of 
Orthopsychiatry, No.3, 1945.
Gerth, Hans and Mills, C. Wright. Character and Social
Structure. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1953.
Gibbs, Philip. The Hope of Europe. London: William Heinemann, 
1921.
Gilbert, Martin and Gott, Richard. The Appeasers. London: 
Wsidenfeld, 1963.
Gillis, John R. 'Conformity and Rebellion: Contrasting Styles
of English and German Youth.' History of 
Education Quarterly, Autumn, 1973.
Ginsberg, M. 'National Character.' British Journal of 
Psychology, Volume 32, 3, January 1942.
Glass, David, C. Individual Difference and The Resolution of
Cognitive Inconsistencies, in Robert P Abelson, 
et al.,(eds.). Theories of Cognitive Consistency 
Chicago, Rand McNally, 1968.
Glock, Charles, Y. The Sociology of Religion. In R. K. Merton, 
L. Brocm, L. S. Cottrell, (eds.). Sociology Today 
Problems and Prospects. New York: Harper, 1965.
Goldman, Aaron. 'Germans and Nazis: The Controversy over
Vansittartism in Britain During the Second World 
War.' Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 14,
1979.
Gollancz, Victor. Shall our Children Live or Die? London: 
Gollancz, 1942.
Gooch, G. P. Historical Surveys and Portraits. London: Longmans, 
1966.
Gorer, Geoffrey 'Themes in Japanese culture.' Transactions of
the New York Academy of Sciences, No.5, [series 
11], 1943.
" " 'The concept of national character.' Science
News, 18. 1950.
" " National Character: Theory and Practice, in
Margaret Mead and Bhoda Metraux (eds.). The Study 
of Culture at a Distance. Chicago: Chicago
University Press, 1953.
[399]
Greenstein, Fred. I. Personality and Politics: Problems of
Evidence, Inference, and Conceptualisation. In 
Seymour Martin Upset (ed.)., Politics and the 
Social Sciences. London: OUP, 1969.
Grigg, Edward. Britain Looks At Germany. London: Nioolson and 
Watson, 1938.
Haffiler, Sebastian, Germany: Jekyll and Hyde. London: Seeker & 
Warburg, 1940.
Hamilton, Cicely. Many Germanies. London: 1931.
Hardyck, Jane Allyn, and Kardush, Marcelle. A Modest Modish
Model for Dissonance Reduction, in Robert P. 
Abelson. Theories of Congnitive Dissonance. 
Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968.
Harrison, F. The German peril. London: Fisher Unwin, 1915.
Hartshome, J. R. May, M. A. Studies in Deceit. New York: 
Macmillan, 1928.
Heaven, Patrick, C.L. 'Do authoritarians hold authoritarian 
attitudes?' Journal of Psychology, 95, 1977
Heider, F. 'Social Perception and Phenomenal Causality.'
Psychological Review, No.51, 1944.
" " 'Attitudes and Cognitive Organisations.' Journal
of Psychology, No.21, 1946.
" " The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations. New York:
Wiley, 1958.
Henry, W. E., Projective tests in cross-cultural research. In 
B. Kaplan (ed.)., Studying personality cross 
-culturally. New York: Harper and Row, 1961.
Her ford, C. H. The Post-War Mind of Germany, and other European 
Studies. Oxford: 1927.
Hofstadter, R. The paranoid style in American Politics. London: 
Jonathan Cape, 1966.
Hofstede, Geert. Culture's Consequences: International 
Differences in Work-Related Values.
London: Sage, 1984.
[400]
Holmes, E. The nemesis of docility: a study of German character. 
London: Constable, 1916.
Humble, M., E. 'The Breakdown of Consensus: British Writers and 
Anglo-German Relations 1900-1920.1 Journal of 
European Studies. Vol.7[lj, 1977.
Hundert, E. J. 'History, Psychology, and the Study of Deviant
Behaviour.' The Journal of Interdisciplinary 
History, Vol.11, 4, Spring 1972.
Hynes, D. Linguistic aspects of cross-cultural personality 
study. In B. Kaplan, (ed.)., Studying 
personality cross-culturally. New York: Harper 
and Row, 1961.
Inkeles, A. Personality and social structure. In R. K. Merton
et al., (eds.)., Sociology today. New York: Basic 
Books, 1959.
" " National character and modem political systems.
In F. L. K. Hsu (ed.)., Psychological 
anthropology. Homewood, 111.: Dorsey, 1961.
" " and Levinson, Daniel J. National Character: The
Study of Modal Personality and Sociocultural 
Systems. In Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson, 
(eds.)., The Handbook of Social Psychology. 
Vol. 4. [2nd edition] Reading Mass.:
Addison-Wesley, 1969.
Jarausch, Konrad, 'The Crisis of German Professions 1918-33.'
Journal of Contemporary History, Vol.20, 1985.
Joll, James. The Unspoken Assumptions. London: Weidenfeld &
Nicolson, 1968.
Jung, C. G. Psychological types. New York: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 1933.
Kaplan, B. (ed.). Studying personality cross-culturally.
Evanston, 111.: Row, Peterson, 1961.
Kardiner, A. Social psychology. New York: Holt, 1940.
" " 'A science of national character.' Journal of
Social Psychology. 19, 1944.
" " Recent studies of national character. In S. S.
Sargent and Marian W. Smith (eds.). Culture and 
personality. New York: Viking Fund, 1949.
[401]
Katz, Daniel. Consistency For What? The Functional Approach,
in Robert P Abelson, et al, (eds.). Theories of 
Cognitive Dissonance. Chicago: Rand McNally,
1968.
Kelley, Harold, H. Group Problem Solving, in Lindzey G. and
Aronson E. (eds.). The Handbook of Social
Psychology. Reading Mass.: Addison-Wesley,
1969.
Kelly, G. A. The psychology of personal constructs. [2 Vols.]
New York: Norton, 1955.
Reiman, Herbert, C. 'Three Processes of Social Influence.'
Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol.25, 1961.
" " and Baron, Reuben M. Determinants of Modes
of Resolving Inconsistency Dilenmas, in Robert 
P. Abelson, et al, (eds.), Theories of Cognitive 
Dissonance. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968.
Kennedy, Paul, M. 'Idealists and Realists: British Views of
Germany, 1864-1939.' Tr. of the Royal Historical 
Society, 25, 1975.
" " 'The Tradition of Appeasement in British
Foreign Policy, 1865-1939.' British Journal of 
International Studies 2, 1976.
" " The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism 1860-
1914. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1980.
11 " The Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background
Influences on British External Policy, 1865-1980. 
Collins, 1981.
Kershaw, Ian. Popular Opinion and Public Dissent in The Third 
Reich. Oxford, Clarendon Press 1983.
" n The Nazi Dictatorship. London: Ed Arnold, 1985.
Klineberg, O. Race Differences. New York: Haper, 1935.
" " 'A Science of National Character.' Journal of
Social Psychology, 19, 1943.
it Recent studies of National Character. In S. 
Sargent and M. W. Smith, (eds.)., Culture and 
Personality. New York: Viking Fund, 1949.
[402]
Kluckhohn, Florence, and Strodtbeck, F. Variations in value
orientation. Evanston, 111.: Row, Peterson,
1961.
Kluckhohn, C., Murray, Henry, A. and Schneider D. M., (eds.).
Personality in Nature, Society and Culture.
New York: Knopf, 1953.
Knop, W. G. J., (ed.). Beware of Hie English: German Propaganda 
Exposes England. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1939.
Knowlson, T. S. ‘Germany’s Ruling Idea.1 Fortnightly Review,
Vol.104, 1918.
Koch, H. W. Social Darwins ism as a Factor in the 'New
Imperialism'. In H. W. Koch (ed.). The Origins 
of The First World War. London: Macmillan, 1972.
Korman, Abraham, K. The Psychology of Motivation. New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall, 1974.
Kracauer, S. Frcm Caligari to Hitler. Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1947.
Kramer, Alan 'Law-abiding Germans? Social disintegration, crime 
and the reimposition of order in post-war Germany 
1945-1949.' German History, No.3, Spring, 1986.
Krasner, Leonard and Ullman, Leonard P. Behaviour, Influence and 
Personality: The Social Matrix of Human Action.
New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973.
Kretch, D., Crutchfield, R. Theory and problems of social
psychology. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1948.
Kroeber, A. L., and Kluckhohn, C. 'Culture: A Critical Review of
Concepts and Definitions.' Papers of the
Peabody Museum of American Archeology and 
Ethnology, 1952.
Langer, W. L. The Mind of Adolf Hitler: The Secret Wartime
Report. New York: Basic Books, 1972.
" " The next Assignment, in B. Mazlish, (ed.)
Psychoanalysis and History. Englewood Cliffs, 
1971.
Lanyon, R. I., Goodstein, L.D. Personality assessment. New York: 
Wiley, 1971.
[403]
Lazarus, Richard S. Personality and Adjustment. New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall, 1963.
Lebovics, H. "'Agrarians' versus 'Industrialisers': Conservative 
resistance to industrialism and capitalism in 
late 19th century Germany." International Review 
of Social History, Vol.12, 1967.
Lemert, E. M. Social pathology. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951.
Lessing, G. E. Nathan The Wise. Translation William Taylor. 
London: Cassell and Co., 1886.
Levitt, Eugene E. The Psychology of Anxiety. London: Staples 
Press, 1965.
Levy, M. R., Kahn, M. W. 'Interpreter bias on the Rorschach Test 
as a function of patients' socio-economic 
status.' Journal of Projective and Personality 
Assessment, 34, 1970.
Levy, David, M. 'The German Anti-Nazi: A Case Study.'
Anerican Journal of Orthopsychiatry, XVI, No.3, 
1946.
" " 'Anti-Nazis: criteria of differentiation.'
Psychiatry, XI, No.2, 1948.
Levin, K. Seme social psychological differences between the
United States and Germany. In Gertrud Lewin 
(ed.). Resolving social conflicts: selected
papers on group dynamics, 1935-46. New York: 
Harper, 1948.
Ley land, John. 'The German Problem.' Fortnightly Review,
Vol.114, 1923.
Lineava, Eugenie. Peasant Songs of Old Russia. In E.
Siegmeister, (ed.). A Music Lover's Handbook.
New York: Morrow, 1943.
Linton, Ralph. The Cultural Background of Personality. U.S.A.: 
New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1945.
Linton, Ralph. The Concept of National Character. In
Personality and Political Crisis, Stanton, A. H. 
and Perry, S. E. (eds). Glencoe 111., Free Press, 
1951.
[404]
Loeweriberg, Peter, 1 Psychohistorical Perspectives on Modem
German History.' Journal of Modem History, 
Vol.47, 2, June 1975.
Lothian, Lord. 'Germany and the Rhineland.' Special Supplement 
to International Affairs. -April, 1936.
Lovell, Terry. 'Frieda', in G. Hurd, (ed.), National Fictions. 
London: British Film Institute, 1984.
Lew, Sidney. 'The German Oedipus.' Contemporary Review,
December, 1908.
Lewie, Robert, H. Toward Understanding Germany. Chicago, 1954,
Lusted, David. 'Builders' and 'The Demi-Paradise,'in G. Hurd,
(ed.) National Fictions. London: British Film 
Institute, 1984.
Lynn, R. Personality and National Character. Oxford: Pergamon, 
1971.
Lynn, R. National Differences in Anxiety 1935-65, in I. G.
Sarason & C. D. Spielberger, (eds.) Stress and 
Anxiety, Vol.2. Washington, 1975.
Maddi, Salvatore R. The Pursuit of Consistency and Variety, 
in Robert P. Abelson, et al, (eds.).
Theories of Cognitive Dissonance. Chicago: Rand 
& McNally, 1968.
Mann, Thomas Unordnung und Fruhes Leid. London: Blackwell, 1971.
Mander, John. Our German Cousins. John Murray, 1974.
Marquand, David. Ramsay MacDonald. London: Jonathan Cape,
1977.
Marshall, Arthur, Calder. 'Democracy and Mass Observation.' 
Fortnightly Review, Vol. 149, 1941.
Masling, J. 'The influence of situations and interpersonal
variables in projective testing.' Psychological 
Bulletin, 57, 1960.
Mayer, Milton. They thought they were free. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1955.
[405]
Mazlish, 'Group Psychology and Problems of Contemporary
History.1 Journal of Contemporary History, 
Vol.3, 1968.
Mead, Margaret, And keep your powder dry: an anthropologist 
looks at America. New York: Morrow, 1942.
" " A Case History in Cross-National
Ccxmiunications, in Lymen Bryson (ed.).. The 
Communication of Ideas. New York: Harper, 1948.
" " The study of national character, in D. Lemer
and H. D. Lasswell (eds.). The policy sciences. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951.
" " 1 Anthropologist and Historian: Their Common
Problems.1 American Quarterly, III, Nd.l,
1951.
" " National character, in A. L. Kroeber, (ed.).
Anthropology today. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1953.
" " and Metraux, Rhoda, (ed.). The Study of Culture
at a Distance. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1953.
Meenes, Max. ’A Comparison of Racial Stereotypes of 1935 and
1942.* Journal of Social Psychology, Vol.17,
1943.
Merton, Robert, K., Broom, L., and Cottrell, L.S., (eds.)
Sociology Today. New York: Harper, 1959.
Metzger, W. P. Generalisations about national character: An 
analytical essay. In L. Gottschalk (ed.), 
Generalisations in the writing of history. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963.
Michael, Horst. A German View. In Gardiner and Rocholl,
(eds.). Britain and Germany. London: Williams 
and Norgate, 1928.
Milgram, S. 'Obedience to Authority: An experimental view. Seme 
conditions of obedience and disobedience to 
authority1. Hunan Relations, 18, 1965.
Moore, Wilbert, E. Social Structure and Behaviour. In Lindzey, 
G. and Aronson, E. (eds.). Hie Handbook of
Social Psychology. Reading Mass.:
Addison-Wesley, 1969.
[406]
Morgan, J. H. [trans]. The German War Book: Being Hie Usages of 
War on Land, Issued By the Great General Staff of 
The German Amy. London: John Murray, 1915.
Muniby, Frank A. The Gresham History of the Great War. London:
1917.
Munro, R. Fran Darwinism to Kaiser ism: origin, effects and
collapse of Germany's attempt to world dominion. 
Glasgow: MacLehose, 1918.
MacIntyre, D. Hie Great War: Causes and Consequences.
Glasgow: Blackie, 1979.
Mackinnon, D. W. Personality. In C. P. Stone, (ed.), Annual
Review of Psychology. California: Palo Alto, 
1951.
MacLaren, A. D. Germanism from within. London: Constable, 1916.
MacLeod, G. H. The blight of kultur. London: Sampson Low,
1918.
McCall, R. J. 'The Defence Mechanisms re-examined: a logical and 
phenomenal analysis.' Catholic Psychological 
Record, Vol.l, No.l, 1963.
McGranahan, D. V., and Wayne, I. 'German and American traits
reflected in popular drama.' Human Relations,
I, 1948.
McGranahan, D. V. 'A comparison of social attitudes among
American and German youth.' Journal of abnormal
social Psychology, 41, 1946.
McGuire, William, J. Theory of the Structure of Human
Thought. In Robert P. Abelson et al (eds.) 
Theories of Cognitive Dissonance. Chicago: Rand 
McNally, 1968.
McReynolds, P. 'Anxiety as related to incongruencies between
value and feelings.' Psychological Record, 8, 
1958.
Namier, L. B. Conflicts: Studies in Contemporary History.
London: Macmillan, 1942.
Nermann, Franz. Anxiety and Politics. In Hie Democratic and 
The Authoritarian State. Glencoe, 111., 1957.
[407]
Nicolson, Harold. Address given at Chatham House, March 18,
1936. Printed in 'Germany and The Rhineland', 
Special Supplement to International Affairs, 
April 1936.
Nicolson, Harold. Diplomacy London: Thornton Butterworth, 1939.
Noakes, Jeremy, 'Nazi Voters'. History Today, Vol.30, Auqust
1980.
Noelle, E, and Nermann, E. P. Jahrbuch der offentlichen Meinung, 
Vol.l, 1947-1955. Allensbach, Verlag fur 
Demoskopie, 1956.
Noelle, E. and Nermann, E. P. Jahrbuch der offentlichen Meinung, 
Vol. 3, 1958-1964. Allensbach, Verlag fur
Demoskopie,
O'Donough, Peter. Picture Post, 10.6.1939.
Osgood, C. E., May, W. H., and Miron, M. S. Cross-Cultural
Universals of Affective Meaning. Urbana, 111:
University of Illinois Press, 1975.
Parsons, Talcott. Democracy and Social Structure in Pre-Nazi
Germany: Essays in Sociological Theory.
Glencoe, 1954.
Peters, R. S. Psychology and Ethical Development. London:
George Allen & Unwin, 1974.
Pettman, Ralph. Human Behaviour and World Politics: A Trans-
disciplinary Introduction. London: Macmillan,
1975.
Phillips, David, [ed.] German Universities After the Surrender. 
Univ. of Oxford, 1983.
Ponsonby, Arthur. Falsehood in wartime: containing an
assortment of lies circulated during the Great 
War. London: Allen & Unwin, 1928.
Popper, Karl. Philosophy of Science: A Personal Report, in C.
A. Mace (ed.), British Philosophy in Mid-Century. 
New York: 1957.
Potter, David, M. People of Plenty: Economic Abundance and
the American Character. University of Chicago 
Press, 1954.
[408]
Powys, J. C. The menace of German culture. London; Rider, 1915.
Pratley, Gerald. The Cinema of John Huston. London: Tantivy 
Press, 1977.
Pronay, N. & Wilson, K, (eds.). Hie Political Re-education of
Germany and Her Allies. London: Croom Helm, 
1985.
Ray, J. J. 'Do Authoritarians Hold Authoritarian Attitudes?' 
Hunan Relations, 29, 1976.
Read, J. M. Atrocity propaganda, 1914-1919. New Haven, Conn:
Yale University Press, 1941.
Remak, Joachim. The Nazi Years. New Jersey: Prentice Hall,
1969.
Reich, Ben, and Adcock, Christine. Values, Attitudes and 
Behaviour Change. London: Methuen, 1976.
Reich, W. The mass psychology of Fascism. New York: Or gone 
Institute Press, 1946.
Riesman, David. The Lonely Crowd. London: Yale Univ. Press,
1974.
Rocker, Rudolph. Nationalism and Culture. New York:
1937.
Rokeach, Milton. Beliefs, Attitudes and Values. San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass, 1968.
" " The Open and Closed Mind. New York: Basic Books,
1960.
" " The Nature of Human Values. New York: Free Press,
1973.
Roper, Katherine, Larson. 'Images of German Youth in Weimar
Novels'. Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 13,
1978.
Rowse, A. L. The End of An Epoch. London: Macmillan, 1947.
Russell, Bertrand. 'War As an Institution.' Atlantic Monthly, 
Vol. 117, 1916.
Ryder, A. J. Twentieth Century Germany. London: Macmillan, 1973.
[409]
Sapir, E. The Unconscious Patterning of Behaviour in Society .
In E. S. Dimmer, (ed.). The Unconscious. New 
York: Knopf, 1927.
Sargent, S. S., and Snith, Marion, W. (eds.). Culture and 
personality. New York: Viking Fund. 1949.
Samoff, Irving. Psychoanalytic Theory and Cognitive
Dissonance. In Robert P Abelson, et al, (eds.). 
Theories of Cognitive Dissonance. Chicago: Rand
McNally, 1968.
Sarolea, Charles. The Anglo-German Problem. London: Nelson,
1912.
Schaffner, Bertram. Father Land New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 
1948.
Schrieke, B. Alien Americans. New York: Viking Press,
1936.
Sheehan, James, J. 'What is German History? on the Role of the 
Nation in German History and Historiography.1 
Journal of Modem History, 53, March 1981.
Singer, Jerane E. The Bother saneness of Inconsistency. In 
Robert P. Abelson, et al (eds.), Theories 
of Cognitive Dissonance. Chicago, Rand McNally,
1968.
Skinner, B. F. Beyond Freedom and Dignity. New York: Knopf,
1971.
Smith, Douglas, Aubrey. Guilty Germans? London: Gollancz, 1942.
Smith, Thcmas, F. A. The Soul of Germany. London: Hutchinson,
1916.
Snell, John L., (ed.). The Nazi Revolution. Boston: Heath, 1967.
Spender, Harold. 'Great Britain and Germany.' Contemporary 
Review. October, 1905.
Steed, H. W. 'Fran Frederick the Great to Hitler: The
consistency of German aims.' International 
Affairs, Vol.XVEI, 1938.
Steiner, Ivan, D. Responses to Inconsistency. In Robert P.
Abelson, et al (eds.), Theories of Cognitive 
Dissonance. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968.
[410]
Steinert, Marlis G. Hitlers krieg und die Deutschen. Diisseldorf
1970. Translation, Thcxnas de Witt as Hitler’s 
War and the Germans. Athens, Ohio 1977.
Stephenson, Jill. "War and Society in Wurttenberg, 1939-1945:
Beating the System. German Studies Review, Vol. 
Ill, No.l, Feb. 1985.
Stephenson, Jill, "War and Society: Germany in World War II" 
German History, No.3, Spring 1986.
Stem, J. P. Hitler: Hie Fuhrer and The People. London:
Collins 1975.
Stem, Fritz, The Politics of Cultural Despair. Berkeley 1961.
Steams, Peter, N. ’National Character and European Labor
History.* Journal of Social History. Vol.4, 2,
1970.
Strassman, H. D., Thaler, M. B., and Schein, F. H. *A prisoner
of war syndrome: Apathy as a reaction to severe 
stress.' American Journal of Psychiatry, 112,
1956.
Taylor, J. A. 'A personality scale of manifest anxiety.1
Journal of Abnormal & Social Psychology, 48, 
1953.
Tajfel, H. ’Stereotypes', Race, Vol.5, No.2. 1963.
Thompson, Neville. The Anti-Appeasers: Conservative opposition
to Appeasement in the 1930s. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1971.
Thomson, David. Europe Since Napoleon. Penguin, 1966.
" " The Aims of History. London: Thames & Hudson,
1969.
Thomer, I. 'German Words, German Personality and
Protestantism.' Psychiatry, 8, 1945.
Thouless, Robert, H. Straight Thinking in Wartime. Hodder and 
Stoughton, 1942.
Tipton, Frank, B. Regional Variations in the Economic
Development of Germany during the Nineteenth 
Century. U.S.A.: Conn., Middletown, 1976.
[411]
Tower, Charles. Germany of Today. Londons Williams and Norqate,
1913.
Troughton, Ernest, R. It's happening again. London: Gifford,
1944.
T y l o r ,  E. B. Researches into The Early History and Development 
of Civilisation. London: John Murray, 1865.
" " Primitive Culture. London: John Murray, 1871.
Usher, Roland, G. Pan-Germanism. London: Constable, 1914.
Vansittart, Lord. Roots of the Trouble. London: Hutchinson &
Co., 1941.
Veblen, Thor stein, Imperial Germany and the Industrial 
Revolution. New York: 1939.
Verba, S. Germany: The remaking of Political Culture. In L. Pye 
and S. Verba, (eds.). Political Culture and 
Political Development. Princeton: New Jersey,
PUP, 1965.
Waite, Robert G. L. Vanguard of Nazism - The Free Corps
Movement in Post-War Germany. Harvard U.P., 1952.
Waltzer, Michael. "War and Revolution in Puritan Thought".
Political Studies, No.2, Vol.XII, June 1964.
Warwick, Frances, Evelyn. 'Prussia and the Woman.' Fortnightly 
Review. Vol.97, 1915.
Weigall, Arthur, E. P. Brcme-, 'German Logic and Its Results.' 
Fortnightly review. Vol.98, 1915.
Weinstein, Fred, and Platt, Gerald M. 'The Coming Crisis in
Psychohistory.' Journal of Modem History, 47, 
No.2, 1975.
" " and Platt, Gerald M. 'History and Theory: The
Question of Psychoanalysis.' The Journal of 
Interdisciplinary History, Vol.11, 4, Spring
1972.
Whalen, Robert, Weldon. Bitter Wounds: The German victims of
the Great War. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 
1984.
Whittaker, J. 0. (eds.) Recent Discoveries in Psychology. Phil: 
Saunders, 1972.
Wilson, Trevor.'Lord Bryce's Investigations Into Alleged German 
Atrocities in Belgium, 1914-15.' Journal of 
Contemporary History. Vol.14, 1979.
Wister, Owen. The Pentecost of Calamity. London: Macmillan & 
Co., 1916.
WOlfenstein, Martha, and Leites, N. Movies: a psychological 
study. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1950.
